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Foreword
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) is
the world’s largest and most ambitious rural development programme, providing
wage employment in unskilled manual work to over 50 million rural households in
India. Ten years on, the support to this programme continues unabated, laying to
rest initial scepticism of its viability. The budgetary allocation for the programme
over a decade had increased approximately threefold, from 113 billion rupees in
2006–07 to 380 billion rupees (or 6 billion USD) in 2016–17. That said, it is only
timely that we now attempt to comprehensively look at the empirical evidence to
assess the impact that MGNREGA has had on livelihoods and rural development.
Over the years, a number of empirical studies have attempted to analyse speciﬁc
dimensions of the programme, especially with respect to its implementation, per-
formances and outcomes. As with many other social and welfare-based pro-
grammes implemented in India, the MGNREGA has shown to have high regional
variations in performance because the responsibility of implementation lies with the
states. A limitation of previous studies has been that they were conﬁned to a few
states, restricting the generalizability of their results.
This volume attempts to provide a deeper understanding of the performance
of the MGNREGA by bringing together a range of empirical studies exploring the
multiple implications of the programme across 12 states. It successfully highlights
distinct development and governance issues, socio-economic conditions and nature
of institutions across various states that have influenced the implementation and
performance of the programme. This compendium of empirically grounded research
papers by over 25 researchers, who have conducted research on the MGNREGA
since its inception, provides insights into state-level variations of the programme, its
implication on rural transformation process in India and its envisioned future.
From this work, we draw new information and insights into the multidimen-
sional impacts, including economic and social impacts, of MGNREGA across
spatial settings––from Kerala to Tripura, contributing to the otherwise scant liter-
ature on the programme’s impact across geographic locations. The ﬁndings from
these works provide insights into the major limitations of the programme and justify
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some of the restructuring processes currently being carried out by various gov-
ernment agencies to further improve the effectiveness of the programme.
The chapters in the book are analytically rigorous in exploring the multi-
dimensional impacts of MGNREGA across states. The empirically rich case studies
tackle important issues of this welfare programme through the lens of the right to
work campaigns, rural development, ecology, human development, food security
and livelihoods of the rural population. I congratulate the authors and co-authors of
each chapter for their commendable work in providing unique insights into the
functioning of the MGNREGA in various contexts. Likewise, I also commend the
editors of this volume for giving this book its vision and for bringing together such
crucial and varied topics that have been impacted by the MGNREGA. I would also
like to extend my appreciation to the Springer Publishers’ team for bringing out this
volume targeted at a diverse audience.
This volume will be a useful read and reference to government ofﬁcials and
policymakers concerned with rural development and welfare. It is also a valuable
source of references for graduate students and researchers engaged in ﬁelds of
agricultural and rural development, regional planning, labour economics, devel-
opment studies, development economics and related ﬁelds of study.
Prabhu Pingali
Director, Tata-Cornell Institute for
Agriculture and Nutrition
Cornell University
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Preface
The dynamism cast by the implementation of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act 2005 (MGNREGA) in India since early 2006 has been
quite fascinating as evident from the growing volume of empirical literature over
the years on different dimensions related to the performance and outcomes of the
programme. Over the last 10 years, the MGNREGS has also evolved signiﬁcantly
and is now providing subsistence level of employment and social safety net beneﬁts
to over 50 million of poor households annually in rural India. It has evolved as one
of the largest welfare programme in the world. After Public Food Distribution
Systems, probably, MGNREGA scheme also stands as the second largest in terms
of coverage of the rural poor by a Social Protection Programme in India.
Incidentally, in terms of public policy discourse, since its inception in 2006, the
MGNREGA has become a fascinating rural development policy agenda in India,
with diverse perspectives across key stakeholders and diverse implementation
modes, performances, and varied outcomes across the states/regions of India. Over
the years, international development agencies and rural development professionals
around the world have also shown keen interest in assessing the programme
impacts, its implementation outcomes to rural poor, as reflected by the growing
empirical literature on MGNREGA from academic institutions, civil society orga-
nizations as well as international agencies across the world. Recently, one of the
World Bank studies has also pointed out that the experiment of MGNREGA is one
of the success stories of poverty alleviation initiatives in the developing world.
Besides, the MGNREGS has also immensely contributed towards rural transfor-
mation process in India over the years with far fetching implications for livelihoods
of agricultural labour force and its targeted beneﬁciaries.
Despite the initial lukewarm response of the government after coming to power
in May 2014, the Government of India has in fact increased annual allocations to
the MGNREGA activities substantially. The Government of India spent INR
463.83 billion (USD 6.8 billion) for MGNREGA work activities during 2016/2017,
which was about 25% increase in the expenditure than that of the fund spent for the
programme in the previous year. However, evidences suggest that several
vii
performance indicators of the programme have either stagnated or declined in
recent years, with notable variations across states, regions and beneﬁciaries.
Likewise, the programme also faces several criticisms from the academia and
policy circles in particular, in view of the overall ineffectiveness in achieving the
prime targeted goal of 100 person days per beneﬁciary household per annum. The
latest interventions in terms of redesigning and widening the scope of the
MGNREGA through the convergence approach, are currently being spearheaded by
the national government and implemented by some state governments with varying
choice of development programmes and implementation activities. In many
respects, the implementation of MGNREGA schemes in rural India can also be
compared with the proposed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the
objectives of reducing inequality in India. For instance, several recent studies have
attempted to link MGNREGA-related schemes with meeting SDGs in India, with
positive impacts on economic, social, institutional and governance structure and
environmental services in rural India.
In this respect, the present volume is an important and timely addition to the
existing literature on MGNREGA and its impacts, as many of the chapters con-
tained in this volume provide more empirical evidences as to how a holistic
assessment of a programme can be done by integrating its multi-level economic,
social, institutional and environmental impacts. These issues are in fact critically
linked with achieving SDGs related targets and indicators in India by 2030.
More speciﬁcally, the present volume takes a critical look at the status of
implementation and performance of the MGNREGA across states since its imple-
mentation. It assesses the emerging dynamics, especially, its interface with the rural
labour market, and changes in social and institutional settings, and local partici-
pation. The studies presented in the volume are unique in terms of the use of
empirical analysis across states using appropriate interdisciplinary research methods
relying on both quantitative and qualitative techniques. The content and coverage of
each of chapter in the volume are unique in terms of the presentation of empirical
case studies using interdisciplinary research perspectives, with rigorous analytical
and methodological approaches. To the best of our knowledge, there has been
hardly any attempt to provide a consolidated and critical review of the status of
implementation and the impacts of the MGNREGA across many states, based on
both macro- and micro-scales of analysis. The uniqueness of the volume lies also in
the fact that authors of each chapter have been engaged in research on various
aspects of MGNREGA implementation ever since its launch in 2006. Thus, this
volume is expected to ﬁll the gap in literature on several counts.
Actually, motivation for this volume originated from the National Workshop on
‘MGNREGA and the Emerging Rural Context: Learning from Selected States’,
held at the Gujarat Institute of Development Research (GIDR), Ahmedabad, during
10–11 December 2013, jointly organized by the GIDR and the International Crop
Research Institute for Semi-Arid Regions and Tropics (ICRISAT), Hyderabad.
During the workshop discussions and brain storming sessions, it was felt that a huge
knowledge gap exists regarding MGNREGA and its performance and outcome
across states. It was felt that there was a need for literature that used both micro- and
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macro-analytical methods, looked at the stakeholders’ perspectives on the outcome
of the programme, and catered to its institutional and governance related aspects.
Besides the papers presented at this workshop, few chapters were also solicited
later to provide a holistic perspective on the programme implementation and its
outcomes across states to get a wider national flavour about the same. Thus, the
present volume is an outcome of the constant and determined efforts we made over
3 years. The volume provides a holistic perspective on the MGNREGA programme
activities and their impacts with detailed studies in 12 states of India, from Kerala in
the South to Tripura in the Northeast of India. A wider coverage of geographic
areas, implementation-related issues and policy and institutional dimensions makes
this volume unique among the other studies on MGNREGA.
The consolidation of the volume in its present form is an outcome of the per-
sistent efforts and cooperation extended by all the authors of its chapters, and by
many personalities, who deserve our special appreciation and gratitude. With
research rigor and application of advance tools and techniques of analyses across
the disciplines, we expect that this book will be useful to the academia, as well as
rural development practitioners and policy makers.
It is also our sincere hope and wish that this volume would generate policy
discussion and further research on several unexplored issues of MGNREGA
activities such as economy wide effects, social and institutional outcomes, envi-
ronmental management and sustainable development related dimensions of the
programme. We also expect that it will bring out the need for appropriate changes
in policy, institutional and governance systems related to the MGNREGA to
transform the programme into a robust, dynamic and more sustainable model in the
future. It is our hope that with the growing interest of public policy discourses to
meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and its various targets on poverty
alleviation by 2030, the MGNREGA programme activities, may also be integrated
with the Government of India’s priority actions for meeting the globally committed
SDGs agendas and the milestones in the near future.
Kathmandu, Nepal Madhusudan Bhattarai
Kochi, India P.K. Viswanathan
Ahmedabad, India Rudra N. Mishra
Hyderabad, India Cynthia Bantilan
May 2018
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Introduction
Madhusudan Bhattarai and P.K. Viswanathan
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act (MGNREGA) is the single most innovative programme from
India and a lesson to the whole world
Joseph Stiglitz (Nobel Laureate), July 2016
1.1 Introduction
The initiation of National Rural Employment Guarantee Act of 2005 (NREGA in
short), later renamed as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) in 2009, is indeed a landmark rural development
programme in the history of Independent India. This is both in terms of the process
and spread of activities carried out, and level of participation by rural poor in the
development activities. In fact, the popularity and importance of India’s signature
social welfare programme—NREGA—is also being discussed worldwide, espe-
cially in the developing countries, for its adaptability and replication. No doubt,
after initiation of this programme in February 2006, it has also brought about
several structural and functional changes in implementing rural development pro-
gramme in India.
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Unlike other Rural Development programmes so far implemented in India,
NREGA1 is a right based employment guarantee programme, which has given a right
to all rural poor and vulnerable households to demand for minimum of 100 days of
employment per annum. Given the nature of monsoon dependent agriculture and
erratic rainfall pattern of monsoon, the 100 days of employment during the slack
period of farm operation is a very critical livelihood support to millions of rural poor
and vulnerable population living below poverty line in the country.
In fact, India has a long history of ‘public spending for rural development and
poverty reduction programmes ever since its Independence and MGNREGA may
be considered as the largest and the widely appreciated flagship programme in view
of its outreach and impacts on the rural economy and society. In what follows, we
provide a brief account of the historical evolution of MGNREGA in India.
1.2 Poverty Reduction Through Employment Generation
in India: A Historical Perspective
Provision of social safety net (SSN) to the poor and vulnerable sections of popu-
lation through public work programmes has a long history in the Indian
sub-continent. Even in Kautilya’s Artha Sasthra (an economic programme of states
and duties of government to its citizen written about 2400 years ago by famous
ancient eastern philosopher Chanakya), emphasis was given to the provision of
adequate social safety net measures to the poor and vulnerable sections of popu-
lation in a country to ensure happiness to king and kingdom. For instance, as
Chanakya then writes in the Kautilya Artha Sasthra “In the happiness of his subjects
lies his happiness; in their welfare his welfare; whatever pleases himself he shall
not consider as good, but whatever pleases his subjects he shall consider as good.”
(Chanakya quotes, 350–283 BCE).
Subsequently in medieval times, the kings and temple institutions in Indian
sub-continent have built several public works—water ponds, irrigation canals, road,
temples, and related community level work programmes to provide employment
and welfare to the needed section of population, when other forms of employment
were not available in the society. In colonial period, public workfares were
organised in India by the government largely to distribute food and other relief
measures at the famine struck communities.
Since independence in 1947, various welfare oriented rural development pro-
grammes have been initiated by the central and state governments of India to
provide employment security and livelihood beneﬁts to the poor and vulnerable
1In this study, Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), or the
term “Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme” (MGNREGS) has been
used interchangeably. Before, 2009, the same MGNREGA programme was called as NREGA (or
NREGS) in India. The same programme was renamed from NREGA to MGNREGA by the
Government of India in 20.
2 M. Bhattarai and P.K. Viswanathan
sections. These schemes were grouped under rural development programme, or
rural employment creation and/or poverty alleviation programmes. Considering the
scale of population living in rural India now, and the magnitude of poverty and
vulnerability situations, it may not be feasible to provide full employment to all the
needy, but the various schemes implemented from time to time, have provided
some relief to the poor. In terms of its scale and coverage across various parts of
India, MGNREGS is one of the prominent welfare enhancement and social safety
net programmes in rural India in recent times.
Evolution of various employment generated related social welfare programmes, or
schemes that are linked with employment generation purposes (or EGS related areas)
and implemented at various periods of time are summarized in Table 1.1. At present,
not all of these schemes are in operation with the exception of a few. Over time, many
of the programmes with narrow scope have been either abandoned or merged with
other schemes and implemented at large areas/regions of the country. TheCommunity
Development Programme that was initiated in 1952 was the ﬁrst large scale social
welfare programme with employment support and asset creation in the rural areas.
Table 1.1 Evolution of employment generation related programmes in India
Year/Period Employment generation related
programmes
Major purpose and highlights of the
programmes
1952 Community Development
Programme (CDP)
Overall development of rural areas and
people’s participation
1960–61 Rural Manpower Programme A comprehensive work programme for
better utilization of the unemployed and
under-employed work force in rural areas
1966–67 High yielding variety programme
(HYVP)
To increase the productivity of food grains
by adopting latest varieties of inputs of
crops involving farm employment
generation
1971–72 Crash Scheme for Rural
employment
Employment generation in the country
targeted at the rate of 25 million man-days
per year in each district through the
execution of labour intensive projects and
creation of durable assets in consonance
with local development plans
1972 Maharashtra Employment
Guarantee programme (EGS)
The Maharashtra Employment Guarantee
Scheme (EGS), the ﬁrst right based
employment programme in India, ensured a
guaranteed and productive employment at a
wage with minimum level of subsistence to
reduce rural poverty. By reducing risks
faced by poor households, and by
constructing productive assets and
infrastructure, the scheme also aimed to
(continued)
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Year/Period Employment generation related
programmes
Major purpose and highlights of the
programmes
have a longer-term developmental role.
This is considered as a precursor of
MGNREGA
1971–72 Rural work Programme (Drought
Prone Area Programme)
Protection from drought by achieving
environmental balance and by developing
ground water
1972 Employment Guarantee Scheme of
Maharashtra
To assist the economically weaker sections
of the rural society
1972 Crash Scheme for Rural
Employment (CSRE)
For rural employment
1977 Wage Employment Programme or
Food for Work Programme
This programme was further strengthened
in the 1980s
1979 Training Rural Youth for
Self-Employment (TRYSEM)
Programme for Training rural youth for
self-employment
1980 Integrated Rural Development
Programme (IRDP)
All-round development of the rural poor
through a programme of asset endowment
for self-employment
1980 National Rural Employment
Programme (NREP)
To provide proﬁtable employment
opportunities to the rural poor
1983 Rural Landless Employment
Guarantee Programme (RLEGP)
For providing employment to landless
farmers and laborers
1983 Self-employment to the Educated
Unemployed Youth (SEEUY)
To provide ﬁnancial and technical
assistance for self-employment
1986 Self-Employment programme for
Urban Poor (SEPUP)
To provide self-employment to urban poor
through provision of subsidy and bank
credit
1989 Jawahar Rozgar Yojana For providing employment to rural
unemployed
1990 Scheme of Urban Wage
Employment (SUWE)
To provide wages employment after
arranging the basic facilities for poor
people in the urban areas where population
is less than one lakh
1993 Employment Assurance
Scheme (EAS)
To provide employment of at least
100 days in a year in village
1997 Swarna Jayanti Shahari Rozgar
Yojana (SJSRY)
To provide gainful employment to urban
unemployed and under employed poor
through self-employment or wage
employment
1999 Swarna Jayanti Gram Swarozgar
Yojana (SYGSY)
For eliminating rural poverty and
unemployment and promoting
self-employment
2001 Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar
Yojana
To provide wage employment and food
security in rural areas and also to create
durable economic and social assets
(continued)
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“Food for the work programme” initiated in India in 1960s were earlier form of
employment guarantee scheme. Under this, food and basic support for survival needs
were provided to the famine or food insured communities through targeting the
population who were willing to participate in the unskilled manual work of the public
works programme. The need to participate for manual work programme is a critical
factor for low cost targeting the population that are vulnerable and urgently in need of
the social safety net supports from rest of the population. At many times, they are also
source of confusion and controversial debates on the subject matter as well.
After a series of severe drought and famine like situations, the Maharashtra state
government introduced a drought relief programme in 1972 with the objective of
providing employment to rural poor, called as Maharashtra Employment Guarantee
Scheme (MEGS). There were several changes in the programme, but in 1977 this
became an act, and institutionalized in the state of Maharashtra by taking the fund
from payroll tax, and passing an act in the Maharashtra state assembly in 1977. The
1977 MEGS Act stated as “An Act to make effective provision for security of right
to work by guaranteeing employment to all adult persons who volunteered to do
unskilled manual work in rural areas in the state of Maharashtra.” The MEGS act
was conceptually the same as that of the unemployment insurance scheme widely
practiced in some of the developed countries, ﬁnancing it from payroll tax systems.
In 1970s and 1980s, this MEGS was very popular Rural Development scheme, and
provided short run beneﬁts and relief to the vulnerable communities as well as the
farming communities through asset creation and building basic rural infrastructure,
or improvement of agricultural productivity.
In reality, MEGS has become a model (basis for) scheme for the employment
programmes in India. In view of increasing unemployment and labour force in the
country, learning from success (and shortcoming) of MEGS, National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) was notiﬁed by the Government of India on
Table 1.1 (continued)
Year/Period Employment generation related
programmes
Major purpose and highlights of the
programmes
2004 National Food for Work
Programme
To give food through wage employment in
the drought affected areas in eight states.
Wages are paid by state government partly
in cash and partly in food grains
2002–03 Jai Prakash Narayan Rojgar
Guarantee Yojana (JPNRGY)
Employment guarantee in most poor
districts
2005 Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act
(MGNREGA)
To create a right based framework for wage
employment programmes and make the
government legally bound to provide
employment to those who seek it
2008 Prime Minister’s Employment
Generation Programme (PMEGP)
To generate employment opportunities in
rural as well as urban areas through setting
up of new self-employment ventures/
projects/micro enterprises
Source Authors’ compilation from various sources, and individual studies on the topics
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7th September 2005 and passed by the parliament. The MGNREGA guarantees
100 days of employment to every rural household during a ﬁnancial year, whose
adult members volunteer to do unskilled manual work. The act came into force on
02 February 2006 and it was implemented in a phased manner. It was notiﬁed in
200 most backward districts in its ﬁrst phase of implementation. In Financial Year
2007–08, it was extended to cover another 130 districts in phase two. The
remaining districts were notiﬁed under NREGA with effect from 1st April 2008. As
a result, since early 2008, NREGA has covered the entire country with the
exception of districts that have a hundred percent urban population. The NREGA
was renamed as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
(MGNREGA) by the then Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh, while addressing a
meeting held to celebrate the golden jubilee of the Panchayat raj institutions in India
on 02 October 2009.
1.3 MGNREGA and Its Salient Features
Since 2009, not only the name and contents of the programme have been changed,
but also the funding for the programme was almost doubled, and it turned an integral
part of the rural development and social safety net measures in rural India covering
nearly 50 million households annually, who voluntarily participate in the programme
by providing un-skilled manual labor. In 2012/13, with USD 8 billion per annum of
government expenditure for the MGNREGS related activities, this is also one of the
largest employment generation related social safety net measures in the world.
The total budgetary expenditure for MGNREGA2 indeed also varies year to
year. In monetary terms it has increased in the recent past, though in real terms, it
gives a different picture altogether. The total expenditure for MGNREGA
accounted for 0.36% of annual GDP of India in 2013, which got reduced to 0.26%
of GDP in 2016/17 (details are in Chap. 2 and in subsequent chapters). In the recent
years, larger chunk of the rural people are directly engaged in any of the
MGNREGS related activities for about 50 days of manual work activities provided
by the local governments (see Appendix Table 1.2 for a detailed overview of
physical and ﬁnancial performance of MGNREGA since its inception).
In due course, the scope of the MGNREGA activities has been widened with
active participation from most of the states, though with differences in the intensity
of implementation. Given the federal structure of the Indian constitution with
2MGNREGA is the act that was passed by the parliament in 2005. For the ease of reading, in this
volume, we have used the term MGNREGS, MGNREGA, or NREGS interchangeably.
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agriculture and rural development issues being the subjects of interest to both the
centre and states, different states have implemented the programme with localizing
it and with appropriate changes. This is also one of the reasons for variation in
performance and effectiveness of the programme across states and regions in India.
MGNREG programme has been designed to meet dual purpose of social needs of
poor section of rural population as well as needs of overall sections of the society.
That is, while providing social safety net to the poor and vulnerable rural house-
holds, utmost care was also given to linking the activities and interventions with the
process of growth and asset creation activities. This ‘dual purpose’ feature of the
programme is also one of the reasons for controversies in its implementation and not
being able to satisfy the programme objectives across states on a uniform basis.
The MGNREGA also has some of the unique features like bottom-up planning
and implementation, demand-driven structure for work activities, and in-built
framework of social audits and empowerment in lowest tier of panchayat and at
hamlet level settlements.
Salient Features of the MGNREGA are summarized below:
• The scheme and targeted population are self-selecting. That is, those who are
interested to do manual unskilled work, have to demand for work at their Gram
Panchayat. Each household is entitled to 100 days of employment in each ﬁscal
year. Forest Right Act (FRA) beneﬁciaries are entitled to 150 days of
employment. In states like Rajasthan, communities like the Sahriyas have been
given an entitlement of 200 days.
• After the compilation of the work demanded, Panchayat has to provide
employment within the 15 days. If employment is not provided within the
15 days, there is a provision of paying unemployment allowances to the job
seekers.
• Public work under MGNRGA should be provided within the 5 km radius of the
village, beyond the 5 km, 10% of extra wages to be payable to meet the
transportation and living expense of workers.
• The wages under the scheme has to be paid weekly, and not beyond a fortnight.
• After 2009, wage rate has been paid in piece-rate basis in most cases, after
measurement of work done by a group of labor force. This has provided flex-
ibility of timing of work as per the local agro-climatic condition, and agricultural
seasonality of work demand.
• Panchayat Raj Institutions should organize Gram Sabhas to plan and take
decision about the nature and choice of works to be undertaken in each of the
ﬁnancial year.
• Every district has to prepare a shelf of projects to be undertaken under
MGNREGA, the exact type of work to be done vary by states and several
factors. Some of the major categories of permissible works are as follows:
– Renovation of traditional water bodies including desilting of tanks.
– Development of lands of the SC/ST/BPL/IAY and land reform beneﬁciaries.
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– Rural connectivity.
– Drought prooﬁng.
– Central government notiﬁed work in consultation with state governments.
• The wage and material expenditure should be in 60:40 ratio at block level of
work distribution.
• Social Audit has to be conducted at least once in every six months.
• The minimum facilities should be provided at worksite such as creche, drinking
water, and shade (For further details on work procedures and guidelines of
MGNREGA, see MoRD 2012).
Within a village, the Panchayat ofﬁce needs to plan for detailed implementation
of modalities and integrity of MGNREGA work in the village.
(a) Implementation Status of the programme
The NREGS scheme was introduced across states in India in a phased manner as
discussed above. In April 2008, the NREGS was expanded to entire rural area of the
country covering 34 States and Union Territories, 614 Districts, 6,096 Blocks and
2.65 lakhs Gram Panchayat. By the end of 2015/16, the scheme was functioning in
648 Districts of India, which includes ongoing work in 6,849 Blocks and 250,441
Gram Panchayats in India (NREGA website).
(b) Major activities covered under MGNREGA
Majority of the MGNREG activities are related to agricultural and allied
activities, water conservation, irrigation ditch cleaning, rural road connectivity, etc.
Permissible activities are clearly stipulated in Paragraph 1 of Schedule-I of
Mahatma Gandhi NREGA, under Ministry of Rural Development. The variety of
activities permitted and allowed to be undertaken by MGNREGA are discussed in
Reddy (2014), MoRD (2012), Desai et al. (2015). Recently, the works have also
been selected to facilitate rural sanitation projects in a major way. Overall, the
works funded by MGNREGA have been divided into 10 broad categories; they
include: Watershed, Irrigation and Flood management works, Agricultural and
Livestock related works, Fisheries and works in coastal areas and the Rural
Drinking water and Sanitation related works. The actual nature and types of work
done in a year greatly vary by states.
In the MGNREGA 2.0 (after the second generation reforms for the rural job
scheme), the priority of the works are decided by the Gram Panchayat in the
meetings of the Gram Sabhas and the Ward Sabhas. The second-generation pro-
gramme of MGNREGS has added 30 new works in the Schedule 1 and now it also
supports rural sanitation projects such as toilet building, soak pits construction, and
solid and liquid waste management. Though the overall 60:40 ratio of labour and
material component are maintained at the Block level (Thaluka/Mandal), some
flexibilities are there in maintaining this ratio even at district level for certain works
based on the local context (MoRD 2013).
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In fact, recently, Construction of Angan Wadi Centre (AWC) building has also
been included as an approved activity under the MGNREG Act. This created direct
linkage with nutrition and health sectors in the rural economy, and provide child-
care support to the labor force, especially women family members. A ‘Guidelines
for construction of Anganwadi Centres’ under MGNREGS, have been issued
jointly by the Secretary, Women and Child Development (WCD) and Secretary,
Ministry of Rural Development, on 13th August, 2015. Under MGNREGS,
expenditure up to Rs. 5 lakh (Rs. 0.5 million) per AWC building for construction
will be allowed. Expenditure beyond Rs. 5 lakh per AWC including ﬁnishing,
flooring, painting, plumbing, electriﬁcation, wood work, etc. will be met from the
related component of ICDS funds. The construction of toilet and Anganwadi
Centers under MGNREGA programme not only provide a direct support to the
efﬁcient running of ICDS and Anganwadi Center across the parts of rural India, but
it may also enable several million of rural women to participate in paid employment
and income generation activities in their village. These activities include both
farming as well as non-farm sector activities. Thus, strengthening rural sanitation
and ICDS programme through MGNREGA activities will help the EGS programme
to directly contribute in improving the nutrition, education, and sanitation status in
rural India, with short run as well as long run public goods beneﬁts.
1.4 Performance of NREGA
Performance of MGNREGA is often one of the most debated issues in public policy
and news media in India. Any discussion on “performance of MGNREGA” is also
one of the politically charged policy issues in recent times. The public opinion as
well as the academia working on the subject seems to be divided into different
camps. A Report of Government of India (MoRD 2015) suggest that, despite
maximum of 100 days of employment cap for an individual in a ﬁscal year, the
average person days employment generated per household in 2015–16 was only
49 days, which was the highest level of employment provided by the programme in
the last eight years.
There is still huge demand for works under MGNREGA, specially in slack
season of agriculture, however, number of days of employment provided by
MGNREGA has not been improved due to several loopholes in the administrative
and ﬁnancial management systems that exist. Recently, the central government has
emphasized more on improvement in timely payment of wages to laborers, linking
the programme with livelihood programmes and other sanitation (national sanita-
tion complain, ICDF, etc.) so that more numbers of working days are added, and
timely payment of wages ensured with the use of ICT and other relevant
technologies.
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A recent report from the MoRD3 suggest that total of about 2.35 billion person
days’ of work were generated in 2015/2016. Then, about 55% of the total bene-
ﬁciaries were women, a large number of whom belonging to scheduled caste,
scheduled tribes and other vulnerable sections. On an average, about 49 days of
work was created in the 2015/16, which was the highest in the past 8–10 years. In
2015/16, the MGNREGA budget was set as Rs. 37,000 corer (Rs. 370,000 mil-
lion), while the actual expenditure incurred was at Rs. 43,000 crore, by providing
additional Rs. 6,000 crore in the year than actually planned earlier. In fact, the
MGNREGA had created 2.35 billion person days of employment in the ﬁscal year
2014–15, which was itself a ﬁve-years’ record in its performance. This suggests still
a growing demand for the MGNREGA across India, despite the rise in agricultural
labor wage rate in the local markets.
The performance of MGNREGA in terms of its implementation greatly varies
across states of India, as also reported by various studies on the topic. State level
local institutions have greater role in setting up the implementation institutions,
laying out administrative and ﬁnancial outlays, planning and designing of the
programme, and selection of expenditure modalities. Depending upon the institu-
tional capability of the state level local institutions and government machinery, the
programme performance is also expected to vary across states. Viewed from this
angle, it may be observed that three northeastern states (Tripura, Mizoram and
Sikkim) were relatively on top in providing number of jobs per person than rest of
the country. For example, in Tripura, under MGNREGA, an astounding 94.5
person days per household jobs were created during 2015–16, against the national
average of 48.5 days in the same year. Mizoram and Sikkim states held second and
third places respectively, by providing 69 and 67 days of jobs per person during the
same period. Whereas, in terms of total expenditure incurred, Tamil Nadu, Andhra
Pradesh, West Bengal, and Rajasthan were much ahead than rest of the states. This
was due to the large numbers of labor force participated in the programme in these
states. Since the total number of work days provided was lower in these states, it
reflected on the lower number of average workdays per household compared to the
three NE states.
The MGNREGA implementation performance report published by the central
government for the year 2015/16 revealed that over 257,847 grama panchayats
spread over 6,858 blocks and 661 districts across the country have been served by
the programme. However, as per the report, about 40,000 panchayats (about 16%)
did not provide any job to any worker during the period. Most of these 40,000
panchayats fall in the states of Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra,
Punjab, Utharakhand and Uttar Pradesh. The average days of employment provided
per household in 2014–15 were only 40.17, signiﬁcantly lower than 46 days as
reported in 2013–14. Thus, with an average of 40.17 days of employment, 2014–15
3These updated recent data on MGNREGA are data are taken from MoRD publication on
‘Performance, Initiatives and Strategies FY 2015–16 and FY 2016–17’.
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was the worst performance year in the last 10 years, whereas 2009–10 was the best
performance year with an average of 54 days of employment provision in a year
(http://www.ﬁnancialexpress.com).
1.5 MGNREGA Achievements, Relevance,
and Growing Concerns
Several empirical studies have demonstrated that the MGNREGA have helped
greatly in providing supplementary household income to rural poor of about 10% of
the annual income, and this programme has contributed largely in checking distress
migration of entire household/family from rural to urban, while women workers
obtained employment from this scheme locally as well. However, some members
who can earn more still move out of village to urban centers seeking better work
and income opportunities, whereas, other members continue to stay back and work
under MGNREGA or take up other available works in the village itself (Desai et al.
2015).
MGNREGA schemes have also indirectly helped in reducing dropouts and
increasing the retention of children in schools. This is because, school going
childrens’ mothers have now stayed back in the village for the sake of their chil-
dren’s education rather than migrating out with their spouse in search of better wage
and longer employment (authors ﬁeld observations in ICRISAT rural villages in
SAT regions in 2013–14). Likewise, a study using difference—in difference method
of impact assessment in a dry region of India has shown that debt burden of
participant households declined sharply over non-participants after the implemen-
tation of MGNREGA in their villages (Bhattarai et al. 2014). Similarly, the recent
UNDP Global Human Development Report refers to the MGNREGA as one of the
milestones in social protection measures in the world, in comparison to schemes in
other countries, such as: (a) the Rural Employment for Public Assets in Bangladesh;
(b) Jefes De Hogar in Argentina; and (c) the Karnali employment programme in
Nepal. However, the programmes in Bangladesh and Nepal are limited in scope in
terms of their inclusion criteria of beneﬁciaries (Chakraborty 2016).
As reported in many studies, the MGNREGA scheme have helped the poor and
vulnerable sections of the population in rural India. The fact that workers belonging
to marginalized and vulnerable social groups have beneﬁted from the MGNREGS
at the national level makes it a unique programme. Almost half of the workforce
comprised of women and the proportion of scheduled caste workers was around
22% and scheduled tribe around 18%. This suggests that the scheme has been able
to influence the lives of rural poor especially the marginalized and vulnerable social
categories and groups. A study by IFPRI (Liu and Barrett 2013) has reported that
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the MGNREGA might have contributed for a decline in underweight children (less
than ﬁve years) and for improving their status. For instance, there were only about
30% underweight children in 2014 vis-à-vis 43.7% in 2005. Likewise, Desai et al.
(2015) reported that the MGNREGA provided beneﬁts to both poor and non-poor
households, of which, the poor are more likely to be attracted by the programme,
and hence, it is a good self-targeting social safety net programme.
Using a rigorous impact assessment procedure based on difference-in-difference
evaluation method, Desai et al. (2015) also reported that MGNREGA participation
across India has been dominated by poor and socially vulnerable (agricultural wage
laborers, schedule tribes (adivasi), and schedule caste (dalits) and other backward
classes, and landless, marginal and small farmers); and MGNREGA was instru-
mental in reducing poverty among these groups. The NCEAR study reports that
MGNREGA reduced poverty overall by up to 32% and prevented 154 million
people from falling into poverty; and it made greater impact in less developed area
and among the socially vulnerable groups (Desai et al. 2015).
However, over last few years, there was also a marked decline in the delivery,
budget expenditure in real terms, and implementation of the total schemes faced a
setback in many places, though the trend varies from state to state. Though the
nominal ﬁgures on total allocation of funds for the MGNREGA activities have
increased over the years, its value in real terms had declined. For example, the share
of total ﬁscal expenditure for MGNREGA works in 2008/09 was close to 1% of the
national GDP, which declined to 0.36% of in 2012/13, and 0.26% in 2016/17. Over
the last two years, there were also concerns as regards the changing labor to
material ratio of the programme expenditure from 60:40 to 51:49.
On the other hand, some amount of disillusionment and disappointment against
the programme has also set in the minds of the labor force in recent years. This is
largely due to administrative delays in the disbursement of wages to workers for
more than 2–3 months, and uncertainty of work availability in the next season so
that the labor force can decide whether to migrate out of the village or remain
locally for seasonal jobs Basu and Sen (2015). Recently, questions have been also
raised on MGNREGA implementation, its planning process at local level, poor
awareness and capacity building among the local panchayat level workers, intro-
duction of complex ICT and new software without adequate training to local staffs
working in rural areas, and growing level of corruption and mishandling of ﬁnancial
resources allocated for MGNREGA work.
Even after a decade of implementation of NREGA, the rural workers are facing
acute shortage of work, long-delays in receiving wage payments, lack of trans-
parency in work allocation, wage payment, and uncertainty in continuation of work
next season or next year. This situation has been primarily due to the result of
various moves by successive governments to undermine NREGA across the
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country. For example, the budgetary allocations for the programme were drastically
reduced from almost 1% of the GDP in 2008–09 to about 0.3% in 2013–14.
Likewise, in 2011, NREGA wages were delinked from minimum wage rate; as a
result, the MGNREGA wage rates have stagnated in real terms for the past several
years.
In addition, changes are being done in the working procedures of MGNREGS,
year after year, which has also exerted additional pressures on villages and local
level institutions to cope up with the MGNREGA work activities. At many places,
local administrations are unable to cope with the constant changes in the work
schedules and guidelines of MGNREGA by the Ministry of Rural Development,
and the excessive reliance on technology for the implementation of the programme
(Agrawal 2017), but without proper training to the local staff in using the
technology.
Of late, discussions were also taking place at the policy and governance circles
as regards restricting the scope of MGNREGA to the 200 backward districts where
the programme was originally launched in 2006. The logic for this argument is that
a broad-based employment guarantee programme is not required in other parts of
the country where market wage rate is already higher than the minimum wage rate
prescribed in MGNREGA. However, this change of rolling back the policy, may
severely twist the spirit of the right based employment guarantee principle of the
MGNREGA Act. This would also potentially impact labor market in rest of the
country greatly, altering the employment security and bargaining power of
unskilled labor in large parts of India.
The fact remains that the poor and vulnerable section of households are not
restricted to only those 200 districts where the programme was launched in 2006,
but instead, are scattered all over. Even in the states of Kerala, and Punjab, where
the wage rates are already nearly double than the NREGA wage rates, the poor
households and labor in these two states are still demanding for MGNREGA wage
work during the slack season of farming, when adequate employment are not
available. On the other hand, implementing MGNREGA to all over India has
ﬁnancial implications, as non-targeted households are also getting beneﬁts.
Over the 10 years period of its implementation, the MoRD and the implementing
agencies have also learnt from the country-wide experiences leading to several
reforms in implementing the scheme. Over the last ﬁve years, nearly 2/3rd of total
expenditure was made in agriculture and allied activities, and 57% of all workers
were women, well above the statutory requirement of 33%, and nearly 20–23% of
the total workers belonged to scheduled caste and scheduled tribe categories. During
the ﬁscal year 2015–16, actual expenditure under MGNREGA was INR 413 billion
(USD 6.35 billion in 2015 exchange rate), which was the highest expenditure in
nominal terms since its inception. Out of this, about 73% was for wage payment,
with women accounting for 55 and 95% of the payments made through electronic
fund management system (NREGA web site at www.nrega.org.in).
Thus, the MoRD has also introduced an electronic fund management system,
and coordinated with banks and post ofﬁces, besides monitoring of dues clearance
time and process. This was intended to ensure the timely release of funds to states
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and the block and panchayat level agencies to provide work on demand. The
government has also increased number of work to up to 150 days in
drought-affected districts. Likewise, the Central government was also planning to
issue a Master Circular, which will consolidate all key instructions from the gov-
ernment on the implementation of the MGNREGA across the states and regions.
Similarly, the MoRD has also planned to train and place 10,000 barefoot techni-
cians from worker households to efﬁciently managing the process at local sites.
Besides, the Ministry of Rural Development has been trying to bring about
major reforms in implementation of the MGNREGA programme and to meet the
demand for work in drought affected areas, as well as to create durable and income
generating assets mostly linked to augmentation of irrigation potential and thus
addressing the agrarian distress permanently. In the year 2015–16, MoRD allowed
state governments to provide employment under MGNREGA wherever needed,
particularly more in drought-affected areas, through earmarking additional resour-
ces available from the central government. The central government has expanded
the job entitlement from 100 to 150 days of MGNREGA work in a year to addi-
tional 2.05 million households in 2015/16 in drought-affected regions of ten states.
All of these efforts beneﬁted 4.4 million of households at all India level who have
completed 100 days of employment under MGNREGA scheme in that year.
Of late, the government of India has started several new programmes on sani-
tation, nutrition, and health sectors in the rural areas as convergence schemes. The
government ministries were planning to construct 3.3 million of Individual House
Hold Latrines (IHHL) in rural India, as part of Swachh Bharat Mission, and 63,000
Anganwadi centers were constructed to strengthen rural infrastructure (MoRD
2016). The central governmental agencies were trying to establish a close linkage
between MGNREGA work and labor use on these new schemes initiated, such as
Sanitation campaign, Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchai Yojana (PMKSY), ICDF, and
other related programmes. It is expected that, convergence of these programmes in
rural areas will address both short-run as well as long run needs of the society. More
importantly, a proper convergence of MGNREGA work with these national level
programmes will provide continuity of the employment guarantee programme in
the long run with sustained funding from state and central governments.
More recently, the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) was also planning to
link MGNREGS job cards with AADHAR numbers and bank account numbers at
the household level. Use of electronic Fund Management System has also ensured
timely payment of the labor wage. The quality of implementation of the scheme
greatly varies across the states. In many states, it has been reported that people
usually do not come forward for MGNREGA works in their village, because there
are other works with higher payments available in the village itself. This is also
perfectly all right, as MGNREGA is a last resort for employment, as a social safety
net to the society, when the alternate jobs and livelihood opportunities are not
available in the local areas.
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1.6 Impacts of MGNREGA: Burgeoning Empirical
Literature
Ever since its inception, the MGNREGA has evinced lot of interest among scholars
who have undertaken research on various aspects of the programme in terms of its
effectiveness, performance in meeting the targets, usefulness in serving livelihood
needs, providing services to rural poor and its effect in creating assets and infras-
tructure in the rural communities. However, there is paucity of empirical studies
addressing several unexplored issues, such as: (a) whether MGNREGA has led to
an increase in rural wage rate in India? and (b) whether, MGNREGA has enabled
reducing the debt burden and food insecurity and vulnerability of poor and
low-income rural households. After 10 years of experience of its implementation
and the impacts on different sectors of the rural and urban economies, it is felt by
many that the MGNREGA programme should be analyzed within a broader per-
spective of rural development and its effectiveness in serving the immediate needs
and requirements of the rural poor and vulnerable sections of the communities.
Contradicting several studies on the performances of MGNREGA, one study by
NCEAR, using panel household analysis across large geographical setting, has
reported very positive impact of the MGNREGA programme on reduction of
poverty, food insecurity, and debt burden among the rural poor and vulnerable
households (Desai et al. 2015). The ﬁndings of this study are quite revealing with
respect to the performance and evaluation of the programme as also reported by
government agencies and several other empirical investigations on the performance
of the programme (see, MoRD 2012).
Due to large number of people involved in the programme and getting beneﬁted
out of it, the successive national and local governments have been compelled not to
change the major course of the programme implementation. In 2014 and 2015, the
national government also floated an idea to have a major change on the course of
action and priority of the MGNREGA programme and its implementation strate-
gies. However, due to changing governments in several states of India, the actual
implementation of the new reforms in the programme has not been much effective.
Instead, the national and state governments have slightly increased the budgetary
provisions for the MGNREGS during the ﬁscal years of 2014/15 and 2015/16 than
the provisions made in the preceding years.
Whether and why NREGA activities are needed in India now when the economy
is growing at almost two-digit level for the last one and half decades? This is one of
the hotly debated policy issues in India now. In fact, there are other issues like
changing dynamics of public policy related to MGNREGA and other flagship
programmes, especially after mid 2014, following a change in the government at
the centre. The question on the rationale of MGNREGA programme has also been
widely contested in academic and policy circles since its implementation in 2006.
On the one hand, one section argues that while the universal access and right based
approach of the programme must be continued in the present format covering the
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entire country, the implementation part needs to be ﬁne-tuned to make it relevant
for the current context.
On the other hand, another section of scholars are of the view that the pro-
gramme must be downsized and implemented only in those areas of less developed
and marginal communities, where it is needed the most. They also argued that the
nature of work undertaken in MGNREGA should include more non-farm activities
keeping in view the growing size of the rural non-farm sector. No doubt, each of the
two alternate strategies discussed in the literature here signify different implications
of the MGNREGA on the rural poor.
More recently, several of the rural development sector think tanks and public
policy experts in the central and state governments have been greatly concerned
with ‘whether to implement the MGNREGA programme as it has been imple-
mented so far, or to adapt and transform it to new ways to address the short-run as
well as long-run problems of employment creation and livelihood improvement in
rural India’. Within the Ministry of Rural Development, there was a debate as to
‘whether to merge MGNREGS work activities with the farm operations, as in the
case of EGS implementation in Maharashtra—which has been in operation in
Maharashtra state since 1972, or to make the MGNREGS programme and its
implementation agencies stand alone and separated from the other rural develop-
ment agencies (Aruna 2013).
To sum up, the overall performance of the programme has been satisfactory. Of
course, there are also several issues and challenges and the entire dynamics of the
programme and its implementation across states and regions within need a deeper
understanding in terms of reflections of the realities from the grassroots level.
1.7 About the Present Volume and Its Relevance
In this regard, the present volume takes a critical look at the status and imple-
mentation of the MGNREGA across states in India and the emerging dynamics in
the rural context, especially, its interface with the rural labour market. The volume
is an effort to consolidate some of the illustrative state level experiences of suc-
cesses and failures in the implementation of MGNREGA by taking cases across
over 15 states of India, and by different authors. It also attempts to explore some of
the future courses of action that may help evolve a sustainable strategy for
implementation of MGNREGA and for achieving inclusive growth with secured
employment in India. The studies presented in the volume are unique in terms of the
use of empirical analysis across states using inter-disciplinary research methods,
and relying on both quantitative and qualitative techniques.
The idea of this volume came up at a workshop jointly organized by the Gujarat
Institute of Development Research (GIDR) and International Crops Research
Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) held at GIDR Ahmadabad, during
10–11 December 2013. The workshop was attended by over 25 eminent scholars
and partners who have been working on MGNREGA across the states. At the
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workshop, a multi-disciplinary team of policy analysts and scholars had presented
papers on various aspects of MGNREGA implementation across states: the per-
formance, and the future direction of the programme. After the workshop, it was
thought to develop a volume by compiling the selected papers on various topics of
implementation of MGNREGS, covering several themes and contemporary issues
of the programme with a pan India coverage, i.e., from Tripura in northeast to
Kerala in South India. Later on, a few papers were solicited from other scholars
working on MGNREGS. Again, in view of the change in the government at the
national level in May 2014, it was felt to speciﬁcally look at the changes in the
policy discourses on MGNREGA. Hence, a few more papers were invited covering
the most contemporary scenarios of implementation of the programme. Thus, we
have a carefully scrutinised collection of empirical papers from eminent scholars in
India and abroad who have been engaged in research on MGNREGA and its
implications on the ground across states.
The volume covers issues that are expected to throw light on redesigning and
reframing MGNREGS activities so that the programme create signiﬁcant impacts
on inclusive growth in rural areas. The scope and coverage of most of the literature
and books available on MGNREGS at present is somewhat limited, as it largely
focuses on a particular state, or at the most, one or few states. Likewise, there are
several studies which rely heavily on the standard macro level data on MGNREGA
while examining the performance of the programme across the states, such as
number of Labor days of employment provided, and wage payment per day, etc.
Such analyses are limited by the fact that they do not provide a critical view of the
impacts of the programme at the micro contexts. The present volume addresses this
limitation by providing more focused analysis in the empirical contexts of a district
or a village or even a particular case study context.
Many of the chapters in this volume have been prepared with series of con-
sultation with the programme beneﬁciaries, by undertaking proper statistical sam-
pling and analytical procedures. These chapters have compiled the stakeholders’
perceptions towards the programme implementation in their villages, and the extent
of participation, engagement in the same and the beneﬁts out of the programme.
The volume of employment generated since the inception of the programme
(from 2006–07 up to 2015–16) of MGNREGA has been around 19 billion person
days that averages around 2 billion person days every year. Set in this background,
the main objective of the Chap. 2 by Parmod Kumar is to analyse the impact of
MGNREGA on the rural livelihoods through generation of additional employment
especially among the deprived sections of the society including the Scheduled
Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), Other Backward Communities (OBC) and
women. The Chapter throws some light on the issue of migration of labour from
rural to urban areas due to lack of employment opportunities in the villages and
examines how MGNREGA has been able to make any dent on labour migration.
D. Narasimha Reddy et al. in Chap. 3 examines the interesting aspect of the
impact of MGNREGA on rural wages as well as the dynamic interface between
MGNREGA and the rural labour markets. The Chapter presents a comprehensive
view of the changes happening in the rural labour markets in the context of the
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wider uptake of the MGNREGA works in the villages. Based on evidences as
emerge from several studies, the Chapter engages with some of the important
concerns arising from the wide-scale implementation of MGNREGA, such as: the
burgeoning labour shortage, increasing farm wages and rising farming costs, farm
mechanization, peak-season labour adjustments, labour migration, etc.
The paper observes that the eventuality of farm labour shortage may not be strictly
ascribed to increased rural worker participation in MGNREGA. The fact remains that
labor scarcity has emerged as one of the major constraints to increase agricultural
production in India. The study suggests for some policy interventions based onmacro
and micro levels analysis of the trends in implementation of MGNREGA, which
mainly include: (a) development of labor saving technologies and machines to
overcome labor scarcity; (b) an inclusive farm mechanization programme for women
and youth, strengthening rural-urban connectivity; (c) social protection for migrant
labor and capacity building programmes for skill augmentation; and (d) development
of MGNREGA calendar depicting the schedule of time-period representing the
lean-season during which the work will be implemented.
While a large number of studies have looked into the nature and progress of
employment creation under the scheme, there have been very few studies looking
into the equally important issue of asset creation under the same. In this regard,
Chap. 4 by Verma and Shah reviews and synthesizes the evidences of asset creation
under the MGNREGA based on ﬁeld case studies of more than 140 best-performing
MGNREGA water assets. In retrospect, when it was launched, the MGNREGA was
expected to create useful, productive and durable assets, both public and private. To
understand the impacts of MGNREGA on creation of durable assets, the IWMI had
undertaken surveys in 2009–10 and 2010–11. The surveys indicated that where
implemented well, the MGNREGA made signiﬁcant and positive income effects
through rural asset creation. The programme witnessed a signiﬁcant turnaround in
respect of water security programmes, investing some US$3 billion annually, by
way of construction, repair and renovation of rural water assets.
The reviews of case studies of best-performing MGNREGA water assets indi-
cated that, on average, the best-performing assets are able to generate gross returns
equal to their investment in a little over a year. The chapter offers eight practical
suggestions for maximizing MGNREGA’s net positive impact. Broadly, the
propositions reflect four principles: prioritization, capacities, incentives and exit (by
‘exit’ it implies a gradual decline in demand for work under MGNREGA).
The Chapter argues that focusing on non-wage beneﬁts of MGNREGA can
elevate its performance; and, in the process, build stakes for rural communities.
Doing this will require signiﬁcant capacity-building investments in local institutions
(PRIs, block and district administration) and creative, context-speciﬁc arrangements
for ensuring sustainability of assets. There is also an urgent need to build capacities
and enhance opportunities in the non-farm sector. MGNREGA work should not and
cannot be a permanent occupation for poor households. Over years, the dependence
of poor households on MGNREGA and the willingness of people to work at
government-prescribed minimum wages must decline. This would be a robust
indicator of MGNREGA’s success. This can be done by building high-performing
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assets that help uplift the village economy to a level of prosperity which crowds out
the need for minimum-wage work.
Chapter 5 by Narayanamoorthy et al. explores the argument that ‘whether the
NREGS had increased the farm wage rate substantially resulting in a sharp
reduction in farm proﬁtability’? It uses the cost of cultivation survey data published
by the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices. Based on data for the period
2000–01 to 2010–11 from few states, viz., Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Punjab,
Karnataka, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, the study examined ﬁve
different foodgrain crops, namely, paddy, wheat, jowar, gram (channa) and tur (red
gram) for the analysis. The study refutes the argument that the proﬁtability of
foodgrain crops had declined after the introduction of MGNREGS. This is not only
true with high area with high productivity (HAHP) states but also with high area
with low productivity (HALP) states.
However, it also shows that the real cost of human labour input had increased
considerably in all ﬁve crops in both HAHP and HALP states following the
implementation of NREGS (2006–07 to 2010–11). The proﬁtability calculated in
relation to all paid out costs (C2) had either increased or the losses incurred reduced
in all ﬁve crops in both the HAHP and HALP states. The number of years of proﬁt
realized by the farmers has also increased in most crops during the post-NREGS
period as compared to pre-NREGS period (2000–01 to 2005–06). Increased pro-
ductivity in most crops seems to have helped to increase the proﬁtability by
negating the increase in human labour cost. The analysis also indicates that the
labour scarcity accentuated due to NREGS may have increased the cost of human
labour at a faster pace. Hence, arrangements may be made to link up NREGS with
agricultural operations to reduce the labour scarcity and also to improve the prof-
itability in crops cultivation.
Maharashtra was the pioneer state to provide guarantee of employment to rural
poor during the drought years of early 1970s. After the implementation of
MGNREGS in 2006, both the schemes were being implemented in Maharashtra
simultaneously. In this context, the Chap. 6 by Kajale and Shroff examines the
employment proﬁle and the assets created under the state run EGS and centrally
sponsored MGNREGS in Maharashtra.
It analyses phase wise performance of the MGNREGS, extent of employment
generated, assets created and expenditure incurred on the works carried out during
2008–09 and 2012–13. Various factors responsible for the poor performance of the
scheme till 2010–11 were also examined. The chapter also discusses limitations and
potentials of the scheme as well as policy implications. The analysis shows that
EGS as well as MGNREGS have been successful as employment guarantee pro-
grammes as they have provided employment whenever and wherever the need
arose. However, it is felt that this has not led to creation of durable and good quality
assets that would enhance overall productivity of the agricultural sector.
The Chap. 7 by Mishra and Mishra assumes relevance in the context of the
announcement of new guidelines/framework towards planning for MGNREGA
works in convergence with other government programmes. Accordingly, the new
guidelines have made it mandatory for the states to ensure that at least 60% of
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works undertaken in a district in terms of costs is spent for creation of productive
assets that are directly linked to agriculture and allied activities. This is very
important considering that creation of productive assets is necessary not only for
making ecological regeneration but also for ensuring sustainable growth of agri-
culture sector and creation of livelihood opportunities in a village economy.
The Chapter also discusses the experience of initiatives towards convergence of
the MGNREGA with other developmental schemes in the states of Odisha and
West Bengal. It is expected that such convergence initiatives would lead to not only
optimum utilization of public investments in conservation and management of
natural resources, but also in creating assets that would help in mitigating adverse
effects of climate change and create conditions for sustainable development of the
rural economy.
The Chapter also discusses some pertinent issues: What are the different types of
convergence models that have been initiated in Odisha and West Bengal? How
have the joint efforts of various line departments contributed to conservation and
management of natural resources? Are assets created under convergence initiatives
sustainable in the long-run? How have these assets contributed to agriculture sector,
particularly to enhance production and yield, changes in cropping pattern, crop
diversiﬁcation, and multiple cropping? Can the existing institutions contribute to
management and utilization of the assets created under convergence? If not, what
institutional supports are necessary in this regard?
The Chap. 8 by Vinoj Abraham is an attempt to understand the process of asset
creation under the MGNREGS covering four south Indian states, viz., Kerala,
erstwhile Andhra Pradesh, Tamilnadu and Karnataka. The Chapter presents an
interesting analysis of how the different states have behaved in respect of setting the
local governance institutions for the effective implementation of the state sponsored
flagship programmes, especially, the MGNREGS. The interface between the
MGNREGS and the local settings has been presented as highly varying across the
states. The Chapter endeavor to argue the case that the type of asset creation,
methods of asset creation and maintenance, and beneﬁts accrued by the local people
across the four states is largely influenced by the local polity, local governance
structure and democratic practices at the local level.
The flagship programme MGNREGA is in practice in all the states since the last
10 years, with dual objectives of creation of jobs and productive assets in rural India.
The small north eastern state of Tripura has successfully implemented the pro-
gramme and marked notable success. In this regard, the Chap. 9 by Bhowmik et al. is
an effort to look into the impacts of the scheme on the participating households in the
Dhalai district. The study reveals that MGNREGS has impacted on livelihood of the
participating households, though most of the households survive on daily wages.
Increase in asset base also portray that income assurance has been evident. The study
also ﬁnds more job opportunities for the unreserved categories in the scheme as it
witnessed a decreasing trend in allotment ratios for the STs in the study area.
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However, with the recent changes in the operational framework, the participants
became apprehensive about the future of the scheme.
Chapter 10 by Vani and Srikantha Murthy explores the multiplier effects of
NREGS employment in a village economy context using the Social Accounting
Matrix (SAM) framework. A good number of research studies have been conducted
on efﬁcacy of the scheme in achieving targets set under the Act. However, most of
the studies had considered only direct employment creation through this pro-
gramme and there were only a few studies undertaken to assess the impact of
MGNREGS on the village economy as a whole. One such research was conducted
by Indira Hirway, M.R. Saluja and Bhupesh Yadav in Nana Kotda village in
Gujarat in January 2008. The Chapter suggests that making the programme more
demand driven, taking more labor intensive work activities under MGNREGA
would also ensure more circulation of MGNREGA expenditures within the local
economy, which would produce more employment and income locally due to
increased feedback and inter-sectoral linkage (or multiplier) effects.
Nagaraj et al. (Chap. 11) make an assessment of the impacts of MGNREGA, on
some of the indicators, such as households’ labor market participation, income,
employment and productive assets creation based on macro level studies of six
states, viz, Karnataka, Rajasthan, undivided Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra and micro level insights from Karnataka villages. It also
analyzed other critical issues such as whether MGNREGA programme has been
successful in providing 100 days of employment per annum to rural families
demanding employment and to what extent the MGNREGA has offered social
protection to the rural poor?
The study indicate that at macro level the performance of MGNREGA is not
even across states even after a decade of its implementation. Only 7–12% of the
households could receive 100 days of employment from MGNREGA in the study
states. The trend of absorbing higher proportion of youth population under
MGNREGA work pose serious implications in terms of labor scarcity in farming.
It was observed that the beneﬁts obtained are largely at community level through
asset creation that included desiltation of irrigation tanks and construction of check
dams beneﬁting bore wells through groundwater recharge, and assured source of
drinking water for livestock even during summer months. Likewise, the other sets
of infrastructural beneﬁts were improvement in rural connectivity due to road
works, construction of school buildings and thus helping village children by
reducing the drudgery of travelling to far away schools and so on.
However, though MGNREGA works were able to assure sustainable develop-
ment through improved Natural Resource Management in some regions, it fails in
providing social protection where the leadership of implementing agencies is weak
and leaders lack dynamism. Stringent rules and regulations resulted in inordinate
delays in executing works and late payment to workers.
Chapter 12 by Ravindra and Chaudhary makes a strong case for enhancing the
scope of Employment Guarantee scheme for inclusive and resilient growth in
rainfed areas under the new ‘inter-sectoral convergence’ guidelines set by the
Ministry of Rural Development in the implementation of flagship programmes. It
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notes that unfortunately, the perception of ‘durable assets’ in MGNREGS is limited
to physically measurable constructions (digging, ﬁlling of earth and brick and
mortar). The same analogy can be extended to other qualitative aspects of public
goods that can potentially provide environmental services in rainfed areas. In fact,
the Agro-ecological restoration needs to be considered as a ‘durable asset’ creation
under MGNREGS, even if it does not involve brick, mortar or earth work.
With the fast spread of Non-Pesticidal Management (NPM) and organic agri-
culture, the scope for local inputs to substitute for external chemical inputs which
are often subsidised, has increased; such demand is also universal across the rainfed
areas. Conversion of this potential demand into local enterprises needs considerable
skilling, innovations and effective demand generation. MGNREGS can be an
effective platform in incubating such local labour intensive enterprises. Provision of
labour subsidy for such enterprises for a deﬁned incubation period can be an
effective instrument for their promotion.
The Chapter then argues that MGNREGS is uniquely positioned to make a
substantial contribution to drive sustainability, resilience and growth in rainfed
agriculture, livestock and ﬁsh production systems. Its strength lies in its universal
presence, focus on labor, well laid out systems of payments, social audit and
intensive coverage of rainfed geography. All that is needed is providing interpre-
tative flexibility on the concept of ‘creation of durable assets’ in natural resources
development and drought prooﬁng. The Chapter also lays out some boundary
conditions for not compromising the constitutional mandate of MGNREGA. Such
expansion of scope of the Scheme without compromising its own objectives can
potentially have multiplier effects of its investments in achieving resilience and
growth of rainfed agriculture.
Chapter 13 by Shah et al. provides a narrative of the journey of MGNREGA by
highlighting the important challenges along with the changing approaches in its
implementation in the recent years. It observes that though MGNREGA in its
present form had signiﬁcantly contributed towards improving the status of the rural
households, continuity of the programme in future will be beset with many chal-
lenges. While the very nature and content of the programme had undergone sig-
niﬁcant modiﬁcations and adaptations over the past one decade of its existence, its
future scope and potential appears to be rather bleak in view of the changing facets
of the rural economies as well as the socio-economic and demographic character-
istics of the households. The Chapter observes that from a future perspective,
employment guarantee programme, ideally, should take into consideration of the
multifunctional nature of the impact that the assets, related mainly to natural
resources, are expected to generate, especially, if initiated through a developmental
mode. The various facets of the impact may thus, include not only income and
employment, but also larger developmental objectives such as environmental sus-
tainability, intra-village equity, and building of institutional capacities through
democratic decentralization.
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1.8 MGNREGS: A Future Perspective
With increasing efforts at the national level to implement the MGNREGS in con-
vergence with several of the other flagship programmes supported by the national
and state governments, it seems that the programme would continue to stay ben-
eﬁting the rural households in most parts of the country. The concept of ‘conver-
gence planning’ of MGNREGA is being undertaken by MoRD since 2009, with the
line state and local government agencies working in tandem to implement various
rural development programmes at the panchayats. The main logic behind this
innovative convergence planning is to have inter-sectoral convergence of devel-
opment programmes to realize optimum utilization of public funds, as also to obtain
maximum returns out of the public investments in terms of more number of
employment and wages earnings out of limited public funding [For details, see in
this volume: Mishra and Mishra (Chap. 7, this volume), and Adusumilli and
Chaudhary (Chap. 12, this volume)]. Given the potential of spreading the multiplier
impacts of the programme in convergence with other state support programmes, it is
quite likely that the programme would still continue to influence the public policy
making and governance in India in the years to come. More importantly, in a
vibrant democratic system, as in India, the nature and scale of the existing social
safety net programmes (including MGNREGS) can also create its own check and
balance on the democratic governance process, as a large segment of the rural
population has already become a major stakeholder and beneﬁciary of the pro-
gramme. This signiﬁes that a democratically elected political party (or political
leader), which has to face election in each four to ﬁve years of time, would less
likely to scrap out the MGNREGA from India now, unless other forms of alternate
livelihoods with signiﬁcant impacts and welfare outcomes are created in the rural
economy.
One of the positive impacts of the MGNREGS has been the rise in rural wages in
many states of India after introduction of MGNREGS (see also Chap. 5 by
Narayanamoorthy et al., this volume), especially, in Kerala, Punjab, Andhra
Pradesh, Haryana, Karnataka, Bihar, Rajasthan, West Bengal, Jharkhand and
Uttarakhand. However, it is important to consider that the MGNREGA notiﬁed
wages in these states are still lower than the mandated minimum wages set for
unskilled agricultural laborers. In many of these states, adult population often prefer
migrating out from the villages to urban areas in search of higher wage rates, and
MGNREGA is not yet an attractive option for these rural youth. Besides, the
proﬁles of the existing work activities assigned under MGREGS are such that they
neither warrant using technical skills nor provide avenues for learning new skills or
technical expertise. Thus, it is a real challenge before the policy makers to reinvent
the programme with more and more work programmes that provide greater scope
for skill development and thereby a progressive shift in the proﬁle of the rural
labour force. This makes a serious case for giving a facelift for the rural workforce
by way of skilling and training in new employment opportunities with immense
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potential for increased wage levels and earnings in tandem with the rising costs and
living standards.
In fact, MGNREGA interventions assume greater signiﬁcance in the heightened
context of the distress induced by persistent drought in rural areas. This raises an
important issue as to ‘whether MGNREGA should also continue as a drought-relief
measure in the drought hit areas’. By virtue of the notiﬁcation by the Ministry of
Rural Development (MoRD), the drought-hit areas are entitled to get 50 additional
days of employment per year from the existing 100-day per year mark. But,
increasing number of days of work in these villages from MGNREGA is a real
challenge, as currently only 4% of the employed households are able to get
100 days of employment (during 2014–15). This is due to either rationing of work
or lack of availability of work. Even when the programme was at its peak of success
in 2008–09, only 14% of the rural households participated in the programme had
100 days of employment in a year, which had declined to 10% and remained at that
level until 2013–14. This calls for revisiting the programme and the implementation
strategies to make them much more sensitive to the drought affected regions as a
measure of livelihood security and distress mitigation. These are also serious
challenges, since the vibrancy and sustainability of the programme invariably
depends on the ﬁnancial strength of the implementing agencies (national and state
governments).
Focusing on the links between right-to-work (MGNREGA), ecology, and health,
it appears that these three aspects of overall human development, especially
amongst the poor, have to get integrated in the next phase of development of
MGNREGS. The speciﬁc question that needs immediate understanding is to know
the macro-micro level interactions in rural India in relation to MGNREGS inter-
ventions. In the absence of this, it may lead to ‘double-discrimination’ of the rural
poor who are still waiting to become an important part of the development process.
Furthermore, in the absence of alternative employment growth paths, the
MGNREGS activities may be continued in the future, though with minimal eco-
nomic gain in the short run.
From a future perspective, employment guarantee programme, ideally, may also
need to take into consideration of the multifunctional nature of the impacts that the
assets, related mainly to natural resources, are expected to generate further
employment, especially, if initiated with a broader developmental perspective in
mind. The various facets of the impact may thus, include not only income and
employment, but also larger developmental objectives such as environmental sus-
tainability, intra-village equity, and building of institutional capacities through
democratic decentralization.
Appendix
(See Table 1.2).
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Part I
MGNREGA: Macro Perspectives
and Analysis
Chapter 2
Employment Generation Under
MGNREGA: Spatial and Temporal
Performance Across States
Parmod Kumar
2.1 Introduction
The Mahatama Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA)
is being implemented by Government of India since 2006. Annual budget expen-
diture for the programme has been fluctuating year to year, with budget allocation
of ` 38,500 crore (or USD 10.5 billion) in the ﬁscal year of 2016–17. With an
accumulated budgetary expenditure for the programme of about ` 3065 billion (i.e.
over 46 billion USD) during the last 10 years (till mid of 2015), the programme has
been acclaimed as one of the largest employment generation programme in the
world. In-built with various transparency and accountability measures and provi-
sions for social audits, this Act, for the ﬁrst time brings the role of the state as a
provider of employment and livelihood in India. The Act was initially launched in
the selected 200 poorer districts of India in February 2006, and was broadened up to
encompass all the districts in the country from 1 April 2008.
The objective of the Act is to enhance livelihood security in rural areas by
providing at least 100 days of guaranteed wage employment in a ﬁnancial year to
every household whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled manual work
which is primarily for natural resource management offering gender-neutral wages.
The major goals of MGNREGA are:
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(a) To provide a strong social safety net for the vulnerable groups by providing a
fall-back employment source, when other employment alternatives are scarce or
inadequate; and
(b) To act as a growth engine for sustainable development of an agricultural
economy in addition to the empowerment of the rural poor. The Act mandates
33% participation for women as compulsory (details about MGNREGA and its
activities are available at <http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/home.aspx>).
In this context, the main objective of this Chapter is to analyze the impact of
MGNREGA on the rural livelihoods through the generation of additional
employment especially among the deprived sections of the society including the
Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), Other Backward Communities
(OBC) and women. The Chapter throws some light on the issue of migration of
labour from rural to urban areas due to lack of employment opportunities in the
villages and examines how MGNREGA has been able to make any dent on such
incidents. Household perceptions on the functioning of MGNREGA are also ana-
lyzed based on review of earlier studies as well as using macro and micro level data.
This study uses both primary and secondary data. Secondary data were collected
primarily from the MGNREGA website (http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/home.aspx)
maintained by the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India. Primary
data was collected from the selected villages and households in seven states across
the country. The data was collected through structured questionnaires. The primary
data pertain to the reference period, January–December 2009. In addition to the
household questionnaire, a village schedule was also used in each village to gather
information based on ‘Group Discussion’ with the Panchayat Members, Ofﬁcials,
educated and other well-informed people available in the surveyed villages.
This chapter is divided into ﬁve sections. The next section presents a review of
studies on the various aspects of functioning of the MGNREGA Scheme. Section 3
analyzes total employment generation under the scheme and its various
socio-economic characteristics, numbers and nature of projects taken up and amount
spent under the scheme and various qualitative indicators of the working of the
scheme. Section 4 brings out observations on employment generated; wage rate
obtained across gender, migration issues and food security aspects at the household
level. Section 5 concludes the chapter and puts forth policy suggestions on how to
improve the functioning of MGNREGA.
2.2 Functioning and Outcomes of MGNREGA: A Review
The literature on various aspects of MGNREGA functioning has been expanding as
the programme encompasses the whole of rural India and a huge budget compared
to any other social welfare programme. Compared to the preceding programmes,
like the National Food for Work Programme (NFFWP), the MGNREGA has
generated roughly three to four times the number of work days. The Programme has
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therefore succeeded in providing the much needed wage employment to the rural
masses. Among the many studies focusing on the implementation and operational
details of MGNREGA, the important ones are Aiyar and Samji (2006), Bhatia and
Dreze (2006), Chakraborty (2007), Comptroller and Auditor General (2008),
Ambasta et al. (2008), Jha et al. (2009, 2011), Gopal (2009), Khera and Nayak
(2009), Adhikari and Bhatia (2010), Shankar et al. (2011), Dutta et al. (2012), Liu
and Barrett (2013), Anderson et al. (2013) and so on.
Aiyar and Samji (2006) explored the case of strengthening of social audit in
order to improve the effectiveness of MGNREGA Programme. They argue that the
earlier wage employment programmes failed due to the common problems of
ineffective targeting, leakages and poor quality asset creation, etc. They argued for a
clear separation of functions across tiers of government. The Gram Panchayat
(GP) along with Zila Panchayat should be responsible for all operational activities
whilst the state government should take overall monitoring and regulation of the
process. In such a system the regular flow of information would be crucial as well
as the enhanced ability of citizens to exercise enforceability through tools such as
social audits and community score cards will have to play a major role.
After reviewing MGNREGA scheme all over the country, The Comptroller and
Auditor General (CAG) report in 2008 flagged out many loopholes in the imple-
mentation of MGNREGA across the states (CAG 2008). In 26 states, 558 village
panchayats were surveyed by the CAG report spread over 68 districts and 141
blocks. The study observed that, as many as 70% of villages checked, no proper
records were maintained on the number of households who demanded jobs, and
actual number of people who beneﬁted from the job guarantee scheme. This study
reported that in 340 villages spread over 24 states, no meetings were conducted for
identifying the households to be registered under MGNREGA. No door-to-door
survey was conducted in these villages to identify persons for MGNREGA card.
Some households were not registered despite submitting applications on the ground
that their names did not feature in the BPL survey list.
After analyzing the budgetary appraisal of MGNREGA, Chakraborty (2007)
reported that existing institutional arrangements in poorer states were not good
enough to implement the programme in an effective manner. Only half of the total
available funds were utilized and the utilization ratio was particularly low in poorer
states. There was an urgent need for both vertical and horizontal coordination across
levels of governments within the states. The paper suggests that the devolution of
responsibilities and strict accountability norms would accelerate capacity building
at the level of the panchayat and the scheme could effectively function as a
demand-driven one.
Based on their evaluation study in Chhattisgarh, Dreze et al. (2008) reported that
MGNREGA was functioning in Chhattisgarh far better than the other employment
programmes. They observed that there was virtually no check on the embezzlement
of NFFWP funds in Surguja district of Chhattisgarh. The situation was so bad that it
was constrained to describe NFFWP as ‘Loot for Work Programme’. In the same
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district, it was interesting to hear from a wide range of sources that the enactment of
MGNREGA had led to a steep decline in the incidence of corruption. This was
borne out by the muster roll veriﬁcation exercises. In a random sample of nine
works implemented by Gram Panchayat, it was found that 95% of the wages that
had been paid according to the muster rolls had actually reached the labourers
concerned. A similar exercise conducted in Koriya, the neighbouring district, led to
similar estimates of ‘leakages’ in the labour component of MGNREGA by only 5%
or so. In Jharkhand, detailed muster roll veriﬁcation of MGNREGA works in ﬁve
randomly selected Gram Panchayats of Ranchi District estimated leakages of
around 33%. Another study by Bhatia and Dreze (2006) highlights the weaknesses
in the implementation of the project in Jharkhand.
Similarly, Afridi (2008) discussed the nature and characteristics of monitoring
the MGNREGA’s implementation with a focus on the community control mecha-
nisms existing in the two pioneering states of Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh. Based
on a closer look at the social audit process held, he pointed out that conduct of
audits in villages without the support of NGOs and members of civil society is
wishful thinking. Jacob (2008) suggested that the MGNREGA programme has
immense potential to improve the gap between urban and rural India and lead to
rural development in terms of basic infrastructure like roads, and enhancing agri-
cultural productivity from irrigation works.
A study (ISWSD 2008) reported that in many parts of Kerala and Karnataka,
large number of workers had demanded for increasing the work days under
MGNREGA at least to 200 days per year per household. However, in both the
states, there were few complaints regarding non-payment of minimum wages. In
gross violation of the Act, workers at many MGNREGA worksites (e.g. in Uttar
Pradesh and Jharkhand) were earning less than the minimum wages. Ambasta et al.
(2008) while evaluating the performance of MGNREGA in its ﬁrst two years
highlights major issues confronting its implementation. It found that issues such as
the lack of trained professionals for time-bound implementation, understafﬁng and
delay in administration, lack of people’s planning, poor quality of works and assets
created, inappropriate schedules of rates, unnecessary bureaucratic interventions
and mockery of social audits were hindering the implementation process.
Khera (2008) reported that the role of farmer’s organization was very effective in
making MGNREGA perform better. Aiyar and Samji (2009) documented the
Andhra Pradesh experience of institutionalizing social audits into the implemen-
tation of the MGNREGA and used it to analyze the social audit process. The paper
draws on empirical work aimed at measuring the effectiveness of social audits
conducted in Andhra Pradesh between March and December 2007. The paper offers
some interesting insights into the effectiveness of regular, sustained social audits.
Emerging empirical evidence on the social audits suggests that social audits, in fact,
have a signiﬁcant and lasting effect on citizen’s awareness levels.
Khera and Nayak (2009) studied on perceptions of women workers on
MGNREGA across a vast coverage of samples from Araria and Kaimur (Bihar);
Surguja (Chhattisgarh); Palamau and Koderma (Jharkhand); Badwani and Sidhi
(Madhya Pradesh); Dungarpur and Sirohi (Rajasthan); Sitapur (Uttar Pradesh).
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They found that the participation of women workers varied largely across the states.
The overall women participation rate across sample states was 32%, whereas the
same in Rajasthan was 71%. In other states, the women participation rate varied
from the highest at 44% in Madhya Pradesh, followed by Chhattisgarh 25%,
Jharkhand 18% to the lowest at 13% in Bihar and mere 5% in Uttar Pradesh. Thus,
in all states, except in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, the women participation rate
was far lower than the 33 as stipulated the MGNREGA guideline. Of the total
sample, more than two-third of the sample workers stated that the MGNREGA had
helped them avoid hunger, while 57% reported that they could avoid migration.
A majority 79% of women workers were found to collect and keep their own
wages. The study reported major barriers to women’s participation as inflexible
social norms, illegal presence of contractors, lack of childcare facilities, and delayed
payment of wages.
Jha et al. (2009) covering 900 households examined the extent of elite capture in
MGNREGA in Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan. They observed that area of land
owned is a negative predictor of MGNREGA participation in Rajasthan, but the
situation is reversed in Andhra Pradesh indicating poor targeting due to the pos-
sibility of elite capture in that state. In another study, Jha et al. (2011) analyze the
nutritional impact of MGNREGA wage, non-MGNREGA income and Public
Distribution System (PDS) participation. It found that MGNREGA affects the
nutritional status of households with respect to two macro-nutrients, namely calo-
ries and protein as well as various micronutrients. Assessing the link between
information, access and delivery of MGNREGA in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra
and Rajasthan, Shankar et al. (2011) observed that information increases the
propensity of access by those who are not MGNREGA’s primary target, whereas,
lack of information unambiguously disadvantages the poor.
According to the NCAER-PIF study (Sharma et al. 2009), there were two
possible outcomes of MGNREGA, viz., (i) slightly improved share of ST house-
holds in employment; and (ii) that the Act outshined the earlier programmes in
terms of increased women participation. The range of wages realized by workers
under MGNREGA varied from state to state, but in a large majority of states, the
average wages were little higher compared to the statutory minimum wages.
Gaiha et al. (2009) constructed an intuitive measure of the performance of the
MGNREGA and analyzed whether excess demand under MGNREGA responds to
poverty and whether recent hikes in MGNREGA wages were inflationary. The
analysis conﬁrms responsiveness of excess demand to poverty. It was noted that the
apprehensions expressed about the inflationary potential of hikes in MGNREGA
wages were conﬁrmed. The higher MGNREGA wages were likely to undermine
self-selection of the poor in the programme. The study suggested the need for a
policy imperative in order to realize the poverty-reducing potential of MGNREGA.
Such a policy might ensure a speedier matching of demand and supply in districts
that were highly poverty prone, as also to avoid the trade-offs between poverty
reduction and inflation.
Kareemulla et al. (2010) evaluated MGNREGA in four states (viz. Rajasthan,
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra) with a speciﬁc focus on desirability,
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quality and durability of assets created and its effects on the livelihoods of bene-
ﬁciaries. They found that a wide variety of works were taken up under the scheme,
including works on soil and water conservation structures and rural roads, which
matched the requirements of the people. However, it was noted that the quality and
maintenance of assets need more attention in the coming years so that investment
made would not go futile. They concluded that scheme was achieving its primary
objective of employment generation but the assets created were generally seen as a
by-product in the study areas.
Adhikari and Bhatia (2010) reported that the direct transfer of wages into
worker’s bank accounts was a substantial protection against embezzlement and
control of corruption. Respondents had a fairly positive attitude towards bank
payments and showed their interest in learning how to use the banking system.
However, poor record-keeping, inability to cope with mass payment of MGNREGA
wages, large distance to the nearest bank or post ofﬁce caused hardship to the
workers. While the wage payment through banks was reported a positive feature,
the study exposed the limited capacity of the banking and post ofﬁce systems in
ﬁghting corruption.
Dey (2010) studied the performance of the MGNREGA from three perspectives.
It examined the targeting aspect of the programme; the efﬁciency of the imple-
menting PRI bodies; and the impact of the programme on various outcomes at the
household level. The study, covering 500 randomly selected households, 2249
individuals and 70 schemes located in 13 Gram Panchayats in Birbhum District of
West Bengal, observed that the programme was likely to be accessed by poorer
households with lower land holding status, low monthly per-capita income and
other household related characteristics.
Harish et al. (2011) evaluate the impact of MGNREGA on income generation
and labour supply in agriculture in one of the districts in the central dry zone of
Karnataka. The study showed that with the implementation of MGNREGA, the
number of days worked in a year had increased signiﬁcantly to 201 days, reflecting
16% increase. It was observed that MGNREGA contributed to an increase in
consumption expenditure while reducing the debt burden of the beneﬁciaries.
A regression analysis of the determinants of participation revealed that gender,
education and family size of the workers were signiﬁcant factors influencing the
worker’s employment under the Programme. The increase in income was to the
tune of 9% due to additional employment generated from MGNERGA. Further, the
study revealed that implementation of MGNERGA works has led to labour scarcity
to the tune of 53 and 30% for agriculture operations like weeding and sowing,
respectively. There was a decline in area for labour-intensive crops like tomato and
ragi to the extent of 30% due to MGNERGA.
Basu (2011) examines labour and output market responses to MGNREGA and
determine the optimal compensation to public work employees consistent with the
objectives of productive efﬁciency in agriculture and welfare maximization of the
labourers. By accounting for the seasonality in agricultural production and the
institution of permanent labour contracts, it shows that technological change and
productivity increases in MGNREGA programmes tend to make labourers better off
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as compared to a direct increase in the wage paid at the relief programme. Further,
an optimal wage that maximizes expected agricultural output may be in conflict
with the one that maximizes the expected lifetime utility of labourers indicating
trade-offs between different policy objectives. Further, in the event of high elasticity
of MGNREGA with respect to permanent labourers, a speciﬁc subsidy targeted
towards the hiring of permanent labourers would best serve the twin objectives of
increased expected agricultural productivity and increased welfare for the labourers.
The paper concludes that MGNREGA by introducing contestability in the agri-
cultural labour market can yield a host of interesting implications for the wage and
employment patterns of the rural poor.
Mukherjee and Sinha (2011) using a theoretical model analyzed the impact of
MGNREGA scheme on rural labour market; income of the poor households; and
overall agricultural production. It ﬁnds that the income from MGNREGA alone can
be a substantial part of the target income of the poor. The poor may exhibit a
backward bending supply curve of labour which may lead to an aggregate reduction
in agricultural output. This adverse production effect could happen even when the
MGNREGA activities lead to a moderate improvement in agricultural productivity.
Berg et al. (2012) test the impact of the MGNREGA on agricultural wages using
monthly wage data for the period 2000–11 for a panel of 249 districts across 19
states. They observed that on average MGNREGA boosts the real daily agricultural
wage rates by 5.3%. It takes 6–11 months for an MGNREGA intensity shock to
feed into higher wages. The wage effect appears to be gender-neutral and biased
towards unskilled labour. They found it was positive across different implemen-
tation stages and months and remained signiﬁcant even after controlling for rainfall,
district and time ﬁxed effects, and phase-wise linear, quadratic, and cubic time
trends.
Dutta et al. (2012) used National Sample Survey (NSS) data for 2009–10 to
verify the guarantee of employment at the stipulated wage rates to the households
seeking employment under the Act. They observed considerable unmet demand for
work under MGNREGA in all states and conﬁrmed that poorer families tend to
have more demand for work expectations on the scheme and that despite the unmet
demand; the self-targeting mechanism allows it to reach relatively poor families and
backward castes. The extent of the unmet demand is greater in the poorest states,
ironically where the scheme is needed the most. Labour-market responses to the
scheme are likely to be weak.
Imbert and Papp (2012) estimated the impact of MGNREGA on wages and
employment using NSS employment and unemployment cross-sectional data. They
used quinquennial surveys as well as thin round surveys starting from 60 rounds up
to 66th round. They found that MGNREGA increases public works employment by
0.3 person days per month, further, the casual wage income of the workers
increased by 4.5%.
Liu and Barrett (2013) using 2009–10 NSS data, analyzed patterns of
job-seeking, rationing and participation in the MGNREGA. At the national level,
they found that the self-targeting design of MGNREGA leads to greater rates of
self-selection into the programme by poorer and Scheduled Tribe or Scheduled
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Caste households. They argued that households near the poverty line were more
likely to receive the jobs they sought than were the poorer households, although
those in the upper per-capita expenditure classes were least likely to secure
MGNREGA jobs. They further observed that MGNREGA fares less well in
reaching poor female-headed households, due both to self-selection and rationing
effects. Male headed households were more likely to seek and receive MGNREGA
jobs across most of the per-capita expenditure classes. They suggest that there was
room for improvement and perhaps much to be learned from an in-depth com-
parative analysis of MGNREGA programme implementation across states that had
demonstrated greater or lesser success in targeting the poor with job opportunities.
Anderson et al. (2013) examine the role of Unique Identiﬁcation (UID) in the
functioning of MGNREGA and how this new system can bring efﬁciency in its
functioning. They use control group methodology for testing the efﬁciency of UID
system in improving MGNREGA. The new UID system will enable payments to go
through the banking system, as bank accounts for MGNREGA workers will be
linked to the UID. As a result, the actual transfer of payments will immediately
reach the hands of who it is intended for. This should drastically reduce the inherent
corruption in the current system as reported by several studies and increase the
amounts and reliability of payments to the workers.
Thus the studies covered almost all aspects of working of the MGNREGA
scheme, viz., issuance of job cards and employment generated; monitoring, regu-
lation and social audit of the scheme; fund utilization under MGNREGA; payment
of minimum wages and provision of stipulated 100 days of employment; issues of
elite capture and participation of Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and women in
the programme; impact of the Scheme on rural migration, poverty and nutrition;
assets creation under the Scheme and their usefulness; role of PRIs and decen-
tralization in decision-making; and impact of MGNREGA on agricultural wage rate
and so on. In summary, the MGNREGA Scheme has high expectations in terms of
employment generation, alleviation of poverty, food security, halting migration and
overall rural development. In the next section, we look at various aspects of the
functioning of the MGNREGA Scheme based on the secondary data portrayed on
MoRD website, followed by a section based on primary survey ﬁndings in 7 states.
The last section presents the ﬁnal conclusion and policy implications.
2.3 The Work Mechanism of MGNREGA
The thrust of MGNREGA is to build a model of governance based on the principles
of transparency and grassroots democracy. As per the Act, the village and district
panchayats will be principal authorities for planning and implementation of the
scheme. The district programme coordinator at district level and the programme
ofﬁcer at the Block level (BDO or equivalent ofﬁcer) coordinate the implementation
of MGNREGA. The Local administration is legally bound to provide work on
demand to any worker or group of workers who apply for work, within 15 days of
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receipt of a work application for public works under the MGNREGA. If the local
administration fails to provide work, an unemployment allowance is to be paid to
the workers. While 90% of the cost is borne by the Union government, payment of
unemployment allowances is borne by the State Governments. Under MGNREGA,
the emphasis is placed on labour-intensive works, thus prohibiting the use of
contractors and machinery.
As per the provision of the Act, Gram Sabha (Village Committee) is supposed to
assist in the identiﬁcation of households, and recommend developmental works and
conduct social audit of the programme. Based on the Gram Sabha’s recommen-
dation, the village panchayat will identify a shelf of projects to be taken up in its
area and will forward to the programme ofﬁcer for scrutiny. The district coordinator
is supposed to ﬁnalize and approve block-wise shelf of projects to be taken up for
implementation. Although the list of permissible works under MGNREGA is
somewhat restricted, there is ample scope for undertaking projects that provide
economically useful assets. There are several provisions which are of special
interest to women workers. First, the act mandates that at least one-third of the
workers should be women. Second, the wage earned is equal for both men and
women. Besides this, the MGNREGA also provides for childcare facilities at the
worksite. Further, in order to monitor wage payments under MGNREGA, the
Government of India has shifted from direct cash payment of wages to transfer
through bank accounts. Thus, MGNREGA includes a range of transparency mea-
sures to maximize vigilance of public funds by workers themselves.
2.3.1 Total Employment Generated and Their
Socio-economic Characteristics
The overall performance of MGNREGA in terms of numbers of days of employ-
ment created and the number of projects completed in all states during the year
2013–14 (up to the end of October 2013) are provided in Table 2.1. A total number
of 2.3 crore households were provided employment during the ﬁnancial year 2013–
14 till the latest estimates were available, and a total number of 63 crore man-days
of employment were generated through MGNREGA during this period. Looking at
the socio-economic structure of beneﬁciaries, around 23 and 15% was the share of
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes, respectively, in the total man-days gener-
ated while women had above 55% share in the total employment generated. Around
44 lakh works were taken up out of which, around 10% works were completed and
the rest 90% were ongoing at the terminal point of the study.
The MGNREGA programme has already completed more than a decade. We
have compiled data up to October 2013 as discussed above. In order to provide a
snapshot of MGNREGA work since its inception, we used the information avail-
able on the MGNREGA website which covers seven full ﬁnancial years starting
from 2006–07 up to 2012–13 and data for the ﬁnancial year up to October 2013.
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Table 2.2 provides statewise statistics on number of days of employment cre-
ated, their socio-economic characteristics and the number of projects completed and
ongoing. Overall, 81 crore households were issued job cards during the period from
2006–07 to 2013–14 (up to October). Out of which, around 35% demanded
employment and around 97.5% were provided employment. Around 34 crore
households were provided employment during the period 2006–07 to 2013–14
averaging around 4.5 crore households working in MGNREGA per annum that
constitutes roughly around 30% of the rural households in the country as a whole.
The states that employed more than 3 crore households during the implemen-
tation of this programme (2006–07 to 2013–14 up to October) were Andhra
Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh.
The states that provided employment between 1 and 3 crore households included
Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Assam, Odisha and Karnataka (Fig. 2.1). All other
states provided employment to less than one crore households. However, the more
pertinent question is how many person days of employment were generated by
different states under this programme. Figure 2.2 presents the aggregate statistics of
total person days of employment generated under MGNREGA during the period of
2006–07 to 2013–14 (up to October). A total number of 1.5 thousand crore
man-days of employment was generated under MGNREGA during the period. Out
of the total person days generated, the share of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes was 27 and 22%, respectively, while the share of women in total employ-
ment was 48% (Fig. 2.2 and Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 MGNREGA statistics for the ﬁnancial year 2013–14 (As on 6 December 2013)
Description Latest estimates
Employment provided to households (crore) 2.31
Total person days generated (crore) 62.57
Person days generated for SCs (crore) 14.45
(23.1)
Person days generated for STs (crore) 9.59
(15.33)
Person days generated for Women (crore) 34.91
(55.78)
Person days generated for Others (crore) 38.53
(61.57)
Total works taken up (lakh) 44.18
Work completed (lakh) 4.22
(9.56)
Works in progress (lakhs) 39.96
(90.44)
Note Figures in parentheses are respective percentages of total
Source http://nrega.nic.in
40 P. Kumar
T
ab
le
2.
2
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
ge
ne
ra
te
d
th
ro
ug
h
M
G
N
R
E
G
A
an
d
its
so
ci
o-
ec
on
om
ic
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
(2
00
6–
07
to
20
13
–
14
)
N
am
e
of
th
e
St
at
es
C
um
ul
at
iv
e
N
o.
of
H
H
is
su
ed
jo
b
ca
rd
s
(i
n
cr
or
es
)
N
o.
of
H
H
w
ho
ha
ve
de
m
an
de
d
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
(i
n
cr
or
es
)
N
o.
of
H
H
pr
ov
id
ed
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
(i
n
cr
or
es
)
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
H
H
pr
ov
id
ed
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
N
o.
of
da
ys
of
E
m
pl
oy
-
m
en
t
pr
ov
id
ed
(p
er
H
H
)
Pe
rs
on
da
ys
in
cr
or
es
W
or
ks
on
go
in
g
(i
n
cr
or
es
)
W
or
ks
co
m
pl
et
ed
(i
n
cr
or
es
)
T
ot
al
w
or
ks
(i
n
cr
or
es
)
W
or
ks
co
m
-
pl
et
ed
(%
)
N
o.
of
H
H
av
ai
le
d
10
0
da
ys
of
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
H
H
co
m
pl
et
ed
10
0
da
ys
of
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
T
ot
al
SC
s
(%
)
ST
s
(%
)
W
om
en
(%
)
O
th
er
s
(%
)
A
nd
hr
a
Pr
ad
es
h
8.
57
4.
08
4.
08
10
0.
00
50
.8
2
20
7.
37
25
.3
1
14
.9
1
57
.8
2
59
.7
8
1.
13
0.
22
1.
35
16
.4
0
49
0,
55
92
12
.0
2
A
ru
na
ch
al
Pr
ad
es
h
0.
09
0.
07
0.
05
74
.4
0
28
.3
2
1.
38
0.
45
87
.4
0
27
.9
4
12
.1
5
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
23
.1
2
17
,9
85
3.
70
A
ss
am
2.
54
1.
19
1.
14
96
.3
4
33
.4
7
38
.2
6
9.
22
32
.4
4
27
.9
3
58
.3
4
0.
02
0.
01
0.
03
30
.2
2
38
0,
26
6
3.
33
B
ih
ar
8.
51
2.
39
2.
32
97
.4
0
30
.9
2
71
.8
5
40
.9
5
2.
29
28
.4
2
56
.7
7
0.
12
0.
04
0.
16
25
.1
5
1,
00
3,
49
6
4.
32
C
hh
at
tis
ga
rh
2.
85
1.
80
1.
76
97
.5
3
47
.8
9
84
.0
9
12
.9
6
39
.2
9
45
.9
8
47
.7
5
0.
06
0.
05
0.
11
46
.9
2
1,
09
3,
63
1
6.
23
G
oa
0.
01
0.
00
0.
00
99
.5
3
24
.7
9
0.
10
3.
93
23
.9
7
70
.4
0
72
.2
0
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
29
.8
9
67
8
1.
74
G
uj
ar
at
2.
34
0.
61
0.
59
97
.3
6
37
.0
0
21
.8
6
11
.7
7
42
.6
7
45
.4
0
45
.5
5
0.
03
0.
05
0.
08
59
.5
6
32
1,
99
8
5.
45
H
ar
ya
na
0.
39
0.
15
0.
15
95
.7
0
39
.2
2
5.
73
51
.4
7
0.
00
36
.4
9
48
.5
2
0.
00
0.
00
0.
01
53
.0
5
63
,7
56
4.
36
H
im
ac
ha
l
Pr
ad
es
h
0.
68
0.
33
0.
31
95
.1
0
47
.9
5
14
.9
0
31
.3
5
8.
11
49
.9
8
60
.5
4
0.
03
0.
02
0.
05
45
.3
3
20
2,
03
8
6.
50
Ja
m
m
u
A
nd
K
as
hm
ir
0.
53
0.
27
0.
25
92
.2
8
43
.1
7
10
.7
8
6.
84
20
.0
2
13
.6
3
73
.1
4
0.
03
0.
01
0.
04
32
.6
2
14
7,
96
8
5.
92
Jh
ar
kh
an
d
2.
82
1.
23
1.
22
99
.2
0
42
.1
9
51
.3
3
16
.4
6
40
.8
1
32
.1
0
42
.7
4
0.
10
0.
04
0.
14
30
.9
0
52
3,
12
6
4.
30
K
ar
na
ta
ka
3.
26
1.
20
1.
13
93
.8
5
47
.2
2
53
.2
2
18
.2
6
9.
93
43
.1
7
71
.8
1
0.
17
0.
05
0.
21
21
.8
3
77
2,
30
1
6.
85
K
er
al
a
1.
52
0.
78
0.
73
93
.1
9
39
.7
9
28
.9
7
15
.9
3
3.
72
90
.9
8
80
.3
6
0.
03
0.
06
0.
09
66
.1
2
59
2,
21
2
8.
13
M
ad
hy
a
Pr
ad
es
h
8.
03
3.
04
3.
01
98
.9
7
52
.4
6
15
7.
85
18
.3
5
42
.7
3
43
.1
1
38
.9
3
0.
30
0.
14
0.
44
32
.5
9
25
15
,9
84
8.
36
M
ah
ar
as
ht
ra
4.
30
0.
67
0.
66
98
.0
6
46
.6
5
30
.8
0
12
.5
3
25
.2
7
43
.9
9
62
.2
1
0.
10
0.
01
0.
11
13
.2
6
51
1,
08
9
7.
74
M
an
ip
ur
0.
28
0.
25
0.
25
98
.4
7
59
.4
5
14
.7
3
6.
96
65
.1
4
39
.5
9
27
.9
0
0.
00
0.
00
0.
01
48
.1
0
35
8,
48
7
14
.4
7
M
eg
ha
la
ya
0.
27
0.
21
0.
20
95
.9
0
46
.0
2
9.
13
0.
53
93
.2
9
46
.5
8
6.
18
0.
01
0.
00
0.
01
31
.8
3
12
5,
78
2
6.
34
M
iz
or
am
0.
13
0.
12
0.
12
99
.1
1
71
.7
1
8.
43
0.
03
99
.7
9
31
.0
3
0.
18
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
35
.5
8
29
9,
15
0
25
.4
4
N
ag
al
an
d
0.
23
0.
22
0.
22
99
.8
7
63
.6
8
14
.0
4
0.
34
97
.5
1
33
.2
7
2.
14
0.
00
0.
00
0.
01
38
.7
6
36
9,
16
7
16
.7
5
O
di
sh
a
4.
26
1.
18
1.
13
95
.6
7
39
.9
6
45
.1
3
19
.7
7
39
.2
0
36
.9
1
41
.0
3
0.
10
0.
03
0.
13
23
.5
5
48
3,
16
5
4.
28
Pu
nj
ab
0.
49
0.
15
0.
15
95
.9
5
27
.3
7
4.
06
77
.6
5
0.
02
36
.4
6
22
.3
3
0.
01
0.
00
0.
01
36
.7
6
25
,5
21
1.
72
R
aj
as
th
an
6.
05
3.
48
3.
37
96
.6
9
60
.5
7
20
4.
10
23
.7
0
27
.4
9
67
.8
1
48
.8
1
0.
13
0.
05
0.
18
26
.5
0
5,
46
4,
90
0
16
.2
2
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
2 Employment Generation Under MGNREGA … 41
T
ab
le
2.
2
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
N
am
e
of
th
e
St
at
es
C
um
ul
at
iv
e
N
o.
of
H
H
is
su
ed
jo
b
ca
rd
s
(i
n
cr
or
es
)
N
o.
of
H
H
w
ho
ha
ve
de
m
an
de
d
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
(i
n
cr
or
es
)
N
o.
of
H
H
pr
ov
id
ed
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
(i
n
cr
or
es
)
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
H
H
pr
ov
id
ed
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
N
o.
of
da
ys
of
E
m
pl
oy
-
m
en
t
pr
ov
id
ed
(p
er
H
H
)
Pe
rs
on
da
ys
in
cr
or
es
W
or
ks
on
go
in
g
(i
n
cr
or
es
)
W
or
ks
co
m
pl
et
ed
(i
n
cr
or
es
)
T
ot
al
w
or
ks
(i
n
cr
or
es
)
W
or
ks
co
m
-
pl
et
ed
(%
)
N
o.
of
H
H
av
ai
le
d
10
0
da
ys
of
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
H
H
co
m
pl
et
ed
10
0
da
ys
of
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
T
ot
al
SC
s
(%
)
ST
s
(%
)
W
om
en
(%
)
O
th
er
s
(%
)
Si
kk
im
0.
05
0.
04
0.
03
95
.7
5
62
.7
6
2.
11
7.
46
40
.7
3
45
.0
4
51
.8
1
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
34
.6
8
59
,4
76
17
.6
9
T
am
il
N
ad
u
4.
94
3.
38
3.
37
99
.6
5
49
.3
7
16
6.
27
42
.2
6
1.
71
78
.9
8
56
.0
3
0.
04
0.
02
0.
06
37
.2
5
4,
53
2,
59
7
13
.4
6
T
ri
pu
ra
0.
42
0.
39
0.
39
99
.5
1
67
.6
0
26
.4
7
18
.6
5
43
.4
4
42
.9
6
37
.9
1
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
61
.1
4
79
2,
63
6
20
.2
4
U
tta
r
Pr
ad
es
h
9.
11
4.
07
3.
92
96
.4
7
42
.2
1
16
5.
62
47
.8
4
1.
68
19
.4
3
50
.4
8
0.
27
0.
21
0.
48
43
.7
0
2,
44
3,
74
9
6.
23
U
ttr
ak
ha
nd
0.
64
0.
28
0.
28
99
.2
4
38
.7
9
10
.7
2
23
.2
1
3.
62
41
.6
9
73
.1
7
0.
02
0.
01
0.
03
39
.6
2
93
,2
52
3.
37
W
es
t
B
en
ga
l
7.
83
3.
38
3.
27
96
.5
8
28
.3
6
92
.6
4
35
.3
4
12
.5
6
30
.3
3
52
.0
9
0.
10
0.
09
0.
19
48
.3
9
54
3,
77
8
1.
66
G
ra
nd
T
ot
al
81
.1
5
34
.9
6
34
.0
9
97
.5
1
45
.2
4
15
41
.9
4
26
.8
7
21
.9
5
48
.0
4
51
.1
8
2.
81
1.
18
3.
99
29
.5
9
28
,6
43
,7
80
8.
40
So
ur
ce
D
at
a
fr
om
N
R
E
G
A
w
eb
si
te
:
ht
tp
://
nr
eg
a.
ni
c.
in
42 P. Kumar
The undivided Andhra Pradesh topped in the generation of total person days
(207 crore), followed by Rajasthan (204 crore), Uttar Pradesh (166 crore), Tamil
Nadu (166 crore), Madhya Pradesh (158 crore) and West Bengal (93 crore) during
the reference period. On the other hand, richer states like Haryana and Punjab
generated less than 6 crore person days during the same time period. However, the
participation of economically weaker community, viz., Scheduled Castes in per-
centage of person days worked in MGNREGA was highest in the richer state like
Punjab (77%), Haryana (52%), Uttar Pradesh (48%) and Tamil Nadu (42%) while
Scheduled Tribes topped in north-eastern states like Mizoram (100%), Nagaland
(98%), Meghalaya (93%), Arunachal Pradesh (87%) and Manipur (65%). The
percentage of women share in MGNREGA work was highest in Kerala (91%),
Tamil Nadu (79%), Goa (70%), Rajasthan (68%) and Andhra Pradesh (58%).
Women share in the work was lowest in Jammu & Kashmir (only 14%), Uttar
Pradesh (19%) and Bihar, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam (28%, each).
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Statewise employment performance of MGNREGA is summarized in Fig. 2.3
for the period 2006–07 to 2013–14 (up to September). It depicts the number of days
of employment provided per household every year under MGNREGA since the
inception of the programme. A total number of 45 person days of employment has
been provided under MGNREGA at the aggregate level over the period, whereas
the target set is 100 days of employment per household. In other words, not even
half of the set target has been achieved by MGNREGA in terms of providing
employment. Only in the year 2009–10, 54 days of employment, that is slightly
above 50% of the target was achieved (Fig. 2.4). In the initial years of 2006–07 and
2007–08, a total number of 43 and 42 days of employment was generated. The
number of days had increased to 48 days in 2008–09, which went up to the
maximum of 54 days in 2009–10, but again came down to 47 days in 2010–11,
further slid down to 43 days in 2011–12, followed by a slight increase to 46 days in
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2012–13. In the last ﬁnancial year, only 33 days of employment was generated up
to the month of October 2013 which is not expected to surpass the last two years
range of above 43–46 days.
Looking at the distribution of different states (Table 2.2 and Fig. 2.3) the highest
number of days of employment (60–70 days) was reported by the north-eastern
states of Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura, Sikkim and Manipur. Among the mainland
states, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh provided between 50 and
60 days of employment. The states that lie in the middle providing 40–50 days of
employment included, Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka,
Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand and Odisha. The states, namely, Haryana,
Jammu & Kashmir, Uttrakhand, Gujarat, Kerala and Assam may be considered as
low performing as they provided only 30–40 days of employment per household
per annum. The states that lie at the bottom included Bihar (31 days), Arunachal
Pradesh, West Bengal and Punjab (28 days each) and Goa (25 days) of
employment.
We now turn to the question, ‘how successful the MGNREGA programme has
been in providing 100 days of employment to those who demanded work?’ While
the per household average employment provided in all the states was far less than
100 days at the aggregate level, there were some households who completed
100 days of work in MGNREGA. Table 2.2 provides statistics on the number of
households who availed 100 days of employment in each state during the whole
period of analysis. Out of the total 34 crore households working in MGNREGA
during the reference period, only 2.9 crore households (ie. 7.65%) completed
100 days of employment. Among the states, Rajasthan provided 100 days
employment to 55 lakh households, followed by Andhra Pradesh (49 lakh house-
holds), Tamil Nadu (45 lakh households) and Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh
(25 lakh households each). On the other side, the richer states like Haryana pro-
vided only 64 thousand households and Punjab only 25 thousand households
hundred days of employment under MGNREGA since its inception.
It is interesting to note that while bigger states, like Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh
and Tamil Nadu had topped in the completion of hundred days of employment, it
was the north-eastern states that topped in the percentage of households who
completed hundred days out of the total households working in MGNREGA.
Around 25% of the beneﬁciary households completed 100 days in Mizoram, 20%
in Tripura, 18% in Sikkim and Nagaland each, 16% in Rajasthan and 14% in
Manipur. Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh were the other states where around 10–
13% households completed hundred days of employment. Goa, Punjab and West
Bengal were at the bottom where only less than 2% households completed hundred
days of employment (Fig. 2.5). At the national level, only 8.4% households com-
pleted hundred days of employment during the entire period of MGNREGA
implementation till October 2013. This indicates the ineffectiveness of the pro-
gramme in providing hundred days work to all household who opted for working in
the MGNREGA programme.
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2.3.2 Number of Projects Completed and Total Amount
Spent
There are around nine broad categories of works in which MGNREGA wage
earners are employed. They are: (a) rural connectivity; (b) flood control and pro-
tection; (c) water conservation and water harvesting; (d) drought prooﬁng; (e) mi-
croirrigation works; (f) provision of irrigation facility to land owned by SCs, STs
and others; (g) renovation of traditional water bodies; (h) land development; and
(i) other activities approved by Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD),
Government of India.
The percentage distribution of works completed or ongoing during the entire
period of MGNREGA implementation up to October 2013 is shown in Fig. 2.7.
Among the different activities undertaken, water conservation was the leading
activity which occupied around 24% projects (completed or under progress). This
was followed by Rural connectivity projects (17%), Provision of irrigation (14%),
Drought prooﬁng (13%), Land development (10%), Renovation of traditional water
bodies and Microirrigation (6% each) and Flood control (3%). Other works,
including Rajiv Gandhi Seva Kendra occupied around 7% among the total works
completed or undergoing during the reference period (Fig. 2.6).
Statewise details of works completed/under progress are given in Table 2.3,
while Table 2.4 presents the details of the total amount spent on each programme
under MGNREGA up to December 2012. It reveals that a total number of 1 crore
projects were completed and around 2.9 crore were ongoing during the reporting
period. Out of total 4 crore projects taken up, around 30% were completed and rest
70% was in progress. Total amount spent on the above projects aggregated to
` 103,204 crores (44%) on the completed projects and ` 131,880 crores (56%) on
the ongoing projects during the period. Thus, a total of ` 235,084 crore was spent
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
Fig. 2.5 Percentage of HH completed hundred days of employment during 2006–07 to 2013–14
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on the MGNREGA during the period spanning seven and a half years since its
launching, with an average of slightly less than ` 30 thousand crore every year.
While presenting the national budget for the ﬁnancial year 2013–14, the then
Finance Minister allocated a sum of ` 33 thousand crore for MGNREGA work
during the ﬁnancial year 2013–14. Working out the total expenditure incurred per
project for the completed projects, it turned out to be around ` 87 thousand per
project (completed) while it was ` 47 thousand per project (ongoing works) giving
a combined average of ` 59 thousand cost per project for all MGNREGA works
undertaken so far at the aggregate level.
Figure 2.7 presents the status of works completed or ongoing for each of the
above nine categories of activities during the reporting period. Out of the total
4 crore projects undertaken, around 96 lakh projects (24%) were taken for water
conservation, 67 lakh (17%) for rural connectivity, 58 lakh (15%) for provision of
irrigation, 52 lakh (13%) for drought prooﬁng, 40 lakh (10%) for land development
and 23 lakh for renovation of traditional water bodies and microirrigation, each and
around 13 lakh (6%) for the flood control and protection. The total amount spent on
completed and ongoing projects during the reporting period is given in Table 2.4,
which show that a sum total of ` 2.35 lakh crore were spent on MGNREGA works
during the reference period.
Out of this, an amount of ` 75 thousand crore (32%) was spent on rural connec-
tivity, ` 45 thousand crore (19%) onwater conservation, ` 27 (11.5%) and 25 (10.6%)
thousand crore on renovation of traditional water bodies and drought prooﬁng,
respectively, ` 17 thousand crore (7.2%) on provision of irrigation, ` 16 thousand
crore (6.8%) on land development, ` 12 thousand crore (5.1%) on microirrigation,
` 11 thousand crore (4.7%) on flood control and around ` 6 thousand crore (2.6%) on
other activities including Bharat Nirman Works (Table 2.4).
Looking at the statewise numbers of works completed or ongoing under
MGNREGA, Andhra Pradesh topped the list with a sum of 135 lakhs works
Water 
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and Water 
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24%
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Provision of 
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bodies
6%
Micro Irriga?on Works
6%
Flood 
Control
3%
Fig. 2.6 Share of different
activities in MGNREGA
work during 2006–07 to
2013–14
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undertaken during the entire period. Uttar Pradesh was second with 48 lakh works
followed by Madhya Pradesh (44 lakh works). Karnataka, Rajasthan, West Bengal,
Bihar, Jharkhand and Odisha fall in the middle order with a number of projects
ranging between 20 and 10 lakh. The states that lie in the lower stratum included
Meghalaya, Nagaland, Punjab, Haryana and Manipur with numbers of projects
between 50 and 100 thousand, while Mizoram, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh and
Goa had less than 50 thousand projects.
Glancing through the total budget spent on the completed and ongoing projects
by different states as presented in Table 2.4, it may be noted that Uttar Pradesh
topped the list with a total budget of ` 26 thousand crore, closely followed by
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh with almost similar amount spent
on all projects at the aggregate. Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, Tamil
Nadu and Bihar spent slightly less each varying between ` 13 thousand and
18 thousand crore. Nagaland, Manipur, Uttarakhand, Jammu & Kashmir,
Meghalaya, Haryana and Mizoram spent only around or less than two thousand
crore each, while Punjab, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh and Goa lie at the bottom
with less than one thousand crore spent on MGNREGA during the period.
The expenditure incurred on the completed and ongoing projects was not exactly
similar to that of allocation of projects in different states indicating cost differences
across the projects as well as per project cost across states. While an average
amount of around ` 59 thousand was spent per project at the aggregate level, the
highest amount per project was spent on the renovation of traditional water bodies,
ie. ` 121 thousand. It was followed by ` 112 thousand per project on rural con-
nectivity. Flood control was in the third place with an expenditure of ` 79 thousand
per project. Micro irrigation had a spending of ` 53 thousand per project followed
by drought prooﬁng ` 49 thousand per project, water conservation ` 47 thousand
per project, land development ` 40 thousand per project and provision of irrigation
` 29 thousand per project (Fig. 2.8).
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Thus, while water conservation topped in the total numbers of projects under-
taken, the spending on per project was much less on water conservation compared
to rural connectivity that topped among all projects not only in the total amount
spent but also amount spent per project. Statewise total expenditure per project
(aggregate of all categories) is presented in Fig. 2.9. Highest amount per project
was spent in Manipur (` 297 thousand), followed by Nagaland (` 245 thousand),
Mizoram (` 269 thousand), Tamil Nadu (` 255 thousand), Assam (` 191 thousand)
and Maharashtra (` 160 thousand). The states that were at the bottom in spending
per project were Andhra Pradesh (` 18 thousand), Gujarat (` 41 thousand),
Karnataka and Goa (` 48 thousand), Kerala (` 49 thousand) and Uttar Pradesh
(` 54 thousand) only.
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Fig. 2.8 Amount spent under MGNREGA (`1000 per project) during 2006–07 to 2013–14
(`1000 per project)
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2.3.3 Performance of MGNREGA—Some Qualitative
Indicators
Table 2.5 provides details of social auditing and inspection carried out for
MGNREGA work in different states in India. The Gram Panchayats open muster
rolls to carry out registration of workers demanding employment under
MGNREGA. These muster rolls are veriﬁed under social auditing. During 2008–09
to 2013–14 (up to October), a total number of 10.52 crore muster rolls were opened
at the aggregate (all states) out of which around 85% were veriﬁed by the
authorities who carried out the auditing work. The veriﬁcation process was more
than 70% in all the states except West Bengal, where it was only 59%. Social
auditing of MGNREGA work of the Gram Panchayats (GP) was held in around
87% of the GPs during 2008–09 to 2013–14. The social audit was held in above
90% GPs in Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh, Kerala and Nagaland, whereas, it was
held in less than 60% GPs in Arunachal Pradesh, around 60–65% GPs in Jammu &
Kashmir and Karnataka.
As regards the inspection of the MGNREGA works taken up by GPs, it is
mandated that regular inspections are conducted both at the district and block
levels. In this regard, the percentage of works inspected at the district level was very
low, ie. only 12%, whereas the works inspected at the block level were as high as
81% during the period. Almost half of the works were inspected at the district level
in Arunachal Pradesh while the proportion of inspected works was half to one-third
in Assam, Sikkim, Nagaland and Kerala. In rest of the states, less than one-third
works were being inspected at the district level. On the other hand, West Bengal,
Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra had less than half of the works inspected at the
block level. In Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh and Tamil Nadu almost all the works taken
were being inspected at the block level, while in rest of the states, more than half to
three-fourth works taken up were inspected at the block level.
Complaint redressed system was adopted under MGNREGA and a total number
of 215,542 complaints were registered in all the states during the period of analysis,
out of which, around 84% were redressed. Complaint redressed was 100% in Goa,
Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram. It was less than 80% in Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Odisha, West Bengal and Gujarat while in rest of the states; over 80%
complaints were redressed. MGNREGA not only provides employment to the
households but also brings awareness among the households.
The efforts are being made to bring more transparency in the payment system.
The Gram Panchayats are encouraged to make payments to the workers through
banks or post ofﬁce. The number of active bank accounts exceeded 20 crore on
individual accounts and 3 crore on joint accounts during the period. Similarly, the
active post ofﬁce accounts during the same years exceeded 15 crore on individual
accounts and around 1.8 crore on joint accounts. Thus, a total number of 41 crore
individual and joint accounts in post ofﬁces and banks were operative through
which payments were made for MGNREGA works (Table 2.6).
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Looking at the statewise performance, the highest number of bank and post
ofﬁce accounts were operative in Andhra Pradesh (6.4 crore), Rajasthan (4.4 crore),
Uttar Pradesh (3.7 crore), Tamil Nadu (3.6 crore) and Madhya Pradesh (3.5 crore)
during the reporting period. The north-eastern states, namely Manipur, Meghalaya,
Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh were at the bottom having less
than 10 lakh accounts in operation for MGNREGA.
The more important issue is how much amount was being paid through these
accounts under MGNREGA. Table 2.6 also presents the amount disbursed through
bank/post ofﬁce for making MGNREGA payments to the households employed.
A total sum of ` 81 thousand crore were disbursed through banks and post ofﬁces
during the period, out of which, ` 51 thousand crore (63%) were through banks and
` 30 thousand crore (37%) through the post ofﬁces. Statewise, the highest amount
was disbursed by Uttar Pradesh (` 12.5 thousand crore), followed by Andhra
Pradesh (around ` 12 thousand crore), Rajasthan (` 11 thousand crore), Madhya
Pradesh (` 9 thousand crore) and Karnataka (around ` 5 thousand crore).
Arunachal Pradesh in North East was at the bottom in disbursal of total amount
through banks and post ofﬁces.
It is interesting to note that out of the total amount paid through banks and post
ofﬁces in MGNREGA, the average amount paid through bank/post ofﬁce per
account was ` 1.97 lakh. Statewise, the highest amount paid per account was in
Nagaland (` 24 lakh), Meghalaya (` 9.5 lakh), Mizoram (` 6 lakh), Sikkim
(` 5.8 lakh) and Tripura (` 3.8 lakh). The lowest amount was paid in Tamil Nadu
(only ` three thousand), Bihar (` 1 lakh) and Gujarat (` 1.2 lakh).
Table 2.7 shows the unemployment allowance paid to the households in lieu of
not being able to provide employment to them after having registered a household’s
name for MGNREGA work. According to the legislation on MGNREGA, if a
member of a household has not been provided employment after issuing him/her a
job card after a lapse of 15 days, the GPs are supposed to provide unemployment
allowance and such amount would be borne by the concerned state government.
Following this rule, during the period 2007–08 to 2013–14 (up to October)
unemployment allowance was due for 4.83 crore person days for which employ-
ment was not provided to the job card holders.
However, there was hardly any unemployment allowance paid to the job card
holders as only in West Bengal, Nagaland, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh
and few other unemployment allowances were paid for few days. Even in the states
where some unemployment allowance was paid, the amount paid per day was much
less than the stipulated minimum wages set by the states, except the case of Tamil
Nadu. However, it is interesting to note that the allowance paid even in those states
was only a small fraction of the total number of days for which unemployment
allowance was due. At the aggregate, out of 4.83 crore days for which unem-
ployment allowance was due only 2478 days of allowance was paid that makes
only 0.01% days of unemployment allowance paid and it was not more than 0.04%
in any state.
2 Employment Generation Under MGNREGA … 59
T
ab
le
2.
7
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
al
lo
w
an
ce
s
pa
id
in
lie
u
of
no
t
pr
ov
id
in
g
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
(2
00
7–
08
to
20
13
–
14
)
Sl
.N
o.
St
at
e
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
ta
llo
w
an
ce
du
e
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
al
lo
w
an
ce
pa
id
A
m
ou
nt
pa
id
R
s.
pe
r
da
y
%
D
ay
s
fo
r
w
hi
ch
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
ta
llo
w
an
ce
pa
id
N
o.
of
da
ys
N
o.
of
da
ys
A
m
ou
nt
(i
n
R
s.
)
1
A
nd
hr
a
Pr
ad
es
h
0
0
0
0
0.
00
2
A
ru
na
ch
al
Pr
ad
es
h
1,
54
7,
35
2
0
0
0
0.
00
3
A
ss
am
37
,0
64
0
0
0
0.
00
4
B
ih
ar
1,
27
0,
14
8
0
0
0
0.
00
5
C
hh
at
tis
ga
rh
1,
11
1,
26
4
0
0
0
0.
00
6
G
oa
83
,0
88
19
14
38
.5
76
0.
02
7
G
uj
ar
at
69
2,
11
7
19
18
20
96
0.
00
8
H
ar
ya
na
18
,9
30
0
0
0
0.
00
9
H
im
ac
ha
l
Pr
ad
es
h
62
1,
27
0
12
13
20
11
0
0.
00
10
Ja
m
m
u
&
K
as
hm
ir
4,
88
9,
44
0
33
11
46
35
0.
00
11
Jh
ar
kh
an
d
12
9,
93
6
0
0
0
0.
00
12
K
ar
na
ta
ka
74
5,
27
6
32
2
10
,8
36
34
0.
04
13
K
er
al
a
77
5,
61
1
31
10
38
33
0.
00
14
M
ad
hy
a
Pr
ad
es
h
62
7,
76
3
21
12
14
58
0.
00
15
M
ah
ar
as
ht
ra
41
3,
62
1
0
0
0
0.
00
16
M
an
ip
ur
1,
23
8,
99
3
0
0
0
0.
00
17
M
eg
ha
la
ya
27
6,
80
7
0
0
0
0.
00
18
M
iz
or
am
1,
34
2,
04
5
0
0
0
0.
00
19
N
ag
al
an
d
2,
08
0,
54
7
66
3
11
,6
20
18
0.
03
20
O
di
sh
a
22
6,
00
4
0
0
0
0.
00
21
Pu
nj
ab
3,
35
8,
23
2
71
62
38
88
0.
00
22
R
aj
as
th
an
68
0,
96
0
15
12
00
80
0.
00
23
Si
kk
im
14
5,
01
4
0
0
0
0.
00
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
60 P. Kumar
T
ab
le
2.
7
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
Sl
.N
o.
St
at
e
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
ta
llo
w
an
ce
du
e
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
al
lo
w
an
ce
pa
id
A
m
ou
nt
pa
id
R
s.
pe
r
da
y
%
D
ay
s
fo
r
w
hi
ch
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
ta
llo
w
an
ce
pa
id
N
o.
of
da
ys
N
o.
of
da
ys
A
m
ou
nt
(i
n
R
s.
)
24
T
am
il
N
ad
u
86
2,
56
4
28
2
99
,9
24
35
4
0.
03
25
T
ri
pu
ra
74
,4
05
6
60
0
10
0
0.
01
26
U
tta
r
Pr
ad
es
h
69
0,
63
5
21
8
24
,6
20
11
3
0.
03
27
U
ttr
ak
ha
nd
6,
01
2,
67
7
7
43
0
61
0.
00
28
W
es
t
B
en
ga
l
18
,4
09
,9
04
75
9
16
,5
74
.5
22
0.
00
T
ot
al
48
,3
61
,6
67
24
78
18
0,
01
9
73
0.
01
So
ur
ce
D
at
a
fr
om
N
R
E
G
A
w
eb
si
te
:
ht
tp
://
nr
eg
a.
ni
c.
in
2 Employment Generation Under MGNREGA … 61
2.4 Performance of MGNREGA—Some Field
Observations
In this section, we present some observations based on ﬁeld survey data and group
discussion carried out across seven states from the North, South and Western parts
of the country. Table 2.8 presents a summary of the observations obtained from the
surveyed states during the year 2009–10. According to the secondary sources, on
average, around 40–50 days of employment was generated per household in each
selected state. However, the selected households obtained more number of days
compared to the estimates provided by the government sources. Among our
selected households, 100 days employment was obtained by the households in
Maharashtra, 94 days in Haryana, 92 days in Himachal Pradesh, above 80 days in
Rajasthan and Gujarat, 76 days in Karnataka and 54 days in Punjab (Fig. 2.10).
The secondary sources indicated that out of all the projects taken up during the
last three years (from 2008 to 2011), the completion rate varied from 17 to 60% in
different states as the works undertaken involved 1–2 years, such as programmes
like watershed management, water conservation and microirrigation. Those
households who obtained work worked for few days to maximum of 100 days and
the percentage of households who obtained work for 100 days varied from less than
2% in Punjab to 24% in Rajasthan (Fig. 2.11). The households who register for
work under MGNREGA, if not provided work, are supposed to be compensated
with unemployment allowance. But except a few cases in Maharashtra and
Karnataka, none of the households were given unemployment allowance although
in all the states the amount was reported to be due for payment for such households.
Now, turning to the observations obtained from the household survey, on an
average, the size of the family working in MGNREGA averaged around 5 members
out of which, 1–2 members were found working in MGNREGA for some time
period. The share of female in the household members working in MGNREGA was
less than half in some of the states while in others it was recorded more than half,
e.g. in Rajasthan, Gujarat and Punjab. The percentage share of work obtained by the
selected households under MGNREGA varied from 12% (lowest) to 25% (highest).
Similarly, the share of wages obtained from MGNREGA in the total income of the
beneﬁciary households was 9–28% (Fig. 2.12).
Thus, we ﬁnd that MGNREGA succeeded in providing some livelihood security
to the households at the crunch situation when getting work elsewhere becomes
difﬁcult because of the ongoing off-season in agriculture and related activities.
Providing some employment opportunities to the households during such periods to
maintain their food and livelihood security has been the basic objective of
MGNREGA programme.
Although wage rate paid under MGNREGA was observed slightly less than the
stipulated Minimum Wage Rate as declared by the legislation in different states,
except Himachal Pradesh, there was no difference in the wage rate paid to the male
and female workers (Fig. 2.13). On the other hand, wages in the open market differ
quite substantially and female wage is sometimes found less than half of that
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obtained by the male for the same kind of activities. Thus, MGNREGA has suc-
ceeded in bringing down the incidence of exploitation of female labour on the work
site by offering them equal remuneration as per that of male workers. Further, in
order to check the impact of MGNEREGA on household migration from rural to
urban areas, we enquired about the number of household members migrating to
other places in search of job and whether there are incidences where members of
these families are returning back to work under MGNREGA attracted by the
availability of work within the residence premises and henceforth not migrating in
search of job.
Fig. 2.10 Employment generated per household under MGNREGA (no of days). Source Field
survey
Fig. 2.11 Percentage of households employed 100 days. Source Field survey
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Our results showed that there are some instances where few members are still
migrating to the city with the lure of getting better wage rate there. There were also
instances where household members returned back to work under MGNREGA after
employment opportunities were available within their villages. However, since the
incidences of members migrating in search of a better job in cities and members
returning back to the village to work in MGNREGA were found with no signiﬁcant
difference, it is difﬁcult to conclude whether MGNREGA has been successful in
arresting migration of households to cities in search of work. However, those
members who returned back to work in MGNREGA after the beginning of this
programme signiﬁcantly indicated that they have been better off after relocating to
the village and getting employment within the village.
In response to our question whether MGNREGA has been successful in pro-
viding food security to the households in the villages by providing them extra
purchasing power, a majority of them agreed with their consent to the above
question. This was also conﬁrmed by the villagers with whom we had a special
group discussion in each selected village. However, there was an overwhelming
opposite view in the village against the MGNREGA programme.
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Fig. 2.12 MGNREGA’s share in employment and income (%). Source Field survey
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The farming community in the village was of the opinion that since much of the
local labour force is engaged by MGNREGA programme for working in
non-farming activities, they were ﬁnding it difﬁcult to get labour for agricultural
purposes especially in the peak sowing and harvesting seasons. Majority of vil-
lagers indicated that after implementation of MGNREGA programme, there has
been shortage of labour force in agriculture sector and thereby leading to an
increase in labour and ultimately production cost in the agriculture sector that might
affect adversely the food production and food security in the long run. The solution
to the above problem is to undertake MGNREGA activities only during the lean
agricultural season and bringing the farming related activities under the
MGNREGA programme.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
In the three phases of MGNREGA implementation in India from 2006–07 to 2013–
14 (up to October) 81 crore households were issued job cards across the states, out
of which, around 34 crore households were provided employment averaging
around 4.5 crore households. Indeed, this is a commendable achievement, as the
coverage under MGNREGA constitutes roughly around 30% of the rural house-
holds in the country as a whole. A total number of 1.5 thousand crore man-days of
employment was generated during the reference period.
Out of the total person days generated, the share of Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes was 27 and 22%, respectively, while the share of women in the
total employment was 48.0%. The undivided Andhra Pradesh topped in the gen-
eration of total person days, followed by Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh Madhya Pradesh,
Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. A total number of 45 person days of employment
was provided under MGNREGA during the period, while the target set under the
programme is 100 days of employment per household.
The surveyed villages present a mixed picture with some villages having perfect
infrastructure like road, post ofﬁce, bank, SHG, school, primary health centre, FPS,
etc. while others had to travel some distance to approach the same. During the last
ten years, there has been a slight change in the occupation structure in the selected
villages. The prevailing wage rates in agriculture were fluctuating widely. Increase
in wage rate in agriculture more than most of the other activities within the village
indicate the enhanced demand for wage labourers due to employment works in
MGNREGA that goes parallel with the agriculture sector thereby causing a com-
petition in the labour market for the agriculture sector.
Increases in charges for agricultural operations per acre on an average were
almost similar to increase in agricultural wages as overall wages observed an
increase of around 49% compared to around 46% increase in the cost of per acre
agricultural operations as per our group discussion data. A majority of the villages
indicated shortage of agricultural labour, which has increased after the implemen-
tation of MGNREGA. In majority of the villages the shortage of labour was
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observed during the sowing and harvesting months of kharif and rabi seasons
especially in the months of July, August and September and March and April. This
was more so after the implementation of MGNREGA. A majority of villagers were
of the view that after MGNREGA implementation cost of production in agriculture
has increased by 10–20% because of the scarcity of labour.
On the question, whether workers who earlier migrated out of the village to work
in the city are now coming back to work in MGNREGA, the trend of villagers
returning back to the village to work in MGNREGA was found more prevalent in
Himachal Pradesh and Karnataka while reverse was the case in Gujarat. But a
majority of participants in the discussion indicated that MGNREGA has not made
any signiﬁcant changes in the migration pattern in the village.
Another point of debate was how the MGNREGA has affected living standards
of villagers, a clear majority indicated that MGNREGA has not been successful in
raising their living standards or their consumption level and the reasons was quoted
that the programme has not provided enough numbers of days of work to make a
signiﬁcant dent on the poverty level, although a minority of them were of the view
that MGNREGA has been successful in doing so, to some extent. The latter ones
indicated that MGNREGA has improved living standards by providing work within
the village and by ensuring same wage rate to female as equal to that of the male.
To another question, whether MGNREGA has changed the trend of attached
labour in agriculture, a signiﬁcant majority agreed on this, as people were getting
better payments within the village compared to agricultural work so the trends of
attached labour for the agricultural work were declining. However, MGNREGA has
certainly increased peoples’ awareness towards Government schemes through
increase in the showcasing by television, newspaper, Gram Panchayat and Gram
Sabhas and by other media. Among the selected states, in Rajasthan, Maharashtra
and Gujarat, a clear majority of the discussants expressed that the household
consumption, as well as enrollment of children in the school have increased after
implementation of MGNREGA that has provided extra purchasing power in the
hands of the villagers.
On the question of awareness, almost all states observed increased awareness of
the households towards existing government schemes because of their participation
in the Gram Sabha and also because of joint working opportunities in MGNREGA.
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Chapter 3
MGNREGS Implementations
and the Dynamics of Rural Labour
Markets
D. Narasimha Reddy, A. Amarender Reddy, Madhusudan Bhattarai,
N. Nagaraj and Cynthia Bantilan
3.1 Introduction
Recently, labour scarcity has emerged as one of the major constraints leading to an
increase in agricultural production cost in India. Therefore, in this chapter, evaluation
of differential impacts of MGNREGA on the extent of fulﬁlment of the basic enti-
tlements such as days of employment, wages and earnings and the extent of coverage
of social groups like dalits, adivasis, women members and poverty alleviation has
been done. Then, this chapter also analyze state level data by disaggregating by
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socials classes, men and women and to the factors that make a difference to the
performance. Also, some micro-level ﬁndings and alternate scenarios are presented
based on the ﬁndings based on a series of focus group discussions (FGDs) conducted
in the villages of Andhra Pradesh. The secondary data presented on agriculture and
rural labour markets are largely based on the ofﬁcial sources of data and from other
studies made on different aspects of the scheme (Reddy et al. 2014).
Though, national economy of India has been growing at a rapid pace in the past
two decades, there is a widely shared view that the increase in employment has not
been commensurate with growth in the national economy. While faster growth of
economy is beneﬁcial to various stakeholders, the employment growth is more
critical to reduce poverty in the economy. The policy initiatives directly addressing
poverty reduction may be grouped into three types. They are:
(a) Institutional measures such as strengthening organization of the poor to enable
them to acquire better capabilities like the promotion community based orga-
nizations (CBOs), provision of targeted credit, etc.
(b) Transfer payments which include direct cash transfers, pensions or indirect
transfers like subsidized food and essentials through Public Distribution System
(PDS).
(c) Provision of self-employment and wage employment programmes to the tar-
geted group of population in the economy.
The experience of welfare programmes in India shows that considerable efforts
have been made on all three modes in terms of effectiveness in their implementation
and providing wider coverage to all the needed population. Here, we concentrate on
one of the major initiatives, viz. Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) of 2005, and the resultant Schemes and its implica-
tions on rural employment.
3.2 Fixation of Wages
The issue of wage rate for MGNREGS has been a subject of controversy since its
initiation as an Act in 2005, because it is not ﬁxed as a uniform daily wage rate
applicable to all states at the same level. Nor it is linked to statutory minimum
wages, which vary from State to State. Except in Himachal Pradesh, the wage
payments under MGNREGS is done in terms of piece rate linked to the ‘Standard
Schedule of Rates’ (SSRs) followed by the Public Works Departments, rather the
MGNREGA wage varies from states to state due to the local economy-related
factors. This brings-in the issues of fairness of rates, fair in time measurement,
employment hours of work, etc. Details are in Boxes 3.1 and 3.2.
One of the basic principles followed is payment of an equal level of wages to
male and female workers participating under the MGNREGA schemes. When the
Scheme was launched in 2006, an indicative wage rate of ` 80 per person day was
proposed. This meant that workers engaged under MGNREGS would be assigned
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physically measurable work equivalent to ` 80 as per the Standard Schedule of
Rates followed in the state. Later, in 2009, the indicative wage rate was raised to
` 100 per person day, further, it was agreed to revise the base wage rate of ` 100
indexed on the basis of inflation rate in each of the states over the years.
Box 3.1: Payment of Wages
Assured minimum wages and timely payment of the same are basic entitle-
ments under MGNREGS. But it turned out to be a controversial issue because
of the complexity involved. The complexity is because of the choice of the
mode of payment under MGNREGS. Except Himachal Pradesh, all states in
the country are required to pay MGNREGS wages on piece rate basis, not on
time rate or daily wages. This is the beginning of the problem. The assured
minimum wage that is ﬁxed under MGNREGS is to be realized through the
physically measurable equivalent of work. This leads to the second problem
of acceptable Standard Schedule of Rates (SSRs). The third problem is a
timely measurement of work that is done. How frequently it should be done,
who should do it and who should approve it, are the questions often raised.
Fourth problem is who should pay wages? Implementing agency or an
independent agency? How to integrate these steps? And at the end of it, how
to ensure timely payment?
For instance, Andhra Pradesh government dealt with these problems
systematically. Since the SSRs used in contract works involves machines,
these rates are not comparable to solely manual work as stipulated under
MGNREGS. The Engineering Staff College of India was commissioned by
the Government of Andhra Pradesh to make work–time–motion studies and
suggest amendments to SSRs to ensure minimum wages under MGNREGS.
The results showed that according to existing SSRs, even after a day’s work,
the wages would be only one-third to one-half of the stipulated minimum
wage under MGNREGS. Based on the study, the government of Andhra
Pradesh revised the SSRs for MGNREGS by reducing the physical quantity
by one-third to one-half. In fact, this change was accepted by the Union
MoRD and was recommended to other States to follow a similar methodol-
ogy. Still there were complaints that there were no rates in SSRs for certain
tasks like, for example, ‘tank silt’, jungle and bush clearance, etc. The state
government took the help of NGOs like Centre for Environment Concerns
(CEC) to carry further studies, particularly focused on women’s tasks in
MGNREGS works. Based on the results of these studies the SSRs were
further revised reducing the load of work to match one day’s work to mini-
mum wages.
The second problem of measurement is solved by the twin approaches of
‘single-pit’ or appropriate marking of the worksite and by ﬁxing the visit of
technical assistant on ﬁxed day in a week for each cluster and logging the
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same in the muster. Recently, there has been further technological up gra-
dation of the system by developing software to transfer measurements
through cell phone.1 The third problem of agency of payment was solved by
opting for postofﬁces and banks for payment using latest technology
including biometrics. For making the system work smoothly coordination
meetings are held between the Divisional level postal ofﬁcials and the District
level rural development ofﬁcials on a ﬁxed schedule twice a month. All this
also has been changing fast. Presently, AP has moved from payment through
postofﬁce to payment by biometric smart card system operated by O-Mass
Agency. At each Panchayat, the system is operated by a women candidate
sponsored by the village organization of SHGs. Payments are made based on
a biometric device which is linked to a bank by a cell phone. The system is
amazingly simple and the village coordinators handle up to Rs. 2 lakh a peak
payments day.2 The Technical Support Unit (TSU) of the A.P State
Employment Guarantee Council, of which the Chief Minister is the
Chairman, took direct interest and initiated a few pilot projects to test dif-
ferent models and chose the one which ensures payment in less than a week.
With a view to avoid bogus attendance and to check instances of tempering
and misuse of muster rolls, the e-Muster system has been introduced. For
smooth fund flows cross-systems, the electronic Fund Management System.
(e-FMS) has been introduced recently. This also reduces delays in payment of
wages. Likewise, kwage payments under MGNREGA has been now linked
with Aadhaar numbers in 300 Direct Beneﬁt Transfer (DBT) districts which
will eliminate ghost beneﬁciaries and for a faster disbursement of wages.
Under this new plan, wage payments will be routed directly into the accounts
of the beneﬁciaries using electronic transfer systems.
1It is called Electronic Muster Measurement System (e-MMS). Under this system the Village
Assistant records measurement every day and transfers the ‘e-muster’ through cell phone. The
Technical Assistant takes the measurements every week and transfer the ‘e-measurement’ data to
the mandal by cell phone. The Engineering Consultant (two or three for each mandal) makes
‘e-check measurement’ and the Mandal Programme Ofﬁcer acts as the ‘e-muste veriﬁcation ofﬁ-
cer’ with power to verify and consolidate the information.
2The person chosen is one of the Vice-Presidents of the Village Organization of SHGs. Often she
is also an MGNREGS worker. She is paid a commission of Rs. 500 per Rs. 1 lakh.
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Box 3.2: Wage Determination and Work Measurement Issues in Group
Basedworks
A peculiar problem was observed in Rajasthan. Usually large numbers of
workers were present at worksites, up to 50–70 persons and they were further
divided into teams to undertake tasks (Khera 2008). Gender and caste-related
issues surfaced in some cases. It was found that only some members of the
group worked, while others shirked, assuming they would be paid anyway.
As a result of this one could ﬁnd 70 year olds and even some college students
at the worksite during their summer holidays, not undertaking work but
merely hanging around. In Tonk district were found some people playing
cards at the worksite. Moreover, members of dominant communities such as
Gujjar and Jat did not work, but threatened associates and ofﬁcials to mark
their attendance so that they could claim wages.
But there is also evidence to the contrary. In Andhra Pradesh, there were
three instances where weak, elderly and female workers were allowed lighter
tasks. Lactating mothers were also allowed to break in order to breastfeed. In
these cases, wages were shared equally by consensus among the groups.
However, there were also cases where male labourers in a mixed group did
not work hard, making women to do much of the work, and leading to female
labourers preferring to work without men in their groups. The programme
ofﬁcer in charge of NREGA in Tonk District mentioned that they were
experimenting by trying to make separate groups for males and females, but
often this too was not preferred.
One of the reasons for low daily wages in Rajasthan is crowding at
worksites. In one instance in Nadri Panchayat of Tonk District, an area with
hard soil and rock, after the division of wages among workers, only Rs. 1 per
day accrued to each of them due to the large number of workers, suboptimal
work output and the outdated schedule of rates (SOR), specifying quantum of
work to be completed to earn minimum wages. On the contrary, in another
village where the numbers of ‘sitting’ labourers were few in number, wages
were above Rs. 80.
Source Reddy et al. 2010.
Table 3.1 presents information on the average wage rate paid per person per day
under MGNREGA scheme from 2006–07 to 2011–12. The average wage rates are
derived by dividing the total MGNREGA wage expenditure in the state by the
person days of employment provided in the state in the year concerned. The derived
wage rate per person may not be adequate to conclude whether the concerned state
is doing better or worse in terms of supplementing the earnings of rural households
through the scheme. A better indicator is the total earnings per household under the
scheme, which depends not only on the wage level but also the number of days of
employment provided for the concerned year.
In almost all states, there has been a rise in money wage rates. But, given the fact
that there has been a very high rate of inflation during these years, it would be more
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Table 3.1 Average wages earned per person day and average annual earnings per household
under MGNREGS during 2008–09 to 2011–12
Sl. No. States MGNREGS average
level of wages per day
(`)
Average
level of
wages per
day (`)
Average
level of
wages per
day (`)
Average
level of
wages per
day (`)
2006–
07
2007–
08
2008–
09
2009–10 2010–11 2011–12
1 Andaman and
Nicobar
– – 124 144 185 174
2 Andhra
Pradesh
86 83 83 92 100 101
3 Arunachal
Pradesh
48 – 59 69 95 91
4 Assam 67 72 77 87 107 130
5 Bihar 70 70 85 98 101 133
6 Chandigarh – – 0 0 0 0
7 Chhattisgarh 62 68 73 82 104 120
8 Dadra &
Nagar Haveli
– – 1 112 116 0
9 Daman & Diu – – 0 0 0 0
10 Goa – – 0 95 139 161
11 Gujarat 56 63 68 89 97 112
12 Haryana 97 115 120 151 169 180
13 Himachal
Pradesh
69 71 99 110 127 123
14 Jammu and
Kashmir
69 70 68 93 113 124
15 Jharkhand 79 82 90 98 103 120
16 Karnataka 67 72 81 86 144 189
17 Kerala 121 118 120 121 133 147
18 Lakshadweep – – 80 112 138 152
19 Madhya
Pradesh
60 63 73 84 98 122
20 Maharashtra 104 84 75 94 134 165
21 Manipur 75 81 78 78 93 125
22 Meghalaya 73 88 70 79 100 114
23 Mizoram 94 102 109 104 116 116
24 Nagaland 66 100 81 103 103 118
25 Odisha 53 76 92 106 96 123
26 Puducherry – 79 76 91 116
27 Punjab 94 100 111 124 130 145
28 Rajasthan 51 61 88 87 75 90
(continued)
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appropriate to examine whether there has been any improvement in real wages
realized under the scheme by deflating the money wages by Consumer Price Index
for Rural Labour. Such an exercise is done by taking the national average wage rate
per person day during the past 6 years and the results are presented in Fig. 3.1. It is
clear from the results that though money wage rates have been rising over the years,
the real wage rates have been virtually stagnant. But, if there were a decision to
index the MGNREGS wage rate with the national inflation, there would have been a
steep decline in real wage payments under the MGNREGS.
Table 3.1 (continued)
Sl. No. States MGNREGS average
level of wages per day
(`)
Average
level of
wages per
day (`)
Average
level of
wages per
day (`)
Average
level of
wages per
day (`)
2006–
07
2007–
08
2008–
09
2009–10 2010–11 2011–12
29 Sikkim 87 88 92 95 100 117
30 Tamil Nadu 80 78 80 72 82 92
31 Tripura 60 71 86 101 103 118
32 Uttar Pradesh 56 90 99 99 105 120
33 Uttarakhand 72 73 85 99 102 127
34 West Bengal 70 79 78 90 107 138
All states 64 74 84 90 100 117
Note For 2006–07 and 2007–08 average wage rates per person day refer to ﬁrst phase districts only
Source 1. Kannan and Jain (2011) for 2006–07 and 2007–08
2. http://www.nrega.nic.in
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3.3 Impact of MGNRGA on Employment, Earning
and Poverty
The overall performance of the scheme as a measure of social protection depends
on not only ensuring better wages but also on achieving the objective of ensuring
that more households are brought under the fold of hundred days of employment, at
least as per the demand in the local areas. Table 3.1 shows that there is no state
which had provided 100 days of employment even to 50% of the participating
households in 2011–12.
Tripura, Mizoram and Manipur are the only states where at least one-third of the
households had obtained 100 days of employment, but the size of their economy is
very small compared to the economic size of the other major states of India. Of the
other ﬁve states, which have reached more than 10%, three of them are Nagaland,
Meghalaya and Sikkim. Among the large scale of States, only Andhra Pradesh
(17.8%) and Maharashtra (11.3%) have achieved 100 days of employment per
household crossing two digit levels under the MGNREGA programme activities.
The overall performance of providing employment under the scheme shows a
tendency towards deceleration in recent years. The macro-picture of the average
person days of employment captured in Fig. 3.2 shows a clear downward trend. An
attempt is made here to estimate the impact of the earnings under the MGNREGS
across the states. State-speciﬁc estimates of annual earnings of participating
households are derived by dividing the total wage expenditure under MGNREGA
work by the average person days of employment per participating household.
Comparing the average household earnings from the scheme with the state-speciﬁc
estimates of rural household poverty threshold expenditure would indicate the
possible extent of the impact of the MGNREGS on rural poverty.
Table 3.2 provides the results of these estimates. For the country as a whole, the
earnings from the scheme are a little over 12% of the poverty threshold income.
These results suggest that in all those cases where the poverty gap is relatively low,
there would have been a substantial reduction in rural poverty. Perhaps the steep
decline in rural poverty in Tripura from 44.5% in 2004–05 to 19.8% in 2009–10
could be substantially attributed to MGNREGS.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Average Person Days
of Employment per
Household
Fig. 3.2 National average
person days of employment
per household. Source http://
www.nrega.nic.in
78 D. Narasimha Reddy et al.
Table 3.2 Impact of MGNREGS on rural poverty (2009–10)
Sl. No. States Average earnings per
household under
MGNREGS (`)
2009–10
Rural household
poverty threshold
income
MGNREGS earnings of %
of poverty threshold
income
1 Andhra
Pradesh
6032 41,580 14.5
2 Arunachal
Pradesh
1711 46,420 3.7
3 Assam 2982 41,500 7.2
4 Bihar 2687 39,336 6.8
5 Chhattisgarh 4228 37,038 11.4
6 Gujarat 3272 43,500 7.5
7 Haryana 5695 47,496 12.0
8 Himachal
Pradesh
6276 42,480 14.8
9 Jammu and
Kashmir
3573 43,374 8.2
10 Jharkhand 4834 36,398 13.1
11 Karnataka 4874 37,764 12.9
12 Kerala 4284 46,518 9.2
13 Madhya
Pradesh
4659 37,914 12.3
14 Maharashtra 4814 44,622 10.8
15 Manipur 5681 52,260 10.9
16 Meghalaya 3901 41,214 9.5
17 Mizoram 9872 57,000 19.4
18 Nagaland 8987 61,008 14.7
19 Odisha 4196 34,026 12.3
20 Puducherry 1708 38,460 4.4
21 Punjab 3504 49,800 7.0
22 Rajasthan 6027 45,300 13.3
23 Sikkim 7625 43,734 17.4
24 Tamil Nadu 3912 38,340 10.2
25 Tripura 8028 39,804 20.2
26 Uttar
Pradesh
6458 39,822 16.2
27 Uttarakhand 3455 43,170 8.0
28 West
Bengal
4029 38,592 10.4
All India 4870 40,368 12.1
Note Average earnings, per household under MGNREGS is derived by dividing the total wage expenditure by
average person days of employment per household
1. Calculated on the basis of the state-speciﬁc poverty line threshold expenditure for 2009–10 based on the
Tendulkar Committee revision and assuming household as comprising ﬁve consumption units
Source 1. http://www.nrega.nic.in
2. Upscportal.com for State-Speciﬁc Poverty Lines
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The highest impact on households’ earning is seen in Tripura state, where the
household earnings from MGNREGS are as high as a little over 20% of the poverty
threshold income. Mizoram is another high-performing state with the share as high
as 19.4%. The performance of some of the relatively backward states like Odisha,
Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan was better than the national average.
But, Bihar still lags much behind, which is also reflected in no decline in rural
poverty in the state, which continued to be as high as 55% in 2009–10, the almost at
same level of poverty as it was in 2004–05.
3.4 Impact of MGNREGS on Rural Labour Markets
3.4.1 Evidence from Across the Country
The search for information on the impact of MGNREGS on agricultural labour
markets leads to some evidence on labour shortage, changes in wages, mecha-
nization, peak season adjustment of work or adoption of MGNREGS calendar and
migration. The available information, however, is sketchy and uneven across the
regions. The implementation experiences also vary widely across the states. Yet
some broad trends can be discerned.
With the exception of a few well-endowed regions, the pre-existing labour
market in agriculture is characterized by surplus labour, low wages, high male–
female wage differentials, and non-implementation of statutory minimum wages.
The introduction of MGNREGS, with minimum and equal wages for male and
female workers, has, in fact, brought not only an increase in the overall agricultural
wages, but also reduction in the male–female wage gap of agricultural labour
operation. For instance, agricultural wage increases were reported in a number of
states right from Punjab and Haryana to Gujarat to West Bengal (Banerjee and Saha
2010). Even in tea gardens of Silchar, wage hikes are attributed to MGNREGS
implementation in the state. That higher wages in the MGNREGS will divert
workers from agriculture and create shortages of labour in agriculture is a theo-
retically valid proposition but the extent to which it will happen is an empirical
question (Papola 2005).
This question assumes importance especially in the context where still sub-
stantial underemployment does prevail in rural areas. The earlier Maharashtra
experience with the Employment Guarantee Scheme did put upward pressure on
agricultural wages but there was no clear evidence of shortage of labour (Acharya
1990; Datt 1994). In agriculturally well-endowed regions, the level of agricultural
wages was higher even before the MGNREGS was launched, where peak season
labour demand was met by seasonal in-migration of labour from labour-surplus
regions. The impact of MGNREGS on agricultural wages in such areas was not
much, except in pockets where the migrant labour flow declined.
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In the villages, most of the forward caste and large farmers are of the opinion
that MGNREGS is the main reason for the labour shortage. While agricultural
labourers and Schedule Castes and Schedule Tribe (SC/ST) communities are of the
opinion that out-migration and work opportunities in non-farm sector are opening
labour market for higher wage employment, and thereby they are demanding higher
wages for agricultural sector. Hence, shortage of labour is not same for the farmers
and agricultural labourers, and also among different social groups.
Recently, several previous studies in India have pointed out labour shortage not
only in agriculture but also in non-agricultural activities that depend on rural casual
labour.3 These studies were from many states like Andhra Pradesh, Punjab,
Haryana, UP and Tamil Nadu have pointed out that after the introduction of
NREGA, there has been a shortage of labour during harvesting of crops like wheat
and rice.4 Labour shortage is also reported during peak paddy sowing season in
Punjab,5 and apple harvesting season in Himachal Pradesh.6
There are reports as to how with the shortage of labour, the bargaining power of
migrant labour in Punjab had increased to the extent of not only raising wages but
also in improvement in working conditions. One study in Punjab even reported
‘Besides the TV, cooler, freshly cooked food and accommodation, the labourers are
now welcome to live in the houses of farm-owners and not in some dilapidated
tube-well room out in the farm. Wages have gone up threefold in some of these
places. Farmers say seasonal payment of wages has increased from a mere ` 1,750
to `.5,000–`. 6,250 per ha, in just about two years’.7
While farmers of these regions of Punjab (and other developed states) tend to
blame implementation of MGNREGS in labour-surplus states like Bihar, U.P and
Jharkhand, the Commissioner of Punjab Agriculture has a different explanation:
‘Earlier, the labour force used to come to Punjab sometime by end of March, at the
beginning of the harvesting season of wheat, and would stay there till paddy sowing
operation was complete by end of July. This assured them ample opportunity of
work for nearly four months. But increased mechanization of farm operations,
especially in harvesting and threshing of wheat, has reduced the duration of
employability for the migrant rural in Punjab, and predictability of the workforce
migration to Punjab from Bihar has shown a dwindling trend from 2006–07 to
2011–12’.8
3“Aspirations within Misery: Labour Shortage in Agriculture”, Sanhati, August 5, 2008.
4“NREGS lures labourers away from ﬁelds”, The Pioneer, May 4, 2010.
5‘Labour shortage affects paddy harvest’, The Hindu, September 23, 2010.
6‘Sugar mills go high-tech to beat labour shortage’ Business Standard, August 14, 2011.
7“Farmers of Tamil Nadu, Andhra show the way”, The Hindu, June 6, 2011.
8http://www.researchandmarkets.co/research/d5e163/indian_tractor-ind
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3.4.2 Impact on Farm Mechanization
Recently, many studies have suggested that the shortage of labour in agriculture can
be met by increased pace of farm mechanization. Farmers in the many villages of
Gangetic belt of Uttar Pradesh (UP) have decided to go for mechanized harvesting
of the wheat crop due to shortage of rural labour forces.9 They have attributed the
labour shortage to implementation of MGNREGS.
The use of combined harvesters for paddy harvesting in Pondicherry is also
attributed to labour shortage resulting from the implementation of the
MGNREGS.10 Mechanization of sugarcane harvesting in Maharashtra and provi-
sion of heavy subsidies to harvesting machines are also shown as a consequence of
MGNREGS.11 In Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka mechanization of
paddy transplantation are promoted by providing subsidies on the machines.12 Even
in West Bengal, mechanization is being promoted to beat rising labour costs (Babu
et al. 2010).
An interesting report on the signiﬁcant rise in the tractor market in India in recent
years has cited shortage of agricultural labour as one of the explanations for the
need of speedy mechanization.13 There is a danger that these reports could be read
as if the MGNREGS is responsible for mechanization of Indian agriculture. It is a
fact that introduction of combined harvesters, sugarcane harvesting machines and
paddy transplanters have long preceded MGNREGS.
Some of these mechanization processes themselves, as observed by the
Commissioner of Agriculture of Punjab cited above, disturbed the stable stream of
labour supply. Tightening of agricultural labour market along with the state policy
of subsidizing farm machinery ownership by farmers has been hastening agricul-
tural mechanization, especially in agriculturally better-endowed regions, and the
regions that are performing better in agriculture in the recent past.
Overall, the pace of growth rate in farm mechanization is faster in almost all the
crops and states between 1997 and 2010 (Table 3.3). Growth rates in farm mech-
anization were above 10% per annum for paddy in Odisha and MP; for chickpea in
UP; for cotton in AP and Karnataka; for maize in AP and Rajasthan.
The medium growth rate (from 5% to 10%) was observed for maize in Bihar; for
chickpea in Haryana; for cotton in MP, Haryana, TN; for paddy in WB, UP, Bihar;
for wheat in Bihar and MP. In the case of sugarcane, no state recorded more than
5% growth in farm mechanization. The growth rate in farm mechanization in
9The Financial Express, August 11, 2008 and The Asian Age, July 18, 2011.
10“Agriculture Ministry wants MGNREGA labour glitch uprooted”, The Pioneer, July 24, 2011.
11A very detailed report on how male members of the household migrate to high paying factory
work and women and elderly take to NREGS is reported as “MNREGS fails to curb distress
migration in parts of Rajasthan”, Business Standard, August 14, 2011.
12D.S. Rawat, Secretary General, ASSOCHAM in India Infoline News Service, June 26, 2011.
13D.K. Nair, Secretary General, Confederation of Indian Textile Industry (CITI) in SME Times,
April 28, 2011.
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agricultural lagging states like Odisha, WB, UP, Bihar and MP were much higher
than other states, which could be due to counting of growth rate from a lower base
in these lagging states.
3.4.3 Adjustment Work Calendar of MGNREGA
to Local Conditions
One of the local demand by farmers across the several places in India is to manage
peak season agricultural labour demand by suspending MGNREGS work during
peak farming seasons of sowing, transplanting and harvesting of paddy and wheat.
Such a measure would not only help farmers to avoid labour shortage but also help
workers to get more days of employment by way of peak season agricultural
employment in farming, as well as, the lean season of employment from
MGNREGS work. To address these public voices, in a number of states, the local
Panchayat bodies were allowed, by mutual consent between farmers and agricul-
tural workers, to work with a crop calendar that avoids commencement of
MGNREGS work in peak farming season in the location.
This is also to ensure that it is implemented in the lean season only.14 Such a
calendar of work scheduled has been practiced even in the context of tea gardens in
West Bengal, as one executive observed: ‘The Government would do well, and it
would be a win-win situation for all, if they keep MGNREGS work between
November and March when we do not need the workers that way, even workers can
make more money’ (Bhagat 2010). The recent initiatives by the Union Ministry of
Agriculture and the Planning Commission appear to be towards making such an
MGNREGS calendar as an ofﬁcial part of the implementation of the programme.15
For improving convergence with the other government rural development related
departments (line agencies) and thereby to improve the quality of assets and
infrastructure created under the MGNREGS, the State Convergence Plans have
been formulated in many of the states.
There is also a focus from the present government in the centre on ensuring
access to water to each agriculture farm by converging resources available under
various rural development programmes such as water harvesting, conservation and
management activities like MGNREGA, Integrated watershed Management
Programme (IWMP) Command Area Development & Water Management
(CAD&WM), Repair, Renovation & Restoration of water Bodies (RRR), etc.
Accordingly, a comprehensive plan based on all available information on water
sources, distribution network, water bodies, new potential for augmentation, efﬁ-
cient management system, etc., have been contemplated under Pradhan Mantri
14Fibre 2 Fashion (online) August 14, 2011.
15SME Times, May 7, 2011.
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Krishi SinchaiYojana (PMKSY), as lunched late 2014, when the new government
came to power in New Delhi in mid of 2014.
3.4.4 Asset Creation in Rural Areas
Although asset creation is not the primary aim of the MGNREGA scheme, in the
recent years, asset creation related issues of the programme are gaining importance
in public discourses. Recently, the Government of India and many other scholars
working on rural development issues have proposed that at least 60% of the works
to be taken up in a district in terms of cost shall be for the creation of productive
assets directly linked to agriculture and allied activities through development of
land, water and trees. It is proposed that the wage-material ratio for works taken up
by agencies other than Gram Panchayat would be counted at the district level, and
not at block level as practiced until now to facilitate for taking more durable assets
under the MGNREGS programme (Government of India, Ministry of Rural
development, Rajya Sabha, Unstirred question No-2044, answered on 16.03.2015,
Performance of MGNREGA).
Likewise, for improving convergence with other line departments, and thereby to
improve the quality of assets created under the MGNREGS programme, the State
Convergence Plans need to be formulated. As noted earlier, there is a focus on
ensuring access to water to each agriculture farm by converging resources available
under various programmes undertaking water harvesting, conservation and man-
agement activities like integrated watershed programmes, command area develop-
ment programmes, etc. Accordingly, a comprehensive plan based on all available
information on water sources, distribution network, water bodies, new potential for
augmentation, efﬁcient management system, etc., is contemplated under Pradhan
Mantri Krishi Sinchai Yojana (PMKSY), or is also called as Prime Minister
Irrigation Plan. The impact of the programme (MGNREGS) is visible in many
states in terms of increased water tables, reduction of fallow lands and increased
land productivity, after the wider spread implementation of the MGNREGS.
3.4.5 Migration
By default on design of the programme, the MGNREGS, by ensuring work for
hundred days at an assured minimum wage at the place of residence under the
MGNREGS act in 2005, was expected to have a substantial impact on the reduction
of distress migration. Though there are no studies yet in estimating the extent of
decline in distress migration because of MGNREGS, there are a number of studies,
which gathered the impression of participants on the impact of MGNREGS on
migration.
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The responses vary from state to state and between districts within a State. The
available responses from these surveys from Uttarakhand (Singh and Nauriyal
2009), Odisha (Nayak), Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka (Kamath 2008), Tamil
Nadu (IITM 2009) and Sikkim and Meghalaya (2009) show, by and large, there has
been a sharp decline in distress migration, after successful implementation of
MGNREGS in the places of these states, where the studies were carried out.
A study of select villages of Dhenkanal (Odisha), Bastar (Chattisgarh), Khunti
and Gumla (Jharkhand) districts shows that earlier due to lack of employment
opportunities within the villages, there was out-migration of large number of rural
forces to agriculturally more advanced states like Punjab and Haryana (Banerjee
and Saha 2010). The marginal and small farmers depended mostly on wage labour
income, with very little earnings from the income from their farm operation, due to
low yields in agriculture.
The commencement of MGNREGA works has ensured not only employment in
their native places, but also afforded them an opportunity to save their labour forces
for investment in their own farming activities that have resulted in higher yields. As
a result, though out migration of labour has not been stopped entirely from these
regions; the incidence of seasonal out-migration has come down sharply in the
recent days.
A study with a speciﬁc focus on the impact of MGNREGS on Scheduled Tribes
in Kandhamal and Koraput districts of Odisha shows that distress migration among
the ST communities has declined by 72.5% among males and by 45.5% among
females, after implementation of the programme activities in the states. And also,
the average duration of migration of a labour household declined from 69 days in
2004–05 to 23 days per worker in 2001–12 (Rao et al. 2010). But a study of Purulia
and Jalpaiguri in West Bengal shows only a marginal impact of MGNREGS on
addressing distress migration, where the average number of days of migration
declined only by about 10% (Babu et al. 2010). A study of ﬁve districts in Bihar
ﬁnds that there was not much of incidence of migration in Siwan and Begusarai.
Whereas, in Madhubani district, with an incidence of as high as 50% of
out-migration of labour forces, only 11% felt that there was any signiﬁcant impact
of MGNREGS on rural labour wage markets. (Rao and Dheeraja 2010).
There are interesting instances of return migration of marginal and small farmers
of Barmer district of Rajasthan who migrated to neighbouring Gujarat, Punjab and
Haryana as wage labour due to water scarcity and depletion of groundwater
(Paliwal 2011). In Barmer district, 47,779 ‘tankas’ (small well-like structures made
of concrete, cement and sand) and other water works were constructed under
MGNREGS to collect rain water which improved groundwater table that enabled
crop cultivation. The improved water supply has brought the small and marginal
farmers back to agriculture from the seasonal labour work in other states.
Of course, migration is not a linear phenomenon, nor is its outcomes binary like
good or bad. The impact would depend on the nature and context of migration. One
study shows that improved irrigation facilities, soil conservation, and increase in
area cultivated and crop diversiﬁcation resulting in more employment-reduced
migration by 60% in Sidhi district of Madhya Pradesh (CSE 2008a, b).
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Reports from Dungarpur, Udaipur and Rajsamand districts show that rural men
continue to migrate to factory work in Mumbai, Udaipur and Gujarat. In all these
cases, the wages in these activities are higher than that of MGNREGS, and the
duration of employment is for longer periods. These can hardly be called distress
migration. From these households while men migrate for high-wage and relatively
long duration non-agricultural work, women and elderly remain in the village to
take to MGNREGS work, which certainly is an addition to overall household
income. Nevertheless, to call this as a ‘failure to curb distress migration’ is
misleading.16
The positive impacts of MGNREGS in reducing distress migration are evident in
the reports from non-farm activities like textiles, jute mills, and a large number of
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The textile industry is dependent on migrant
workers especially from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Odisha. Since schemes like
MGNREGS provide livelihood to workers nearer home, it discourages labour
migration from catchment areas to production centres. However, this cannot be read
as the cause for labour shortage although it adds to the difﬁculties in mobilizing
‘additional workforce’ needed in this sector. The growth projections of the textile
industry also earlier suggested that the labour demand would increase from the
about 35 million in 2011–12 to 47 million by 2015.
Most of the workers earning about Rs. 7,000 a month are migratory in nature.
They move from the agricultural sector to cities after the sowing season for half of
the year, and get back to village when the harvest season starts. The MGNREGS is
seen as discouraging migration of unskilled labour from rural to urban areas. but,
there is no evidence that migration of labour for works that ensure higher wages and
longer duration was discouraged by the implementation of MGNREGS in the rural
areas.
The Secretary General of Confederation of Indian Textile Industry (CITI)
observes that the problem in the textile industry is not losing workers, but the
industry is not getting additional workers, especially skilled workers. ‘The chal-
lenge will be to ﬁnd enough workers and to train them. Though the training needs
are neither complicated nor time consuming, the magnitude of the requirements
would make it a herculean task’. Within the textile industry, it is claimed that jute
mills in West Bengal pay the maximum daily wages with a fresher getting Rs.
227 per day and a skilled worker Rs. 404. These wages are two to four times
MGNREGS wages.
Therefore, it is a widely held claim among many industrials and related stake-
holders of jute mills there that shortage of labour in jute mills is due to MGNREGS,
since MGNREGS activities in the villages have discouraged agricultural workers to
16It is reported that the draft proposal by the Planning Commission submitted to the Ministry of
Rural Development suggests rechristening the Scheme as MNREGS-II so as to cover agricultural
activities like sowing, harvesting, soil and compost preparation, irrigation and allied activities like
tending livestock. It is also proposed that to begin with the farm activities will be allowed under
the revised Scheme only in 2000 backward blocks, with a goal of putting back small-marginal
farmers on their own farms. (The Pioneer, August 19, 2011 and Tehelka, August 20, 2011).
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migrate from rural to urban areas. However, this does not reflect a true situation of
migration behaviours of rural population. Similarly, the Indian Industries
Association (IIA), Ghaziabad Chapter, has also reported that MGNREGS as the
main culprit for labour shortage in small and medium industries in India now.
Moreover, there are also several evidences and case studies from ﬁeld across the
places in India that migration for high-wage employment, especially male members
of the household has not declined even after implementation of MGNREGS across
India, but only distress migration of women and other vulnerable groups.
3.4.6 Youth and Educated
Educated and unemployed youth were more interested to migrate to work in urban/
non-agricultural works, even though there are opportunities to work in agriculture
and MGNREGA. They are attracted neither to agricultural work nor to MGNREGA
works. It is due to laborious nature and also due to low social status attributed to
such agricultural work. Besides, a small farmer (especially youth) is not interested
in agriculture because of the low income and insecurity of return from the land.
Farmers and rural youth are concerned that the hard work they put in agriculture
may go waste, if there are natural calamities like drought, hail storms, frost, and
insect-pest and disease infestations. Penetration of electronic media in the rural
areas has changed the attitude of the youths and turned them against agriculture.
Their interest in agriculture is further waning, because of low expected returns from
agricultural produce. Youth of the village do not want to work in agriculture and
MGNREGA works, because it is strenuous work for long durations and is a low
paid job if opportunities exist outside. Hence, MGNREGS has less impact on
stopping the migrant labour who moves for higher wage rates.
In short, the review of evidence shows that MGNREGS has certainly provided
dent on following aspect of rural livelihoods.
(i) reduced distress migration among rural poor,
(ii) smoothened rural consumption in the lean season,
(iii) set high standards and transparency in doing rural development even in
hinder-land villages,
(iv) addressed underemployment problem in vast tract of rural India,
(v) created assets that improved livelihoods of rural poor,
(vi) gave boost to the ﬁnancial inclusion
(vii) strengthened activities and functions of Gram Panchayats
(viii) improved the wage levels in rural areas and thereby increasing the income
levels of the poorest of poor
(ix) set standards for decent working conditions and
(x) Helped in bringing fallow lands into cultivation.
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In fact, the MGNREGS programme has also faced several challenges on its
implementations such as,
(i) delays in payment of wages
(ii) corrupt practices in implementation
(iii) denial of entitlements
(iv) poor technical capacity to implement large number of works and
(v) poor quality of assets created.
3.5 Impact of MGNREGS on Rural Labour Market
in Telangana and Andhra Pradesh
One of the major and direct impacts of MGNREGS in rural Telangana and Andhra
Pradesh, as in many other parts of the country, is felt in the rural labour market.
Based on the series of focus group discussions (FGDs) spread over a fairly large
number of villages (77), Table 3.4 presents some broad indicators of the change in
the rural labour market as a result of implementations of MGNREGS in those
villages. These indicators have to be interpreted in all their nuances to the extent the
FGDs could capture them.
Table 3.4 Impact of MGNREGS on rural labour market in select villages in Telangana and
Andhra Pradesh 2008–09a
Indicator Increased Decreased No
change
No clear
response
All
villages
1. Agricultural wages 70 Nil 2 5 77
2. Peak season shortage of
agricultural labour
62 Nil 6 9 77
3. Male–female agricultural wage
differential
Nil 71 Nil 6 77
4. Migration (a + b) Nil 51 20 6 77
a) Villages with migration before
NREGS
Nil 51 4 Nil 55
b) Villages with no migration
before NREGS
Nil Nil 12 Nil 12
aThe evidence is based on reports of Focus Group Discussions (FGD) of 77 villages (panchayats)
spread over 8 districts (Chittoor, Nalgonda, Medak, Ranga Reddy, Adilabad, Karimnagar and
Kurnool). These FGD reports are part of the two projects: Galab et al. (2008) and Reddy et al.
2014)
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3.5.1 Job Security
As a result of MGNREGA, not only did the rural labour have been able to obtain
increased wage rates but also their holding of job cards has given them a sense of
job security. The labours consider job cards as a measure of minimum security of
job that will be offered to them in future, especially in the off-season of agriculture
where the unemployment is rampant in all rural areas, especially in a dry region
with less access to irrigation water to grow crops all rounds the year. Because of
this perceived assurance of future availability of jobs and at assured wage rates, the
labour is empowered with increased bargaining power for setting their wage rates
even in other seasons than the case of without the minimum guarantee of
employment as was the case before implementation of MGNREGS in 2006.
This increased bargaining power of the agricultural labour, at least in relative
sense, is also one of the factors that the farmers community at large have felt their
reduced says in setting the rural wage and hiring the labour forces in many parts of
the year, and so has become a point of criticizing the MGNREGS activities by the
farming communities. These points have been expressed by many farmers during
the focus discussions with the farming communities regarding assessing the impact
of the MGNREGS. However, a more thorough sociological and political economy
related study on the topics may provide further insight on this social-cultural aspect
of the age-old patronizing type of relationship between farming communities and
agricultural labour forces in Indian sub-continent.
3.5.2 High Risk Perception of Farming
In general, a small farmer is not interested to depend on his all livelihood activities
in agriculture because of the inadequate income from farming and an insecurity of
return from the crop husbandry in general. In addition, the majority of the rural
youth in India are concerned that the hard work they put in agriculture is not
sufﬁcient to sustain their livelihoods. In the case of any of the natural calamities like
drought, hail storms, frost, and insect-pest and disease infestations, their labour and
investments in farming would be wasted.
Likewise, penetration of electronic media in the rural areas has changed the
attitude of the youths and turned them against agriculture. Their interest in agri-
culture is further waning, because of low expected returns from agricultural pro-
duces, and uncertainty in farm income. Therefore, for educated rural youth, farming
is a strenuous work for long durations, and is a low paid job compared to alternate
jobs for them in the non-farm sector. Thereby, in many parts of India, educated
rural youth and women, even unemployed ones, are usually do not attracted to
agricultural work due to drudgery and due to low social status attributed to agri-
cultural work than services and other sector employment.
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3.5.3 Perception of Different Social Groups
In the villages, at many times, large sections of the forward caste community of
agricultural families have often complained that the MGNREGA is the main reason
for the labour shortage in their communities. The authors have faced such feedback
and remarks from farmers during their case studies and focus group discussions at
several dryland villages in western and southern India. While agricultural labourers
are of the opinion that out-migration and work opportunities in non-farm sector are
opening labour market for higher wage employment, hence they are also
demanding higher wages for the agricultural sector in the rural areas; otherwise,
they prefer to go to non-farm sector jobs in the nearby cities. Hence, the notion of a
shortage of labour in large part of the rural India is not same for the farmers and
agricultural labourers and among different social groups within a rural community.
3.5.4 MGNREGA Wage Rates
In the ﬁrst phase of MGNREGS, the minimum wage was ﬁxed at ` 80 per day. It
was increased in Andhra Pradesh to ` 100 in 2009. Since the MGNREGS wage is
calculated on the basis of work done at the schedule of rates, the minimum wage
level is only indicative and the wage level could be higher or lower depending on
the nature of work and group efforts in completion of the work on time. But, in
Kuppanagar, a village used here as a case study, the average wage level obtained
has always been higher than the minimum indicated. Even in the earlier years when
the minimum wage was ` 80, Kuppanagar workers logged wages ranging from ` 93
to ` 126.
The results of the household survey showed average wage rate of ` 103 in
2009–10. In Kuppanagar, as in other places in the state, work is allotted to a group
calibrating the quantity equivalent to the schedule of rates that would fetch mini-
mum wage to each member. Often, some members of the group do not turn up but
yet the remaining ones complete the total allotted work and this increases the
average wage to a level higher than an indicated minimum wage. Wherever, the
workers are formed into Shrama Shakti Sangams (SSS), as in Kuppanagar, there is
a better motivation to work as a team and complete the work allotted at a time, even
if some members do not turn up. The result is the average wage of the group is then
higher than the minimum wage.
Besides, the average wages are paid equally to men and women. The average
MGNREGS wages logged by Kuppanagar workers are higher than local agricul-
tural wages, especially for women. The impact of MGNREGS wages is felt in two
ways. First, overall agricultural wages have increased. Male wages in agriculture
increased from Rs. 80 before MGNREGS to ` 100 in 2008–09, and female agri-
cultural wages increased from ` 50 to ` 80. The male–female wage gap has
declined substantively. The hours of agricultural work also have declined and it is
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invariably half a day work at the wages mentioned above. In the second half of the
day, the same agricultural labours have also worked on farm on piece rate basis.
The net impact on agriculture is higher wage costs.
The feedbacks offarmers in the groupdiscussions held by the authors have revealed
an interesting pattern. Regardless of the social group,most of theMGNREGSworkers
are also small and marginal farmers and they too feel the impact of rising agricultural
wages on their farms, but marginally, because of two reasons. First, their earnings,
especially those of women, from MGNREGS are substantially higher now than the
case of 5–6 years before the implementation of MGNREGS.
Second, they have substantially gained by way of improved productivity of their
land due to MGNREGS sponsored land development works on their private lands. In
many cases, after improvement of the land development work, even the value of land
has become double within a year. Therefore, the small-marginal farmers do not com-
plain much about rising wages recently, as they also get paid on increased wage rate
now. The landless workers, in fact, acknowledge rising agricultural wages. However,
their main complaint is about the steep rise in prices of essential commodities.
The response of relatively bigger farmers, normally non-participants in
MGNREGS, is about the rising agricultural wages. Interestingly, in many villages,
they do not complain about the MGNREGS as such, since most of them beneﬁted
from rising water table and increase in yield of their wells and bore wells due to
MGNREGS works in the villages, especially due to de-silting of tanks and ponds
and construction of a number of percolation tanks. These relatively bigger farmers
have been repeatedly making a plea that half of their agricultural work and wages
could be shared under MGNREGS. Paradoxically, they have developed a
vested-interest in MGNREGS hoping their wage costs would be shared under the
Scheme and, the political forces appear to be nursing this hope!
3.5.5 Agricultural Wages
At the time of the ﬁeldwork during 2008–09, the MGNREGS minimum wage for
both male and female workers was ` 80. In some of the villages, the male agri-
cultural wage was equal or marginally more than the MGNREGS wage rate, but the
female agricultural wage level was much lower in almost all the villages. The
introduction of MGNREGS increased the demand for labour in rural areas and
resulted in increase in agricultural wages for both male and female workers.
The rise in female agricultural wages, which were at much lower level, was
much steeper than the rate of increase in male wage rates. As a result, the difference
between male–female agricultural wages declined substantially in almost all vil-
lages (71) studied. An evaluation based on a large sample drawn from nine districts
of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh shows 43% increase in wages in 2011–11 from
the time when the inception of the scheme was done in 2005/06 (GoAP 2011).
The Telangana experience of the high, average and low performance in
MGNREGS employment, wage rates and household earnings is highly instructive
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and worthwhile presenting here as a summary statement (Reddy 2011; Reddy et al.
2014). While, the relatively high average wage rate for the state as a whole could be
attributed to state level political and administrative commitment and initiatives, the
high and the low observed at the grassroots level is for most part a result of the
presence or absence of participatory governance at the Panchayat level (Table 3.5).
3.5.6 Food Insecurity and MGNREGA
The experiences of Kuppanagar and Makkarajpet show what difference effective
implementation of MGNREGS could make to food insecurity in dryland areas.
While best performing Kuppanagar may show that hunger is a thing of the past, in
poor performing Makkarajpet 85% still feel that they have to suffer the privation.
While there has been an improvement in the consumption of food and reduced food
insecurity, but everywhere there was growing concern about rising prices.
There are interesting instances reported in FGDs which reveal varying degrees of
impact depending on the local conditions and the performance of MGNREGS. For
instance, the ﬁve villages in Karimnagar district report that MGNREGS has no
impact on food insecurity, meaning, Karimnagar, being agriculturally prosperous
district did have higher levels of employment, wages and levels of consumption of
food and hence MGNREGS did not make any difference. At the same time there is
Adilabad, a relatively backward district but here too, ironically, MGNREGS did not
make much difference to food insecurity. It is because of poor implementation of
the MGNREGS in the district, no assured employment, low earnings from the
scheme and continued migration which together perpetuate low levels of food
consumption.
Table 3.5 Employment and earnings under high, average and low MGNREGS performance in
Telangana (2009–10)
Indicator Kuppanagar Village
(High)
State
average
Makkarajpet
village
(Low)Sample
households
All
households
1. Average person days of
employment per household
161a 84 65 31
2. Average wage per person day (`) 103 110 92 86
3. Average annual MGNREGS
earnings per household (`.)
16,137 9,240 5,980 2,781
4. MGNREGS earnings as % of
poverty threshold income
(Tendulkar poverty line)
40.0 23.0 14.9 6.9
aThe high number of days is due to combining drought relief work with MGNREGS in the village
during 2009–10
Source http://www.nrega.ap.gov.in and Household Sample Survey (Reddy 2011)
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In contrast, in Khammam district, where there were villages with food deﬁcit and
hunger before MGNREGS, reports show complete turnaround in food consumption
and security because of better implementation of MGNREGS, more employment,
earnings and access to food. In most of the villages besides improved consumption
levels in food, MGNREGS earnings have enabled the households to buy food in
lump sum quantities. There is also change in food habits and some households have
reported that they consume ‘tifﬁn’ for the breakfast.
A larger survey reports that large proportions of MGNREGS households are able
to buy chicken and meat (68%) and vegetables (58%) and for 87% of these
households MGNREGS has become a source of lean season employment. There are
moving instances of livelihood dilemmas of the poor that before MGNREGS their
incomes were too meagre to meet their own consumption requirements and
therefore, neglected the needs of the aged members of the household. MGNREGS
has enabled them to take better care of the aged parents. Some households reported
that they provide pocket money to parents to buy toddy and beedies (local
signature).
3.5.7 MGNREGA and Labour Shortage for Agriculture
Even before MGNREGS, in peak agricultural season labour shortage was experi-
enced in many villages. Of course, there were a few dryland villages where it was
shortage of work, than shortage of labour, which continues to be a problem. But
after MGNREGS, 62 out of 68 villages reported increase in labour shortage.
However, out 77 villages, only two villages reported that there was not any decline
in area under cultivation due to rise in wages or shortage of labour in the peak
season.
In Kupanagar village, there has actually been an increase in the area cultivated in
the last 2 years, due to MGNREGS investment in fallow and rainfed lands of SCs.
A number of strategies are being adopted to meet the changing labour market
situations which in turn are also leading to many changes in the nature of rural and
especially agricultural labour markets. Six villages reported labourbeing brought
from outside the village by paying transport charges in addition to wages. In three
villages wages were paid in advance to ensure labour supply in the peak season for
agriculture. There has been growing tendency towards piece rate or contracting out
of agricultural work than employing labour on daily wages.
Agricultural workers reported better bargaining power, better treatment at the
farm, visible change in the form of respect and less pressure at the place of work.
Besides a rise in wages, in most of the villages workers have been able to negotiate
reduced duration of agricultural working day. And the growing shift towards piece
rate or contract work on agriculture facilitated the change in the working day. There
has been increasing tendency in the MGNREGS working day to begin early in the
day by seven in the morning and terminate by one in the afternoon.
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There are instances where the workers take to agricultural work in the afternoon,
often on their own farms, after attending the MGNREGS work in the forenoon.
There is an emergence, in some villages, a dual mode of work in a given day with
MGNREGS work in the forenoon and agricultural work in the afternoon (Reddy
2011). The latter mostly on own farms. Such adjustments appear to soften the
shortages of agricultural labour. And the very working day is being redeﬁned due to
changes in the labour market brought about by MGNREGS.
3.5.8 Group Work
There are important changes in the nature of work, duration of working hours and
attitude to group work. Almost all work under MGNREGS is in the form of group
work. The workers in many places, like in Kuppanagar, are oraganized into ﬁxed
labour groups called Shramik Shakti Sangams (SSSs). The group formation,
imparting training to ‘mates’ of the groups and working together for over 2 years
appears to promote better awareness, solidarity and motivation to perform better.
The majority of groups with a few exceptions are groups of mixed castes.
There was considerable mutual understanding and sharing of work. The reaction
of workers to group work reveals some of the ﬁner elements of work, like work not
being looked upon mere drudgery or exploitation but as a positive involvement.
Worker’s response was that under group work, which often involves the entire adult
family members along with others, even hard work is not felt as difﬁcult work.
There is a sense of mutual sharing when old people and physically disabled are also
part of the group. This has been possible because some stronger members com-
pensate by taking more load and share wages equally. In the perception of workers,
there is also certain amount of dignity associated with MGNREGS, since it is
government work and no room for exploitation.
3.5.9 MGNREGS Calendar
Though there are reports elsewhere about mechanization of agriculture as a
response to labour shortage, there is no such perceptible change towards mecha-
nization as a response to MGNREGS in the villages of the eight districts discussed
here. But there is a widespread demand by farmers for stopping MGNREGS work
during the agricultural peak season. In fact, a number of Gram Panchayats have
evolved, through mutual negotiation, work calendar that avoids MGNREGS work
during the local agricultural peak season. Such adjustment is seen as a mutually
beneﬁcial measure that helps farmers to avoid labour shortage in the peak season
and workers to get NREGS work in the lean season and thus increase the overall
days of employment in a year.
3 MGNREGS Implementations and the Dynamics of Rural Labour Markets 95
3.5.10 Migration
Of the 77 villages reported in Table 3.11, in twelve villages there was no migration
before or after MGNREGS. Of the remaining, in four villages there was not much
change in the migration situation even after the scheme and in six other villages,
there was no clarity in the information recorded. In the rest of the 55 villages, there
were varying degrees of decline in migration. Most of the decline is in distress
migration, but not in the emerging process of movement towards higher paying,
relatively high productivity non-agricultural work and often, rural to urban
mobility. At least four villages reported complete stoppage of distress migration.
Some villages in districts like Ranga Reddy reported decline in long-distance
distress migration to Mumbai and Pune. This is similar to the decline in migration
from drought-prone Mahabubnagar district which was well-documented elsewhere
(Sainath 2008). In many other villages, the participants in discussions observed that
there would be further decline in distress migration if MGNREGS work is provided
for longer periods at a time and if wages are paid without much delay. Their
arguments were well reasoned. They were conscious of the costs of migration
including raising informal loans at high interest rates to meet the expenses of
mobility, high rents and fuel costs in destinations, the ordeal of having to live in
sub-human conditions and the risk of their children missing a chance to go to
school.
The non-distress type of migration from these villages, which is not affected
much by MGNREGS, is of three types. One is the migration of male members of
the households for high paying non-agricultural work for relatively longer dura-
tions. For instance, from the villages of Kurnool district which borders Karnataka,
male members of the households migrate to Bellary to work in construction, mining
and other activities. The second type of non-distress migration that continues even
after MGNREGS is rural to rural migration from dryland areas to fertile areas for
agricultural work. For instance, from Mandals like Aspari in Kurnool district, entire
household members migrate to Guntur district during June–August to work in the
mirch (chilli) and tobacco ﬁelds where each migrating couple make as much as
` 500 per day.
These families return during September–October to their own villages to work in
agriculture, and some, even in MGNREGS. The third type of continuing migration
is—strictly speaking not migration—daily commuting to neighbouring towns. For
instance, in Kurnool district members of some rural households commute to
neighbouring towns like Allagadda to work in shops and other establishments
where the wages are high. Interestingly, some work in MGNREGS in their villages
in the forenoon, and commute in the afternoon to nearby towns to work in odd jobs
including vegetable and fruit vending. Another independent survey cutting across
81 villages in nine districts of A.P reports 44% reduction in migration (GoAP
2011).
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3.5.11 Extra Worker and Extra Employment Effect
A question often raised is, if there were to be substantial increase in employment
under MGNREGS, what would be the impact on agriculture? Would there be
shortage of labour for agriculture? Ora decline in the area cultivated due to shortage
of labour? The experience of Kuppanagar village, suggests that though initially
there were signs of shortage of labour, over the past three years there have been
interesting developments in the working hours and the working day. Gradually
there has been a shift in the daily work schedule of MGNREGS works. It is
increasingly now tending to be conﬁned to forenoon. With it, there is also a ten-
dency on the part of workers who are engaged in the forenoon to take up either
agriculture wage labour or own farm work in the afternoon.
As observed earlier, many workers earn MGNREGS wages in the forenoon and
also earn on agriculture in the second half of the day, thereby doubling their day
into two working and earning days. This is hard work but preferred by many
workers since there is a substantial increase in income. This is a clear extra
employment effect. The other factor contributing to extra worker effect is the
inducement of relatively higher wages for women in MGNREGS compared to
agriculture. Some women from certain social groups who did not perform wage
labour are participating in MGNREGS work. It is because of being ‘government’
work, not work for a contractor or a landowner which carried a social stigma for
certain social communities. Thus, the extra employment and worker effects together
appear to keep labour supply to agriculture from being greatly disturbed.
3.5.12 Need for Improvement and e-FMS
However, there are number of complaints on the functioning of MGNREGS from
the grassroots level participants. The complaints mainly relates to cases of job cards
not provided, misappropriation of funds, engagement of contractors, forgery of
muster roll, manipulation in job cards, underpayment of wages, non-payment of
wages, corruption and other irregularities, use of machinery, delay in payments,
etc., which needs to be addressed both at macro- and micro-level.
With a view to reduce above malpractices and to avoid bogus attendance and to
check instances of tempering and misuse of muster rolls, the e-Muster system has
been introduced. For smooth fund flow, the electronic Fund Management System
(e-FMS) has been introduced which would also reduce delays in payment of wages.
With a view to eliminate ghost beneﬁciaries and for a faster disbursement of wages,
it has been decided to link the payments under MGNREGA to Aadhaar numbers
300 Direct Beneﬁt Transfer (DBT) districts. Under this, payments will be routed
directly into the accounts of the beneﬁciaries using the electronic system. Already,
there are visible signs of reducing malpractices in a number of villages.
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3.6 Concluding Observations
There is a growing evidence of an increase in agricultural wages across the country
over the period between 2006–07 and 2011–12, in which the impact of
MGNREGA is considerable. This review has also revealed a steep increase in
female agriculture wages and a substantive decline in the male–female wage
gap. The search for information on the impact of MGNREGA on agricultural labour
markets leads to some evidence on labour shortage, changes in wages, speeding up
mechanization process, peak season adjustment of work or adoption of MGNREGA
calendar and migration.
The absolute decline in labour force in rural areas has tightened the rural labour
market leading to shortage of labour for farm operations. Thus, labour scarcity has
emerged as one of the major constraints to increase agricultural production in India.
Furthermore, the tightened labour market has offered, better bargaining power to
agricultural labourers, better treatment at the place of work, ability to negotiate the
duration of the working day and has initiated a growing shift towards piece rate or
contract work on agriculture facilitating change in the number of working days.
Based on macro-level results and micro-level evidence some policy interven-
tions are suggested—such as development of labour saving technologies and
machines to mitigate labour scarcity, an inclusive farm mechanization programme
especially for women and youth, strengthening rural–urban connectivity, social
protection for migrant labour and capacity building programmes for skill aug-
mentation. Further, a revision of the time-frame of MGNREGA work to create more
employment in the lean season has been recommended.
Based on the facts and ﬁgures presented earlier, some of the clear evidence on
the impact of MGNREGS relates to labour market emerging out of the study are
summarized as follows:
• Agricultural wages have increased across the country, in which the impact of
MGNREGS is considerable.
• The rate of increase in the female agricultural wage has been much higher than
male wages, and the historically high male-female differentials in agricultural
wages have declined substantially.
• The peak period labour shortages in agriculture are observed in several regions
and are resulting in a number of changes in working hours, working day and
MGNREGS work calendar.
• The tightening labour market has offered better bargaining power to agricultural
labourers, better treatment at the place of work and ability to negotiate the
duration of the working day.
• The terms of wages are increasingly tending towards piece rate contracts.
• The ongoing process of agricultural mechanization is hastened especially in
certain operations like ploughing and harvesting of paddy, chickpeas, wheat
even in backward states.
• A clear response to peak season agriculture labour shortage is the negotiated
MGNREGS calendar that avoids implementing works during agricultural peak
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and provides developmental works during the lean season. And such a time
schedule though not universal is welcomed by farmers as well as workers
wherever adopted.
• There is no evidence that there has been marked a decline in the area cultivated
either due to rise in agricultural wages or shortage of labour. On the contrary,
there are counteracting forces by way of ‘extra worker effect’ by drawing
especially women from certain social groups into the ‘government employment’
of MGNREGS wage work; and ‘extra area effect’ by making the some of the
fallow lands of the poor more productive.
• There is clear evidence that rise in wages is one of the contributing factors,
along with other rising input costs, to increasing costs of cultivation. While SC,
ST and other small-marginal farmers who are also participants in the
MGNREGS were not affected much, or in many cases gained considerably, the
better off farmers could face the rising costs partly through mechanization.
• One of the salutary effects of MGNREGS on poor rural households is the drastic
reduction in distress migration. But there is no reason to share the apprehension,
as expressed by some (Farrington et al. 2007), that the scheme ‘may discourage
them from moving to more economically dynamic areas’. Just as in favour of
decline in distress migration, there is equally strong evidence to show that
migration for higher wage work that lasts for relatively longer period in a year
remains unaffected and possibly would improve if skill formation and capacity
building activities that would improve human capabilities are also brought under
the MGNREGS.
• The worst affected are the small-marginal farmers who are neither participants in
the MGNREGS work nor beneﬁciaries of works on their private lands. This
section of the small-marginal farming community may not be small and face
serious crisis. In this context the Planning Commission’s proposal to make the
scheme more farmer-friendly by extending the coverage to some of the agri-
cultural operations, if designed properly, may address the problems of excluded
small-marginal farmers.
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Chapter 4
Beyond Digging and Filling Holes:
Maximizing the Net Positive Impact
of MGNREGA
Shilp Verma and Tushaar Shah
4.1 Background
TheMahatmaGandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA)was
enacted by the Indian Parliament in 2005. Starting with the 200 most ‘backward’
districts, the implementation of the programme spread to an additional 130 districts
by 2007–08 and to all the districts of India by 2008–09. In 2013-14, MGNREGA
generated 2.3 billion person-days of employment for over 50 million rural house-
holds; more than half the person-days went to women andmore than 40 per cent to the
SC and ST population (see Table 4.1). With the annual outlay of over US$ 6 billion,
MGNREGA is arguably the world’s largest employment guarantee programme. It
may as well be the world’s largest rural water security programme, as over half the
MGNREGA funds are being invested in water-related works (Shah et al. 2011).
MGNREGA was introduced as a flagship social security programme of the
Government of India but instances of large-scale corruption, political favouritism
and poor quality of assets have resulted in ﬁerce criticism and disenchantment with
the programme. One of the biggest strengths of MGNREGA is believed to be its
self-targeting design. This implies that unless there is widespread systemic cor-
ruption, the programme’s beneﬁts can be expected to reach its desired beneﬁciaries
as the rural elite are unlikely to be willing to do unskilled manual labour at mini-
mum wages.
However, this strength might also turn against the programme for two reasons.
One, such a targeted programme might get branded as ‘raahat kaam’ (relief work)
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in the minds of its intended beneﬁciaries as well as the implementing agency.
Worse, the beneﬁciaries may come to view it as a precursor to a future uncondi-
tional entitlement. Two, the programme may completely bypass and is likely to be
overlooked by the better-off farmers and the rich rural elite, who, either ofﬁcially via
the Gram Panchayat or unofﬁcially via strong socio-cultural networks, tend to be
the opinion makers in the village.
It is therefore important to distinguish between the programme’s wage and
non-wage beneﬁts and to understand that, while the poor may beneﬁt from both, the
better-off in the village would be interested primarily in the latter. The challenge is
to enhance the stake of both groups in maximizing the net positive impacts (Shah
2009).
4.1.1 Studies and Methods
In 2009–10, and then again in 2010 and 2010–11, the International Water
Management Institute (IWMI) worked with masters students from the Institute of
Rural Management, Anand (IRMA) to: (a) understand how MGNREGA and village
labour markets interact; and (b) document case studies of over 140 best-performing
MGNREGA water assets (Fig. 4.1). Detailed tables are in annexure: Tables 4.5, 4.6
and 4.7).
In 2009–10, 35 students were asked to provide a qualitative overview of
MGNREGA implementation in their village while collecting speciﬁc data on
MGNREGA works. This was largely an exploratory study to understand the
dynamics of MGNREGA implementation; students were given a common village
schedule which they were asked to ﬁll-up based on focussed group discussions with
villagers.
Fig. 4.1 Study Locations. a Districts covered in exploratory study on MGNREGA, 2009–10
b Districts covered in study of MGNREGA—labour market interactions, 2010 c Districts covered
in case studies of best-performing MGNREGA water assets, 2010–11
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In 2010, 27 students undertook ﬁeldwork with speciﬁc research questions and
hypotheses to explore the interactions between MGNREGA and rural labour markets.
The students used a common research framework and were asked to explore the
following aspects of labour market interactions with MGNREGA. They were
a. Has MGNREGA implementation had an additive or substitutive impact in the
village;
b. How have local wage rates changed;
c. Has there been any segmentation in the village labour market;
d. What is the role played by the MGNREGA work supervisors;
e. Has there been any change in the incidence of shared cropping and land leasing;
and
f. What has been the impact of MGNREGA on migration?
Further, in 2010–11, eight students spent 10 weeks and surveyed more than 600
landless and marginal farmers and nearly 350 medium and large farmers; they also
conducted 143 case studies of best-performing MGNREGA water assets in 75
villages across four states (see Table 4.2). For the case studies of MGNREGA
assets, the students followed a common case study protocol. For the survey of
village leaders, labourers and farmers, village schedules and structured question-
naires were used.
In addition to these, the authors also undertook ﬁeldwork in Rajasthan, Madhya
Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal (Shah and Indu
2009; Verma 2010; Verma and Schwan 2012).
In Sect. 4.2 of this chapter, we discuss how prevailing conditions in rural labour
markets influence MGNREGA implementation. In Sect. 4.3, the impact of
MGNREGA implementation on rural labour markets is presented. Section 4.4
focuses on the views, attitudes, and perceptions about MGNREGA among rich and
poor villagers. Section 4.5 discusses the case studies of 143 best-performing
MGNREGA assets. In Sect. 4.6, we try to draw inferences and lessons from all the
studies and ﬁeldwork and enumerate some practical suggestions for improving the
net positive returns from MGNREGA. We conclude in Sect. 4.7 with a discussion
on the emerging new context of MGNREGA.
4.2 How Do Local Labour Markets Influence MGNREGA
Implementation?
The design of MGNREGA assumes that every village has poor people who demand
more work than is locally available at the government-determined minimum wage
rate. While this might broadly be true for India as a whole, it is certainly not true
everywhere. In all, we found four distinct situations of MGNREGA’s interaction
with local, especially agricultural, labour markets (Table 4.3).
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4.2.1 Type I: Misﬁt
In this case, a booming local labour market, with work going aplenty at much
higher than the ofﬁcial minimum wages, makes MGNREGA a ‘misﬁt’ and difﬁcult
to implement for lack of demand. There was neither interest in the scheme’s wage
beneﬁt nor in its non-wage beneﬁts.
Shah et al. (2011) provide a glimpse into this from the ﬁeld studies in Mundra,
Kutch district in Gujarat, where people have hit jackpots by selling their land at
very high prices and were able to access limitless work opportunities at twice the
MGNREGA wage rate or more. There were no work-seekers; yet the block and
district administration were relentlessly pressurizing the Panchayat leaders to ﬁnd
people to work in the programme. Somewhat similar were Uttarakhand and
Himachal Pradesh villages, where the prevailing agricultural wages were equal to or
far above the minimum wages resulting in a general indifference towards the
programme; and it required an unusually enthusiastic Panchayat leadership to goad
people into joiningMGNREGA works.
4.2.2 Type II: Insigniﬁcant
This is the situation of no or insigniﬁcant interaction between MGNREGA and the
local labour markets. In other words, MGNREGA neither had any impact on the
functioning of the local labour markets; nor did the labour markets signiﬁcantly
affect the programme’s implementation. In Godda (Jharkhand), Koraput (Orissa)
and Nalanda (Bihar) villages, the volume of MGNREGA work on offer was too
small compared to the demand and the total size of the labour market. Here,
MGNREGA had no perceptible impact on the working of the local labour markets,
nor was the scheme able to substantially animate the village community.
4.2.3 Type III: Potentially Signiﬁcant
This is the situation where MGNREGA wages were signiﬁcantly higher than local
wages and the volume of potential MGNREGA work was also signiﬁcant and yet,
MGNREGA invoked a lukewarm response from the community owing to admin-
istrative bottlenecks, distrust, systemic corruption, lack luster implementation or
lack of awareness.
In Narmada (Gujarat), the prevailing local agricultural wages were roughly a
third of the MGNREGA wages on offer. The local Panchayat rallied to initiate
MGNREGA works in the village but was discouraged by a passive block
administration.
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When they ﬁnally managed to initiate some work, there were long delays in the
payment of wages prompting villagers to give up on MGNREGA and return to the
residual labour market, which paid out cash wages instantaneously (Verma 2010).
Likewise, in Mandla, people initially took to MGNREGA enthusiastically but
shifted back to lower paying works as MGNREGA wage payments took as long as
6 months.
4.2.4 Type IV: Signiﬁcant
This is the situation in which MGNREGA presence is large enough to catalyze
widespread interest in the community and to signiﬁcantly alter the structure, con-
duct and performance of agricultural labour markets. We found this, to some extent,
in Dholpur (Rajasthan) and to a much greater extent, in Palakkad (Kerala), Chittoor
(Andhra Pradesh) and Jalna (Maharashtra) villages.
Thus the prevailing labour market conditions deﬁne how village communities
react and respond to MGNREGA. In labour-scarce regions, MGNREGA is unlikely
to ﬁnd many enthusiastic takers as the prevailing market wage rate would be higher
than the MGNREGA wages. However, in labour-surplus conditions with depressed
market wage rates, a well-implemented MGNREGA is likely to bring huge relief to
the labourers.
4.3 How Does MGNREGA Influence Local Labour
Markets?
Bhalla (2004) argued that the unemployment rate among the poorest—the agri-
cultural workers—was only 1 per cent and therefore, MGNREGA was unlikely to
beneﬁt them much, especially since it offers work at low (minimum) wages.
However, the response to MGNREGA and the scale of its implementation has been
overwhelming, with signiﬁcant and possibly irreversible impacts.
According to the ofﬁcial statistics released by the Ministry of Rural Development
(MoRD), till date MGNREGA has spent US$ 51.7 billion1 and generated more than
19.6 billion person-days of employment for roughly 50 million participating
households. A large part of this employment accrues to women and SC/ST partic-
ipants (Fig. 4.2). Bhalla (2010), however, argues that the ofﬁcial ﬁgures of
employment generation are gross over-estimates and that the actual ﬁgures are likely
to be closer to half these numbers.
1Assuming an average exchange rate over the years as: 1 US$ = ` 60.
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4.3.1 Tighter and Segmented Labour Markets
Where the interaction between MGNREGA and labour markets has been signiﬁ-
cant, it has altered the local labour markets in several ways. It has increased work
participation rates by offering attractive, accessible and convenient work opportu-
nities, thereby shifting the labour supply curve outward.
It has partitioned the pre-MGNREGA labour market into two: the MGNREGA
market and the residual labour market. By removing a block of labour supply from
the residual labour market, MGNREGA has created labour shortages and pushed up
wage rates in the residual market.
Further, administrative pressures to implement MGNREGA works can create
incentives for site supervisors and managers to be lenient in work measurement.
This would mean that the MGNREGA segment of the rural labour market, over
time, become less productivity-sensitive vis-à-vis the residual market. This, among
other factors, has attracted women and less-able men to MGNREGA works.
Fig. 4.2 Performance of MGNREGA over the years. Source MoRD (2015)
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For MGNREGA to have major impact on farm labour markets, it is critical that
the volume of work offered under the scheme is substantial during the peak agri-
cultural season. In Dholpur (Rajasthan), much MGNREGA work was scheduled
during summer when farm labour demand was low; therefore, the scheme’s impact
on labour market was relatively small. Here, MGNREGA work was additive; it
expanded the labour market by attracting new labour to the work force without
drawing away a signiﬁcant chunk of workers from the residual market.
Similar results were reported from Bikaner and Rajsamand (Rajasthan); Idukki
and Trivandrum (Kerala); West Sikkim District (Sikkim); and Chittoor (Andhra
Pradesh). In Palakkad (Kerala), however, the plantation economy demands farm
labour throughout the year; and here, MGNREGA offered nearly 100 days of work
to anyone who asked; as a result, the scheme’s impact on labour market was broad
and deep, raising female wage rates from ` 60 to ` 90 and male wage rates from
` 100 to anywhere between ` 150 and 225/day. The impact of MGNREGA in
Palakkad, therefore, was substitutive; it withdrew a sizeable, mostly female, work
force from agriculture. To make up, farm wage rates had to go up 50–70 per cent.
Several parallel effects seem to be in operation here. The scheme puts into the
hands of poor people signiﬁcant amount of cash that reduces the need for distress or
forced labour. Our survey of landless and marginal farmers across 75 villages in
four states found that, on average, MGNREGA workers experienced more than
50 per cent increase in income from labour; from ` 9,177 to ` 14,551 per annum.
Where MGNREGA is implemented on full scale, farm and non-farm labour mar-
kets become tighter, putting pressure on wage rates.
4.3.2 Increased Women Participation and Reduced
Male-Female Wage Ratio
MGNREGA work has found particular appeal among poor women who ﬁnd the
wages attractive and the facilities at the work site—such as crèche and shade—
particularly convenient. Finding work close to their home also increases the
scheme’s appeal. In Bambara village of Adilabad, the Panchayat also offered
flexi-time on MGNREGA works which enhanced its appeal even further.
The convenience and appeal of MGNREGA—besides the general impression of
MGNREGA work being light and poorly monitored—also attracts relatively less
poor rural women to the scheme, some entering the labour market for the ﬁrst time.
In a Dholpur village (Rajasthan), it was noted that when SC/ST women ﬁrst joined
the MGNREGA work force, Thakur women stayed aloof; but soon, they too joined
and got away with shirking work while the SC/ST women did the hard labour.
Likewise, in Idukki (Kerala), we found that almost all economically inactive middle
class women joined the MGNREGA labour force.
Since the residual labour markets pay signiﬁcantly higher wages to male workers
than to their female counterparts, MGNREGA sites were doubly more attractive to
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women workers. In Palakkad villages, the labour market got vertically segmented:
women, old and the inﬁrm choosing MGNREGA but able-bodied men demanding
higher wages in farm jobs.
Likewise in Rajsamand and Dungarpur (Rajasthan) where migration to urban
centres like Udaipur, Ahmedabad and Surat offers lucrative opportunities for men,
much of the MGNREGA workers were found to be women and older men who had
discontinued migration. Women found MGNREGA work attractive since it gave
them extra cash they could spend on themselves and on household items. For which
they earlier had to depend on their husbands/male family members and had to wait
for them to return home during festivals (Verma 2010).
Wage data from our surveys in 75 villages shows that not only have the wages in
the residual market been rising steadily, the ratio of male wages to female wages
has been declining (Fig. 4.3). This is a positive outcome of the pressure
MGNREGA exerts on the residual labour markets.
4.3.3 Less Clear Impact on Migration
Surveys revealed that farmers in popular migrant destinations repeatedly com-
plained about reduction in the inflow of migrants and the demand for higher wages
and better facilities by the migrant workers. At the same time, in migrant-source
locations, we found no signiﬁcant reduction in out-migration.
Shah and Indu (2009) reported that in many villages of Punjab and Haryana,
MGNREGA was seen reducing the inflow of migrant labour; and even those
Fig. 4.3 Impact of MGNREGA implementation on Male and Female wage rates. Source
IWMI-IRMA village surveys in 2010–11
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workers who come often prefer to work on MGNREGA works. In Rithal village of
Rohtak district in Haryana, farmers depended heavily on migrant labour from
Madhya Pradesh. These migrants however started working on MGNREGA works
in Rohtak. Farmers felt that poor people and migrants prefer MGNREGA work at `
135 per day rather than farm work at ` 200 per day, because, the former is lighter
and less rigorously supervised. Farmers are now using JCBs to get their earth work
done.
Our overall impression was that while MGNREGA implementation reduced
distress migration, opportunistic migration continued as before. MGNREGA wages
could not match up to the wages able-bodied men could earn by migrating to urban
centres where the wages are much higher. Moreover, administrative bottlenecks
might have tempered any potential impact on out-migration. In Mandla (Madhya
Pradesh), MGNREGA implementation initially reduced out-migration but delays in
payment of MNGREGA wages led the people back to their migrant ways. Similar
delays were also reported elsewhere.
4.4 Attitude of the Rich and the Poor
The principal-agent problem comes to full play in MGNREGA. Moral hazard is
openly evident, so is adverse selection. A working hypothesis we had was that
works on private lands would be better monitored compared to works related to
development/rejuvenation of common pool resources (CPR).
For instance, in some villages of 24-Paraganas district in West Bengal, Shah and
Indu (2009) found MGNREGA work on private ﬁshing ponds was supervised well,
all funds available were utilized and wages were paid promptly. Shah and Indu
(2009) also reported that people applying and then not reporting for work was
emerging as a big issue in Punjab and Haryana villages.
In one village near Rohtak town, the Pardhan got a MGNREGA project to get
irrigation drains de-silted, but most people who applied for work refused to come
despite cajoling and coercing; so children, old people and anyone who would work,
were to be persuaded to complete the work.
Large land owners are at the receiving end of MGNREGA. Subodh Saha, a large
farmer who migrated from Bangladesh on the basis of land exchange, asserted that
MGNREGA was government’s plan to ﬁnish off the farmers. ‘When people got
` 80 for doing ‘nothing’, why would they do hard farm labour for me?’ he asked
(Shah and Indu 2009).
Similar sentiments were portrayed in eastern UP, south Rajasthan and West
Bengal. Growing labour scarcity and the consequent rise in wages were the obvious
grouses, so were the growing laziness of labourers and a decline in the work ethic.
Our survey in 75 villages of Bihar, Gujarat, Kerala and Rajasthan tried to better
understand the perceptions of the rich and poor regarding MGNREGA and its
various aspects.
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In focused group discussions, we asked about the most beneﬁcial and most
worrisome aspects of MGNREGA in each village (Fig. 4.4). Not surprisingly, most
groups mentioned ‘availability of work close to home’ as the most beneﬁcial aspect
of MGNREGA; ‘empowerment of village communities, including women’ was
second; closely followed by ‘creation of useful rural assets’.
In terms of the worrisome aspects, the most prominent was a dilution in work
ethic expressed as ‘labour becoming lazy’. Nearly half the groups complained about
the ‘lack of sufﬁcient work’ and one-third felt that MGNREGA offered ‘low
wages’. These groups demanded that MGNREGA be implemented more forcefully
and at a larger scale. Interestingly, corruption and malpractices in MGNREGA did
not ﬁgure prominently; and were reported by only one-fourth of the groups as
worrisome.
As shown in Table 4.1, we surveyed around 600 landless and marginal farmers
and around 350 medium and large farmers. The landless and marginal farmers are
Fig. 4.4 Most beneﬁcial and worrisome aspects of MGNREGA. Source IWMI-IRMA village
surveys in 2010–11. Note The values on the y-axis represent the percentage of villages that chose
the particular variable
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the most likely beneﬁciaries of the wage beneﬁts of MGNREGA; we asked them
reasons why they found it attractive; and reasons that made MGNREGA
unattractive to them (Fig. 4.5).
As in the group discussions, ‘availability of work close to home’ was found to be
the most attractive aspect of MGNREGA. This was followed by ‘higher wages’
than the prevailing residual market wage rates; somewhat contradicting the results
from the group discussions. Labourers acknowledged that MGNREGA wages acted
as the new wage floor and offered negotiating power to the labourers vis-à-vis their
employers.
The labourers also appreciated the ‘improved work-site facilities’; putting
pressure on residual labour market to provide the same. Several labourers, espe-
cially women, acknowledged that ‘MGNREGA work is lighter’ compared to the
residual farm labour market. Our respondents reported frequent delays in
Fig. 4.5 Reasons why MGNREGA work is attractive and unattractive for labourers. Source
IWMI-IRMA village surveys in 2010–11. Note The values on the y-axis represent a composite
index based on ranks given by the respondent to the different variables
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MGNREGA wage payments and the non-availability of sufﬁcient quantum of work
as the most unattractive aspects of the scheme; several labourers were also unhappy
with the unclear/arbitrary manner in which actual wages were calculated, leading to
suspicions of corruption and malpractices. In some villages, labourers suspected
that large farmers colluded with the MGNREGA administration to ensure that no
works were carried out during the peak agricultural season. This signiﬁcantly
reduced their bargaining power.
In our interviews with medium and large farmers, the people most likely to hire
labourers to work on their farms, we discussed their perceptions about the impact of
MGNREGA implementation in their village (Fig. 4.6). These farmers, not sur-
prisingly, thought that the biggest impacts of MGNREGA have been the growing
scarcity of labour and the resultant hike in wages and beneﬁts. Several of them
acknowledged improvements in local water security and appreciated the creation of
useful rural assets. The erosion of work ethics among labourers and their growing
laziness was another key impact that they reported.
4.5 Overview of Best-Performing MGNREGA Water
Assets
Our sampling of MGNREGA assets was purposive: in each state, the students
selected the study villages after a review of secondary data and discussions with
local MGNREGA ofﬁcials. The objective was to document, through case studies,
some of the best-performing MGNREGA water assets.
A common case study protocol was used (with slight modiﬁcations to suit the
speciﬁcities of assets being studied). Of the 143 best-performing MGNREGA water
Fig. 4.6 Key impacts of MGNREGA for medium and large land-owning farmers. Source
IWMI-IRMA village surveys in 2010-11. Note The values on the y-axis represent a composite
index based on ranks given by the respondent to the different variables
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assets we studied (see Table 4.4), 46 were village ponds, 29 check dams and
anicuts, 26 private ponds and farm ponds, 21 micro-canal works, 20 private wells
and 1 river works. 60 of the studied assets were constructed afresh while 83 works
involved renovation and/or capacity enhancement of existing infrastructure. 100 of
the 143 works were completed before March 2009, while 40 of the remaining 43
were undertaken in 2009–10 and the remaining three, in 2010–11. With the
exception of ﬁve works, all others were completed well within the budgeted cost
estimates.
On average, each work created more than 2000 person-days of employment
amounting to roughly 700 days of labour created per lakh rupees investment.
However, there was huge disparity in the size of works as indicated by the range of
land area that they influenced, from 0.18 to 100 ha. A majority of these works were
undertaken with the primary objective of creating and enhancing irrigation poten-
tial. Other objectives included augmenting groundwater recharge, addressing
domestic water requirements and livestock needs, ﬁshing and pisciculture. Taken
together, the 117 assets (for which detailed quantitative data on costs and beneﬁts
was calculated by us) generated annual gross value equal to their cost (see Figs. 4.7
and 4.8).
Traditional inundation canal systems (pyne) that serve the dual-purpose of irri-
gation and drainage in conjunction with embankments (ahar) have been prevalent
in Bihar for centuries. According to Pant, these indigenous systems were used to
irrigate nearly a million hectares in Bihar in 1930.
However, due to various reasons—including the abolition of zamindari and rapid
development of groundwater irrigation—the area irrigated by these systems
declined to half by 1997 (Pant 1998). Kumar and Chandra (2010) found in their
study villages that these systems were near-completely dysfunctional before they
were taken up for renovation and revival under MGNREGA.
Table 4.4 Sample size of best-performing MGNREGA water asset case studies
State District Types of assets No. of
assets
No. of
villages
Ownership
Public Private
Bihar Bhojpur Pyne micro-canals;
Ponds; wells
10 08 5 5
Nalanda 15 10 14 1
Vaishali 10 05 7 3
Gujarat Junagadh Ponds; check dams;
wells
16 13 11 5
Sabarkantha 18 08 13 5
Kerala Palaghat Public and private
ponds
40 12 23 17
Rajasthan Dungarpur Anicuts; farm ponds,
wells
21 09 17 4
Tonk 13 10 9 4
Total 75 99 44
143
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The 19 case studies of MGNREGA works on micro-canal systems turned out to
be the most promising across the four states in terms of gross returns. The assets
required little investment in renovation and allowed farmers to provide 3–6 addi-
tional watering to their paddy crops. Bulk of the beneﬁt to farmers came in the form
Fig. 4.8 Beneﬁts from one year of use as a proportion of investment made in different asset-types.
Source Bihar: Kumar and Chandra (2010); Gujarat: Gaur and Chandel (2010); Kerala: Nair and
Sanju (2010); Rajasthan: Singh and Modi (2010)
Fig. 4.7 Gross returns from one year of use as a proportion of investment made in different states.
Source Bihar: Kumar and Chandra (2010); Gujarat: Gaur and Chandel (2010); Kerala: Nair and
Sanju (2010); Rajasthan: Singh and Modi (2010)
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of diesel-saving. Kumar and Chandra (2010) also found that while ponds were
demanded primarily for irrigation, an important share of their beneﬁts accrued from
pisciculture.
In Gujarat, Gaur and Chandel (2010) found that most of the public assets created
under MGNREGA were check dams, not used directly for irrigation but undertaken
to augment groundwater recharge. They also reported that while the gross returns
from MGNREGA assets on private land were signiﬁcantly lower, their provision
had exemplary impact on the livelihoods of the beneﬁciaries.
The ﬁeld study in Rajasthan (Singh and Modi 2010) offered an interesting
comparison between MGNREGA implementation in a predominantly tribal district
(Dungarpur) and a non-tribal district (Tonk). Despite a more proactive and better
staffed MGNREGA administration in Dungarpur, the productivity of assets was
signiﬁcantly higher in Tonk. While the ratio of gross returns to MGNREGA
investment in anicuts was 102 per cent in Tonk, it was a much lower 37 per cent in
Dungarpur. This may partly be attributable to the physical factors (undulating
terrain, poor soil quality, etc.) and partly to the fact that the farmers in Tonk were
far more experienced and better connected to markets.
4.6 Lessons from Best-Performing MGNREGA Assets
The 143 best-performing MGNREGA assets were purposively selected to under-
stand the potential of MGNREGA in meeting its dual objectives of livelihood
security and rural water security. However, they do not seem to depict the general
situation of MGNREGA works across the country. We offer eight propositions
which will ensure than more, if not all, MGNREGA assets perform exceptionally.
4.6.1 Pick the Low Hanging Fruits First
The estimates of gross return from our case studies illustrate two important points.
First, that purely in terms of returns on investment, the best bet would be
enhancement, renovation or revival of existing village water bodies that may have
fallen into disrepair as the socio-economic context of communities changed over
time. Pynes in Bihar is a case in point but there might be others—cleaning of
irrigation canals and channels; de-silting and deepening of tanks and ponds to
enhance storage and augment groundwater recharge; de-silting of small and large
irrigation reservoirs to rejuvenate their storage capacity, etc.
Second, although the annual economic returns from MGNREGA assets on
private lands might be lower, when implemented well, they make signiﬁcant
improvements in the lives of beneﬁciaries—who invariably belong to the poorest
households and the most marginalized communities. The feverish demand for
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Kapildhara2 wells in Madhya Pradesh also illustrates this point. The distinct
advantage of implementing works on private lands is that their ownership is clearly
deﬁned; and beneﬁciaries either themselves work in the construction process or
provide additional supervision and oversight to ensure superior quality of work.
4.6.2 Keep MGNREGA Demand-Driven
One of the concerns with MGNREGA was that its success would depend on
villagers internalizing the fact that MGNREGA offers an ‘entitlement’ to demand
work and is not a relief programme. However, we found several instances where the
implementation of MGNREGA was driven not by an overwhelming demand for
wage labour but by the MGNREGA administration at various levels. It did not
always appear as if the administration itself understood well the difference between
MGNREGA and other centrally sponsored schemes.
The Sarpanchs (president, Gram Panchayat) viewed MGNREGA as an
opportunity to gain political mileage and enhance their social clout at the expense of
the national government. The Block and District administration set spending targets
for themselves in order for the State to take advantage of a centrally sponsored
programme with near-unlimited access to funds. The MGNREGA administration at
the Centre did not help either by awarding districts that managed to generate more
days of employment, and in effect, spend more money. While this enthusiasm might
have led to some high-quality assets, in several cases this also led the administration
to ignore work quality and focus exclusively on employment creation.
In 2009–10, the then Gujarat Chief Minister (CM) declared his wish to under-
take the construction of boribandhs under MGNREGA. An overzealous adminis-
tration took up the wish of the CM in a mission mode and more than 250,000
boribandhs were constructed. Little did the administration realize that the con-
struction of effective boribandhs required a thorough understanding of local stream
hydrology or that it needed to be done in a small time window—when the stream
flow was neither too much nor too low.
Not surprisingly, studies found that more than 85 per cent of the boribandhs
were rendered useless in no time (Shah and Mistry 2012). Our surveys also revealed
that MGNREGA assets performed best where they were most required and where
the decision to undertake the works was taken by the village communities, rather
than by the Sarpanch or the MGNREGA administration.
2Kapil dhara yojana in Madhya Pradesh was initiated with the objective of stabilizing agricultural
production and improving farmers’ livelihood by providing irrigation facilities including digging
of new wells.
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4.6.3 Recognize the Importance of Assets
A common perception under the previous UPA national government was that
MGNREGA was primarily a conduit for doling out extra cash to people and that the
focus on MGNREGA’s non-wage beneﬁts was often missing. Apparently,
MGNREGA has an elaborate system of reporting, much of which is done
near-real-time. However, none of the parameters in the management information
system (MIS) seem to focus on the quality of assets, the beneﬁts people can derive
from them, or on their sustainability. Once a work is declared complete, the MIS
stops tracking it.
Admittedly, almost in every state, we found that the local MGNREGA staff was
over-burdened by the rush to initiate ‘new works’ or to complete the ongoing ones.
Field engineers in several states reported that each of them was looking after 6–10
Gram Panchayats, which could easily mean more than 100 ongoing works at a
time.
In Andhra Pradesh, we found engineers eagerly looking forward to vacancies
being ﬁlled in the hope of easing their burden; in Madhya Pradesh, we found that
MGNREGA engineers were also looking after non-MGNREGA works; and some
of them ‘informally trained and hired’ local villagers to help them out.
They suggested that MGNREGA Mates should be given some technical training
to assist them better. The MGNREGA Mates are fairly well qualiﬁed and can easily
be trained into barefoot engineers. Doing this would not only provide some
much-needed relief and assistance to the engineers; but will also train a cadre of
young villagers in practical aspects of civil engineering.
Another issue is the high dropout rate of engineers and this came up repeatedly
in our discussions in Madhya Pradesh. The open market offers signiﬁcantly higher
salaries to engineers and it is therefore, difﬁcult for MGNREGA to retain the best
ones. The ﬁeld engineers candidly admitted that the quality of assets suffered due to
poor supervision and lack of proper technical inputs but also described their
inability to do anything about it.
Singh and Modi (2010) found that the difference in the work load of Junior
Technical Assistants correlated well with difference in the quality of assets between
Dungarpur and Tonk. Gaur and Chandel (2010), on the other hand, reported that a
smart system of incentives in place for MGNREGA Mates in Gujarat led to healthy
competition among them on who could create the best-performing assets. Shah
(2009) argued that it is the non-wage beneﬁts of MGNREGA that afford it a clear
advantage over a cash transfer scheme. Conversely, if the quality of MGNREGA
assets were to be consistently poor, it would end up being nothing more than a poor
substitute for a cash transfer programme.
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4.6.4 Fix Responsibility for Maintenance
Our surveys reported that even in the case of best-performing public assets,
maintenance was an issue and the life expectancy of assets was woefully low. In
Kerala, of the 23 public ponds we surveyed, only one was being maintained by the
community. Villagers, including those who were directly beneﬁting from the assets,
felt that it was the responsibility of the Gram Panchayat to regularly clean and
maintain the ponds.
In some cases, the user-community used to carry out some kind of annual
maintenance work before it was taken up under MGNREGA. Ever since, the
user-community stopped the maintenance activities and expected the government or
the Gram Panchayat to shoulder the responsibility. Likewise in Gujarat, Gaur and
Chandel (2010) suggested that because the beneﬁts from public assets were diffused
over a larger group of beneﬁciaries, there was little interest in maintenance among
individual users.
Singh and Modi (2010) noted that in Rajasthan, while communities were vigilant
about the maintenance of public assets, they were either incapable (in Dungarpur)
or unwilling (Tonk) to contribute monetarily towards asset maintenance. Likewise
in Bihar, Kumar and Chandra (2010) recommended that special provisions should
be made for the Gram Panchayats to undertake repair and maintenance works on a
regular basis.
Even in Madhya Pradesh, where the implementing agencies are required to
identify user groups and hand over the assets to them on completion, maintenance
was an issue. The then MGNREGA Commissioner in Bhopal, Dr. Pastore sug-
gested that it is futile to hand over assets to user groups that are identiﬁed after the
works have been implemented. He suggested that the user groups should be
identiﬁed before construction begins and should be involved in the planning,
design, procurement and implementation of the works. Only then would they
assume ownership and responsibility for the asset (Verma and Schwan 2012).
The relatively better work-supervision and maintenance of MGNREGA assets
on private lands suggests that if the assets built are useful and effective. The users
have clearly deﬁned ownership, and if it is clear to them that neither MGNREGA,
nor the Gram Panchayat, nor any other programme of the government would take
up the responsibility of maintaining the assets. The users should see self-interest in
proper maintenance of assets on their own land. The problem with assets on
common land is that their ownership is not clearly deﬁned and their beneﬁts are too
diffused.
There is unlikely to be any one institutional model for maintenance that would
work everywhere. MGNREGA must therefore offer flexibility and actively seek out
local institutional arrangements. The MGNREGA administration, on its part, should
include asset quality parameters in the MIS and initiate a routine of regular
inspection of works even after their construction has been completed.
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4.6.5 Better Equip MGNREGA Administration, Especially
in Poor Areas
Through an analysis of the National Sample Survey data for 2009–10, Dutta et al.
(2012; p. 57) show that ‘poorer states have greater unmet demand’ for MGNREGA
work (see Fig. 4.9). Thus, MGNREGA implementation becomes a function of the
ability of the administration rather than of the demand, as originally envisaged.
The administration in better-off states, districts and villages tends to be better
equipped in implementing MGNREGA in a supply-push mode even when the
effective demand might be relatively low. Poor communities, on the other hand, are
likely to be less resourceful and have less effective MGNREGA administration.
They are also more likely to have less effective, less informed and less empowered
Gram Panchayats. There is, therefore, a need to pay special attention to ensuring
that MGNREGA administration at all levels is well trained and equipped.
4.6.6 Build Capacities of PRIs and Help Them Become
Better Demand Systems
Among the four states where we conducted asset case studies, Kerala and Rajasthan
seemed to be performing better, but for different reasons. Singh and Modi (2010)
suggested that the MGNREGA awareness levels in Rajasthan were quite high and
people were quite aware about the provisions and processes of MGNREGA.
Fig. 4.9 Rural poverty and unmet demand for MGNREGA work. Source Dutta et al. (2012),
p. 58
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In Kerala, where Kudumbashree is involved in MGNREGA implementation, the
programme was able to reach out to women much more than anywhere else. This
explains the very high participation of women in MGNREGA in Kerala.
Impressions from Gujarat were mixed. While PRIs in Junagadh and Sabarkantha
districts seemed to be doing quite well, their performance in tribal south Gujarat
was largely disappointing.
In Narmada district, the wages offered by MGNREGA were more than twice the
prevailing market rates. Tribal communities were initially quite upbeat about
MGNREGA, but an indifferent block and district administration caused long delays
in the works approval and wage payment processes and a poor performance in both
quantity of employment generated and quality of assets; leaving the village com-
munities feeling helpless, dejected and cynical.
4.6.7 Avoid Alienating Better-off Farmers,
but not by Constraining Wage Beneﬁts
In several states, we found that the better-off farmers viewed MGNREGA as a
headache; several of them even called it a conspiracy against farmers. In several
places, farmers complained about scarcity of agricultural labour, rising wages,
deteriorating work ethic, labour demanding improved working conditions and better
facilities, etc. They argued that just as MGNREGA was trying to help the labourers;
it must also beneﬁt the farmers—who are at the receiving end of the tightened
labour markets.
In Kerala and Andhra Pradesh, there was a forceful demand for allowing
MGNREGA workers to work on the private land of farmers, especially for labour
intensive agricultural operations, such as paddy harvesting. In Anand (Gujarat), the
labourers complained that the rich farmers were colluding with the Gram Panchayat
and block administration to ensure thatMGNREGAworks are frozen during the peak
agricultural season. This was also reflected in the demand by the then Agriculture
Minister to freezeMGNREGAworks (Tiwari 2011). Doing this would undo much of
the gains that MGNREGA workers might have picked up so far.
It was observed by many that the rise in agricultural wage rates, the setting of a
new wage floor, the greater bargaining power and the better working conditions—
all of these would vanish if the competition between MGNREGA and agricultural
labour is eliminated.
We believe that such demands from farmers stem from two sources: (1) in places
where the agricultural labour market is already tight, a supply-push implementation
of MGNREGA unreasonably distorts the market. If MGNREGA is allowed to
retain its intended demand-pull character, much of these complaints would vanish;
(2) where farmers have not experienced non-wage beneﬁts of MGNREGA, they
perceive MGNREGA only for its negative consequences.
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If MGNREGA assets improve local water security; enhance connectivity to
input and output markets; and improve village amenities, the entire agrarian
economy would get a boost. Instead of tweaking MGNREGA to reduce its wage
beneﬁts, efforts should be made to enhance its non-wage beneﬁts so that the
better-off farmers acquire a stake in its effective implementation.
4.6.8 Get Performance Measurement Right
and Plan an Exit
As discussed earlier, the current MIS of MGNREGA unintentionally creates per-
verse incentives for the administration to focus on spending. If we want to maxi-
mize the non-wage beneﬁts of MGNREGA, the parameters on which MGNREGA
implementation is measured will have to be carefully revised. Popular articles and
news reports also see a reduction in MGNREGA spending—year on year—as a
sign of deteriorating performance or a lapse on the part of the local MGNREGA
administration instead of celebrating a decline in demand for minimum-wage
labours a positive (see Deccan Herald 2012; ToI 2012).
MGNREGA has a huge database down to the level of each individual job card.
This goldmine of data needs to be carefully analysed. If the same households and
the same people keep returning to work at minimum-wage year-after-year,
MGNREGA cannot be said to have fulﬁlled its objectives. A perpetual MGNREGA
will, in all probability, be a poor one.
In the long run, the success of MGNREGA may be measurable in terms of its
reduced demand. Regions and people that require MGNREGA work today should
be able to improve their economic condition and enhance their access to oppor-
tunities through it and this should reduce their demand for unskilled labour
employment over years. This will happen only if the assets created under
MGNREGA are effectively able to enhance the proﬁtability of agriculture by
improving land productivity, providing enhanced water security, connecting vil-
lages to input and output markets and improving rural infrastructure to lift people
and places out of poverty.
4.7 Conclusion
Recent discussions on the fate of MGNREGA have tended to focus on operational
guidelines—labour-material ratio, wage rates, use of machines, etc.—and on the
question of targeting its implementation to a few poor districts. Our ﬁeld studies
highlight how, in spite of all its shortcomings, MGNREGA is transforming rural
India through its wage and non-wage beneﬁts.
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As labour markets tighten and become segmented, they are also becoming more
appealing and equal for women. Village communities identify opportunities of
ﬁnding ‘work close to home’, ‘empowerment’ of labourers and ‘useful rural assets’
as among the most beneﬁcial aspects of MGNREGA while also raising concerns
about deteriorating ‘work ethic’ and delays in wage payments.
AlthoughMGNREGA is designed to be self-targeting at the individual level, at the
community level, it relies heavily on the capabilities of local institutions. Unless these
institutions are strengthened, it is likely that the districts, regions and villages thatmost
need the beneﬁts of MGNREGA will remain deprived. For the rural elite,
MGNREGA-induced labour scarcity and higher wages are areas of concern but where
implemented well, rich farmers do recognize the value of MGNREGA assets.
Our case studies of best-performing assets highlight the potential of MGNREGA
as a water security programme. Under the right conditions, the incremental gross
value created with the help of these assets can surpass their costs in a little over a
year. However, these conditions are rarely met. The case studies also highlight
potential convergence opportunities with the ambitious Pradhan Mantri Krishi
Sinchai Yojana (PMKSY) which promises ‘harkhetkopaani’.
Mainstreaming the creation of high-performing assets is the key to MGNREGA
success.We have offered eight practical suggestions for maximizingMGNREGA’s net
positive impact. Broadly, our propositions reflect four principles: prioritization, ca-
pacities, incentives and exit. By ‘exit’ we imply a gradual decline in demand for work
under MGNREGA. We argue that focusing on non-wage beneﬁts of MGNREGA can
elevate its performance; and, in the process, build stakes for rural communities.
Doing this will require signiﬁcant capacity-building investments in local insti-
tutions (PRIs, block and district administration) and creative, context-speciﬁc
arrangements for ensuring sustainability of assets. There is also an urgent need to
build capacities and enhance opportunities in the non-farm sector.
MGNREGA work should not and cannot be a permanent occupation for poor
households. Over years, the dependence of poor households on MGNREGA and
the willingness of people to work at government-prescribed minimum wages must
decline. This would be a robust indicator of MGNREGA’s success. This can be
done by building high-performing assets that help uplift the village economy to a
level of prosperity which crowds out the need for minimum-wage work.
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Annexure
(see Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7)
Table 4.5 List of students who worked with IWMI in 2009–10
State Districts Students
Andhra
Pradesh
Adilabad Anjanayulin M., Sindhura A., Sarah S. and Pravin Y
Bihar Nalanda Gaurav Kumar and Pratik Gupta
Gujarat Kutch Manoharsinh Chauhan, Pavan Chandel, VR Patel and
ZailsinhMaharaul
Jharkhand Godda Ahmad Fawaz and SumanAcharjee
Kerala Palakad Nisha Nair, Gayathri Devi, J P Sara, M. Arulmani and T R Karthik
Maharashtra Nandurbar NitinPai and Utsav Mishra
Orissa Koraput Anshuman K Gupta
Rajasthan Dholpur Abhishek Tiwari, Deepali, Dipin Gupta, Rajat Bhatia, Rajesh
Sihag, Suyash Raj and Sunil Yadav
Bhilwara Karanpret Singh, Mukesh Mehta and Yash Menaria
Uttarakhand Uttarkashi Archit Gupta, Govindkumar Rai and Vineet Khokhar
Bageshwar Nitya Chanana and Priyanka Sah
Table 4.6 List of students who worked with IWMI in 2010
State Districts Students
Andhra
Pradesh
Chittoor Ramachandra Rani and Premkumar Loganathan
Gujarat Narmada Uchit Desai and Mehul Srivastava
Himachal
Pradesh
Kangra Pushpendra Sharan
Kerala Idukki Annu Ann Alexander and Milli Anthony
Trivandrum Rahul, K. and Vyas Sreenivas
Madhya
Pradesh
Mandla Abhishek Gupta, Ashish Patil, Gandharv Paliwal. Krati Vyas,
Shubham Dwivedi and Rohit Bhatnagar
Maharashtra Jalna Manoj Prabhakar Sonawane and Shaikh Ateeque Abdul
Orissa Mayurbhanj Amrita Chandra and Avantika Garg
Rajasthan Bikaner Jaywardhen Tiwari and Shakti Singh Sekhawat
Rajsamand Gaurav Jain and Rahul Soni
Sikkim Sikkim
West
Ankit Saxena, Sankalp Patnaik, Shantanu and Vishnu
Raghunathan
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Chapter 5
Has Proﬁtability of Foodgrain Production
Declined After Implementation
of MGNREGS in India?
A. Narayanamoorthy, Madhusudan Bhattarai and R. Suresh
5.1 Introduction
The major objective of this study is to ﬁnd out whether the Mahatma Gandhi
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) has affected the
proﬁtability of crops cultivated in different parts of India. Several scholars have
argued vehemently in recent days that ‘MGNREGS has “pushed up” the average
wage of casual workers and distorted the rural labour markets by diverting large
number of labour from agriculture to non‐farm rural jobs, thus creating an artiﬁcial
labour shortage and raising the cost of production of agricultural commodities’
(Gulati et al. 2013a, b, c, p. 9). As a result of increased cost of production, the
proﬁtability of different crops reportedly has declined.
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Several studies and reports published in various sources, including vernacular
dailies,1 especially those published in south India, have reported declining
proﬁtability of farmers due to the introduction of National Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS). Some of the past studies have shown that it helps
getting the assured wage rate and employment to rural poor in most of the states
where it is implemented effectively (Shah 2009; Mukherjee and Sinha 2011; Dutta
et al. 2012; MoRD 2012; Mann and Ramesh 2013). But, other studies have shown
the contradictory evidence as well (Gulati et al. 2013a, b, c).
Several past studies have also reported that since implementation of the
MGNREGS, the growth of agricultural sector declined that has already been
passing through a serious crisis since the early 1990s because of increased cost of
cultivation and poor remuneration from crop cultivation (Harish et al. 2011;
Narayanamoorthy and Alli 2013; Gulati et al. 2013a, b, c). In many places, this
scheme is operated throughout the year including in the busy seasons of agriculture.
As a result, it has created unusual labour scarcity in the rural areas which resulted in
steep increase in the wage rate of agricultural labourers (Shah 2009; Dutta et al.
2012; Berg et al. 2012; Gulati 2013a, b, c).
Likewise, some studies have also reported that introduction of MGNREGS has
also reportedly deteriorated the quality of labour uses in several parts of the country,
considerably, meaning that the effective working hours of labour has reduced which
is ultimately increasing the labour requirement for the given operation (Verma and
Shah 2012). Both the increased wage rate and requirement of labour have report-
edly increased the cost of cultivation of different crops substantially since the
introduction of MGNREGS (Chandrasekar and Ghosh 2011).
As the farm output prices are not ﬁxed in consonance with the rise in the cost of
cultivation in India, the losses from crops cultivation reportedly increased for
farmers. Importantly, citing increased wage rate due to MGNREGS in agriculture,
farmers belonging to the fertile region of Andhra Pradesh have even declared
‘paddy crop holiday’ in the large area during Kharif season 2011 (GoAP 2011;
Narayanamoorthy and Alli 2012).
The farm wage rate and cost of cultivation are determined by irrigation coverage
and host of other factors which vary widely from one region to another in India.
Given the wide variation in determining factors, is it correct to say that the
MGNREGS is increasing farm wage rate which results in increased cost of culti-
vation uniformly across different crops and states in India? Even if one accepts the
1A large number of news reports have been published in various national and state level news
papers covering the issue of NREGS’s impact on crop cultivation and its proﬁtability since the
introduction of the national rural employment scheme. Most news reports have highlighted the
sufferings of the farmers due to non-availability of labour and increased wage rate after the
introduction of NREGS. For instance, Dinamani, a popular news paper in South India, has brought
out many reports on this issue during 2009 (August 6, August 23, September 11, November 5),
2010 (January 1, February 11, September 25, November, 27), 2011 (January 25 and 31) and also
during 2012 (April 24 and August 17). Many news reports focusing on this same issue have also
been published during 2013 and 2014 in various news papers.
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argument that MGNREGS increases the farm wage rate, will the impact of it on wage
rate and cost of cultivation be the same across high and low irrigated states? Quite a
few studies have analysed the implementation, equity and governance aspects of
MGNREGS after the implementation of this scheme (Aiyar and Samji 2006; Bhatia
and Dreze 2006; Chakraborty 2007; Gopal 2009; Khera and Nayak 2009; Adhikari
and Bhatia 2010; Jha et al. 2009, 2011; Imbert and Papp 2011; Liu and Barrett 2013).
Several studies have shown that the MGNREGS has been relatively successful
since it directly provides more employment opportunities and wage to the poor in
the rural areas (Dutta et al. 2012; MoRD 2012). Although the employment guar-
antee scheme has multiplier impacts on village economy that help in ameliorating
the standards of living, it is also expected to cause a hike in agricultural wages
(Berg et al. 2012; Hirway et al. 2008).
Gulati et al. (2012) reported that by distorting the rural labour markets through
creating an artiﬁcial labour shortage, the employment scheme has reportedly raised
the cost of production of agricultural commodities. As a result, farmers have been
facing an adverse effect on the farm proﬁtability in major crops (Narayanamoorthy
2013; Reddy and Reddy 2007).
Although a large number of studies have analysed the impact of the employment
scheme on farm wage rate particularly, not many detailed studies are available as to
what happened to the proﬁtability of crops covering major states and major crops of
India. Given the absence of detailed macro-level data-based studies, one cannot
come to a conclusion that MGNREGS has reduced the proﬁtability of the crops
uniformly across states.
Moreover, the surplus labour available is less in the irrigated regions as com-
pared to un-irrigated regions and therefore, the impact of MGNREGS on the cost of
human labour will not be the same between the two regions. Irrigation coverage to
the cropped area, cropping pattern, intensity of crop cultivation, availability of
labour and rural infrastructure facilities widely vary across the states. Accordingly,
the crop proﬁtability is also a function of irrigation, infrastructure and other input
factors noted above (Vishandass and Lukka 2013), the impact of MGNREGS on
the proﬁtability of crops may not be the same across the states.
Keeping this in view, an attempt is made in this study to ﬁnd out the impact of
MGNREGSon the cost of cultivation aswell as the proﬁtability of differentmajor crops,
utilising the cost of cultivation survey data. The speciﬁc objectives of the study are:
1. To analyse change in the cost of human labour in different operations of selected
crops before and after the introduction of rural employment guarantee scheme,
2. To examine the change on the overall pattern of the cost of cultivation in
different crops before and after the introduction of rural employment guarantee
scheme.
3. To estimate the proﬁtability in different crops also including imputed value of
family labour cost (cost C2) before and after the introduction of rural
employment guarantee scheme.
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5.2 Data and Methodology
The entire study has been carried out utilising crop-wise cost of cultivation survey
data covering the period from 2000–01 to 2010–11.2 The Commission for
Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) has been publishing valuable time series data
on operation-wise costs, productivity, income, etc., for various important crops over
the years. For studying the proﬁtability of crops cultivation, all the costs and income
related data have been compiled from various CACP’s publications and also from
its website.
The labour and other inputs required for the cultivation of different crops are not
the same, which is also expected to be varied in different states depending upon the
intensity of crops cultivation. The intensity of input use in high productivity states
will be totally different from the states that are producing relatively low productivity
in any crop.
Proﬁt level is also expected to be different for different crops because of nature
and market conditions. One of the objectives of the study is to ﬁnd out whether the
proﬁtability of crop varies with the states having high and low productivity.
Keeping this in view, a total of ﬁve foodgrain crops, namely, paddy, wheat, jowar,
gram and tur have been considered for the study. Based on the productivity data of
Triennium Ending 2010–11, for each crop, two states belonging to the category of
high area with high productivity (HAHP) and high area with low productivity
(HALP) have been considered for studying the proﬁtability of crops. The details of
crops and the states selected for the analysis are presented in (Table 5.1). States
have been selected based on the cultivated area and productivity of the crops.
As regards the method of proﬁt calculation, CACP has been using nine different
cost concepts (A1, A2, A2 + FL, B1, B2, C1, C2, C2* and C3) for measuring the
economics of various crops cultivation. Details on each of the cost types are pro-
vided in the appendix section. For this study, cost C2 has been considered for
computing the proﬁtability of various crops as it covers the entire variable and ﬁxed
costs needed for crop cultivation.
The objective is to study whether or not the proﬁtability in different crops
cultivated in different states had increased after the introduction of MGNREGS. For
this, all the costs and income related data have been converted into constant prices
using Consumer Price Index of Agricultural Labour (CPIAL) deflator at 1986–87
prices. Proﬁt level of the crop is computed by deducting the cost C2 from the value
of output. For purpose of analysis, the study period has been divided into two
sub-periods as pre-MGNREGS (2000–01 to 2005–06) and post-MGNREGS
(2005–06 to 2010–11) to capture the impact of the national rural employment
scheme on the cost of cultivation and proﬁtability.
2In order to capture the very latest development in the proﬁtability of different crops, we ideally
wanted to cover the data up to 2012–13. But, unfortunately the CACP has published cost and
income related data of different crops only up to 2010–11 as on July 2014.
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5.3 Analysis and Discussion
As reported earlier, this study covers ﬁve different foodgrain crops for analysis.
These ﬁve selected crops are not the same in terms of its duration, coverage of
irrigation, productivity, value of output, etc. The states that are selected for the
analysis of each crop are also not the same. Therefore, it is prudent to analyse the
proﬁtability of each crop separately rather than taking all the crops together. First
analysis of the proﬁtability of paddy crop before and after the introduction of
MGNREGS is done.
5.3.1 Proﬁtability in Paddy
Paddy is one among the important and labour-intensive crops cultivated in most
parts of India. It has been reported especially in south India that the introduction of
National Rural Employment Scheme has created artiﬁcial demand for labour which
resulted in increased labour cost required for crop cultivation.
Table 5.1 Details of crops and states selected for the study
Crops States selected
for study
Category of state
selected
Area (mha) Yield (kg/ha)
TE
2005–06
TE
2010–11
TE
2005–06
TE
2010–11
1. Paddy Andhra Pradesh HAHP 3.35
(9.12)
4.19
(11.08)
3,020 3,114
Odisha HALP 4.48
(10.26)
4.35
(9.87)
1,491 1,577
2. Wheat Punjab HAHP 3.46
(13.10)
3.52
(12.07)
4,202 4,487
Madhya Pradesh HALP 3.97
(13.94)
4.13
(14.93)
1,716 1,816
3. Jowar Karnataka HAHP 1.63
(17.53)
1.33
(16.80)
806 1,129
Maharashtra HALP 4.65
(54.67)
4.10
(55.01)
745 862
4. Gram Madhya Pradesh HAHP 2.70
(36.94)
3.01
(33.84)
927 972
Rajasthan HALP 1.08
(15.58)
1.31
(19.37)
607 760
5. Tur Maharashtra HAHP 1.08
(30.73)
1.13
(29.75)
664 730
Karnataka HALP 0.57
(16.76)
0.70
(20.37)
539 529
Notes: HAHP High area with high productivity, HALP High area with low productivity, TE
Triennium ending; Figures in brackets are percentage to India’s total area
Sources Computed utilising data and www.dacnet.nic.in
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As generally human labour cost accounts for close to one-third of cultivation
cost in paddy, this increased labour cost has reportedly increased the gross cost of
cultivation that eventually affected the proﬁtability of paddy crop.
Is it correct to say that the human labour cost required for paddy cultivation has
increased after the introduction of rural employment scheme? What is the increase
in labour cost vis-à-vis the costs of other operations? Will the proﬁtability be
affected only due to the increase in labour cost that occurred because of rural
employment scheme? What was the state of labour cost in paddy cultivation before
the introduction of the employment scheme? There is need to ﬁnd out answers to
these questions to make any judgment as to whether or not the rural employment
programme has made any impact on the proﬁtability of paddy crop.
Proﬁtability of any crop is directly linked with its productivity, which is high-
lighted by many studies (Bhalla and Singh 2012). Therefore, as mentioned in the
methodology section, two states having the characteristics of high area with high
productivity (HAHP) and high area with low productivity (HALP) have been
selected for the analysis. While Andhra Pradesh has been considered as HAHP
state, Odisha has been selected as HALP state in paddy crop for the detailed
analysis.
Table 5.2 presents the trends in operation-wise cost, productivity, value of
output and proﬁt for paddy crops for the two selected states for pre and
post-MGNREGS period. For the purpose of analysis, the operation-wise cost has
been classiﬁed into ﬁve categories, namely cost on human labour, cost of bullock
labour, machine labour cost, costs on yield increasing inputs and other costs. This
classiﬁcation is done in order to ﬁnd out the pattern of human labour cost in
comparison to other operations of paddy cultivation.
It is clear from Table 5.2 that there has been a substantial variation in the
operation-wise cost of cultivation between the two periods considered for the
analysis. This is particularly true in the case of cost of human labour, which is
discussed widely as a serious issue after the introduction of national rural
employment programme.
The cost of human labour has increased at a rate of 6.13% per annum in HAHP
state during post-MGNREGS period, but the same grew at a negative rate of
−1.84% during pre-MGNREGS period. What is interesting here is that this has
happened despite signiﬁcant increase in the cost of machine labour which grew at a
rate of 7.50% per annum during post-MGNREGS period. It is generally expected
that the cost of human labour would decline when farmers spend more cost on the
machine labour. But, this has not happened in the case of HAHP state in paddy
cultivation.
This implies that the wage rate paid for the human labour used for paddy
cultivation has increased substantially possibly due to the introduction of the
national rural employment programme. The growth rate in human labour cost is
also found to be much higher as compared to the costs of all other major operations
during the post-MGNREGS period. As a result of fast increase in cost of human
labour and machine labour, the gross cost of cultivation (cost C2) of paddy has also
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increased at a rate of 2.62% per annum during post-MGNREGS period, which was
not the case during pre-MGNREGS period.
The pattern of cultivation of crops is not the same across the states in India.
Some states have been following intensive agriculture by adopting modern tech-
nological inputs, while other states are following different forms of cultivation
practices. Therefore, one may not be able to ﬁrmly conclude that what is happening
in one state is same in all other states. Speciﬁcally, the labour use pattern and the
wage rate are widely varied across the states.
In view of this, another state namely Odisha has been selected under the category
of HALP so as to ﬁnd out whether or not the pattern of operation-wise cost of
cultivation is same in comparison to HAHP state. As expected, the pattern of
operation-wise cost including the cost of human labour in HALP state varied from
the HAHP state during both pre and post-MGNREGS period.
Table 5.2 Cost and proﬁtability of paddy cultivation from 2000–01 to 2010–11 (values in Rs. at
1986–87 prices)
Parameters Particulars Andhra Pradesh (HAHP) Odisha (HALP)
2000–01 to
2005–06
2006–07 to
2010–11
2000–01 to
2010–11
2000–01 to
2005–06
2006–07 to
2010–11
2000–01 to
2010–11
Human labour Cost (Rs.) 2,709 3,157 2,913 2,034 2,141 2,083
CGR (%) −1.84 6.13 1.33 1.05 4.19 2.18
Share (%) 31.25 34.14 32.30 38.59 39.37 39.07
Bullock
labour
Cost (Rs.) 281 158 223 636 562 598
CGR (%) −0.39 −10.09 −4.73 1.55 −1.03 −0.40
Share (%) 3.25 1.71 2.47 12.06 10.43 11.22
Machine
labour
Cost (Rs.) 550 851 705 121 153 136
CGR (%) 4.24 7.50 6.46 12.42 0.44 6.70
Share (%) 6.34 9.21 7.81 2.30 2.83 2.55
Yield
enhancing
inputs
Cost (Rs.) 2,005 1,765 1,850 850 766 806
CGR (%) 2.22 −2.17 −2.85 0.32 −2.96 −1.55
Share (%) 23.13 19.09 20.52 16.12 14.22 15.12
Other cost
(ﬁxed costs)
Cost (Rs.) 3,220 3,501 3,381 1,630 1,786 1,708
CGR (%) 1.00 1.13 0.62 1.06 −0.24 −0.04
Share (%) 37.16 37.85 37.49 30.93 33.15 32.04
Cost C2 Cost (Rs.) 8,667 9,248 9,018 5,271 5,389 5,331
CGR (%) −0.58 2.62 0.57 1.21 1.12 0.76
Share (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Value of
output
VOP (Rs.) 8,810 10,030 9,507 4,088 4,851 4,501
CGR (%) 0.48 1.58 0.95 0.19 2.60 1.13
Yield (qtl/ha) 50.49 53.29 52.04 29.42 30.64 30.01
Proﬁt
(VOP-C2)
143 782 489 −1,182 −538 −829
Number of years proﬁt
realised
4/6 4/5 8/11 0/6 0/5 0/11
Notes: CGR Compound growth rate percent/per annum, HAHP High area with high productivity and HALP High area
with low productivity
Sources Computed using data from CACP (various years)
5 Has Proﬁtability of Foodgrain Production Declined … 137
However, the cost of human labour, which is one of our main focuses in the paper,
has increased at a faster pace during post-MGNREGS period as compared to its
previous time period considered for the analysis. For instance, the cost of human
labour increased at a rate of 4.19% per annum during post-MGNREGS period, but the
same has increased only at a rate of 1.05% per annum during pre-MGNREGS period.
In contrast to the human labour cost, the growth rate in machine labour cost has
decelerated sharply after the introduction of rural employment scheme, which is
something unexpected. The gross cost of cultivation (cost C2) too has decelerated
in HALP state during post-MGNREGS period because of the slow pace of growth
in the cost of all other operations except the human labour cost.
Overall, what is clear from the analysis of operation-wise cost is that although
the cost pattern is not the same between the two states, the cost of human labour has
increased at relatively faster pace in both the states after the introduction of rural
employment scheme.
One of the major objectives of the study is to ﬁnd out whether the proﬁtability in
crops cultivation has affected after MGNREGS. It has been argued in the recent years
that the rural employment scheme introduced throughout the country has created
artiﬁcial demand for labour which resulted in increased cost of human labour.
After studying operation-wise cost of cultivation, the focus is towards the
proﬁtability of paddy crop. It is to be noted here that the proﬁtability of any crop is
determined not only by the cost of cultivation but also by the factors such as
productivity of the crop, market price, etc.
The results presented in Table 5.2 shows that the average value of paddy output
increased from ` 8,810/ha in 2000–06 to ` 10,030/ha in 2006–11 (output measured at
market prices only) in HAHP states, showing amuch faster pace of growth rate during
post-MGNREGSperiod. As a result of the faster growth inVOP, the proﬁtability from
paddy increased from ` 143 to ` 782/ha during the period 2001–06 and 2006–11.
Although the absolute proﬁtability is very meager, it increased manifold during
post-MGNREGS period as compared to its earlier period. Not only has the prof-
itability increased after the introduction of employment scheme, but the number of
years proﬁt realised by the farmers have also increased during post-MGNREGS
period in HAHP state (see, Fig. 5.1).
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Fig. 5.1 Proﬁtability in paddy cultivation at 1986–87 price
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The proﬁtability scenario of HALP state is totally different from HAHP state.
While no signiﬁcant increase is noticed in VOP between pre and post-MGNREGS
period, the losses incurred by the farmers in cultivating paddy have reduced from
` 1,182 to ` 538/ha during this period.
Surprisingly, farmers belonging to HALP state could not reap proﬁt even in single
year during the entire period of analysis from2000–01 to 2010–11.Although the cost of
cultivation is very low inHALP as compared to HAHP state, farmers are unable to reap
any proﬁt from paddy cultivation possibly because of low productivity. This suggests
that it is difﬁcult to increase the proﬁtability without increasing its productivity.
5.3.2 Proﬁtability in Wheat
Wheat is an important foodgrain crop cultivated predominantly during rabi season in
different parts of the country. It accounts for about 24% of India’s total foodgrains
area and about 37% in India’s gross production of foodgrains during 2011–12.
Similar to paddy crop, it is also cultivated mostly under irrigated conditions where
the cost of cultivation is generally higher; human labour cost accounts for about
10–17% of cost C2 of wheat crop.
Therefore, the introduction of MGNREGS may have made some impact on the
proﬁtability of wheat crop through increased human labour cost in different states.
In order to study the proﬁtability in wheat crop, two states have been selected
having the characteristics of HAHP and HALP. Punjab (the highest productivity
state in wheat in India) has been considered as HAHP state, while Madhya Pradesh
(MP) has been selected as HALP state for the analysis.
The details of operation-wise cost, gross cost of cultivation, value of output and
proﬁt pertaining to wheat crop for the two selected states are presented in Table 5.3.
The pattern of proﬁtability in HAHP state is studied ﬁrst. It is expected that the
human labour cost would have gone up considerably after the introduction of
MGNRES in wheat crop.
But against the expectation, the human labour cost has increased only marginally.
For instance, the average human labour cost during pre-MGNREGS period was `
757/ha, which has increased to ` 831/ha during post-MGNREGS period. The growth
rate computed for pre and post-MGNREGS period also shows that the cost of human
labour incurred for the cultivation of wheat crop in Punjab has decelerated (−1.67%)
during post-MGNREGS period as compared to its previous period (−1.00%). This
happened despite deceleration in the cost of machine labour during post-MGNREGS
period. Interestingly, the real cost of all other operations has also decelerated during
post-MGNREGS period, which is something not noticed in the case of paddy crop.
On the whole, the analysis on HAHP state shows that the real cost of human
labour incurred for the cultivation of wheat crop has not increased during
post-MGNREGS period. What happened to the proﬁtability of wheat crop after the
introduction of MGNREGS is the next key question probed in the study. As per the
data of CACP, the gross cost of cultivation (C2) has increased marginally from
` 7,249 to ` 7,773/ha between 2000–06 and 2006–11 in Punjab. But, in spite of the
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marginal increase in cost C2, the proﬁtability from wheat cultivation has increased
from ` 1,202 to ` 1,887/ha during this period.
The results of wheat crop discussed above in relation with HAHP state are in
many ways different from HALP state (Madhya Pradesh). In spite of substantial
growth in machine labour cost during post-MGNREGS period (4.63%), the human
labour cost spent for the cultivation of wheat has increased at a rate of 1.01% per
annum during this period. This is different from the results arrived above with
HALP state. This seems to suggest that although the national rural employment
programme has been in operation across all the states in India, the impact of it on
labour cost is not the same in all the states because the factors determining the wage
cost of agricultural labour are not the same.
Whatever may be the reasons for the increased wage cost, the results from HALP
state show that the proﬁtability from wheat crop has increased dramatically from
Rs. −132 to ` 1,251/ha between pre and post-MGNRES period in HALP state. This
raise in proﬁt is mainly due to increased productivity of wheat which had increased
from 19.83 to 24.81 qtl/ha between the two periods.
This analysis of wheat crop, on the whole, suggests that the introduction of
MGNREGS has not affected the proﬁtability in both the high and low productivity
states as the number of years proﬁt realised by the farmers have increased after its
introduction (Fig. 5.2).
5.3.3 Proﬁtability in Jowar
Jowar is another food grain crop which is considered for the analysis for two
reasons. First, unlike paddy and wheat crops, jowar is cultivated predominantly
under rainfed condition.3 Second, it is generally treated as a low-value crop in
comparison to paddy and wheat crops.
Fig. 5.2 Proﬁtability in wheat cultivation at 1986–87 price
3The coverage of irrigation in jowar crop is very low in India; it increased only from 3.60% in
1960–61 to 8.70 in 2011–12. This is very low when compared to the crops like paddy and wheat
where the coverage of irrigation is 58.60 and 92.10%, respectively, during 2010–11.
5 Has Proﬁtability of Foodgrain Production Declined … 141
Therefore, studying the proﬁtability of this crop would give some interesting
results that will be useful to compare with other high value cereal crops. As fol-
lowed earlier, two states namely Karnataka and Maharashtra have been considered
for the analysis of jowar crop. While Karnataka has been selected as HAHP state,
Maharashtra has been considered as HALP state for the purpose of analysis.
First, the analysis of the proﬁtability of jowar crop is done by taking data from
HAHP state. It is evident from Table 5.4 that the cost of human labour incurred for
cultivating jowar has increased at a faster rate after MGNRGES. The real human
labour cost increased at a rate of 10.24% per annum from 2006–07 to 2010–11,
whereas the same was almost constant (0.01%) during pre-MGNRGES period.
In terms of value, an average of ` 850/ha was incurred on account of human
labour during post-MGNRGES period which was only ` 567/ha during
pre-MGNRGES period. It is generally expected that the machine labour cost would
be less wherever the human labour cost is higher for any crop cultivation. But
contrary to this, the machine labour cost too has increased at a much faster rate
(9.36% per annum) after the introduction of employment scheme in Karnataka
which is an interesting result.
The increased human as well as machine labour cost has also made substantial
impact on the gross cost of cultivation (C2) after the introduction of employment
scheme. Despite substantial reduction in the cost on yield increasing inputs, the cost
C2 increased at a rate of 4.15% per annum during post-MGNRGES period as
against the negative rate of −0.31% per annum during pre-MGNRGES period.
However, the increased labour cost as well as the gross cost (C2) have not made
any big impact on the proﬁtability of jowar in HAHP state; the average proﬁt in
relation to cost C2 was negative during both pre and post-MGNRGES period. It
appears that although the cost of cultivation in jowar has increased after the
employment scheme, it has not made any signiﬁcant damages on its proﬁtability
(Fig. 5.3).
The proﬁtability of jowar in HALP state (Maharashtra) is somewhat different
from its counterpart state of HAHP. The results show that the real human labour
cost increased at a rate of 8.70% per annum during post-MGNRGES period as
against the negative growth of −1.44% during pre-MGNRGES period. This is
almost matching with the result of HAHP state. The cost of machine labour too
increased at an appreciable rate (6.66%) during post-MGNRGES period which also
increased at a rate of 7.49% per annum during pre-MGNRGES period. Possibly
because of slower increase of machine labour cost, the gross cost of cultivation has
increased at a rate of 3.62% per annum, which is little lower (2.83%) than the
increase experienced during pre-MGNRGES period.
As observed in HAHP state, the changes observed in cost of cultivation during
pre and post-MGNRGES period have not made any impact on the proﬁtability of
jowar. Proﬁtability is found to be negative at both periods considered for the
analysis. The only difference noted between the two periods is the magnitude of
losses (in relation cost C2) incurred by jowar farmers is relatively less during
post-MGNREGS period as compared to pre-MGNRGES period.
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5.3.4 Proﬁtability in Gram
After studying the proﬁtability of three cereal crops, the focus is turned towards the
pulse crops which accounted for about 13% (24.46 million ha) of the cropped area
as of 2011–12 in India. Although various pulse crops have been traditionally cul-
tivated in India, two major pulse crops namely gram (Bengal gram) and tur (red
gram) have been considered for the purpose of analysis as these two crops together
accounted for about 52% of India’s total pulses area in 2011–12.
Since gram and tur are different in many ways, it is not prudent to analyse the
proﬁtability of these two crops together. Therefore, here proﬁtability of Gram
analysed ﬁrst and then tur. As followed earlier, two states namely Madhya Pradesh
(HAHP state) and Rajasthan (HALP state) have been considered for the study. It
clearly emerges from Table 5.5 that the cost incurred and proﬁt realised from gram
is not the same between the two states. In the case of HAHP state, the cost on
human labour has increased substantially after the introduction of employment
scheme. The real human labour cost grew at a rate of 4.36% per annum during
post-MGNREGS period, but the same grew at a negative rate of −1.58% per annum
during pre-MGNREGS period, suggesting a fast increase of human labour cost after
the employment scheme.
However, the machine labour cost has surprisingly not increased substantially
during post-MGNREGS period (2.87%) as compared to its previous period
(2.81%). Because of negative growth in bullock labour cost as well as in the cost of
yield increasing inputs, the gross cost of cultivation on gram has declined at a rate
of −3.88% per annum during post-MGNREGS period.
As regards the proﬁtability, although the average value of output has increased to
` 4,730/ha during post-MGNREGS period from its pre-MGNREGS period value of
` 4,397/ha, the growth rate of VOP during post-MGNREGS period was negative
(−6.67% per annum). Notwithstanding this, the average proﬁt realised by the
farmers belonging to HAHP state during post-MGNREGS period increased to
` 1,034/ha, which was only about ` 800/ha during its previous period.
It was expected that the pattern of operation-wise cost of cultivation and prof-
itability of gram in HALP state would be different from that of HAHP state. But the
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results presented in Table 5.5 depict not much difference in proﬁt and other major
parameters. Similar to HAHP state, the cost of human labour has increased at a faster
rate during post-MGNREGS period as compared to its previous period. The growth
in gross cost of cultivation (C2) has sharply declined during post-MGNREGS
period, which was also observed with HAHP state. Due to the increase in yield of
gram from 6.62 to 8.25 qtl/ha between the two periods, the proﬁtability has increased
from ` 587 to ` 1,023/ha between pre and post-MGNREGS period.
Again the increase in proﬁtability in gram cultivation between HAHP state and
HALP state is more or less same after the introduction of employment scheme
(Fig. 5.4). The number of years proﬁt realised by the farmers through the culti-
vation of gram is also same for both the states selected for the analysis. It appears
Table 5.5 Cost and proﬁtability of gram cultivation from 2000–01 to 2010–11 (values in ` at
1986–87 prices)
Costs/Proﬁt Particulars Madhya Pradesh (HAHP) Rajasthan (HALP)
2000–01 to
2005–06
2006–07 to
2010–11
2000–01 to
2010–11
2000–01 to
2005–06
2006–07 to
2010–11
2000–01 to
2010–11
Human labour Cost (Rs.) 552 587 568 815 725 774
CGR (%) −1.58 4.36 0.45 −3.92 4.41 −1.02
Share (%) 15.35 15.87 15.59 26.77 23.56 25.30
Bullock
labour
Cost (Rs.) 201 113 161 155 88 125
CGR (%) 1.02 −10.78 −7.48 −9.45 −27.15 −19.78
Share (%) 5.60 3.06 4.43 5.11 2.86 4.08
Machine
labour
Cost (Rs.) 338 450 389 316 320 318
CGR (%) 2.81 2.87 3.64 1.25 0.64 0.23
Share (%) 9.38 12.18 10.67 10.39 10.40 10.39
Yield
enhancing
inputs
Cost (Rs.) 882 914 897 672 748 707
CGR (%) 2.22 −7.26 −1.49 3.20 −15.20 −3.57
Share (%) 24.53 24.72 24.62 22.09 24.30 1,137
Other cost
(ﬁxed costs)
Cost (Rs.) 1,624 1,632 1,628 1,086 1,197 3,060
CGR (%) 1.83 −6.16 −1.66 0.51 −10.22 −2.74
Share (%) 45.14 44.16 44.69 35.68 38.88 37.14
Cost C2 Cost (Rs.) 3,597 3,696 3,642 3,044 3,079 3,060
CGR (%) 1.44 −3.88 −0.85 −0.38 −7.24 −2.53
Share (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Value of
output
VOP (Rs.) 4,397 4,730 4,548 3,631 4,102 3,845
CGR (%) 2.14 −6.67 −1.09 −0.42 −11.71 −3.19
Yield (qtl/ha) 9.89 10.08 9.98 6.62 8.25 7.36
Proﬁt
(VOP-C2)
800 1,034 906 587 1,023 785
Number of years proﬁt
realised
6/6 5/5 11/11 6/6 5/5 11/11
Notes and Sources Same as in Table 5.2
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from the analysis that although the human labour cost has increased at a faster rate
after the introduction of national employment scheme, it has not made any severe
impact on the proﬁtability of gram in both HAHP and HALP.
5.3.5 Proﬁtability in Tur
Asmentioned earlier, tur is another important pulse crop selected for the analysis along
with gram. Tur is cultivated predominantly under rainfed condition in various parts of
India. Because of increased demand for tur, its area increased from 2.43 million ha in
1960–61 to 4.01 million ha in 2011–12, an increase of about 65%.
But, its productivity has not increased appreciably despite various efforts taken
by the government which has been a serious concern among the policy makers.4 In
order to study the proﬁtability of tur crop during pre and post-MGNREGS period,
two states namely Maharashtra (HAHP state) and Karnataka (HALP state) have
been considered as these two are cultivating tur under large area over the years. In
fact, about 50% of India’s total tur crop area was found only from these two states
during 2011–12.
Given the variation in productivity of tur between the two states selected for the
analysis, it is expected that the proﬁtability would also be different among them. It
is evident from Table 5.6 that the cost of human labour has increased substantially
in HAHP state after the introduction of the NREGS. Not only has the average of
cost of human labour increased from ` 1,082 to ` 1,827/ha between the two periods
but its growth also registered at a high rate of 14.08% per annum during
post-MGNREGS period, which is much higher the same registered during
pre-MGNREGS period (7.23%).
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Fig. 5.4 Proﬁtability in gram cultivation at 1986–87 price
4Considering the increased demand for tur, the government of India has substantially increased its
minimum support price (MSP) especially in the recent years. The MSP announced for tur was only
Rs. 1,105 per quintal during 1999–2000, but it increased to Rs. 3,850 per quintal during 2012–13.
The hike in MSP for tur crop is very high as compared to many important foodgrain crops
cultivated in India.
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Interestingly, this substantial increase in labour cost is seen in spite of consid-
erable increase in the machine labour cost (19.98% per annum) during
post-MGNREGS period. This kind of faster growth in labour cost has not been
observed in any of the crops analysed so far.
Along with the labour cost, the costs of yield increasing inputs have also
increased considerably during post-MGNREGS period which resulted in increased
gross cost of cultivation (C2) between the two periods; increased from ` 4,058 to
` 6,379/ha. But, this steep increase in cost C2 has not affected the proﬁtability of tur
which in fact has increased from ` 612 to ` 935/ha between the two periods mainly
because of increased value of output. One can say certainly from the analysis that
the proﬁtability of tur in HAHP state would have been much better if the cost of
human labour has not increased substantially after the introduction of MGNREGS.
It is expected that the cost of cultivation and proﬁtability of tur in HALP state
would be totally different from that of HAHP state because of variation in pro-
ductivity. But both the cost of human labour and the machine labour have increased
at a pace which is almost similar to HAHP state (Table 5.6). While the human
labour cost grew at a rate of 12.03% per annum during post-MGNREGS period, the
same grew only at about 4.50% per annum during pre-MGNREGS period.
The cost of yield increasing inputs registered negative growth during both
periods of analysis in HALP state which is different from HAHP state. However,
despite a considerable increase in gross cost of cultivation, the proﬁtability of tur
has increased from ` 40 to ` 1,072/ha between the two periods in HALP state.
Increased value of output and the slower increase in the gross cost of cultivation
have helped the farmers cultivating tur to realise better proﬁt during
post-MGNREGS period (Fig. 5.5).
5.4 Conclusions and Suggestions
An attempt has been made in this study to analyse the impact of MGNREGS on the
proﬁtability of ﬁve foodgrain crops utilising cost of cultivation survey data from
2000–01 to 2010–11 covering different states. The results of the study have shown
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mixed results; not completely supported the argument that the proﬁtability of crops
has declined after the introduction of NRGES. This is not only true with HAHP
states but also with HALP states.
Supporting the earlier studies that the farm wage rate has increased due to the
introduction of employment scheme, this study results also showed that the real cost
of human labour has increased considerably in all ﬁve crops in both HAHP and
HALP states after its introduction (2006–07 to 2010–11).
However, it has not made any deleterious impact on the proﬁtability. The prof-
itability, which is calculated by deducting the value of output from cost C2, has
increased in all ﬁve crops in HAHP states, whereas either the proﬁtability has
increased or the losses reduced in HALP states. Besides, the number of years proﬁt
realised by the farmers have also increased in most crops during the post-MGNREGS
period as compared to pre-MGNREGS period (2000–01 to 2005–06).
While there is no distinct pattern emerging in proﬁtability between cereals and
pulse crops, the level of increase in proﬁtability is found to be relatively better
among the pulse crops after the introduction of NRGES. Increased productivity in
most crops has one way or the other helped to negate the increase in human labour
cost which also facilitated to increase proﬁtability.
Although there is no clear evidence from this study that the proﬁtability of crops
has declined during post-MGNREGS period, this may not be true in all regions/
states in India. Regions where the employment scheme have been operated inten-
sively may have increased the farm wage rate at a faster rate which might have
affected the proﬁtability of crops.
It is difﬁcult to capture this effect through the cost of cultivation survey data
which is used in this study. Detailed studies using farm level collected from dif-
ferent regions need to be carried out to verify the results of this study. The study
ﬁnds that wherever the productivity of crop has increased during post-MGNREGS
period, the proﬁtability has not been affected despite considerable increase in
human labour cost. Therefore, concerted efforts are needed to increase the pro-
ductivity of crops and then the gross value of output to negate the cost increase in
human labour.
This study clearly reveals that the gross cost of cultivation (C2) has increased
substantially in most crops as compared to the increase that is observed in value of
output in both HAHP and HALP states after the launch of rural employment
programme. Farmers would have earned appreciable proﬁt during post-MGNREGS
period, if the cost of human labour had not increased appreciably.
The relatively less increase in the value of output in most crops suggests that the
farmers are not getting the price for their produce in consonance with cost of
cultivation. The National Commission on Farmers has suggested that the govern-
ment should announce the minimum support price (MSP) for crops at 50% more
than the actual cost of production (Cost C3). Minimum support prices announced
every year for various crops should also be linked with the wholesale price index so
as to protect the farmers from the possible inflationary pressure.
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The cost of human labour incurred for cultivating different crops in south Indian
states like Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka has registered high growth rate as
compared to other selected states especially after the introduction of MGNREGS.
This has either dampened the proﬁtability of the crop or created losses for farmers
in relation to cost C2. One needs to ﬁnd out as to why have these happened
speciﬁcally in south Indian states? Is it due to labour scarcity that was accentuated
by the proper implementation of rural employment programme in these states?
The Mohan Kanda Committee (GoAP 2011) appointed for studying the reasons
for crop holiday in East Godavari region in Andhra Pradesh pointed out that
‘Non-availability of labour in the peak season of agricultural operation on account
of MGNREGS’ as one of the reasons for the distress call made by the farmers. Our
analysis based on the cost of cultivation survey data also seems to indicate that the
labour scarcity accentuated due to MGNREGS may have increased the cost of
human labour at a faster pace. Therefore, arrangements may be made to link up
MGNREGS with agricultural operations to reduce the labour scarcity and also to
improve the proﬁtability in crops cultivation.
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Appendix Note 1
CACP has been using nine different cost concepts. These are the followings:
(a) Cost A1 = All actual expenses in cash and kind incurred in production by
owner.
(b) Cost A2 = Cost A1 + rent paid for leased-in land.
(c) Cost A2 + FL = Cost A2 + imputed value of family labour.
(d) Cost B1 = Cost A1 + interest on value of owned capital assets (excluding
land).
(e) Cost B2 = Cost B1 + rental value of owned land (net of land revenue) and rent
paid for leased-in land.
(f) Cost C1 = Cost B1 + imputed value of family labour.
(g) Cost C2 = Cost B2 + imputed value of family labour.
(h) Cost C2* = Cost C2 estimated by taking into account statutory minimum or
actual wage whichever is higher.
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(i) Cost C3 = Cost C2* + 10% of cost C2* on account of managerial.
(j) Functions performed by farmer.
Source Narayanamoorthy (2013).
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Part II
MGNREGA: State Level Experiences and
Outcomes
Chapter 6
From EGS to MGNREGS
in Maharashtra: Were the Programme
Potentials Achieved?
Jayanti Kajale and Sangeeta Shroff
6.1 Introduction
Agriculture is the mainstay of the Indian economy because of its high share in
employment and livelihood creation. While India’s agricultural sector has an
impressive record of taking the country out of severe food crisis to that of
self-sufﬁciency, the recent past speaks of lack of dynamism in this sector. The
contribution of agriculture to the gross domestic product (GDP) had declined from
36.4% in 1982–83 to 13.7% in 2012–13. Besides the declining contribution of
agriculture to GDP, the growth rate of the agriculture sector has also shown dismal
performance in recent years than in the preceding decades.
During the Tenth Plan period, the growth rate of GDP was 7.6% per annum,
whereas the growth of agricultural sector was only 2.4% per annum. In contrast,
industry and service sectors grew at a little more than 9% per annum. The Eleventh
Plan (2007–12) target of growth of 4% per annum in the agricultural sector has also
not been achieved as the average growth rate of this sector for this plan period was
3.3%.
While the slower growth of GDP in agriculture compared to other sectors is
expected, the main failure has been the inability to reduce dependence of the
workforce on agriculture signiﬁcantly by creating enough non-farm opportunities to
absorb surplus labour in rural areas. The agricultural sector is also characterised by
the dominance of small and marginal farmers and a decline in the size of holdings
which is not able to provide sufﬁcient income to farmers.
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In view of the stagnancy in agriculture in the post-2000 period, intervention by
the government certainly has an important role to play. One such intervention has
been the implementation of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) in 2006, which aims at enhancing livelihood
security of the households in rural areas of the country as agriculture has under-
performed and is unable to sustain the huge workforce dependent upon it. In this
context, we present here Maharashtra state experience relating to implementation
and performance of MGNREGS and also compare it with the implementation and
performance of EGS (i.e. Maharashtra EGS, or MEGS), the social Safety Net
programme for rural poor, which is in fact precedent of MGNREGS in India.
The implementation of MGNREGS by the central government since 2006 is
considered to be a landmark policy decision in terms of its socio-economic
implications across rural India. At all India level, MGNREGS was implemented in
February 2006 in the most backward 200 districts. It was extended to 130 additional
districts in 2007-08 in its second phase. Finally in the third phase in 2008–09, the
scheme was implemented in the remaining districts. It was thus implemented in all
the 615 districts of the country since April 2008. By the end of 2014, the
MGNREGS had provided over 2.2 billion person days of employment beneﬁting
over 50 million households per annum. At all India level, an average wage
employment of 46 person days was provided in the year 2013–14 with an outlay of
` 330 billion in a year (or USD 5.5 billion per year). With wages indexed to the
consumer price index for agricultural labour, the average wage under the scheme
had increased from ` 65 per day in the year 2006–07 to ` 132 in 2013–14,
(Economic Survey of India, 2013–14, Govt. of India publications).
Reports from different regions (states) of the country reflect a positive outcome
of the scheme as far as employment generation is concerned (see, Khera 2008;
Khera and Nayak 2009). Likewise, past studies on the impact of MGNREGS in
states, such as Rajasthan, Gujarat and Maharashtra revealed that the scheme had
made a positive impact on the employment generated and food security in these
states. Several empirical studies have reported that the rural poor would like a
continuation of the scheme in the respective states (Swain and Sharma 2011; Shah
and Makwana 2011; Kajale and Shroff 2011).
Nonetheless, there are studies and media reports which point out flaws in the
system and the need for strengthening the same (Bhatia and Dreze 2006;
Chakraborty 2007; Siddhartha 2008; NCAER 2009). Corruption, noncompliance
with the provisions of the Act in terms of delays in providing employment as well
as in making wage payments, problems relating to monitoring of the works,
overburdening and shortage of permanent staff at the Panchayat level, the existing
method of wage calculation were some of the major administrative issues believed
to have affected creation of employment on one hand and generation of demand for
the works on the other. These studies thus showed apprehensions on the potential of
MGNREGS to bring about positive changes in rural areas and highlighted the need
for carrying out administrative reforms.
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Moreover, it is now increasingly being recognised at various levels that there is
an urgent need to shift the focus from employment generation to creation of durable
assets along with generation of employment. The Economic Survey of India (2013–
14) suggested ‘an urgent need to revamp the MGNREGA to prevent its misuse and
make it a development oriented programme creating tangible and meaningful assets
and infrastructure including tourism—related infrastructure or some large
agriculture-related activities’ (GoI 2014, p. 253).
The state of Maharashtra had pioneered in launching the employment guarantee
scheme (EGS) to the rural poor during the drought years of the early 1970s. The
Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme (i.e. MEGS) Act came into existence
in 1977 and continued to provide a supplementary source of employment and
income to the rural poor of the state. After the implementation of MGNREGS in
2006, both the schemes are being implemented in Maharashtra simultaneously. This
has also provided the authors an opportunity to compare implementation and per-
formances of two alternate schemes in the same location of a state.
Maharashtra is one of the leading states as far as industrialization is concerned.
However, a major characteristic feature of the state is its urban centric growth which
has taken place around the districts of Thane, Mumbai and Pune, which are located
in western part of Maharashtra. The economic activities of these three districts
together contribute more than 30% to the state income.
Around 50% of the state population is mainly dependent on the agricultural
sector as cultivators and agricultural labourers for livelihood. The agricultural sector
of the state to a large extent is characterised by low level of irrigation and therefore
rainfed farming. Currently, only 18% of the gross cropped area in the state is under
irrigation1 (Economic Survey of Maharashtra, 2013–14), resulting into lower crop
productivity in the state. The state experienced agricultural stagnation and agrarian
crisis that manifested in suicides of farmers across various regions especially after
2000. Under such circumstances, it is extremely important to increase and sustain
growth rate of the agricultural sector of the state not only for maintaining food
security and improving the standard of living of the rural population, but also for
sustaining growth in rural employment and income.
One major component of sustainable development of agriculture is increasing
productivity of land resources by creation of assets and increasing absorptive
capacity of the sector. In this context, it is argued that MGNREGS, with aims to
create employment and generate assets in rural areas, has potential for creating a
base for sustainable development of the agricultural sector of the country as a
whole.
1Data relating to irrigated area under crops are available till 2000–01 only.
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6.2 Objectives and Methodology
The main objective of this chapter is to study the employment proﬁle of the state
run EGS and centrally sponsored MGNREGS in Maharashtra. It analyses phase
wise performance of MGNREGS, extent of employment generated, assets created
and expenditure incurred on the works carried out during 2008–09 and 2012–13.
Various factors responsible for the poor performance of the scheme till 2010–11 are
also examined. Finally, the chapter discusses limitations and potentials of the
scheme as well as policy implications. The study is based on secondary data,
mainly collected from the MGNREGS website. This is supported by discussions
and qualitative data collected from the ﬁeld by the authors.
Section 6.3 of the chapter discusses characteristic features of the state run EGS
and the centrally supported MGNREGS and the employment generated under these
schemes. Next, in Sect. 6.4, trends in phase wise employment generated as well as
assets created under MGNREGS during 2008–09 to 2012–13 are analysed.
Section 6.5 discusses insights from the ﬁeld and problems encountered during
implementation of the scheme at the grass root level. Conclusions and the emerging
policy implications are discussed in Sect. 6.6.
6.3 Employment Guarantee Schemes in Maharashtra:
EGS and MGNREGS
The state of Maharashtra was the ﬁrst state to provide guarantee of employment
to the rural poor during the drought years of early 1970s. In fact, a pilot employ-
ment guarantee scheme was implemented way back in 1965 and was later extended
to all rural areas and areas of ‘C’ class Municipal Councils of Maharashtra in 1972.
Finally, the EGS Act came into existence in 1977, and was implemented all over
rural areas of Maharashtra as an act since 1979.
The EGS intended to provide unskilled manual employment on demand. Since
its inception till 2005–06, Maharashtra EGS had generated 427.7 crores (or 4.28
billions) person days of employment thus making it one of the largest public works
programmes in the world. Several studies in the past have reported a signiﬁcant
impact of the EGS programme on the socio-economic status of the rural poor in
Maharashtra, and that it performed better than several other poverty alleviation
programmes in India like National Rural Employment Programme, Rural Landless
Employment Guarantee Programme and Integrated Rural Development Programme
(Acharya 1990; Government of India 2005).
The broad pattern of expenditure and employment generated under EGS over the
years has shown a strong correlation with droughts and bad harvests. Similarly,
higher EGS employment levels were found to be related to seasonality, i.e. with the
slack agricultural season. The composition of employment under EGS shows that it
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has been successful in providing considerable employment to women workers and
tribal population (Vatsa 2005).
From 2001–02 till 2005–06, on an average of over 15 crores mandays of
employment were generated annually under EGS (Table 6.1). Besides, EGS has
also been a very successful drought relief employment generating programme, as it
has provided employment whenever the need arose in the state of Maharashtra.
4,30,000 works were started since beginning of EGS till March 2002, and over
4,08,000 works were completed till that time (Department of planning, Govt of
Maharashtra).
In the beginning, majority (93% in terms of expenditure) of the works under
EGS were related to drought prooﬁng (Vatsa 2005). In the post 1990 period, there
has been a shift in favour of individual asset building schemes such as wells and
plantations (horticultural linked EGS). This has beneﬁted individual farmers and the
horticultural sector of the state. However, this does not seem to have increased
availability of water over the years that would enhance overall productivity of the
agricultural sector and create durable assets in the long run. This underlines the
need for creation of good quality assets and mechanism for their maintenance. It
was rightly pointed out that professional and management support was needed for
creation of good quality assets under EGS Vatsa 2005).
In the light of implementation of the central act—MGNREGS, the Government
of Maharashtra decided to amend its EGS Act, 1977 and enlarge its scope to
remove parts that were inconsistent and less favourable and to accommodate
essential features of the Central Act. MGNREGS that is implemented today is a
combination of two schemes. Guarantee of employment for 100 days per household
as well as the expenditure incurred for the same is provided by the central gov-
ernment. IT based reporting and monitoring, social auditing, provision of job cards
are some of the distinguishing features of the central scheme.
Expenditure incurred for the employment generation exceeding 100 days is
contributed from EGS by the state government. Also, under EGS, the state gov-
ernment provides subsidies for the individual beneﬁt schemes such as Jawahar
(Dhadak) Sinchan Well Scheme, and horticulture linked EGS. Hence, data relating
to employment generation is now reported only under the central scheme, i.e. under
MGNREGS.
Table 6.1 Employment generated and expenditure under EGS in Maharashtra state
Year Man days of employment
generated (in crores)
Expenditure under
EGS (in ` crores)
Expenditure per man day of
employment generated (`)
2001–02 16.17 914.62 56.56
2002–03 15.45 889.00 57.54
2003–04 18.53 1050.71 56.70
2004–05 22.18 1256.47 56.65
2005–06 11.64 983.24 84.47
Source www.mahaegs.nic.in
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After the implementation of MGNREGS, with increasing expenditure and
inability of MGNREGS to generate employment in the state comparable to that
under EGS (before implementation of MGNREGS) (Table 6.2), questions were
raised about sustainability of MGNREGS in the future. Discussions with the ofﬁ-
cials of the EGS and Water Conservation Department revealed that the continuous
decline in employment days generated was a consequence of difﬁculties faced in the
initial days by the administrative machinery when two schemes were being
implemented simultaneously. The decline, however, was arrested and since 2011–
12, the employment generated has started rising as is clear from Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 shows the implementation status of MGNREGS in Maharashtra since
2008–09, when the scheme became fully opertationalised. Almost all the house-
holds which demanded employment in Maharashtra were provided work under the
scheme. However, the share of such households had slightly declined over time. In
the year 2008–09, 4.19 crores days of employment were created in the state under
the MGNREGS.
The employment days created under the programme started to decline since
2009–10. The data for later years showed that the situation improved in 2011–12
with 6.51 crores employment days being generated. However, this number is less
than the employment generated under the EGS per annual basis prior to imple-
mentation of the MGNREGS in the state. A similar pattern is noticed for average
employment per household and households completing 100 days of employment.
The share of scheduled caste (SC) and scheduled tribe (ST) population in total
employment generated, however, has not shown any encouraging trend. Share of
the women employment also has shown a decline.
The share of the state in the total employment generated at all India level was
1.94% in 2008–09 and in the consecutive years, it declined to less than 1%. The
ﬁgures for the year 2010–11 show that 219 crores and 1.33 crores (0.6% of the all
India level) days of employment have been generated at the national and state level
Table 6.2 Status of implementation of MGNREGS in Maharashtra
No. Indicators 2008–
09
2009–
10
2010–
11
2011–
12
2012–
13
1 Households provided employment (lakhs) 9.06 5.36 4.5 13.8 15.5
2 Households provided employment/
households demanded employment (%)
99.8 99.9 99.3 98.5 97.9
3 Employment days (crores) 4.1 2.7 2.00 6.5 8.1
4 Average employment per household (days) 46.2 51.1 44.3 47.3 52.6
5 Households completing 100 days of
employment (0000)
32 22 28 15 21
6 Share of SC employment (%) 16.5 25.6 22 5.8 6.9
7 Share of ST employment (%) 44.2 33.1 25.5 17.1 14.6
8 Share of women employment (%) 46.2 39.6 45.8 45.9 44.4
Source District’s implementation report on www.nrega.nic.in
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respectively. In the consecutive years (2011–12 and 2012–13), however,
Maharashtra’s share in total employment generated increased up to 3%. Thus, data
for the later years reveals gradually increasing importance of the scheme in the
state.
6.4 Employment Generated and Assets Created
Under MGNREGS in Maharashtra
6.4.1 Employment Generated
In the ﬁrst year of implementation (phase I) in 2006–07, the scheme of MGNREGA
was implemented only in twelve most backward districts of the state. These are the
districts with considerable tribal population and together contribute around 45% to
the state ST population. In the second year (phase II), six additional districts were
included. These eighteen districts are the districts with per capita net district
domestic product (NDDP) (at current prices) less than the state average in 2012–13
(Economic Survey of Maharashtra, 2012–13). The scheme was then fully opera-
tionalized in 2008–09 (phase III) with the inclusion of remaining ﬁfteen districts.
These 15 districts included in phase III are also the most developed districts with
higher per capita NDDP (at current prices) in 2012–13 (Economic Survey of
Maharashtra, 2012–13). The names of the districts of Maharashtra included under
MGNREGS in phased manner are provided Appendix Table 6.7.
Table 6.3 shows that in 2008–09 when MGNREGS became fully operational,
the share of phase I districts in total employment generated in the state under the
scheme was 75%. It went on increasing till 2010–11. It is observed that share of
phase II and III districts has increased considerably only after 2011–12. This
indicates that the demand for employment under this scheme was negligible in
those districts which came under the Act in the third phase. In fact, in eight districts
in Phase III, there was no employment generated under MGNREGS and ﬁve dis-
tricts had a share of less than 1%.
According to the media reports, in some of the phase III developed districts,
employment could not be provided to the registered families. This shows that there
was a demand for MGNREGS work which could not be satisﬁed. There was a
feeling that lack of provision of work under MGNREGS was closely related to the
objective of maintaining stability in the agricultural sector in terms of adequate
availability of labour and lower wage rates, particularly in the sugarcane belt of the
state. Overall, it appears that MGNREGS has created demand for work mainly in
the most backward districts of the state where it was implemented in phase I.
This situation completely reversed, however, since 2011–12. It can be seen that
the number of days of employment generated at the state level almost doubled in
2011–12 and further increased in 2012–13. The combined share of second and third
phase districts which was less than 20% increased to more than 40%. As has been
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stated earlier, concerted efforts to revitalise the scheme were carried out by the
department of Water Conservation and EGS. As a result, the outreach of the scheme
increased and all the districts came to be covered by the scheme.
6.4.2 Assets Created
Apart from the number of days of employment generated, another important
indicator for assessing the outcome of MGNREGS is the number of works com-
pleted. The list of permissible works under MGNREGS are:
(i) Water conservation and water harvesting;
(ii) Drought prooﬁng, including afforestation and tree plantation;
(iii) Irrigation canals, including micro and minor irrigation works;
(iv) Provision of irrigation facility, plantation, horticulture, land development to
land owned by households belonging to the SC/ST, or to land of the ben-
eﬁciaries of land reforms, or to land of the beneﬁciaries under the Indira
AwasYojana/BPL families;
(v) Renovation of traditional water bodies, including de-silting of tanks;
(vi) land development;
(vii) Flood-control and protection works, including drainage in waterlogged
areas;
(viii) Rural connectivity to provide all-weather access.
(ix) Any other work that may be notiﬁed by the Central Government in con-
sultation with the State Government.
From the list of work, it is obvious that the focus is more on enriching water
resource base and land development. The works get classiﬁed as completed works
and ongoing/suspended works. Table 6.4 presents phase wise data relating to assets
created under MGNREGS. It can be seen that the number of works completed had
raised for phase I and phase II districts till 2010–11. But, there was a marked fall in
the same in the year 2011–12 and again a rise in the year 2012–13.
In the developed districts of phase III, the performance of the scheme was very
poor in the initial years. In 2012–13, however, 54% of the total works completed
Table 6.3 Phase wise number (in lakhs) and share of person days of employment generated (in
percentage) under MGNREGS in Maharashtra
Phase 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13
Phase I 312.38 (74.41) 213.46 (77.81) 172.44 (86.22) 362.05 (55.6) 430.91 (49.39)
Phase II 80.62 (19.2) 23.08 (8.41) 7.07 (3.54) 94.89 (14.57) 132.82 (15.22)
Phase III 26.82 (6.39) 37.81 (13.78) 20.49 (10.25) 194.27 (29.83) 308.66 (35.38)
State 419.82 (100) 274.35 (100) 200 (100) 651.21 (100) 872.39 (100)
Note Figures in the parenthesis indicate percentage share of employment generated to total
Source District’s Implementation Report on www.nrega.nic.in
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were from these districts. The extent of MGNREGS activities started increasing
after 2011–12 in these districts. The number of works completed has risen by more
than 72 times in 2012–13 as compared to the initial year. It is observed that at the
state level, the number of works completed during the period has increased by more
than 600%.
However, considering the number of inhabited villages (40,959 as per the
Economic Survey of Maharashtra, 2012–13) and the number of completed works
(77,084), the number of works completed per village in the year was less than 2
(1.88). The data on ongoing works shows that their number was increasing over the
years both at the district and state levels. The number of ongoing works was higher
by almost 26 times in 2012–13. Throughout the period, phase I districts have
maintained higher share in the ongoing works.
Table 6.5 shows the percentage of the completed works in a year to the ongoing
works of the previous year. This percentage was relatively higher in the initial years
for all the districts. In fact, completed works were more than the ongoing works of
the previous years for phase I and II districts. This proportion had fallen in the latter
years. In 2012–13, only 31% of the works of the earlier year could be completed at
the state level. Thus, the data suggests that a number of works could have remained
incomplete whereas some might have been suspended for certain reasons. However,
the fact remains that resources have been spent on these works (Table 6.6).
The government had to take the challenge of completing a maximum of 2.91
lakh (ongoing/suspended) works of the previous years in the ﬁnancial year 2013–
14. Though the overall performance of the scheme improved in the latter years, the
extent of incomplete/suspended works was also increasing (see, Tables 6.4, 6.5,
and 6.1).
Table 6.6 presents the expenditure on total works completed as well as on the
ongoing/suspended works in Maharashtra under the MGNREGS. The year wise
pattern of expenditure is similar to that relating to the number of MGNREGS works
completed. The expenditure on completed as well as ongoing works declined at the
state level till 2010–11 and has shown increasing trend since 2011–12. It can be
noted that in 2008–09 around 97% of the expenditure on the ongoing projects was
incurred in phase III districts (mainly only on one district, i.e. Raigad).
Table 6.5 Percentage of completed MGNREGS works to previous year’s ongoing MGNREGS
works in Maharashtra
Phase CW 2009–10
to OW in 2008–09
CW 2010–11
to OW in 2009–10
CW 2011–12
to OW in 2010–11
CW 2012–13
to OW in 2011–12
Phase I 51.60 139.25 26.15 21.18
Phase II 240.51 243.80 18.95 23.0
Phase III 31.90 18.59 15.79 48.97
State 74.23 130.70 21.09 30.98
CW completed works, OW ongoing work
Source Based on data collected from District’s Implementation Report on nrega.nic.in
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In the remaining years, however, more than 50% was spent on phase I districts.
Since 2011–12, share of phase III districts had increased again. It is 41% for the
completed works and 36% for the ongoing works in 2012–13. It is worth noting
here that large amount of resources have been spent on ongoing works. In 2012–13,
the number of ongoing works was 29,1795 and the amount spent was ` 129,517
lakhs.
Figure 6.1 shows the total number of completed and ongoing works and
expenditure during the concerned ﬁve year period. Considering the total number of
works that were ongoing and completed every year during 2008–09 and 2012–13, it
appears that only around 21% of the total ongoing/suspended works were com-
pleted. Taking together the data relating to employment generated and assets cre-
ated in Maharashtra over the last ﬁve years, it may be observed that though there
has been an improvement in the performance in terms of employment generated, the
scheme seems to have underperformed in terms of asset creation given the extent of
resources that have been spent on ongoing and suspended works.
The total expenditure under EGS in 2005–06 was ` 98,324 million (Table 6.1).
In 2008–09, when MGNREGS was fully operationalized, the expenditure on
completed works was ` 65,360.6 million. Besides, expenditure was also incurred on
ongoing works (Table 6.6). Thus, the funds available as well as expenditure
incurred under MGNREGS are many times higher than those under EGS before
implementation of MGNREGS.
However, as discussed above, the performance of MGNREGS in the initial years
of implementation was not satisfactory and the employment generated was less than
that created under EGS. It was only since 2011–12 that the performance of
MGNREGS started improving. Efﬁciency in the usage of funds allocated for gen-
eration of employment and creation of assets would go a long way in tapping the
potential of MGNREGS to improve the resource base of the agricultural sector.
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Fig. 6.1 Number of works and expenditure incurred by MGNREGS in Maharashtra during 2008–
09 and 2012–13. Note Figures in the table are cumulative ﬁgures for the entire period. Source
District’s Implementation Report (monthly progress report on performance indicating assets
created) on nrega.nic.in
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6.5 Employment and Assets Created Under MGNREGS:
Insights from the Field
A survey was conducted for understanding the working of MGNREGS in ﬁve
representative districts of Maharashtra, viz., Nandurbar, Gondia (phase I districts),
erstwhile district Thane2 (phase II district) and Jalna and Kolhapur (phase III dis-
tricts). From each district, data was collected from two villages, one near the district
headquarters and the other away from it. From a total of 10 villages, 205 participant
households were selected for ﬁeld survey (Kajale and Shroff 2011). A structured
schedule for the participant households and a village schedule to be ﬁlled in by the
village ofﬁcials were designed.
The data was collected for the year 2008–09. It was revealed that in 2008–09, a
large number of works were undertaken by the government and participation of
households in this particular year was impressive. However, it was noted that that
the employment was generated mainly in the backward and tribal districts such as
Thane and Nandurbar as well as in the interior parts of Jalna (see Boxes 6.1 and
6.2).
The survey clearly brought out that in dry areas as well as in areas with hardly
any employment opportunities, seasonal migration was the only livelihood strategy.
In these areas, MGNREGS proved to be a better livelihood option for the rural
households. In fact, majority of the households reported that during the period when
enough work was available, participation in the scheme enhanced their standard of
living and ensured food security. However, in contrast to the backward and tribal
districts, developed sample districts of the state such as Kolhapur registered neg-
ligible demand for MGNREGS work as ample employment opportunities were
available for the rural poor (see Box 6.2).
Box 6.1: MGNREGS in the Backward Districts
Situated in the northern hilly part of Thane District, Jawhar is one of the
interior-most talukas of the district. About 96% of the rural population
belongs to the ST community. It was reported that 2008 and 2009 were the
years when adequate work under MGNREGS was available and generally the
households were satisﬁed with the same. Majority of the agriculture based
households in the villages participated in MGNREGS in these two years.
Since the beginning of 2010, the extent of work available at the village had
declined. This affected the economic status of the households. The month of
May was especially difﬁcult as agricultural work was also not available. In
such cases, the workers migrated temporarily to nearby towns/cities to get
2Thane, located in the western Maharashtra region was divided and a new district ‘Palghar’ was
carved out of talukas of Palghar, Vada, Vikramgad, Jawhar, Mokhada, DahanuTalasari, and
Vasai-Virar in August 2014. In view of non-availability of data for the newly created district
Palghar, this study is based on erstwhile district Thane with 15 talukas including Palghar.
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employed as casual daily labourers. The poor households survived on food
grains from their own farms and food grains available under the Public
Distribution System.
Mohadi was one of the sample villages—a Banjara village, situated in the
hilly areas of district Jalna. Discussions with the villagers revealed that they
were in need of work within the village and generally were reluctant to
migrate in search of work and would willingly take up physically rigorous
work under MGNREGS. However, according to the Sarpanch, the estimate
of proposed work under MGNREGS could not be prepared due to
non-availability of the technical ofﬁcer either because the posts did not get
ﬁlled or because the selected candidates did not join. In such cases, the
existing technicians were to shoulder responsibilities of additional gram
panchayats. In another village—Malkhed in Jalna, it was reported that being
a dry area, large scale migration took place in the nearby Aurangabad district.
However, implementation of MGNREGS had reduced the flow of migration
from this village.
Source Kajale and Shroff (2011) (unpublished report, Agro-Economic
Research Centre, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune).
The analysis of the ﬁeld level data underlines the important role of MGNREGS
in areas where agricultural and non-farm sectors have failed to provide livelihood
support to the households. These are the areas where work under MGNREGS was
undertaken in the slack season and the households could participate in the scheme
after the busy season in the village was over. MGNREGS thus has shown potential
to introduce positive changes in the village economies, traditionally dependent on
subsistence and dry agriculture, provided that work is available whenever needed.
Box 6.2: MGNREGS in Kolhapur
Among the ﬁve sample districts, Kolhapur was the most developed district in
terms of its agricultural performance. The soil here is fertile and cropping
pattern is varied. The land ownership pattern was dominated by small and
marginal land holders and the proportion of landless population was very
low. Discussions with the households revealed that demand for MGNREGS
work was very low during the concerned period as people were not used to
and willing to participate in rigorous physical activity. They preferred to
cultivate their own land, get income from the livestock (at least 2 cows) and
work as agricultural labour (to supplement income and for getting fodder).
The agricultural labourers were paid in cash and got advance if needed.
Under MGNREGS however, the payment was made through Bank/Post
Ofﬁce after 15 days. On this background, the households did not prefer to
work on this scheme. It was found during the survey that women speciﬁcally
from the SC community were the main participants of the scheme.
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Source Kajale and Shroff (2011) (unpublished report, Agro-Economic
Research Centre, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune).
Figure 6.2 shows the number of days of employment generated under
MGNREGS per household in the sampled districts. It was higher in case of
Nandurbar (202) and Jalna (155) followed by Gondia (73). It was found that in
Jalna and Gondia, the MGNREGS work was undertaken on large scale in the
villages located farther from the district headquarters than those which were
comparatively nearer. In Nandurbar also, which is a tribal district, in both the
villages, MGNREGS works were taken up on large scale. In these villages, many
household members got employment individually up to 100 days. The number of
days was very low in Thane. This was probably because of participation of almost
the whole village in MGNREGS work. In Kolhapur, a number of employment days
per household was very low.
6.5.1 Nature of Assets Created Under MGNREGS
and Their Durability
Provision of work under MGNREGS leads to the creation of assets such as farm
ponds, tanks, check dams, roads, etc. As mentioned earlier, the focus of the works is
on enriching the water resource base and on land development. A substantial
amount of money is spent on labour and other components while the assets are
being created. It is therefore important that the assets that are created are of good
quality and serve the purpose for a longer period. The ﬁeld surveys showed that
majority of the households were employed under water conservation/harvesting
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Fig. 6.2 MGNREGS employment days (nos.) generated per sample household in 2008–09.
Source Kajale and Shroff (2011)
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(75%), micro irrigation works (8.1%) and road connectivity (10%). This pattern is
similar to that observed at the district level as well as at the state level.
At the aggregate level, majority of the sample households, i.e. 60% reported that
the quality of assets generated was good. About 34% of the households reported
that the quality was very good. However, here, the perception of the village ofﬁcial,
who coordinated various MGNREGS activities, was different (Box 6.3). The above
discussion shows that MGNREGS has potential to enhance the quality of agri-
culture in a particular region provided that the assets created are of good quality and
are durable.
Box 6.3: Perception of a Gramsevak in a Village in District Thane
regarding Asset Creation
Thane District receives heavy rainfall during monsoons but because of hill
slopes, it becomes difﬁcult to store water at low costs. Hence the households
face water shortage and considerable time is spent in searching and collecting
water especially during summer. The topography of this region hinders
successful watershed and soil conservation strategies and due to lack of any
protective irrigation, rabi cultivation is difﬁcult. The gramsevak of one of the
sample villages of Jawahar (district Thane) reported that some of the bunds/
bandharas or such other structures constructed under MGNREGS before the
arrival of monsoon, for storing water, got washed away due to heavy rains
and it was difﬁcult to get sanction for the same work in the next ﬁnancial year.
Thus, unless the quality of work is superior (both on account of technical
assistance and adequate investment), the asset created would not be durable
and would lead to wastage of resources.
Source Kajale and Shroff (2011) (unpublished report, Agro-Economic
Research Centre, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune).
Discussions with the village ofﬁcials also revealed some of the problems asso-
ciated with working of the scheme. In the initial year of MGNREGS, labourers
were paid wages in cash. However, they were reluctant to participate when it
became mandatory for them to receive payments through banks or post ofﬁces.
Often the post ofﬁce or the bank was located far way and the households also found
it cumbersome to open an account. It was also revealed that for the village ofﬁcials,
planning for new works on a continuous basis in each and every village so as to
provide 100 days of work was not technically feasible.
Similarly, many farmers were reluctant to give their land for construction of farm
ponds or other MGNREGS activities. Some of the line departments such as forest
department or PWD did not have enough land to start new activities. This served as
a constraint on the work that could be created and employment that could have been
generated. Workers sometimes migrated to nearby urban areas for few months for
construction and other non-farm work as wages in non-farm sector were two to
three times higher than MGNREGS wages. One of the main problems reported by
the ofﬁcials was that with the implementation of MGNREGS, the system had come
170 J. Kajale and S. Shroff
under tremendous pressure and this had largely affected the efﬁciency of the pan-
chayat level ofﬁcials and the gramsevak.
In view of various problems faced at the village level in implementing the
scheme, it is possible that MGNREGS had a set back after 2008–09, i.e. in 2009–10
and 2010–11. At the state level, as has already been mentioned, it was revealed that
the continuous decline in employment generated was a consequence of difﬁculties
faced in the initial days by the administrative machinery when two schemes (EGS
and MGNREGS) were being implemented simultaneously. The decline, however,
was arrested and the performance of MGNREGS started showing indications of
recovery since 2011–12.
6.6 Conclusions and Implications
MGNREGS is indeed a policy decision which has a huge impact on the
socio-economic and poverty dynamics in rural India so the state of Maharashtra. In
2008–09, when MGNREGS was fully operationalised all over Maharashtra, about
4.20 crores person days of employment were generated in Maharashtra which,
however, felled to only 2.74 crores person days of employment generated in the
following year. The same pattern was observed in all most all districts of
Maharashtra. The number of districts brought under the purview of MGNREGS in
phase III had negligible or no demand for work, rather the work was mainly
provided in the most backward districts where it was in great demand (mostly in
districts included in phase 1). The decline in employment generation under
MGNREGS was apparently due to certain limitations in the implementation of the
scheme, as such. Planning for work in every village was always not feasible and
farmers were also reluctant to give their land for work under MGNREGS.
The programme participants were also reluctant to open an account in the bank
or post ofﬁce for receiving cashless payment, rather they preferred cash payment on
the spot, as was practiced in other forms of employments. It was also reported by
the ofﬁcials of the EGS department that problems were faced by the administrative
machinery due to simultaneous implementation of both schemes of EGS and
MGNREGS in the state, especially in the initial years of the implementation.
It is clear that EGS which was implemented since 1979, was successful in
creating employment. However, it appears that it has not been able to create durable
assets for drought mitigation and infrastructure for agricultural development during
the 35 years since its inception and before the implementation of MGNREGS. Our
analysis of MGNREGS also shows that though the scheme has started expanding
since 2011–12, its performance relating to asset creation does not present a satis-
factory picture. It still has not been able to match the extent of annual employment
that was generated under EGS before 2005–06. The funds allocated for MGNREGS
are many times higher than those allocated for EGS. So far, a massive amount of
resources have been spent not only on completed works but also on works that are
ongoing or suspended under MGNREGS.
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Our analysis of MGNREGS also shows that though the employment generation
schemes and EGS have started expanding to large areas since 2011–12, its per-
formance relating to asset creation does not provide a satisfactory level of
achievements. In case of Maharashtra, MGNREGS has still not been able to match
the extent of annual employment that was generated under EGS before 2005–06.
The funds allocated for MGNREGS are many times higher than those allocated for
EGS. Massive amount of resources have been spent not only on completed works
but also on works that are ongoing or some are also suspended half ways.
Moreover, the activities under MGNREGS will continue to be successful in
terms of participation if beneﬁciaries demanding work are provided within the
locality at appropriate time and at comparable wage rates as that of alternate sources
of employment. It is noted that there is a need for locating newer and appropriate
types of works and innovative ways of undertaking works under MGNREGS to
ensure timely provision of work especially in slack seasons of agricultural activi-
ties. Possibilities of working on private lands under MGNREGs can also be
explored to generate more number of work and employments in the rural areas, but
it needs pilot testing and experiment for assessing the success of the evidence.
Provision of timely and adequate technical help to all the Gram Panchayats to
ensure timely starting of the MGNREGS activities is another step for strengthening
local capacity for effective implementation of the schemes. Such technical back up
may also expand potential demand for MGNREGS work. Similarly, this would also
help in timely starting the work activities when they are needed most and ensuring
quality of assets generated at the local level. Careful planning and timely com-
pletion of the works is extremely essential also to reduce frequent suspension of
works at the middle stage of implementation.
In sum, the activities under MGNREGS will be sustainable and successful if
they lead to creation of durable assets and efﬁcient management of scarce water
resources locally, which ultimately would also lead to increasing productivity of the
state agricultural sector. Efﬁciency in the usage of funds allocated for generation of
employment and creation of assets would go a long way in tapping the potential of
MGNREGS to improve resource base of the agricultural sector, and bring about
transformation of the rural economy by development of allied sectors as well as
non-farm activities in rural areas.
Acknowledgements The paper largely draws on the report titled ‘Impact of NREGA on Wage
Rates, Food Security and Rural Urban Migration in Maharashtra’, 2011, submitted to the Ministry
of Agriculture, GoI New Delhi, by the authors.
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Chapter 7
Asset Creation Under MGNREGA
and Sustainable Agriculture Growth:
Impacts of Convergence Initiatives
in Odisha and West Bengal
Pulak Mishra and Saswat Kishore Mishra
7.1 Introduction
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA),
implemented by the Government of India is a landmark legislation in the history of
India’s development initiatives, particularly towards the creation of employment
security and rural livelihood opportunities to mass population of India. Execution of
the Act has helped in promoting employment and livelihood security in rural India
(Jha and Gaiha 2012), increasing purchasing power of the poor (Vijayananda and
Jithendra 2008), boosting rural wages and labour force participation (Azam 2012),
empowering women (Khera and Nayak 2009) and creating pressure on rural
economy towards better terms of trade in favour of agriculture (Panda 2013). Along
with indexing wages with inflation, more than 10 crore new bank/post ofﬁce
accounts have been opened with around 80% of payments being made through this
route within 5 years of its initiation (Shah 2012). Besides, the share of female in
employment generated has also increased (Azam 2012) along with that of the STs
and the SCs (Prasad 2012).
It is observed that majority of the works undertaken for asset creation have not
been completed and quality of assets created has been poor lacking desired potential
(GoI 2014; ILO 2014). In many cases, quality of the assets created in general
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‘leaves much to be desired’ (Dreze and Khera 2009).1 While the necessity of such
assets cannot be discarded, planning for and designing of assets, their maintenance
and efﬁcient utilization need special attention.
In order to overcome the constraints as well as to realize better outcomes, the
concept of ‘convergence planning’ was introduced in 2009. The Ministry of Rural
Development designed the guidelines for convergence. Presently, the major par-
ticipating ministries/organizations in the convergence initiatives include Ministry of
Agriculture, the Ministry of Environment and Forests, the Ministry of Water
Resources, the Department of Land Resources and Indian Council for Agricultural
Research (ICAR).2
It is expected that inter-sectoral convergence of development programmes would
lead to optimum utilization of public fund and maximum returns on public
investments. Besides, such an effort is also crucial for conservation and manage-
ment of natural resources and creation of assets that would help in mitigating
adverse effects of climate change. Thus, convergence initiatives can be seen largely
as efforts towards sustainable and inclusive development of rural India.
In this perspective, this Chapter is an attempt to understand the experience of
initiatives towards convergence of the MGNREGA with other developmental
schemes in the Indian states of Odisha and West Bengal. More speciﬁcally, the
Chapter addresses the following issues: What are the different types of convergence
models that have been initiated in Odisha and West Bengal? How have the joint
efforts of various line departments contributed to conservation and management of
natural resources? Are assets created under convergence initiatives sustainable in
the long-run? How have these assets contributed to agriculture sector, particularly
in respect of increase in production and yield? Can the existing institutions con-
tribute to management and utilization of these assets? If not, what institutional
supports are necessary in this regard?
The relevance of the study in the context of Odisha and West Bengal arises as
agriculture is both a predominant occupation as well as an economic lifeline in
these states. Although contribution of agriculture to the respective Gross State
Domestic Product (GSDP) had declined over the years,3 the sector still provides
1For example, the kuchcha structures in Bihar were often incomplete when the monsoon arrived
and many check dams were left without “dressing” making them vulnerable to soil erosion.
Besides, roads did not have adequate top layer and the location of many of these assets was often
inappropriate (Dreze and Khera 2009).
2Accordingly, the major programmes covered under the convergence initiatives include Watershed
Programmes, National Agriculture Development Programme, National Horticulture Mission,
Scheme of Artiﬁcial Recharge of Ground Water through Dug well, Accelerated Irrigation Beneﬁt
Programme, Backward Region Grant Fund, Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY),
Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY), National Afforestation Programme (NAP), etc.
3While the share of agriculture and allied activities in GSDP of Odisha(at constant prices 2004–05
prices) declined from 19.08 to 16.38%, that in West Bengal declined from 20.43 to 16.92%. For
details in this regard, see ‘Data Report for the use of Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, 4th
August, 2014’ (sourced from http://planningcommission.gov.in).
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employment to about 68 and 56% of the rural workforce in Odisha and West
Bengal, respectively.4
Thus, revival of agriculture through inter-sectoral convergence is imperative to
arrest widespread distress and persistent rural poverty in these two states.5 Further,
there is huge difference between the two states in respect of convergence plans received
over the years. For example, while contribution of line departments in total conver-
gence plans of West Bengal was 68.38% in 2014–15, it was only 19.28 % for Odisha.
The study uses secondary data and information gathered from various reports
and case studies on convergence initiatives at block/village levels in the Indian
states of Odisha and West Bengal. The secondary data are sourced from the Ofﬁcial
Website of the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India (i.e. http://
nrega.nic.in/netnrega/home.aspx).
The present paper also examines the impact of convergence initiatives undertaken
in the Sankrail block of Paschim Medinipur district of West Bengal. It is one of the
tribal-dominated and backward blocks in West Bengal. Necessary data/information
for this case study is gathered from related reports on the block. Analysis of experi-
ences using secondary data has been carried out at all India level with special emphasis
onOdisha andWest Bengal. Theﬁndings are supplementedwith experiences from the
cases of convergence in different places of Sankrail block of West Bengal.
The Chapter is divided into six sections including introduction. The second
section discusses the role of convergence as an institution in facilitating the growth
of Indian agriculture sector. An overview of performance of the MGNREGA in
Odisha and West Bengal is given in section three. Convergence initiatives under the
MGNREGA in Odisha and West Bengal are discussed in the fourth section. The
ﬁfth section examines the experience of convergence initiatives and their impact for
a selected case in West Bengal. Section six summarizes the major ﬁndings with
necessary policy suggestions.
7.2 Convergence as Institution for Sustainable
Growth of Agriculture
While growth of non-farm sector is imperative during economic transition, a sub-
stantial body of literature also suggests that agricultural growth is a precondition for
the sustainable and inclusive development of an economy. Economies of the West
with faster agriculture growth developed more rapidly in the nineteenth century
(Adelman and Morris 1988). Similarly, industrial revolution of Europe including its
offshore and Japan followed green revolution in these countries (Allen 1994;
Bairoch 1973; Crafts 1985; Lipton 1977; Ohkawa and Rosovsky 1960;
4For details see 66th NSSO Round, 2009–10.
5While rural poverty in Odisha is 60.8% (highest in the country) that in West Bengal is 38.2%. For
details in this regard, see ‘Data Report for the use of Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission,
14th March, 2013’ (sourced from http://planningcommission.gov.in).
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Overton 1996; Rostow 1960). The post-war industrialization of Taiwan and South
Korea was also largely facilitated by pre-war agricultural growth (Kang and
Ramachandran 1999). Even rapid growth of China in recent years is considered as
an outcome of reforms in agriculture and rural areas (Fan and Gulati 2008).6 Many
of the developed countries have followed government led agrarian transformation
resulting in rapid growth of industry sector and reduction in poverty (Bezemer and
Headey 2008).
In India, policies to enhance agricultural growth focus on large-scale investment
in irrigation and other infrastructure (Vaidyanathan 2010) and issues relating to
technology, environment and institutions are largely ignored. It is found that
intensive use of fertilizer and pesticides has resulted in lower land productivity,
ground water depletion and pollution and health hazards (Reddy 1995; Reddy and
Galab 2006). Further, application of modern technologies and cultivation of water
intensive crops have increased use of water resulting in desertiﬁcation and drying
up of wells in many states such as Punjab, Haryana, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra
and some parts of Uttar Pradesh.
More speciﬁcally, retarded growth of Indian agriculture can be seen as market,
policy and institutional failures (Behera and Mishra 2007). For enhancing its
growth requires institutional framework based on competition, transaction costs,
and efﬁciency and bounded rationality among various agents with enough bar-
gaining power for rural people. Such institutions can signiﬁcantly influence growth
and socio-economic development across countries (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008
and 2012). This is crucial as a failure of markets causes the emergence of outliers
during the course of development, creating the necessity of state intervention
(Krueger 1990). Further, inclusion of socially marginalized sections into the
mainstream development process requires institutional framework with a
well-functioning political order.
Asset creation through the convergence of various line departments under the
MGNREGA is one such institutional framework that can lead to optimum uti-
lization of public investments in conservation and management of natural resources
through synergy amongst different government programmes. Such efforts can also
help in mitigating the adverse effects of climate change and creating conditions for
sustainable development of the rural economy. Besides, given the decentralized
nature of implementation of the MGNREGA, convergence measures can enhance
people’s participation and provide necessary flexibility that suit to the local con-
ditions while ensuring optimum utilization of public fund (Nayak et al. 2011).
However, since investment in common lands may not generate optimal out-
comes primarily because of free rider problems, convergence initiatives in private/
individual lands are very important. This is so because people use environmental
resources largely depending on property rights governing these resources
6Experience from a broader subset of less developed countries (LDCs) also suggest that agricul-
tural transformation is important at the early stages of development, especially for breaking down
the barriers to growth in traditional rural societies (Adelman and Morris 1988; Adelman 1984).
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(Tietenberg 1994; Williamson 2000). There are evidence of massive degradation of
natural resources due to lack of well-deﬁned and secure property rights (Panayotou
1993; Pearce and Warford 1993). Privatization of natural resources among potential
users can lead to efﬁcient use and allocation through market forces (Demsetz 1967).
Thus, sustainable management of resources and acceleration of agricultural
growth require an integrated approach to link natural resources and people through
institutions and convergence initiatives implemented through Panchayati Raj
Institutions (PRIs) can play a crucial role in this regard.7 Although traditionally
West Bengal is known for its success in panchayati raj implementation, the state
needs to improve on three basic parameters of devolution including framework,
ﬁnances, and functionaries concerning the panchayats (Table 7.1). While West
Bengal just about manages to perform as much as the 20 major states taken together
in terms of adhering to the basic provisions of the Constitution (74th Amendment)
Act 1992, Odisha fares much higher on this account.
The extent of ﬁscal transfers, availability of funds and the expenditures incurred
by panchayats is by and large the same in both these states. Although the extent of
physical infrastructure, e-connectivity and capable manpower deployed to the
panchayats in West Bengal is much better than that in Odisha, yet there is enough
scope for further improvement. Moreover enhancing the knowledge and skills of
elected representatives and panchayat ofﬁcials at the local level is critical in case of
Odisha.
Hence, the institution of convergence has the potential to facilitate the sustained
growth of agriculture through asset creation that provides capacity to withstand
shocks and uncertainties. The critical mass of these assets may vary from a limited
(e.g. economic) to a wider set (e.g. personal, cultural, social and political).
Table 7.1 Panchayat devolution index and sub-indices
States West Bengal Odisha Average of 20 major statesa All India
1. Framework 56.84 66.50 55.22 51.40
2. Functions 50.57 51.46 40.53 34.06
3. Finances 35.41 35.11 32.25 29.45
4. Functionaries 37.67 28.55 39.56 36.99
5. Capacity 81.18 19.14 53.98 49.33
6. Accountability 53.96 53.04 48.92 43.33
7. Overall score 49.81 40.01 42.57 38.52
8. Overall rank 6 11 – –
Note aExcluding four North Eastern States and four Union Territories
Source Alok, V. N. (2013)
7So far, the PRIs, especially the Gram Panchayats (GPs) have played a crucial role in people’s
participation in the MGNREGA. For example, social audits by the GPs has increased awareness of
the workers regarding their rights and entitlements and contributed to their increased ability of
bargaining power.
7 Asset Creation Under MGNREGA and Sustainable Agriculture Growth … 179
In addition to coping with stresses and shocks, such institutional approach can also
enable the farmers to gain required economic, political and social bargaining power
and freedom that are crucial for boosting agricultural growth and facilitating the
economic transition. Given this backdrop, what follows next is an attempt to give
an overview of the MGNREGA in the Indian state of Odisha and West Bengal.
7.3 Performance of MGNREGA in Odisha
and West Bengal: An Overview
The MGNREGA is one of the largest social security and public works initiative in
India. While the overall impact of the Act in terms of employment generation is
satisfactory, outcomes of the works undertaken (mostly related to water and soil
conservation) appear to be largely redundant.8 Further, the performance of the
MGNREGA has deteriorated over the years (Jha and Gaiha 2012). However, the
experiences at the state level have been mixed (Mishra and Mishra 2015). It is
observed that higher utilization of available funds in these states did not have any
signiﬁcant impact on physical performance of the scheme (Table 7.2).
The average person days of employment generated per household and per-
centage of households provided with 100 days employment are fairly lower in
Odisha and West Bengal despite substantially higher fund utilization ratio there as
compared to the national average. The situation is more critical for West Bengal
which spends in excess of the available funds while providing hardly 3% of the
households with 100 days employment. Work completion rate, in general, is also
quite low in both the states. More than 50% of the works initiated under the
MGNREGA are not completed in West Bengal, whereas the work completion rate
is only 22% in Odisha.
Besides, share of both the SCs and the STs in employment has sharply fallen in
West Bengal during 2008–14 (Table 7.3). In case of Odisha, although participation
of the STs has increased, that of the SCs has declined during the same period.
However, contrary to nearly the same share of the SCs in the rural population, their
inclusion in the MGNREGA in Odisha is lower than that at all India level. Unlike in
Odisha, share of women in employment generated has increased in West Bengal.
However, low rate of women participation in both the states vis-a-vis that at all
India level is a matter of serious concern.
The overall work completion rate of major asset creation projects related to
agriculture undertaken during 2007–13 was also not very encouraging (Table 7.4).
The average work completion rate in West Bengal declined sharply across all major
projects during this period. The average completion rate in Odisha increased steeply
8The audit report tabled by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) in the Parliament on 23rd
April, 2013 ﬁnds that while more than 22 million works were taken up under the programme
during 2007–08 to 2011–12, close to 70% of these works were never completed.
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across all project categories, there is scope for further improvement. It is observed
that more than 70% of the works initiated towards creation of assets related to
agriculture sector is not completed.
Although the impact of the works completed on production and yield is yet to be
explored, slower pace seems to have restricted growth of production and yield in
Odisha and West Bengal (Table 7.5).9
Production of food grain and non-food grains in these states have either
remained by and large the same or increased only by limited extent. However,
production of horticulture crops in West Bengal has increased during 2011–12 and
2013–14 contrary to its stagnated production in Odisha (Table 7.6).
Thus, the experience of the MGNREGA in Odisha and West Bengal over the
years suggests that the quantum of assets created does not match with the quantum
of expenditure. Furthermore, even when assets are generated, their potential
towards yielding sustainable livelihood for the rural poor creates doubt. In this
perspective, the Ministry of Rural Development initiated convergence of various
development programmes with the MGNREGA to create sustainable productive
assets at the household and community levels, promote better cohesion across
sectors/departments, lower transaction and administrative costs and ensure effective
utilization of resources. It is expected that the convergence initiatives will facilitate
the growth of agriculture, diversify occupational structure and enhance economic
Table 7.2 Performance of MGNREGA in Odisha and West Bengal, 2008–09 to 2013–14
Odisha West
Bengal
All Indiaa
1. Total expenditure (Lakh Rs.) 651114.26 1553353.92 21453597.9
2. Total person days of employment generated
(Lakh)
3674.8 9637.28 1,41,926
3. Expenditure incurred per unit lakh person days of
employment generated
177.18 161.18 151.16
4. Actual expenditure against total available fund (%) 92.79 101.05 74.06
5. Share in country’s total expenditure (%) 3.03 7.24 –
6. Average person days of employment per
household
39 33 47
7. Share in country’s total person days of
employment generated (%)
2.59 6.79 –
8. Percentage of households getting 100 days
employment
6.31 2.58 10.91
9. Completed work against planned work (%) 21.63 47.84 32.37
Note afor all the 34 states and union territories of the country
Source Ofﬁcial Website of MGREGS, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India
9This is particularly so as the works relating to agriculture has potential of improving soil fertility,
restricting land degradation and top soil erosion and mitigating against droughts.
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opportunities. The following section critically accounts for the convergence ini-
tiatives undertaken in Odisha and West Bengal and their possible implications.
7.4 Convergence Initiatives in Odisha and West Bengal
The concept of convergence is not new in development literature. The conventional
hypothesis has emphasized primarily on interregional convergence within and
across countries. Many past empirical researches have treated convergence as an
Table 7.4 Work completion rate of major asset creation projects in Odisha and West Bengal
Activities/works related to Odisha West Bengal All India
2007–09 2011–13 2007–09 2011–13 2007–09 2011–13
1. Rural connectivity 20.34 28.09 60.86 42.91 47.02 37.03
2. Flood control 17.28 29.74 66.76 48.23 59.35 41.22
3. Water conservation and
water harvesting
14.33 30.52 46.74 48.21 47.11 22.15
4. Drought prooﬁng 9.13 24.08 61.14 48.59 35.91 17.54
5. Micro-irrigation 19.82 19.46 56.89 49.10 45.49 40.45
6. Provision of irrigation
facility
13.21 35.26 57.98 38.05 39.75 25.33
7. Renovation of
traditional water bodies
12.47 29.31 52.73 45.50 35.85 39.12
8. Land development 21.89 33.71 61.21 48.44 54.10 46.11
9. Any other activity
approved by MRD
21.07 18.22 9.72 42.86 61.46 29.10
10. Othersa NPUb 9.77 NPU 11.41 NPU 17.90
Total 16.62 28.34 52.67 44.94 47.34 28.22
Note aincludes the average completion rate of all projects namely under Bharat Nirman, Coastal
areas, Rural drinking water, Fisheries, Rural sanitation, Aanganbadi and Play ground. bNo projects
undertaken
Source Ofﬁcial Website of MGREGS, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India
Table 7.5 Production of food grains and major non-food grains in Odisha and West Bengal
Odisha West Bengal All India
2007–09 2011–13 2007–09 2011–13 2007–09 2011–13
1. Food grains (in 000’
tonnes per 100 sq km)
4.94 4.83 18.06 18.59 6.93 7.92
2. Non-food grains (in
000’ tonnes per 100 sq
km)
0.76 0.97 11.91 11.81 11.29 12.86
3. Yield of total food
grains (In Kgs/Hectare)
1414.67 1514.33 2513.33 2693.33 1855.67 2099.33
Source Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 2014, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India
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outcome in itself rather than a process. There are attempts to undertake convergence
initiatives in rural development programmes (Mukherjee and Kuruda 2002).
As regards convergence under the MGNREGA, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and
Chhattisgarh are the leading ones in terms of share in the total convergence plans
received during 2014–15 followed by Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Odisha
(Table 7.7). On contrary, West Bengal lies at the bottom end with roughly 4% share
in total convergence plans. However, the contribution from the line departments in
total project costs is high in West Bengal and quite less in Odisha.
While the states like Maharashtra and Gujarat have been able to garner large
number of convergence plans with a ﬁnancial contribution from the line depart-
ments, Odisha and West Bengal showcase contrary positions in this regard. It is
therefore, necessary to understand the extent of assets creation through convergence
and models of convergence initiated. What follows next is an attempt in this
direction?
Although the number of works approved for convergence as a proportion of total
approved works in both the states is by and large the same, proportion of works for
convergence under implementation is less in Odisha as compared to West Bengal
(Table 7.8). The same is true in respect of their share of expenditure incurred on the
ongoing works. While the share of works completed under convergence is miser-
ably low in Odisha both in terms of number and expenditure incurred, it is evenly
poised for West Bengal, possibly due to the intensive approach of convergence
initiative in the state. Further, Odisha has performed poorly in terms of work
completion rate under convergence.
The convergence models adopted in Odisha and West Bengal have subtle dif-
ferences in their approaches towards the planning, implementation and monitoring
of the projects (Table 7.9). Unlike what is observed at the state level, these models
of convergence appear to be fairly successful in addressing their objectives in the
target districts of Odisha.
The gliding path of convergence initiatives in the state largely include: active
community participation at every stage of project implementation, community
evaluation of project activities, vigorous social mobilization processes and mass
public campaigns about the beneﬁts of the interventions, imparting of training and
dissemination of information to the targeted beneﬁciaries about skill-sensitive
practices coupled with marketing of the output.
Table 7.6 Production of
horticulture cropsa (000’MT
per 100 Sq. Km.) During
2011–12 and 2013–14
States/All India 2011–12 2013–14
Odisha 7.86 7.95
West Bengal 30.45 33.55
All India 7.83 8.54
Note aincludes Fruits, Vegetables, Flowers, Aromatic/Medicinal
Plants and Spices
Source Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 2014, Ministry of
Agriculture, Government of India
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Table 7.7 Convergence plans received so far by the Ministry for the year 2014–15
State No. of convergence
partner
Ministries/Department
Share in the
country’s
total plans
received (%)
Total
project
cost (Rs.
In Cr.)
Contribution from line
departments in the
total project cost of the
state (%)
1. Andaman
and Nicobar
11 6.88 12.80 4.38
2. Chhattisgarh 13 8.13 975.85 39.03
3. Gujarat 11 6.88 789.30 64.30
4. Haryana 14 8.75 199.54 37.40
5. Himachal
Pradesh
8 5.00 209.07 58.98
6. Karnataka 10 6.25 1258.91 35.93
7. Madhya
Pradesh
7 4.38 10,529 14.85
8. Maharashtra 10 6.25 1438.01 78.59
9. Meghalaya 9 5.63 182.12 68.94
10. Mizoram 4 2.50 82.32 31.01
11. Odisha 10 6.25 1166.12 19.28
12. Rajasthan 8 5.00 747.99 45.44
13. Sikkim 3 1.88 101.40 67.22
14. Tamil Nadu 7 4.38 1765.04 25.15
15. Tripura 10 6.25 567.34 40.00
16. Uttar
Pradesh
19 11.88 102.06 36.28
17. West
Bengal
6 3.75 4159.06 68.38
Total 160 24285.90 35.00
Note Major line departments include Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Irrigation, Horticulture,
Forestry, Fishery, Drinking Water & Sanitation, PWD, Women& Child Welfare
Source Ofﬁcial Website of MGREGS, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India
Table 7.8 Percentage share of no. of works with convergence in total works approved, ongoing
and completed in Odisha and West Bengal
Status of Worksa Odisha West Bengal All India
Approved 11.08 11.62 9.16
Ongoing 6.23 (0.24) 8.78 (3.93) 11.34 (3.80)
Completed 5.16 (1.39) 50.28 (31.98) 7.10 (4.86)
Work completion rate 0.70 (2.80) 2.81 (6.30) 3.90 (2.90)
Note Figure in the parentheses show the percentage share of expenditure on works with
convergence in total expenditure
aThese works include Drought Prooﬁng, Flood Control and Protection, Development of Land,
Micro-Irrigation Works, Renovation of traditional water bodies, Rural Connectivity, Rural
Drinking Water, Water Conservation and Water Harvesting, Fisheries, and Works on Individuals
Land (Category IV)
Source Ofﬁcial Website of MGREGS, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India
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While such initiatives have ensured enhanced purchasing power and improved
standard of living of the people through transformation of agricultural practices in
Koraput (Odisha), there has also been large-scale local participation in planning for
and execution of the works. This has further opened up avenues for a sustainable
livelihood by the creation of productive assets in the backward districts of
Kandhamal and Mayurbhanj in Odisha.
In case of West Bengal, the approaches to the convergence interventions include
undertaking need-based work programmes (unlike resource endowment-based
projects undertaken in Odisha), larger involvement of local institutions such as the
PRIs, Self-Help Groups (SHGs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), etc. While
the coverage appears to be more intensive in the state, the focus has largely been
towards attaining sustained livelihood opportunities and self-sufﬁciency and cre-
ating infrastructure for disaster preparedness in rural areas. Given these broad
observations, the next section attempts to analyze selected convergence initiatives
undertaken in Odisha and West Bengal on the livelihood of the local community
and agriculture and allied sectors.
7.5 Impact of Convergence: Experience of Selected Cases
As mentioned above, the models of convergence initiatives and their outcomes are
likely to vary depending on socio-economic and ecological settings and institutional
dynamics at the local level. On realizing these aspects, an attempt was made by
Nayak et al. (2011) to understand the convergence initiatives in Odisha. The study
ﬁnds three broad models of convergence of various rural development projects with
the MGNREGA in the state.
In the ﬁrst model, rejuvenation of community tanks for ﬁsheries is linked with
plantation, irrigation, and water conservation. In the second model, watershed
development projects undertaken under the MGNREGA are linked with irrigation,
social forestry, plantation, soil and water conservation and animal husbandry. The
third convergence model relates to conversion of rural connectivity projects under
the MGNREGA to black-topped roads along with soil conservation through
plantation and water conservation by digging water channels on both sides of the
roads.
The joint efforts of the various line departments have resulted in better conser-
vation and management of natural resources. It is observed that with excavation of
tanks, de-siltation of existing water bodies, and building of strong embankments
around them, availability of water for irrigation has increased and groundwater
level has improved considerably. This has enabled the farmers to go for multiple
cropping in the catchment areas. At the same time, plantation of trees along the
embankment of these water bodies has also helped in checking soil erosion.
Given the experience, the present section examines the implications of con-
vergence initiatives by analyzing selected cases from the Sankrail Block under
Paschim Medinipur district West Bengal. The block comprises of 10 GPs spread
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across 287 villages, covering an area of 275.68 km2. While the sex ratio is 973
females per 1000 males, the share of the STs and the SCs in the total population is
23.07 and 15.92%, respectively (Census of India 2011). In some parts of the block,
soil is highly productive and alluvial in nature. The rest of the area is used mostly
for cultivation. The workforce constitutes mainly cultivators and agricultural
labourers. A number of MGNREGA schemes have been converged with various
other programmes enhancing livelihood opportunity for the local people by har-
nessing agriculture and allied sectors. Three such cases are discussed below:
7.5.1 Case I: Convergence of the MGNREGA
with Fisheries and Horticulture
During the last 7 years, a large number of water bodies (about 5000) have been
excavated and/or renovated under the MGNREGA in the Sankrail block. However,
extensive excavation of pond was implemented from the year 2012–13 for the BPL
marginal farmers in their own land. The objective was of twofold: (a) to conserve
maximum water through natural watersheds and (b) to introduce scientiﬁc exca-
vation method conducive for ﬁsh netting and pisciculture. Table 7.10 presents the
further details in this regard.
7.5.1.1 Rationale for Water Conservation Under the MGNREGA
Most part of the block is covered with laterite soil having low water retention
capacity resulting in steady depletion of the water table, and thus limiting growth
and diversiﬁcation of agriculture.
7.5.1.2 Impact
This project is found successful by increasing water table. Availability of water has
broadened the scope as well as scale of vegetation in the area. In addition to the
creation of physical assets, wage expenditure also ensured increase in income of
local workforce.
7.5.1.3 Convergence Intervention
In order to address the objective of ﬁsh cultivation, the Department of Fisheries
(Govt. of WB) had prepared a detailed model plan with the involvement of the
Department of Agriculture & Cooperation (GoI). The National Horticulture Mission
(NHM) was also converged with the MGNREGA. While the Department of
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Fisheries has provided fully subsidized ﬁshery inputs along with technical training,
awareness and frequent exposure visits, the NHM has distributed various horti-
culture saplings.
7.5.1.4 Rationale for Fish Cultivation Under Convergence
The fundamental reasons for exploiting water bodies created under the MGNREGA
include the following: (a) the ﬁshermen and ﬁsh farmers in the Sankrail block are
poverty-ridden and cannot afford desired expenses for ﬁsh culture, (b) there is huge
potential for high ﬁsh production given the alluvial nature of soil, and (c) huge
population and domestic market offers enormous incentives for higher production.
Also, limited application of manure and technical know-how on the part of the ﬁsh
farmers had resulted in sub-optimal ﬁsh production over the years.
7.5.1.5 Impact
Since contemporary means of ﬁsh cultivation is expensive, farmers either mostly
conﬁne their economic activities to agriculture or follow traditional methods of
pisciculture. The convergence initiatives have motivated local people to take up
pisciculture as an alternative livelihood option. Provision of training has enabled the
ﬁsh farmers to follow more progressive and professional approach towards ﬁsh
cultivation. The once economically downtrodden people have started producing as
well as consuming protein-rich food while their projected annual net income
showed healthy signs (Table 7.10). Support from the NHM has further expanded
opportunities and strengthened livelihood of the beneﬁciaries.
7.5.2 Case II: Convergence of the MGNREGA
with Agriculture, Horticulture and Eco-Tourism
This project was proposed to come up at Kodopal, a tribal-dominated area located
about 4 km away from the block headquarters and spread across around 400 acres.
Forest wood collections and seasonal wage labour are the main source of livelihood
of the local people. In order to provide greater livelihood opportunity to the local
workforce, the block administration has undertaken convergence initiatives in
barren land. Although the primary aim of this initiative is to guarantee extra
livelihood, the plan was also to extend it to a comprehensive eco-tourism project.
Around 400 acres of delta land at the confluence of Subarnarekha and Dulung has
been identiﬁed for this purpose.
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7.5.2.1 Rationale
Prior to 2013, the area was covered with bushy hedges and undulating sandy plants.
Earlier interventions through the MGNREGA such as trench cutting, ﬁeld binding,
ﬁeld mulching and land preparation lacked proper planning and technicality despite
engaging more than 400 labourers daily. The detailed comprehensive plan has been
drawn for convergence of the MGNREGA with horticulture, agriculture and
self-help group and self-employment related works (Table 7.11).
7.5.2.2 Impact
About 10% of the allocated fund under convergence has been spent generating
11,000 man days of work. While the MGNREGA works have been directed for
road development, building social forestry, vermicompost units and orchard sap-
lings, the Horticulture Department has provided technical support for orchard
raising and material oriented components, such as irrigation system, pump mech-
anization, initial sapling and medicinal plantation. The Agriculture Department has
given demonstration on cultivation of seasonal vegetables that have greater scope
for extra livelihood generation. The human resources engaged under the
MGNREGA have been brought for extensive planning through district resource
persons (DRPs/RPs and other resource persons). This has facilitated ﬁnancial
inclusion through opening of bank accounts and completion of group formation for
a new model of tribal-cooperative farming.
7.5.3 Case III: The MGNREGA in Convergence
with Sericulture
The aim of this project is to enhance the livelihood of local people through
Sericulture across two regions each under the GPs of Pathra and Khudmarai.
7.5.3.1 Impact
The initiatives could generate employment of more than 9000 unskilled man days
with substantial wage expenditure ` 13.49 lakh (Table 7.12). Besides, additional
projected employment of 4000 man days with projected average earnings of
` 34,000 per beneﬁciary per annum are very also encouraging.
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7.6 Summary and Conclusions
This Chapter assesses and document experience of convergence planning related
initiatives under the MGNREGA in the states of Odisha and West Bengal towards
sustainable growth of agriculture. The assessment suggests that West Bengal has
performed better than Odisha in terms of the physical performance of the
MGNREGA on most of the criteria of assessments. Odisha, on the contrary, has
followed an extensive approach in terms of coverage whereby the average person
days generated and households provided with 100 days employment are higher.
Nonetheless, there is a huge potential for improvement. Convergence initiatives
have yielded better output in West Bengal than in Odisha possibly due to the
efﬁcacy of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in the state.
The convergence initiatives taken in Odisha and West Bengal have immense
potential in achieving sustainable agriculture growth and enhancing livelihoods
opportunities. For example, works relating to soil conservation and land
Table 7.12 The MGNREGA in convergence with sericulture
District/Block/GP Line
Departments
involveda
Programmes
Converged
Objective(s)
*Activities
cFinancial
component
dImpact(s)/Present
status
Pathra and
Khudmarai GPs
(Sankrail Block)
Department
of Sericulture
Ministry of
Rural
Development
(GoI)a
Integrated
Action Plan
(IAP)
(1) Providing
livelihood
through
sericulture
bLand
development
and land
preparation
bProtection
trench cutting
bInternal
drainage
development
and road
development
bCreation of
water body
bTraining and
cultivation of
Tussar
bMarketing
of production
cTotal Cost
—Rs. 53.55
lakh
cShare in
total
expenditure
(%)
▪
MGNREGA
(91.88)
▪ Dept. Of
Sericulture
(3.45)
▪ IAP (4.67)
d9000 no. of
unskilled man
days completed
with a wage
expenditure of Rs.
13.49 lakh under
MGNREGA
dOver 4000 no. of
unskilled man
days projected to
be generated
dAverage earnings
per beneﬁciary
per annum
projected at Rs.
34, 000
Note arefers to programmes converged; brefers to objective(s) of the programme; crefers to
ﬁnancial component; drefers to impact(s) of the programme
Source Ofﬁce of the Block Development Ofﬁcer, Sankrail
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development can increase agriculture production and yield, whereas commercial
plantation is likely to diversify occupational structure of the local workforce.
Similarly, convergence with National Horticulture Mission, National Rural
Livelihood Mission and National Mission for Micro-irrigation is expected to result
in transformation of wasteland into productive agricultural land. However, reaping
the potential beneﬁts require more coordinated approach by the line departments
towards convergence as lack of clarity on nature and extent of participation by them
can hinder such efforts. Besides, too many formalities and differences in priorities
of the line departments can also limit the success of convergence.
Simpliﬁed procedures, unity of command, greater involvement of organizations
like Krishi Vigyan Kendras, incentives for the functionaries and appropriate leg-
islative structure are required to enhance the success. Further, while monitoring/
evaluation of planning and maintaining quality of assets created may be outsourced,
the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) should have larger role to play as planner and
executor of decisions. Assigning property rights of the assets is an another critical
aspect as lack of well-deﬁned property rights may result in their overutilization and
social conflicts. Greater success of convergence initiatives also requires active
participation of the line departments and other stakeholders in planning, manage-
ment and execution of the works.
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Chapter 8
MGNREGS: Political Economy, Local
Governance and Asset Creation in South
India
Vinoj Abraham
8.1 Introduction
The rural economy of India was reeling under a severe agrarian crisis marked by
declining agricultural productivity, stagnating real wages, and fluctuating prices for
agricultural products since late 1990s, which worsened the living conditions of the
rural poor, otherwise faced with rising unemployment, distress migration, and
farmer suicides. It was in this background that the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (2005) and the subsequent Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) were implemented since 2006.
Arguably, the world’s largest workfare programme, the scheme, aimed at enhancing
the livelihood security of the households in rural areas of India.
This scheme in its spirit aims to ameliorate the worsening conditions of living of
the rural poor and recharge the rural sector by increasing the purchasing power, and
at the same time reverse the trends in rural sector by building assets that would
increase productivity in agriculture speciﬁcally and upkeep the rural common
properties. While a large number of studies have looked into the nature and pro-
gress of employment creation under the scheme, there have been very few studies
looking into the equally important issue of asset creation under the scheme.
The study contained in this chapter is an attempt to understand the process of
asset creation under the MGNREGS. Though it is a centrally sponsored scheme, the
responsibility of its implementation is vested with the local government bodies,
including gram, block and district panchayats. The functioning of these bodies,
their approach to the scheme and the influence of the local socio-political forces
largely shape the process of asset creation at the local level. This chapter looks into
the process of asset creation from within the above-said framework.
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This chapter is based on a set of ﬁeld-based surveys conducted in the four
south Indian states, Andhra Pradesh (erstwhile), Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil
Nadu, as part of an evaluation of MGNREGS funded by Planning Commission
and Government of India. In the four states, fourteen districts were chosen to
cover: districts on the basis of regional representativeness within the states;
phase-wise implementation of MGNREGS; and districts that had incurred the
highest expenditure in MGNREGS within each state.1 Primary surveys of
MGNREGS workers, beneﬁciaries of assets created, veriﬁcation of assets, focus
group discussions, etc. were also conducted as part of the ﬁeld study. The data
collection at the ﬁeld sites was done during the period April to October 2013 for
the reference year 2011–12.
The ﬁrst section presents the introduction to the paper. The next section
(Sect. 8.2) provides a comparative overview of the local governance and political
economy of the four southern states and contextualizes MGNREGS within this
frame. Then Sect. 8.3 provides an analysis of the processes and outcomes of asset
building under the scheme. Likewise, the selection of project and type of assets to
be created under the scheme, and its implications on project expenditure on assets
created are described in Sects. 8.4 and 8.5. Then, ownership type, asset quality and
importance of the assets created under the programmes are provided in Sects. 8.6,
8.7 and 8.8. The last section (Sect. 8.9) provides the broad conclusions and policy
implications of the study.
8.2 Local-Level Governance, Politics and MGNREGS
The implementation of MGNREGS scheme at the local level is essentially pillared
on the panchayat Raj and it envisages exploiting the various tiers of panchayat Raj
system in administering the programme. The panchayat Raj institutions (PRI) are
involved in both concurrent planning and execution of MGNREG scheme. Given
the central role played by the gram panchayat in MGNREGS, the execution of the
scheme is closely linked to the structure and efﬁciency of these local bodies.
In preparing the MGNREG annual work plan for the impending year, the gram
panchayats undertake the functions, viz., (a) receive applications for job cards from
households; (b) generate the estimate of labour demand for the year; and (c) gen-
erate the shelf of projects (assets) to be created for the year to be prepared and
prioritized as passed in the gram sabha.
In executing the scheme, the gram panchayats perform the functions, such as
issuing job cards to households after due veriﬁcation; executing the projects using
the labour and materials with the help of the programme ofﬁcer of MGNREGS;
providing worksite facilities and conducting social audit. Work demand and asset
1For details of the survey, please see Report of the Evaluation of the MGNREGS cluster 6, Centre
for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.
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demand are generated from the grass roots level through the gram panchayat and
gram sabha meetings. Essentially, this flow is managed and organized by the
representatives of people at the gram panchayat level.
At the block panchayat, the demand for assets and its technical speciﬁcations and
the actual days of works generated are recommended. From this level, the demands
which represent the opinion of the local people flow to the District Programme
Ofﬁcer, who is also the Collector of the District. The responsibility for imple-
mentation of the scheme, after receiving the approval from the District Programme
Ofﬁcer, goes back to the gram panchayat. The execution of the programme is
largely overseen by the gram panchayat secretary, under whom separate
MGNREGS staff is appointed to administer the programme implementation.
The above-mentioned two aspects, i.e. planning and execution at the local level,
are affected by the following factors. First, the coordination between the two
branches of the local government, the bureaucracy and the elected representatives;
Second, deepening of the democratic process within the local governments, and
third, local social-economic structure that shape the local polity. In what follows, a
discussion of the above three aspects in the four southern states is presented to
understand the context under which MGNREGS was implemented in these states.
The three-tier panchayat Raj system, instituted through the 73rd amendment of
the Indian Constitution, has been in place in all states of the country. Since the
amendment in 1993, the South Indian states, viz., Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka,
Kerala and Tamil Nadu had undertaken various legislations and had been in the
forefront of implementing the scheme. However, the functioning of these local
bodies has been guided by the powers devolved to it by the respective state gov-
ernments, and their relation with traditional local-level axes of power.
Narayana (2005) had argued that the transformation of the gram panchayats from
being extensions of the state agencies to fully functional local governments varied
widely across the states depending on the willingness to give up power of those
who draw power from the existing state structures. Also, the traditional village
councils, which are rooted in traditional practices, values and power relations,
coexist with the elected gram panchayats acting as parallel structures of governance
with their writs running over the elected gram panchayats (Ananth Pur 2007).
This apart, the elected representatives of the local governments are often local
elites and proxy members of the elites who control the local governments. Their
motives and attitudes towards the gram panchayats and local community in general
could shape the processes and outcomes of the gram panchayat. Besley et al. (2007)
had shown that in South India, politicians in the gram sabha were social elites in
terms of education, land ownership and with a history of political representation in
their households. Furthermore, the political elites participated and beneﬁted more
from various social welfare and workfare schemes than the local public.
8 MGNREGS: Political Economy, Local Governance … 201
In Andhra Pradesh, the economic reforms initiated by the Telugu Desam Party
(TDP) since 1993–94 with funding from the World Bank, DFID and advisory
support from the McKinsey embarked on a centralized technocratic governance
structure, which ironically for greater governance efﬁciency weakened the local
bodies.2
Since 2006, there had been no panchayat level elections. In fact, after 2006, the
next election was held only in 2014 after a gap of 8 years. The panchayat elections
were not held because of the very volatile political conditions in the wake of the
demand for a separate state of Telengana. In the absence of the panchayat level
elections, the gram panchayat was virtually non-functional. Though a gram pan-
chayat president did exist, their influence was considerably weakened as their
legitimate tenure of 5 years was over and their local support was weakened.
Moreover, the state government had followed its tradition of technocratic gov-
ernance established during the early 1990s and was successful in reaching gover-
nance to the grassroots level, ironically by establishing more centralized
technocratic governance bypassing the local bodies at the gram panchayat level,
thus, considerably weakening the position of local bodies in the governance
structure of the state (Kumar 2009).
The MGNREG scheme, as in the case of other development programmes in
Andhra Pradesh, was largely administered as a technocratic centralized scheme
mostly bypassing the local-level government at the panchayat level in a top-down
approach. With a weakened GP system, the bureaucracy along with the technocrats
at block and the district-level panchayats became the dominant actors in adminis-
tering the scheme.
Karnataka was one of the ﬁrst states to experiment with devolution of power to
the local level starting in the late 1980s. The strengthening of the local governments
by transferring of functions, funds and functionaries were successfully conducted in
Karnataka and is widely considered to be a success story of decentralization.
However, the influence of the local elites run deep and many gram panchayats
experience parallel systems of traditional governance in the gram panchayats. In
Karnataka, the co-existence and involvement of such traditional village councils in
the elected gram panchayats were documented well by Ananth Pur (2007) and
Ananth Pur and Moore (2010). Manor (2007) had noted that in rural Karnataka, the
influence of caste system and other social institutions was on the decline in creating
material opportunities, but individuals, who operated through local politics, were
becoming more important.
With changes in the economic structure of rural Karnataka, which was fast
transforming to non-agriculture occupations, the traditional dominant classes had to
give way for new emerging individuals who rose as political elites in the emerging
political horizon of Karnataka. Local elites who were wealthy and relatively high in
2It is argued that while TDP ruled the state during 1993–04, the local bodies were largely held by
the Congress, and hence there was great reluctance for the state to pass on power to the local
bodies (Kumar 2009).
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the caste hierarchy were also more educated and closer to political power in the GP
than the rest of the villagers. Their domination in the village life helped them
control the resources and capture programmes and policies that were implemented
within the GP. Multiple government schemes were contracted out to these local
elites for many years, which encouraged them to invest heavily in this direction.
At the state level, the Congress-JD(S) alliance which won the election in 2004
was toppled in 2006 for a BJP-JD(S) alliance ministry. It was during the tenure of
the BJP-JD(S) alliance in the Karnataka state government that the MGNREGS was
implemented for the ﬁrst time in Karnataka. In the next tenure starting from 2008,
the BJP had formed the government with support of only six independents.
While BJP was ruling the state, it was the lead opposition against the Congress-led
central government during the same period.
The political will to implement a programme in its full import that was initiated
by the Congress was perhaps not forthcoming from the BJP-led state government.
The lack of political will from the state government along with strong local political
elite ensured the dominance of the local elites in development and welfare schemes
administered through the gram panchayats, including the MGNREGS.
Kerala embarked on decentralization and strengthening of the local governments
by institution building and legislative reforms in the early 1990s. The state offered
as the laboratory of the unique experiment of decentralized people’s planning since
1997 (Isaac and Harilal 1997). The local government in Kerala is relatively
autonomous compared to similar bodies in other states. It is not controlled by upper
bodies and generates its own revenue and budgets (Narayana 2005). Given the
strong decision and implementing powers of the gram panchayat, they have become
agents of development and change in Kerala. The autonomy granted to the gram
panchayats made these bodies very important in the rural governance.
Drawing on a large section of the population of the state, the left dominant LDF
government in early 2000s initiated the grass root level planning for the ninth plan
under the Kerala State Planning Board. Scholars report that Kerala’s decentralized
governance is different from the rest of India as it moved ahead of others to devolve
powers, responsibilities and funds (Oommen 2014).
The representatives in the gram panchayats continued to be dominated by political
elites in Kerala as in the case of other states. However, the high level of political
awareness and higher participation of the people in gram sabhas and grampanchayats
as well as the higher level of average level of education among the representatives
have created a condition wherein, though political elite capture was present, the extent
and intensity of the developmental programmes captured by these elites are atminimal
level in Kerala than other states of India (Narayana 2005; Heller et al. 2007).
Nevertheless, even in Kerala, the dominance of middle-level and upper level
bureaucracy over the elected representatives is widespread across the state. For
instance, Chathukulam and John (2002) noted that while during the LDF regime the
synergies between the elected representatives and bureaucracy were maintained, the
bureaucracy was not reined into being part of the decentralization process in Kerala.
Oommen (2014) had noted that the decentralized planning which held much pro-
mise in its early stages in Kerala has now become a routine exercise at the local
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level, bereft of the spirit of inclusion. It is not anymore a shield against issues of
vital concern such as ‘…endemic vested interests, communalism, clientelism,
alcoholism and several other negative factors that envelop Kerala society today’
(Oommen 2014, p. 45).
A committee appointed by the state government of Kerala to evaluate the pro-
gress of the decentralized planning and development (GoK 2009) had observed that
the Beneﬁciary Committee system, to counter clientilistic behavior, and elite cap-
ture of programmes were not successful. In fact many project mode programmes,
aimed at individual households, were being used as tools of vote bank politics by
the elected members of the local bodies. In case of MGNREGS too, it was observed
in our study that while elite capture and corruption of the programme were minimal
in Kerala, vote bank politics seemed to play an important role in the running of the
programme at the gram panchayat level.
In Tamil Nadu, the Panchayat Raj Act was passed in 1994. Tamil Nadu, which
had a long history of traditional village councils administering the villages, how-
ever, had a weak institutional setup for the implementation of the Act in its spirit.
Narayana (2005, p. 2822) noted that ‘the government was reluctant to give powers
to local bodies as it issues executive orders instead of notiﬁcations on the 29
subjects mentioned in the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994. As executive orders
do not have legal validity that notiﬁcations have, the bureaucracy ignores them and
local bodies remain mere agents of the government’. Kumar (2009) remarks that
probably this poor devolution of powers to the local governments stem from the fact
that regional parties like DMK and AIADMK hold way at the state-level politics.
Regional parties see local governments as a dilution of their powers and would
like to guard their interests at the state level. Regional parties often view decen-
tralization as a means of the central government to bypass their powers to reach the
grass root levels. Yet, despite poor devolution of powers to the local bodies, various
centrally sponsored and state-sponsored welfare and development programmes
were successfully implemented in the state, mainly due to the direct role of the
bureaucracy supported by newer technologies, such as Information Communication
Technology (ICT), Geographical Positioning System (GPS), etc.
While implementation of development programmes in a top-down manner had
been by and large successful in Tamil Nadu, there has been growing resentment
amongst the landlords and industrialists against such initiatives, mainly due to their
losing control over labour. Harriss et al. (2010) in a village study noted that while
the traditional village councils have weakened and are probably non-existent, the
landlord’s power and reach have persisted to the present times.
With the increasing levels of education among the agricultural workers, imple-
mentations of the schemes like the ‘One rupee rice scheme’ and ‘NREGA’ tensions
between the landlord and the farm workers have escalated. The sharp caste divi-
sions in land holding groups and agricultural workers have led to polarization and
political identity formations around caste groups. De Neve and Carswell (2011)
have argued that these rising tensions have led to protests among the landed and
landless, leading to the formation of new political parties with considerable
influence.
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In the recent past, a number of exclusively caste-based parties and new Dalit
parties have sprung across Tamil Nadu, such as PMK, the Dalit Panthers, Puthiya
Tamizhagam, KNMK, etc. De Neve and Carswell (2011) ﬁnds that the involvement
of local parties’ and politics is entrenched in MGNREGS and the local elected
representatives use the scheme for strengthening patron–client relationships.
From the above discussion, for the sake of analytical abstraction, one could
contrast the four states as having the following features of local governance. Andhra
Pradesh is marked by the dominance of the techno-bureaucratic administration and
weak people’s representation at the local level. Karnataka is marked by dominance
of local-level institutions of decentralization over the bureaucracy; however, the
local-level institutions have been captured by traditional social and political elites.
Kerala too is marked by the dominance of local-level institutions. Though role of
traditional elites had declined in Kerala, vote bank politics had invaded these
institutions. Tamil Nadu is again marked by dominance of the techno-bureaucratic
administration at the local level and weak institutional arrangement for local gov-
ernance. Additionally, the emergence of identity-based politics at the village level
has a strong impact on local-level programme implementation.
From the above premise of the local polity and governance structure, now we
embark on the question of asset creation under the MGNREGS scheme. The
endeavor here is to argue the case that the type of asset creation, methods of asset
creation and maintenance and beneﬁts accrued by the local people are largely
influenced by the local polity, local governance structure and democratic practices
at the local level.
8.3 Asset Creation Under MGNREGS
The MGNREGS guidelines provide for construction of various types of assets
under the scheme.3 Within these various asset types, the MGNREGS mission of the
respective state governments prioritize the asset types based on demand for assets
and local requirements. Finally, gram sabha of each gram panchayat in their
meetings puts forward the yearly demand for construction of various assets from the
list of asset types provided by the national guidelines and prioritized by the state
governments.
All these assets are aimed at improving the rural livelihoods, particularly
improving rural infrastructure, and improving agricultural performance by
enhancing the quality of land and increasing the availability of water through water
management methods. It can be noted that the importance given to the type of asset
created reflects the local economic needs of the region (Table 8.1).
For instance, in Tamil Nadu, where many traditional water bodies have disap-
peared and have caused deleterious consequences on agriculture, the restoration of
3See Table 8.1 for the broad list of type of assets that is taken up under MGNREGS.
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Table 8.1 Distribution of number of assets completed 2006–07 to 2011–12 (in %)
Type of asset 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12
Andhra Pradesh
Rural connectivity 0.2 1.0 4.2 2.9 7.1 1.6
Flood control and
protection
0.0 1.9 0.7 0.8 0.6 3.5
Water conservation 47.9 29.8 30.6 35.2 36.1 57.0
Drought prooﬁng 10.4 3.7 4.1 4.0 1.9 4.8
Micro-irrigation 4.2 7.2 10.6 14.1 15.3 30.3
Provision of irrigation to
SC/ST
0.2 3.6 12.7 9.2 10.1 0.7
RTWB 6.2 5.5 6.0 6.6 11.0 1.6
Land development 30.9 47.2 30.9 27.1 17.9 0.5
Any other activity 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bharat Nirman RGSK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100.0
Karnataka
Rural connectivity 26.2 16.3 12.2 8.0 11.7 12.6
Flood control and
protection
6.2 5.9 10.0 6.0 10.4 11.5
Water conservation 34.7 29.4 28.0 17.1 10.4 16.1
Drought prooﬁng 6.1 19.0 13.7 11.9 17.4 13.3
Micro-irrigation 3.6 2.5 4.9 7.4 4.2 5.2
Provision of irrigation to
SC/ST
7.3 9.4 9.1 18.9 17.8 12.1
RTWB 5.1 6.1 11.6 4.8 4.4 4.6
Land development 2.1 11.4 10.4 20.9 20.6 19.4
Any other activity 8.8 0.0 0.1 5.1 3.2 5.2
Bharat Nirman RGSK 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Total 100 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Kerala
Rural connectivity 0 6.5 2.8 3.4 3.2 2.8
Flood control and
protection
0 27.4 42.8 36.5 26.6 21.0
Water conservation 0 22.5 10.0 8.8 13.2 15.6
Drought prooﬁng 0 1.6 2.3 4.0 3.3 2.8
Micro-irrigation 0 13.4 13.8 12.2 8.5 8.0
Provision of irrigation to
SC/ST
0 0.9 1.1 3.9 4.2 3.9
RTWB 0 12.3 16.3 16.5 14.1 10.5
Land development 0 15.3 10.9 13.8 26.4 34.9
Any other activity 0 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.4 0.6
Bharat Nirman RGSK. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(continued)
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these bodies received the maximum attention. While in Kerala which is affected by
incessant rains, flood control and flood protection have been one of the most
important asset types created. Similarly, the semi-arid regions of Karnataka and
Andhra Pradesh opted for drought prooﬁng and water conservation as important
type of assets created.
During the initial phase of the programme, land development and water con-
servation were the two most important types of assets constructed in south India
accounting for more than 70% of the assets created in the year 2006–07 (Table 8.1).
Though water conservation still continues to be an important type of asset being
built in the recent years also. The prominence of land development has declined
Table 8.1 (continued)
Type of asset 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12
Tamil Nadu
Rural connectivity 12.2 11.9 19.9 23.1 24.8 27.8
Flood control and
protection
0.3 0.6 0.7 0.7 1.5 0.5
Water conservation 27.3 20.4 14.9 12.4 14.0 17.8
Drought prooﬁng 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Micro-irrigation 16.7 20.3 19.0 18.6 13.0 13.4
Provision of irrigation to
SC/ST
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RTWB 43.1 46.9 45.5 45.1 46.7 40.2
Land development 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2
Any other activity 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bharat Nirman RGSK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
All Southern States
Rural connectivity 5.3 3.0 5.2 4.4 7.6 5.5
Flood control and
protection
1.2 3.6 8.3 5.3 3.9 7.6
Water conservation 45.0 29.0 26.3 28.8 31.1 40.4
Drought prooﬁng 9.4 4.7 4.3 5.2 3.3 5.6
Micro-irrigation 4.4 7.6 11.1 12.9 13.7 21.1
Provision of irrigation 1.5 3.8 10.0 10.1 9.9 3.2
RTWB 6.8 7.5 9.9 8.4 11.7 6.2
Land development 24.9 40.8 24.8 24.0 18.4 9.5
Any other activity 1.6 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.3 1.0
Bharat Nirman RGSK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source MIS, MGNREGS website
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substantially and its place has been taken up by works on micro-irrigations. This is
mainly because of the decline in the land development assets created in Andhra
Pradesh which declined from 47% in 2007–08 to just 0.5% in 2011–12 (Table 8.1).
While in Kerala and Karnataka, Land Development4 continues to be an important
type of asset. In Tamil Nadu, Land Development works were hardly taken up.
Though the state governments provide priority lists, the actual works done could
vary according to the demands rising from the gram sabha. It can be inferred that
the state priority ranking and ranking of actual works done will have greater
congruence if the priority list have a more dominant role in deciding the actual
works being done than the works demand generated by the local-level bodies and
vice versa.
A simple rank correlation done between the state priority ranking and the
ranking of actual works done for the period 2006–07 to 2011–12 in Andhra Pradesh
shows moderately high degree of correlation (0.57), while in the other three states,
the coefﬁcient of rank correlation was very small and not signiﬁcant. This probably
signals that in Andhra Pradesh the directions from the MGNREGS mission at the
state level are implemented at the grass root level to a considerable extent without
being interfered at the local level, while in other states this is not the case.5 It also
points that probably the weak local-level bodies in Andhra Pradesh have made it
easier for a bureaucratic implementation of the directions of the state mission from
top.
In Tamil Nadu, while apparently the choice of assets is aimed at reviving
agriculture sector, the prioritization of certain assets and exclusion of certain assets
seemed to be aimed at keeping the local power relations in balance. Among the
various asset types, in Tamil Nadu, the share of assets under Restoration of
Traditional Water Bodies (RTWB) was the highest, accounting for nearly 50% of
all assets completed throughout the period 2006–07 to 2011–12.
During the same period, however, asset types that beneﬁted the SC/STs, i.e.
provision for irrigation for SC/ST land, were the least important. Assets created
under land development, which also beneﬁts SC/ST land, and small and marginal
land holdings were also almost completely absent. The priority list of assets notiﬁed
by the Tamil Nadu NREGS mission also gives the highest priority to RTWB while
the irrigation provision for SC/ST and Land Development do not appear in the
4Unlike in Andhra Pradesh, where one of the prominent assets to be developed was ‘Investing on
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe lands for irrigation and land development duly fulﬁlling Special
Component Plan/Tribal Sub-Plan norms in each Mandal’, this item was conspicuous by its
absence. http://karnregs.kar.nic.in/Resource/KREGS_Scheme_Eng.pdf, accessed on 3 January
2015.
5In Tamil Nadu, the priority list does not match directly with the MGNREGS guidelines, so the
exercise is limited to the other three states.
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priority list.6The choice of assets ensured that options of self-employment for the
poor would not open up through the scheme.
Within RTWB, tanks and ponds built for irrigation purposes are the most
important. Studies show that irrigation tanks were traditionally managed by the
upper caste dominant landlords in local collectivities in rural Tamil Nadu
(Sivasubramaniyan 2006). Tanks form the second most important source of irri-
gation after wells and Tube wells in Tamil Nadu. Tanks were not private properties,
but the gains from the usage of the tanks had a large class component. The
importance of these tanks in irrigation, agriculture and thereby to the local landlords
is self-evident. The prioritization of assets and the completion of assets under the
scheme thus seem to maintain the power relations between the landless agricultural
workers, majority of them being scheduled castes and the landlords.
8.3.1 Project Selection Under MGNREGS
The sample survey conducted by us also corroborates the above arguments. As can
be seen from Table 8.2, in all other states, an overwhelming majority stated that the
choice of projects was as per local people’s needs. In Andhra Pradesh, 12.5% of the
beneﬁciaries stated that there was no speciﬁc way to choose, whereas another
12.3% stated that they did not know how the choice was made. Only 66% of the
sample responded that the choice of projects was according to the need of the local
people.
In Kerala and Karnataka, nearly 90% of the sample claimed that the choice was
according to the needs of the local people. It may be noted here that these are the
two states that have fairly well-developed local government institutions, as men-
tioned earlier. It is probably the influence of these local institutions in project
decision-making that have led to the selection of projects and asset types that
represented the local needs.
In Tamil Nadu, project selection was influenced to an extent by the local
leadership. About 20% of the beneﬁciaries stated that project selection was as per
the need of the local leader. Another 10% responded as either not knowing the
method of selection or having no particular method of selection in a place.
Similar evidences that support the above arguments are visible on the role of
gram sabha in asset choice. Majority of the respondents (87%) from all the states
reported that all MGNREGS works are being approved in gram sabha (Table 8.3).
In Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, about 18 and 15% of the respondents,
6Priority of works for Tamil Nadu are as follows: (a) Formation of new ponds. (b) Renovation of
existing Ponds, Kuttais, Kulams, Ooranies, Temple tanks, etc. (c) Desilting of channels.
(d) Desilting and strengthening of bunds of irrigation tanks. (e) Formation of new roads. (f) Other
water conservation/soil conservation measures/flood protection measures. http://www.tnrd.gov.in/
schemes/nrega.html, accessed on 3 January 2015.
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respectively, stated that the works were not being approved in gram sabha, whereas,
in Kerala and Karnataka, more than 95% respondents stated that the works were
passed in the gram sabha.
8.4 Project Implementation
The interaction between the elected bodies and the bureaucratic executive body
reduces at the implementation stage. The implementation is done by the executive
body at the panchayat level with the panchayat secretary playing an active role
taking additional charge as the NREGS Programme Ofﬁcer at the panchayat level.
The scheme design does not require the participation of the elected bodies in
implementation of the same. Some members of the GP, but at times, oversaw the
worksites and enquired the welfare of the workers. In general, however, involve-
ment was limited to expressing their views on the programme, often critically.
In Andhra Pradesh, at this stage, the implementation is directly from the Mandals
(blocks) and below which there are ﬁeld assistants and mates and hence, there was
hardly any interference of the elected bodies at the implementation stage. On the
contrary, in Tamil Nadu, some of the elected members of the panchayat took
Table 8.2 How projects are selected across the selected states
AP (n = 440) KL (347) KN (528) TN (440) Total (1755)
As per need
of local people (%)
65.68 89.91 78.6 69.32 75.27
As per need of leader (%) 9.32 2.02 11.55 20.45 11.34
No speciﬁc way
to choose (%)
12.5 0.58 0.57 7.05 5.19
Don’t know (%) 12.27 2.88 8.33 2.27 6.72
Others (%) 0.23 4.61 0.95 0.91 1.48
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Source Primary survey of asset beneﬁciaries, 2013
Note AP—corresponds to Andhra Pradesh, KN—Karnataka, KL—Kerala and TN—Tamil Nadu
Table 8.3 Whether the NREGA works are being approved in gram sabha: state-wise
Responses\states Unit AP
(n = 459)
KL
(n = 345)
KN
(n = 560)
TN
(n = 414)
Total
(n = 1,778)
Yes % 85.84 97.39 94.64 75.12 88.36
No % 9.8 2.32 4.82 18.12 8.72
Gram Sabha does
not exist
% 4.36 0.29 0.54 6.76 2.92
Total % 100 100 100 100 100
Source Primary survey, 2013
210 V. Abraham
interest in the implementation of the scheme in their personal and political inter-
ests.7 In Kerala, though the NREGS mission was responsible for implementation of
the scheme, the GP members also took active interest in this. However, they were
also critical of the scheme in many instances.
In Karnataka, also there is very active involvement of the GP elected members in
the scheme. However, their involvement in the scheme is due to the peculiar way
the scheme was interpreted at the local level. In many parts of Karnataka, the
scheme lost one of its most important characteristics, namely, self-targeting of
beneﬁciaries. In many parts of Karnataka, the scheme was interpreted as a targeted
asset building scheme. The GP members were informally entrusted with targets to
achieve through the scheme. Moreover, the GP members often represented, or
themselves, were the local elites, caste leaders or landlords.
Locally dominant elite weakened the powers of the local-level bureaucracy
considerably while the needs of the elite were addressed in the implementation of
the MGNREGS projects. The dominance of the local elites in the gram panchayats
led to considerable amount of elite capture of the programme in parts of Karnataka.
Table 8.4 shows that 25% of the workers claimed that there were contractors
involved in the MGNREGS works in Karnataka. This is the response received to a
direct query on contractors’ involvement in the scheme.
The actual ﬁgures could be much higher. During the ﬁeld visit, it became evident
that in some parts of Karnataka, there were local elites owning machinery, like
Road Rollers, JCB excavators, etc., whose only utility was to be rented out to run
various government schemes. Many members of these families are trained to enter
the system, through education. For instance, we met a household who had three of
their kins including children being civil engineers with contract license from the
state government. They were involved in running many government schemes
including asset building under the MGNREGS within the GP. They were also the
richest and the household head was the virtual gram panchayat president, his wife
being the titular president.
Though in general Karnataka had a high share of contract involvement, there
were exceptions such as Bilagi block in Bagalkote (see Table 8.5). As can be
noticed, contractors are not completely absent in any of the districts, and in all cases
are higher than the state averages of all other states. But there is a greater presence
of such contractors in Belgaum and Mysore.8
7For instance in a GP in Tanjavur district of Tamil Nadu, we came across a very industrious GP
president who, along with all the elected members of the GP and his supporters, regularly featured
in the worksites as MGNREGS workers. They also worked and gave directions at worksites and
ensured that along with the workers the GP also gained by building some useful assets. This
interaction and active involvement of the GP leadership in the scheme made the scheme hugely
popular in the GP and was successfully used as an asset building as well as rural livelihood
scheme. But in other GPs the elected members were wary that the scheme was depriving the
agriculturists of their labour and making agriculture unviable.
8However, it may be noted that at the GP level, there were claims of contractor involvements even
in States with aggregate low levels of contractor interference. Byson Valley GP in Kerala, for
instance, had 40% respondents claiming there was contract involvement.
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For the programme to be run on target-based contractor-driven mode, the assets
that were prioritized under the guidelines were probably not sufﬁciently attractive.
The modus operandi was to re-interpret the asset types and build large assets that
could utilize large machinery. For instance, constructions of temple walls, school
walls and market walls were common across different districts, yet they would
appear in the MIS as flood control, flood protection, land development, etc.
Re-interpretation of asset types was not unique to Karnataka. Kerala is another state
that had involved in interpreting asset types, but that was under the completely
different premises of interpretation of the labour cost–material cost ratio in asset
creation.
The MGNREGS guidelines stipulate that the ratio of labour cost to material cost
cannot be below a ratio of 60:40, implying that at least 60% of the spending on
asset creation should be of labour cost. This stipulation was essentially aimed at
keeping the works as much as possible labour intensive and also to reduce
involvement of contractors and middlemen. This ratio should be applied preferably
at the gram panchayat, block and district levels, while the 60:40 ratio was main-
tained in all the states, where it differed was the unit at which this ratio was
maintained.
In Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, the labour material ratio was interpreted as
the share of the total budget at the district level. In Tamil Nadu, it was interpreted as
the ratio to be followed for each project. In Kerala too, this was essentially the
interpretation. In Kerala, additionally, all works involving materials were
Table 8.4 Agents performing NREGA work in the gram panchayat across the states surveyed,
2013
AP
(n = 454)
KL
(355)
KN
(539)
TN
(444)
Total
(1,792)
Contract % 2.64 7.04 25.05 2.25 10.16
Gram
panchayat
% 94.71 69.3 67.72 97.3 82.2
Others % 2.64 23.66 7.24 0.45 7.65
Total % 100 100 100 100 100
Source Primary survey of MGNREGS workers, 2013
Table 8.5 Percentage share
of workers response to who
are carrying out the NREGA
work in the gram panchayat
(GP) across the districts
surveyed in Karnataka
District Contract Gram
panchayat
Others Total
Bagalkote (1) 13.21 84.28 2.52 100.0
Belgaum (4) 43.97 43.97 12.07 100.0
Chitradurga (10) 11.49 79.05 9.46 100.0
Mysore (22) 39.66 54.31 6.03 100.0
Total 25.05 67.72 7.24 100.0
Source Primary survey of MGNREGS workers, 2013
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discouraged so much that there were hardly any projects that included material
involvement. From the ﬁeld visits, interviews and Focus Group discussions, it was
repeatedly heard that complete avoidance of material costs in Kerala essentially led
to a situation where the shelf of activities that could be taken up under the scheme
was very limited.
This, along with other factors, led to the interpretation of asset types in Kerala.
For instance, a channel clearance near a road would be termed as flood protection,
while the same activity may appear as water conservation with cosmetic changes in
another region. This, though will not affect the overarching goal of employment
provisioning, led to very similar type of assets/activities being taken up under
different names in Kerala.
8.5 Assessment of Expenditure Incurred on Assets
To assess the appropriateness of the expenditure on the assets, data was collected on
the actual expenditure on assets and an assessment made by a competent person
(usually an engineer) on the expenditure that could have incurred on the asset. The
cost of asset is assessed in terms of both material and total expenditures. Table 8.6
shows the average ratio of actual material expenditure to that of the material
expenditure that the engineer had estimated to be ideal. A ratio of above one
suggests that there is over expenditure and a ratio of less than one would mean that
there is under expenditure. This query was responded from very few assets only.
Here we have analyzed the data for all the assets for which we got responses. In
Andhra Pradesh, the actual expenditure on materials was more or less the same as
assessed by the engineer, while in Kerala there was severe under expenditure on
materials. In Kerala, material expenses were completely discouraged; hence, it can
be expected that there was under expenditure.
In Karnataka, on the other hand, there was an overshoot of material expenditure
by 50% more than the ideal expenditure that the engineer estimated to be ideal. This
again is explainable as the involvement of informal contractors and skilled workers
could have led to scaling up of material use in asset building. We were not able to
get any data of Tamil Nadu, and hence cannot comment about Tamil Nadu on this
(Table 8.6).
Table 8.6 Estimates of
expenditure on material for
the project by engineer ideally
versus actual material
expenses in rupees
State Mean Std. dev. Freq.
Andhra Pradesh 1.02 0.05 11
Kerala 0.55 0.13 6
Karnataka 1.55 2.28 16
Tamil Nadu
Total 1.19 1.61 33
Source Primary survey of MGNREGS, 2013
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Table 8.7 shows the average ratio of actual total expenditure to that of the total
expenditure that the engineer had estimated to be ideal. This shows the divergence
between actual and ideals. It may be noted that overall the actual and ideal were
nearly the same. In Andhra Pradesh, there was considerable under expenditure
while in Kerala, there was some marginal over expenditure. In Tamil Nadu and
Karnataka, the overall expenditure was more or less equal to the ideal expenditure
as estimated by the engineer. Thus, it may be stated that in general there were no
large cost overruns, and the actual expenditure was more or less close to the ideal
expenditure.
However, Tables 8.6 and 8.7 may be interpreted only with caution, as, it can be
seen, a large share of the asset survey respondents chose not to answer these
questions relating to actual and ideal spending.
8.6 Ownership Type of Assets
The MGNREGS scheme accommodates the creation of both public and private
assets. Public assets are those whose beneﬁts are not derived by any exclusive
individual or group speciﬁcally; rather the beneﬁts are drawn by the local com-
munity in general. Though MGNREGS is a public-funded programme, it does
allow for private asset creation in some cases such as works on the land owned by
SC/ST or works on small and marginal farmers.
In our study, we deﬁne private assets as those assets whose major beneﬁciaries
are private individuals or an exclusive group. To arrive at the ownership nature of
the asset if there was a claim of ownership over the land or the beneﬁts of the assets
by an individual or a group, then it was identiﬁed as private asset, or else it was
classiﬁed as public assets.
From our sample, in Tamil Nadu (100%) and Karnataka (90%), most works
done were public in nature where the asset became a common village property (see
Fig. 8.2). In Kerala, nearly 65% of the assets were public in nature while in Andhra
Pradesh, more than 86% of the assets created were private in nature. Private assets
Table 8.7 Ratio of estimates
of total expenditure for the
project by engineer ideally
versus actual expenses
State Mean Std. dev. Freq.
Andhra Pradesh 0.62 0.51 101
Kerala 1.18 1.58 59
Karnataka 0.83 0.41 40
Tamil Nadu 0.99 1.21 60
Total 0.87 1.04 260
Source Primary survey of MGNREGS, 2013
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were created in Andhra Pradesh as most of the activities conducted were in private
lands as land development activities.9
In Kerala too, a large share of works (35%) were done in private lands. This was
especially true in case of Idukki district where most works were private in nature.10
In Kerala and Andhra Pradesh, land development activities were taken up in large
scale and land development activities were aimed at rejuvenating agriculture in
these regions. Most land development activities in Andhra were related to Jhuliflora
clearance and putting fresh soil. In Kerala, most land development activities were
related to clearance of unused land and preparation for agriculture. In Karnataka
and Tamil Nadu, such activities were not encouraged. Activities which had a clear
public nature were only taken up in these states (see Fig. 8.1).
Andhra Pradesh was able to utilize the provision of land development and
irrigation works for the private individuals through the prioritization of the scheme
and provisioning it to SC/ST and small land holders. But in Kerala, the provisioning
for private assets was largely speciﬁc to the hill district of Idukki, while in
Thiruvananthapuram district, there were hardly any private assets being created.
Idukki district has a plantation crop based agricultural economy.
Though the district has a plantation economy, a large share of these plantations is
small and marginal land holdings. There is a large presence of scheduled tribes and
castes but they are largely landless population in the region. Christian migrants
from the mid-Travancore region, which form the major vote bank for the Kerala
Congress (M), a local regional party with considerable power in the state-level
multiparty coalition of the Congress-led UDF, are the dominant small and marginal
farmers in the region. In this region, most MGNREGS works taken up were in
private lands, such as preparation of land for next agricultural season or doing the
initial works for the next crop, mainly Cardamom and other spices cultivation.
From the ﬁeld interviews, it was clear that the groups formed for MGNREGS
were essentially ‘exchange labour groups’11 that were already prevalent in the
region. These MGNREGS groups were essentially working on their own farms or
neighborhood farms and thus were beneﬁtting a wage subsidy through MGNREGS
on the farm work. The scheme probably would not have achieved same level of
success in Idukki had it been designed as total public works programme. The
9Though most works done in Andhra Pradesh were private in nature, two GPs in
Ibrahimpatnamblock of Krishna district and the three GPs in Vidapanakkal block of Anantapur
had about 30–40% respondents claiming that assets were public.
10In Kerala, there were speciﬁc GPs that did complete private works, while some had a mix of both
private and public; and some had only public works. In Idukki district, Kanchiyar and Kattapana
were two GPs that had very high share of private works, in all other GPs private works were not
the majority of the works. In both these GPs, KC (M) was ruling in coalition with the Congress,
while in other panchayats their role was in the opposition or marginal.
11Exchange labour system is a traditional system of labour sharing, wherein the small farmers pool
their labour together and work in each other’s farms. This practice, which was waning earlier, had
resurged in the recent past due to rising wages of wage labour and unavailability of unskilled
labour in the local labour markets in Idukki.
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attraction of the programme in Idukki, despite lower MGNREGS wages than pri-
vate wage works, is the associated private gains in asset creation.
In Tamil Nadu, private works were discouraged completely, even when the
MGNREGS provisions allowed this, probably, as argued earlier, i.e. to maintain the
power relations within the local economy. In Karnataka too, private works were
discouraged as private works empower the SC/ST and the small and marginal
farmers. Moreover, within the present arrangement, wherein there was elite capture
of the programme, public works provided better gains to the elites, while private
works which beneﬁtted only the poor and marginalized were unwelcome.
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Fig. 8.1 Distribution of number of assets completed from 2006–07 to 2011–12 (%). Source MIS,
MGNREGS
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8.7 Asset Quality and Durability
For creating durable and good quality assets, each state follows a protocol manual
that describes the technical speciﬁcations of the assets to be created. This protocol
manual usually is drawn from either the Central Public Works Department or the
Local Public Works Department. To ensure the quality of assets at the ﬁeld level,
engineers or technically competent supervisors are appointed at the block level or
gram panchayat level who conducts feasibility studies prior to the work. There are
also monitoring and evaluation bodies at different levels of bureaucracy that visits
the assets routinely.
From the ﬁeld visits it was evident that despite the clear guidelines laid down for
asset creation, the quality of assets created varied vastly across various projects and
states. From the asset level survey we conducted, nearly 70% of all assets were
constructed as per the speciﬁcation of the CPWD or local PWD manual (see
Fig. 8.3). In Kerala, 81% of the assets were created as per the speciﬁcations laid out.
In Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, the provisions of the CPWD speciﬁcations
were followed in case of 77% of the assets. From the ﬁeld interviews, the asset
beneﬁciaries in Andhra Pradesh and Kerala also perceived that the quality of assets
created under MGNREGA was as per speciﬁcations. In Tamil Nadu, however, only
60% of the assets were built as per speciﬁcations.
The relatively higher level of following the speciﬁcation in Andhra Pradesh and
Kerala could be due to the fact that many of these were private works. In such
cases, probably there is a greater incentive for the private owner to encourage and
ensure that the work is done in good quality. The low performance in Tamil Nadu
where the public works were the maximum also supports this argument. But
Karnataka, which also did mostly public works, had performed well in this respect,
unlike Tamil Nadu. From our ﬁeld veriﬁcation visits, we had noted that some of the
better assets among the four states that we surveyed were constructed in Karnataka
(see Fig. 8.2).
But it is also the fact that Andhra Pradesh had introduced Global Positioning
System (GPS)-based work measurement and wage payment system. This essen-
tially ensured that the works were completed as per the technical speciﬁcation and
there was no space for human manipulations or errors. In none of the other states,
GPS-based measurement system was followed except in parts of Tamil Nadu.
While a technological solution ensured speciﬁcations in Andhra Pradesh, it was the
vigilant and active gram panchayat that enabled the creation of a strong social audit
process that ensured the speciﬁcation of assets in Kerala.
At the time of survey, in 2013, Kerala had a very vibrant local social audit
mechanism established at the gram panchayat level, with members drawn from
different walks of life in the social audit team. In Tamil Nadu, an independent social
audit mechanism at the village level did not exist in the early years of implemen-
tation, and it was only in 2012–13 that a permanent social audit mechanism was
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structured and audit was conducted in two blocks in Tamil Nadu.12 In Karnataka,
social audit mechanism was in place early but it had been subject to elite capture,
like the rest of the programme (Rajasekhar et al. 2013).
This apart, there was a politics of the quality of asset building in southern states.
Quality of asset was linked to follow the stipulated speciﬁcation of the assets. And
speciﬁcation of assets was to be measured by the competent authority, based on
which the wages were to be paid. MGNREGS allows discretion to follow either
piece rate or time rate wages.
In case of piece rate wages, completion of work as per speciﬁcation is the norm
for wage payment and in case of daily wages, a daily productivity norm, determined
by the implementing agency, is the basis for wage payment.
The wage payment system followed in different states varied, for instance, while
Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh followed the piece rate method, and Kerala and
Karnataka followed the daily wage method. In both cases, however, measurements
of the completed assets were to be carried out to ensure fulﬁllment of the
speciﬁcation.
In Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, where the practice of piece rate was fol-
lowed, the average daily wage was in general less than the minimum wages
declared by the state to be paid for MGNREGS works. In Andhra Pradesh, the
GPS-based measurement yielded many works that were not completed to speciﬁ-
cation, leading to under payment of wages. But in Tamil Nadu, which had a more
severe case of under—payment compared to Andhra Pradesh, yet did not have
GPS-based measurement of wages was accomplished through manual
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12Minutes of the meeting of the Empowered Committee to scrutinize and discuss Anticipated
Labour Demand of Tamil Nadu for 2013–14, 15 February 2013, http://nrega.nic.in/Netnrega/
WriteReaddata/Circulars/Minute_TN_meeting15Feb13.pdf, accessed on 7 January 2015.
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measurement. The manual measurement of wages was implemented by local
supervisors or overseers who were temporary appointees under the scheme.
The measurement of assets created was strictly imposed owing to the pressures
from the local landlords. In many places in Tamil Nadu, it was stated in interviews
with the workers that local landlords were enthusiastic about measurement of assets
and payment being made accordingly. This probably was a tactic to keep the
MGNREGS wages lower than the agricultural wages, thus dis-incentivising par-
ticipation in MGNREGS.
In Kerala, where daily wage payment was followed, measurement of assets was
opposed by workers collectives in many parts. Any attempt to impose
measurement-based wages was opposed by the worker’s collectives and was sup-
ported by the local political leadership, such that in our survey, there was hardly
any worker who received wages less than the minimum wages stipulated.
In many parts of Karnataka, though daily wage system was followed, there was
no conflict between the local elites, workers and the implementing agencies as the
assets created were as per the speciﬁcations, while the works were done by skilled
workers using machinery. The agricultural workers who cooperated with the
arrangement and doubled up as MGNREGS workers got an additional small sum of
money as payment for the arrangement. Thus, while the scheme got captured and its
main objective of providing rural livelihood opportunities got diluted, Karnataka
was able to build assets that were according to speciﬁcations and also that were
durable.
Though overall, the assets created were claimed to be as per speciﬁcations, and
many of these assets were not durable. Durability of these assets was dependent on
multiple factors including implementing the technical asset speciﬁcations, durable
materials used in asset creation, weather conditions and most importantly periodic
maintenance of these assets.
Since in Kerala and Tamil Nadu use of material components was completely
discouraged, most of the assets created were used with non-durable materials and
the nature of the work themselves non-durable. Given the climatic conditions of
Kerala which has very heavy rainfall, these assets almost completely disappear after
a cycle of rains. Also, many of the private works taken up in the agriculture land
were seasonal works which would not sustain to the next cycle of crops. Interviews
with the stakeholders show that in Tamil Nadu also, the works done were not of
permanent nature, though they were relatively more durable. Most of the works
done were pond cleaning or road cleaning, which were not asset creations, but
doing maintenance works of assets already existing, through MGNREGS.
While asset creation was designed within the MGNREGS scheme, there was no
provision for maintenance of the assets created. Lack of maintenance of the assets
was an important concern raised by all stakeholders alike, including workers, asset
beneﬁciaries and the panchayat ofﬁcials in almost all GPs of the states. The nature
of the works taken up under MGNREGS is such that for sustenance of the assets
large maintenance cost needs to be incurred or else assets would deteriorate in a
short time.
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Though a large majority of the assets created under MGNREGS require main-
tenance, as noted above, however, in practice, only 33% of the assets were being
maintained regularly (Table 8.8). More than 67% of the assets were not having any
maintenance. In Tamil Nadu, more than 78% of the assets were not receiving any
maintenance. While in Kerala, nearly 69% were not receiving any maintenance.
During interviews with workers, it was revealed that MGNREGA helped to
create good quality assets, and it has been maintained well. But some felt that
quality of assets created is very poor and maintenance of assets is not addressed
well in Tamil Nadu; more than 79% of the workers opined that the assets were not
maintained properly. While in Andhra Pradesh 79% stated that assets were main-
tained properly.
In Kerala too, nearly 67% claimed that the assets were maintained properly. This
divergence between Tamil Nadu on the one side and Kerala and Andhra Pradesh on
the other is probably due to the incentive problem. In Tamil Nadu, as noted earlier,
most works were public in nature, and since there were no funds allotted for
maintenance, maintenance was not done, while in Andhra Pradesh and Kerala,
many of the works were private in nature, thus incentivizing private maintenance,
even if there were no funds available for it.
This private versus public asset dimension can be seen in case of involvement of
local people in maintenance as well. As can be seen from Table 8.8 in Andhra
Pradesh, more than 90% of workers stated that local people were involved in
maintenance, which is due to the involvement of the owners of the private assets
themselves. In Kerala too, where there was a large share of private assets, the
involvement of local people was substantial in maintenance, while in Tamil Nadu
where the assets were public in nature, more than 96% of the workers stated that
local people were not involved in the maintenance of the assets.
8.8 Importance of the Asset Constructed for the Locality
In Tamil Nadu, 58% of the asset beneﬁciaries claimed that the asset that constructed
in the locality was very important (see Table 8.9). In Kerala, 48% stated that the
asset was very important for the locality. While in Andhra Pradesh, only 22.5%
considered it to be very important and in Karnataka only 7% considered it to be
very important. In none of the states, the assets built were considered to be
unimportant.
In Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, the largest share of respondents considered
these assets to be important. Thus it can be concluded that the assets created were
necessary for the locality to most regions of the various states. But Kerala and
Tamil Nadu were able to identify assets that were most important for the regions.
This probably has to do with better functioning of the Panchayat Raj system in
these states.
In Andhra Pradesh, due to the lack of elections at the GP level during the last 5
years, people’s representation in asset selection might have been weak. In Karnataka,
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since the scheme was interpreted and implemented differently from the objectives
and plan of the scheme, it might have led to poor selection of assets as compared to
other regions. Since contractors could get involved in asset building, many of the
assets chosen would be of the nature that there could be greater use of material,
skilled workers and machinery and hence, may be some of the local issues at grass
roots level that may have got sidelined.
8.9 Concluding Observations
Though the MGNREGS was a centrally sponsored scheme, with clear guidelines on
the implementation at each level of governance, there were considerable variations
across states in planning and implementation of asset creation. Depending on the
local economic, political and social structure, planning and implementation of asset
creation under the scheme was redesigned, re-interpreted and implemented to
accommodate the interests of the various interest groups.
To generalize if there were a strong and functioning gram panchayat and gram
sabha system at the village level, then there was greater representation in demand
generated for work and assets at the local level. But if functioning of the GP system
is compromised, then it is possible that at this stage, either a dominant bureaucratic
executive branch could make the decisions, which may not be representative of the
people, or dominant local political lobbies could exploit the programme for political
clientelism, or dominant elites could capture the programme for economic gains,
which may represent only the needs of the elites in the society.
Table 8.8 Aspects on maintenance of assets: state-wise
AP KL KN TN Total
Regular maintenance carried out 41.79 37.29 28.85 7.41 32.68
Proper maintenance done 79.01 66.57 44.3 2.05 46.54
Local people helping to protect and maintain
the assets
90.62 50.15 65.18 3.67 53.15
Source Primary survey of MGNREGS, 2013
Table 8.9 Importance of the selected asset in the locality surveyed across the states
Unit AP
(n = 440)
KL
(346)
KN
(514)
TN
(439)
Total
(1739)
Not important % 1.82 6.36 6.42 2.51 4.26
Important % 75.68 45.66 86.19 39.86 63.77
Very
important
% 22.50 47.98 7.39 57.63 31.97
Total % 100 100 100 100 100
Numbers of beneﬁciaries are in percent share
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Technocratic solutions to corruption did yield outcomes that were largely un
captured by various interest groups, but the top-down approach of such technocratic
planning also left the scheme without participation in choice of assets, and local
level ownership in planning and implementation at the grass root level. Central to
the efﬁcient functioning of such public programmes is the bottom-up planning and
implementation of projects. It is the active local representative bodies that voice the
grass roots that can transform such public programmes into transformational agents
in development.
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Chapter 9
MGNREGA and Inclusive Development:
A Case Study in Tripura, Northeast India
Indraneel Bhowmik, Pritam Bose, Samrat Goswami
and Pradip Chouhan
9.1 Introduction
Tripura is the second smallest state in the northeastern region of India. Its economy
is predominantly rural-based and is characterised by a heterogeneous mix of tribal
and non-tribal population. Tripura’s hilly topography has been a prime deterrent to
development as it impairs the transportation and communication network within the
state as well as with other states. Moreover, unemployment, poverty, low capital
formation, poor infrastructure facilities, and lack of private sector employment1 add
to problems in the development process.
Under these circumstances, the state government, being the largest employer in
the state, is also an important economic player. In case of Tripura, the state gov-
ernment has taken an active role in the implementation of MGNREGA. Recently,
one of the state ministers in the Legislative Assembly has demanded the provision
of 200 person-days per household per annum, under the scheme of MGNREGA in
the areas.
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As a result of high commitment from state government, Tripura is one of the best
performers of MGNREGS in the country by creating employment of highest
average person-days per household per year consequently for last 3 years (2011–12,
2012–13 and 2013–14). Moreover, Unankoti district of Tripura has also been
awarded by the central government for best utilisation of funds for the year 2013–14
(which has utilised 98% of allotment fund).
The social safety net beneﬁt to the vulnerable groups of society (like SC, ST and
Women) of MGNREGA is a major factor for the state support, as it is akin to the
political ideology of the Communist Party Of India (M)-led state government.
Inclusiveness has been an inherent objective of the programme, as it is attested by
the fact that SCs and STs account for appropriated 29 and 32% of the total
man-days generated under MGNREGA nationally in the initial years of inception.
In this context, we provide the impact of the MGNREGA in Tripura, one of the
smaller states in northeast India.
It is beyond doubt that MGNREGS is having an impact on the livelihood of the
rural people. However, the studies on effectiveness and impact of MGNREGS in
the past have provided conflicting results, and the ﬁndings widely varied across
studies, the regions and states covered. For example, the impacts of the programme
have widely varied across the states (Dreze and Khera 2009).
The effectiveness of the scheme is seen to have a signiﬁcant relationship with
good governance at state level (Sen Roy and Samanta 2009). On the contrary, Jha
and Gaiha (2012) evaluating the ofﬁcial statistics of the scheme provided a very
meagre impact and performance of MGNREGA in most of the states. Further,
Usami and Rawal (2012) ﬁnds notable discrepancies between the NSSO data and
the Management Information Systems (MIS) data regarding the number of
households having job cards and the number of job cards that are ofﬁcially recorded
as issued.
Moreover, numerous critics have reported about corruption, fund embezzlement,
and malpractices in course of the functioning of the scheme. Thus, with the
inception of National Democratic Alliance government at the Centre, the scheme,
considered as a product of the earlier United Progressive Alliance regime, was
reportedly in trouble (EPW 2014) following the stringent release of funds for
individual states.
The argument in favour of the scheme stems from the various studies showing
positive outcomes, like income security to the rural poor, creation of productive
assets, high level of women participation and also the higher bargaining power of
the rural labourers, has, however, led to the continuance of the scheme albeit small
changes focussing on greater linkage to agriculture and improved asset quality
through convergence, in accordance with the priorities of the new government.
It is important to note here that Tripura’s performance has been credited par-
ticularly for higher average person-days employment generation per household
(Dreze and Oldiges 2007; Usami and Rawal 2012; The Shillong Times, 2012). The
scheme is supposed to improve the agriculture, poor irrigation system and poor road
connectivity (Roy 2010) in the state.
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Further, the equity aspect of the scheme has also been found to be in the right
direction as participation of women and socially excluded groups are higher in
Tripura (Talukdar 2008; Bhowmik 2013). In Dhalai district, the scheme has been
found to be positively contributing to the income, employment generation, value
addition in education, food consumption pattern, investment on assets, and savings
pattern of the beneﬁciaries (Roy 2012).
In this background, the Chapter presents the impact of the scheme on the par-
ticipating households especially on the STs, who are generally considered to be at
the lower extreme in the ladder of social exclusion. Nonetheless, for the present
context, the speciﬁc objective of the study is to examine the impact of the scheme
on the participating households of the Dhalai district of Tripura with a particular
focus on the ST households. Dhalai is the remotest and the most backward district
of the state with a majority (55%) of the population belonging to Scheduled Tribes
category.
The study uses both secondary and primary data. Secondary data on employ-
ment, physical assets, and ﬁnancial investments was collected from the ofﬁcial
website of the MGNREGA. The primary data was collected through a household
survey using a structured schedule. A representative sample of 100 households
selected purposively from the two Gram Panchayats (GPs) of Dhalai district in
between June and July 2015.
One Rural Development (RD) Block was selected in the district randomly—
Durga Chowmuhani—and from the selected RD Block, two gram panchayats, viz.,
Kalachari and Dhan Chandra Para, were selected randomly. From each Gram
Panchayat, 50 households participating in the scheme were selected randomly and
were surveyed through a structured schedule.
It should be noted here that Kalachari GP is situated on the major district road
connecting the district headquarter Ambassa to the Subdivisional (Taluk) head-
quarters Kamalpur. Categorised as a Census Town by Census 2011, Kalachari is
predominantly inhabited by people belonging to the scheduled castes community,
though sizeable number of people from other communities including religious
minorities and scheduled tribes also live there.
Dhan Chandra (DC) Para, situated on the road connecting ManikBhander to
Fatikroy in Unakoti district, beyond the Durga Chowmuhuni RD Block head-
quarters, is predominantly inhabited by scheduled tribes belonging to the Tripuri
community with a few households belonging to the scheduled castes also. Among
the two villages, Kalachari is more vibrant economically owing to its geographical
advantages while DC Para being in the hinterlands has limited economic oppor-
tunities. A revisit to the study area was made in November 2015 to understand the
implications of the recent changes in the MGNREGS framework and its
implementation.
Standard statistical analysis of the data has been undertaken to fulﬁl the stated
objective. Paired sample t test has been used to examine the changes in income.
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Real income of pre-MGNREGS period was obtained using the GSDP deflator.
Moreover, in order to measure the extent of inclusiveness, ‘Allotment ratio’2 was
calculated to see the issue of inclusiveness:
Allotment ratio;¼ Proportion of Person-days generated for a community
categoryð Þ=Proportion of Job card holdings by that community categoryð Þ:
A score of 1 or above suggest greater inclusion of people in the scheme, while
less than 1 means lesser inclusion. Moreover, an ‘asset ownership index’3 was
constructed on the basis of information relating to the ownership of six assets (land,
bicycle, DVD, TV, motor bike and fan). Possession was recorded as 1, while it was
0 for non-possession. The correlation coefﬁcients between the monthly income of
the workers and ownership of these assets were taken as weights (Thapa, 2012) to
obtain the asset index as below:
AssetOwnership Index ¼ r1  landð Þþ r2  bicycleð Þþ r3 mobileð Þþ r4  dvdð Þ½
þ r5  tvð Þþ r6  fanð Þ=6
where, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5 and r6 are the value of correlation between monthly income
and the possession of the respective asset. The value of the asset index was nor-
malised using the following formula:
Observed valueMinimumvalueð Þ= MaximumvalueMinimumvalueð Þ:
The chapter is divided into ﬁve sections including the introduction. Section 9.2
presents a brief proﬁle of MGNREGS in Dhalai district, while Sect. 9.3 deals with
observation on the basis of ﬁeld survey. Section 9.4 provides a discussion on the
nature and impact of the recent changes in the scheme, while Sect. 9.5 provides the
summary of the ﬁndings along with concluding remarks.
9.2 An Overview of MGNREGS in Dhalai District
Dhalai is considered to be the most remote and backward of the eight districts of
Tripura though it has emerged as the largest in the state, with a geographical
coverage of 2400 km2, owing to the administrative reorganisation made by the state
government in 2012. It is the only tribal dominant district with 55% of the popu-
lation belonging to Scheduled Tribes (STs). Moreover, 17% of the district popu-
lation of 3.78 lakhs belong to the Scheduled Castes (SCs) category. Dhalai is the
2Refer to Bhowmik (2013) for greater detail.
3Refer to Thapa (2012) for greater detail.
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least urbanised district of the state with 90% of the district population residing in
rural areas.
The overall literacy rate is 85.72%, while the work participation rate is 41.20%.
The female literacy rate and work participation rate in the district are 79.79 and
27.32%, respectively. The district is predominantly agrarian, where Jhum cultiva-
tion has been the main source of livelihood for the tribal households dwelling in
tiny hamlets across the district for a long period. Developmental plans and welfare
initiatives by the state government are the major contributors to the district econ-
omy as the contribution from the industrial sector is negligible.
Dhalai also has the distinction of being the only district of Tripura to be included
among the 200 backward districts of India when MGNREGS was ﬁrst launched.
The district had almost 80,000 households with MGNREGS job cards in 2013–14
and accounts for 10–13% of the total job cards issued in the state as shown in
Table 9.1. More than 95% of the enrolled households have demanded job all
throughout the period and as a result, the district exhibits a marginally higher share
among the total households demanding employment.
The share of the district in terms of person-days generated (ﬁgures in parentheses
in the third row of Table 9.1) has been much higher than the share of households in
2008–09, but declined in 2009–10 and thereafter has been higher than the share of
employment demanding houses for all successive years. The share has reached
15.21% in 2014–15, which is highest after 2010–11. Such a scenario attests to the
overall backwardness of the district as well as dependence on the scheme among the
people of the district as also higher degree activism than some other districts.
The success of a programme can be measured through the performance of the
programme and the performance of a programme can well be understood through
certain performance indicators. Considering the performance indicators as depicted
in Table 9.2, it is seen that Dhalai has consistently created higher average
person-days per household than the state average except in 2009–10. In terms of
provision of 100 days of work to the households also the district’s performance is
better than the state average and it has increased from 10.37% in 2008–09 to
43.22% in 2014–15.
Table 9.1 Employment scenario of MGNREGS in Dhalai district of Tripura
Indicators 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 2014–15
Job cards
(HHs)
78,134
[13.00]
73,982
[11.89]
68,447
[10.96]
71,824
[11.92]
76,810
[11.98]
79,152
[12.22]
78,426
[12.50]
Employment
demand (HHs)
76,875
[14.00]
72,156
[12.81]
68,178
[12.23]
69,499
[12.25]
74,130
[12.41]
75,756
[12.52]
76,272
[12.87]
Person-days
(Nos. in lakhs)
75.77
[21.58]
49.69
[10.80]
58.59
[15.64]
62.72
[12.80]
68.61
[13.26]
67.08
[12.76]
68.11
[15.21]
Note Figures in the parentheses indicate share of Dhalai in Tripura
Source Computed from www.nrega.nic.in
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In terms of female participation, the district has not always been ahead of the state
average though the percentage of women person-days have improved slightly
between 2008–09 and 2014–15. In terms of the work completion rate, the district has
been lagging behind the state average for the entire reference period until 2013–14.
Wherein the improvement continues in the subsequent year also, actually, the
work completion rate in the district has been most impressive in 2013–14 only. The
fund utilisation in the district has been impressive and has been higher than the state
average for most of the years except for 2014–15. The fund utilisation has been
more than 100% for both Dhalai and the state owing to the usage of earlier leftover
funds.
From the point of equity and inclusion of the socially excluded classes,
Table 9.3 depicts that allotment ratio for SCs was 1.07 in 2008–09 and has con-
sistently been less than 1 (one) for the rest of the reference period. In case of the
STs, the allotment ratio has been above 1 (one) in 2009–10, 2010–11 and 2011–12,
but declined in subsequent years and again reached 1.04 in 2014–15.
It should be noted that the allotment ratio for STs shows a decreasing trend since
2009–10 till 2013–14. The lower score for the SCs is similar to other parts of the
Table 9.2 Performance indicators of MGNREGS in Dhalai district
Indicators 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 2014–15
1 Average
person-days
(Nos./HH)
98.56
[63.95]
67.18
[79.83]
86.05
[67.23]
90.25
[86.00]
92.96
[87.00]
89.15
[87.69]
90.17
[77.08]
2 HHs with
100 days
(%)
59.85
[10.37]
17.35
[37.09]
47.31
[14.61]
45.86
[35.72]
58.87
[37.93]
47.23
[47.14]
62.03
[43.22]
3 Women
person-days
(%)
54.80
[41.09]
35.20
[38.45]
34.11
[38.21]
32.49
[33.42]
40.84
[37.93]
50.01
[47.11]
48.74
[49.60]
4 Work
completion
rate (%)
76.16
[91.92]
85.63
[98.41]
96.56
[97.98]
68.40
[87.75]
79.08
[96.09]
97.24
[94.19]
84.78
[71.86]
5 Utilisation
of funds (%)
97.24
[94.48]
104.38
[75.82]
98.55
[99.04]
83.74
[93.78]
99.84
[92.92]
95.55
[91.17]
100.72
[103.30]
Note Figures in the parentheses indicate the corresponding ﬁgures of Tripura
Source Computed from www.nrega.nic.in
Table 9.3 Allotment ratio of SCs and STs in Dhalai district
2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 2014–15
Schedule Caste
(SC)
1.07 0.90 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.94
Scheduled
Tribes(ST)
0.99 1.07 1.06 1.03 0.99 0.98 1.04
Source Computed from www.nrega.nic.in
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state but the lower score for the STs is quite surprising, as for the state as a whole
the allotment ratio has been in favour of the community (Bhowmik 2013). The
below 1 (one) score in allotment ratio for the socially marginal class indicates that
the ‘others’ (unreserved) category has a favourable allotment ratio. In this context, it
may be noted that the unreserved category in Dhalai is a minority unlike other parts
of the state (Table 9.4).
The intra-district performances at the RD Blocks level for the 3 years (2012–13,
2013–14 and 2014–15) show that Chawmanu (98.19) lead in terms of the average
person-days per household for 2012–13, while Dumburnagar is at the top for the
two other years with an average of 92.96 and 115.10 person-days for 2013–14 and
2014–15, respectively.
These two RD Blocks are at the top again in terms of provision of 100 days of
work to the households for the corresponding years. It is important to note here that
the performance of the blocks in providing 100 days of work has shown a sharp
decline in 2013–14 as compared to 2012–13 and has increased again in 2014–15.
On the other hand, the Salema RD Block had the best work completion rate for
2012–13 and 2014–15, while Dumburnagar achieved a 100% work completion rate
in 2013–14. Though the average person-days generated per household has been
similar among the RD Blocks, there has been signiﬁcant variation in the mean
average person-days among the 3 years of reference with 2013–14 being different at
5% level of signiﬁcance.4
In terms of the proportion of households getting 100 days’ work, the yearly
variations are of strong statistical signiﬁcance.5 In terms of the Work Completion
rate, there are wide variations among the years, owing to lower rates in 2014–15,
which, however, is likely to increase in latter period following completion of
leftover works in the next year. However, it may be noted that the differences in the
Table 9.4 Average person-days, HH with 100 days and WCR among the RD Blocks of Dhalai
(2012–13, 2013–14 and 2014–15)
Blocks Average person-days
(Nos./HH)
HH with 100 days (%) Work completion rate
(%)
2012–
13
2013–
14
2014–
15
2012–
13
2013–
14
2014–
15
2012–
13
2013–
14
2014–
15
Ambassa 94.86 90.22 93.37 49 17 55 98.05 99.23 88.46
Chawmanu 98.19 91.61 99.00 75 10 56 99.55 98.83 71.93
Dumburnagar 95.45 92.96 115.10 62 22 85 99.82 100.00 89.76
Durga
Chowmuhani
85.73 86.02 93.47 32 15 54 95.51 97.29 94.32
Manu 93.17 85.55 94.70 63 20 54 99.82 96.73 64.76
Salema 91.72 91.83 99.56 53 16 65 100 99.82 94.41
Source Computed from www.nrega.nic.in
4F = 7.37, p = 0.010.
5F = 33.34, p = 0.00003.
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rates of average person-days, households with 100 days and work completion rate
among the RD Blocks are not different statistically.
In this context, we may note from Table 9.5 that among the two study villages,
DC Para has had higher average person-days for all the 3 years, while Kalachari has
been a better performer in terms of work completion rate. The proportion of
households with 100 days of work has been higher in DC Para in the ﬁrst 2 years
while in 2014–15, Kalachari was ahead. Interestingly, the performances of both the
GPs are better than the average of the Durga Chowmuhuni RD Block of which they
are component in terms of the performance indicators save for the average
person-days in 2013–14 and 2014–15.
9.3 Impact on Households
As stated in Sect. 9.1, the objective of the study was to understand how the
MGNREGS affect the life and livelihood of the rural poor. The present section,
therefore, attempts to examine the impacts of the scheme particularly on income
generation and livelihood strategies. Moreover, the attempt was to examine the
awareness level of the participants about the scheme as well as explore their assets
in possession.
9.3.1 Proﬁle of Sample Workers
The sample respondents were truly representatives of the heterogeneous demo-
graphic and socio-economic mix that Tripura exhibits (Table 9.6). Most of the
respondents in Kalachari panchayat were SCs (70%), while OBC and general
households were also found albeit in lesser numbers. On the other hand, the sample
respondents from DC Para were predominantly from the tribal communities, though
almost 15% came from the SC communities. In all, the sample consisted of 43 ST
households and 42 SC households. The ST respondents of DC Para were primarily
followers of Christianity, while the ﬁve unreserved households in Kalachari prac-
ticed Islam, the remaining being Hindus.
Table 9.5 Average person-days, HH with 100 days and WCR in the study area (2012–13, 2013–
14 and 2014–15)
Blocks Average person-days
(Nos./HH)
HH with 100 days (%) Work completion rate (%)
2012–
13
2013–
14
2014–
15
2012–
13
2013–
14
2014–
15
2012–
13
2013–
14
2014–
15
DC Para 91 84 92 45 64 61 97 100 98
Kalachari 87 78 88 18 41 70 99 100 99
Source Computed from www.nrega.nic.in
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The average family size, 5.54, is higher in DC Para as compared to that of
Kalachari, 4.98. Interestingly, the average household size in Dhalai as per Census
2011, 4.48, is lower than that of both the sample villages. Respondents from DC
Para belonged to a wider age group as compared to that of Kalachari with both the
oldest and the youngest, aged 66 and 36 years, respectively, belonging to the
former. The mean age of the respondents of DC Para is also higher than that in
Kalachari.
Interestingly, all the respondents across the two GPs possessed BPL (Below
Poverty Line) ration cards and 44% of the households from DC Para possessed
Antyodaya card. In all, 29% of the respondents possessed Antyodaya cards. The
occupational patterns of the respondents show a clear dominance of daily labourers
in both the villages, while a few cultivators were also part of the sample in DC Para.
Table 9.6 Basic proﬁle of sample MGNREGS workers
Kalachari (n = 50) DC Para (n = 50) Total (n = 100)
1. Community
(a) ST – 43 (86) 43
(b) SC 35 (70) 7 (14) 42
(c) OBC 10 (20) – 10
(d) Others 5 (10) – 5
2. Religion
(a) Hinduism 45 (90) 11 (22) 56
(b) Islam 5 (10) – 5
(c) Christianity 39 (78) 39
3. Family size
(a) Mean 4.98 5.54 5.26
(b) Max 7 7 7
(c) Min 3 4 3
4. Age (years)
(a) Max 59 66 66
(b) Min 41 36 36
(c) Mean 45.5 51.34 48.42
5. Ration Card
(a) APL 0 0 –
(b) BPL 43 (86) 28 (56) 71
(c) Antyodaya 7 (14) 22 (44) 29
6. Occupation
(a) Cultivators 1 (2) 10 (20) 11
(b) Day labourers 46 (92) 39 (78) 85
(c) Traders 3 (6) – 3
(d) Unemployed – 1 (2) 1
Notes Figures in the parentheses indicate percentage
Source Computed from Field Survey, 2015
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Interestingly, three persons from Kalachari were petty businessman, who did not
miss the opportunity of supplementary income through MGNREGA. A respondent
from DC Para claimed to be unemployed for he had no other alternative except for
the MGNREGS assignments.
9.3.2 Experience of the Scheme
The respondents (86%) were well informed about the provision of unemployment
allowances in the scheme but none of them have ever received any such allowance.
Quite contrary to this, the provision of compensation for being assigned work at a
distance more than 5 km was hardly known to the respondents. Only eight
respondents from DC Para were aware of such facilities.
Again, 53 respondents were aware of the provision of payments within 15 days
of completion of work. On the other hand, the system of holding meetings in
advance to ﬁx/decide the work was not known to any respondent. Table 9.7 also
shows that the most important source to obtain information about MGNREGS has
been the Ward Member in Kalachari while in DC Para, the ofﬁcials in the GP are
the most prominent sources. Neighbours, relatives and villagers have been the
Table 9.7 Awareness and Information about MGNREGS (Nos.)
Category Indicators Kalachari
(n = 50)
DC Para
(n = 50)
Total
(n = 100)
Knowledge about
MGNREGS
Provision of
unemployment allowance
44 (88) 42 (84) 86
Compensation for
travelling far off
0 8 (16) 8
15 days time limit for
payment
29 (58) 24 (48) 53
Meetings in advance 0 0 0
Sources of
information
Neighbours, relatives and
villagers
17 (34) 19 (38) 36
Ward members 33 (66) 8 (16) 41
GP Ofﬁcials 0 23 (46) 23
TGBRAIJC Less than 7 days 41 (82) 38 (76) 79
Between 7 to 14 days 9 (18) 12 (24) 21
WPBAAOW Less than 7 days 38 (76) 32 (64) 70
Between 7 to 14 days 12 (24) 18 (36) 30
Custody of job card Self 36 (72) 12 (24) 48
Head of family 14 (28) 38 (76) 52
Notes TGBRAIOJC—Time gap between registration and issue of job card; WPBAAOW—
Waiting period between application and allotment of works; Figures in the parentheses indicate
percentage
Source Computed from Field Survey, 2015
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source of information for more than 35% of the total respondents. Most of the
respondents (79%) had received their job cards within 7 days of application.
Similarly, the time gap between the application and allotment of works has been
less than 7 days for most of the respondents (70%), whereas the work was assigned
within 14 days for the rest.
It may be noted that though MGNREGS is a demand-driven scheme, the par-
ticipants hardly know it. To them the scheme is similar to previous programmes
where they got assignments whenever any such work was undertaken by the
authorities. The Job cards are generally in possession of the respondents them-
selves; however, in DC Para, for 38% of the respondents, the job cards were in
possession of the head of the household. It may be noted here that there have been
instances of job cards being in possession of the ward members in earlier times
(Bhowmik and Bose 2015).
9.3.3 Impact on Income
The sample respondents, as seen earlier, are mostly from labourer households and
seek to avail any income opportunities that come their way. The annual household
income earned by the sample workers from two villages varied from a low of
` 32,400 to a high of ` 96,000.
From Table 9.8, it is seen that the average annual household income of the
respondents from Kalachari, ` 53,376, has been higher than that obtained in DC
Para, ` 38,400 per annum. The income slab from ` 48,001 to ` 54,000 have had the
highest frequency in Kalachari, 46%, while in the other villages, 52% of the sample
respondents survive with less than ` 3000 per month for the household. In all 94%
of the respondents in DC Para earns less than ` 42,000 per annum. Nevertheless, it
may be noted that the average annual household income of the sample respondents
is ` 45,888 per annum.
Table 9.8 Household
income of the sample
respondents (in Rs./annum)
Rs./Annum Kalachari DC Para Total
Less than 36,000 0 26 (52) 26
36,001–42,000 1 (2) 21 (42) 21
42,001–480,000 11 (22) 2 (4) 13
48,001–54,000 23 (46) 0 23
54,001–60,000 9 (18) 0 9
Above 60,001 6 (12) 1 (2) 7
Mean 53,376 38,400 45,888
Max. 69,600 96,000 96,000
Min. 42,000 32,400 32,400
Notes Figures in parentheses indicate percentage
Source Computed from Field Survey, 2015
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The comparative economic prosperity in the non-tribal dominant Kalachari and
the relative lower levels of income in the tribal majority areas of Dhan Chandra Para
are evident from the pattern of income distribution itself, with the median of the
former being much higher than that of the latter. However, we may note that the
income spread in DC Para is much wider than that in Kalachari because of a
respondent quoting of a much higher annual income which is visible as an outlier in
the adjoining Fig. 9.1. The maximum household income in Kalachari GP is ` 69,
600 per annum, which is also an outlier though not as big as that of DC Para.
Table 9.9 shows that the annual income of the households from MGNREGS is
approximately ` 12, 000 per annum in the district. The average household income
from the scheme is higher in DC Para, ` 12, 420 per annum, which accounts for
more than 32% of the annual income of these households. The contribution of the
scheme is somewhat lesser in Kalachari, ` 11, 800 per annum.
One cannot deny the fact that the intervention of MGNREGS has had a stimulus
on the livelihood of the rural workforce by augmenting their income levels. The
responses of the sample respondents also conﬁrm this point. The income earned
through MGNREGS activities has certainly uplifted the economic status of the
respondents, as is evident from Table 9.10. The differential in income level is
highly signiﬁcant across the study regions.
The increase in absolute terms has been higher in Kalachari as compared to DC
Para, even though the contribution of MGNREGS income is higher in the latter.
DC ParaKalachari
100000
90000
80000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
Fig. 9.1 Income spread among the MGNREGS workers in Dhalai (Rs./Annum). Source
Computed from Field Survey, 2015
Table 9.9 MGNREGS intervention to sample households
MGNREGS contribution Kalachari DC Para
Average household income from MGNREGS (in Rs. per annum) 11,800.00 12,420.00
Average share of MGNREGS income in aggregate income of
participating households (%)
22.1 32.34
Source Computed from Field Survey, 2015
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The relative importance of MGNREGS in DC Para and on the tribal households is
due to the lack of alternative sources of income for these people. Kalachari is
situated near the subdivisional headquarter Kamalpur and most of the respondents
often ﬁnd casual employment in the town and thus their dependence on the scheme
is much lower.
On the contrary, the residents of DC Para were traditionally jhum6 cultivators
and hardly had any access to wetland rice cultivation or any other rural non-farm
activities and informal sector wage job. With declining jhum cultivation, these tribal
people depend a lot on government welfare programmes and hardly have any
alternative sources of income. The contribution of the scheme to these tribal
households has certainly been phenomenal. The average monthly income during the
pre-NREGS period has been statistically different than that of the post-NREGS
period (2014–15) in both the GPs.
9.3.4 Impact on Quality of Life
As noted, there is no doubt about the positive impact of the scheme on the par-
ticipating households. Increased household earnings arising from the higher
employment opportunities have been the most prominent outcome of the scheme.
All the households from Kalachari and DC Para have vouched for their increased
employment opportunities, which is evident in the increased income among the
households. Better healthcare facilities, fall in school dropouts and reduced
out-migration have been the other positive outcomes from the scheme (Bhowmik
and Bose 2015).
The status of asset possession among the sample households is reflected in
Table 9.11. Considering the scenario of possession of ‘production assets’,7 it is
found that 16 and 20% of the respondents in Kalachari and DC Para have land
ownership and the number has remained unchanged in the post-MGNREGA period
also. Interestingly, the usage of bicycle has decreased in recent years in both the
Table 9.10 Results of paired sample t test for pre- and post-MGNREGS programme of the
respondents (N = 60)
GPs Average monthly income(Rs. in
2015 prices)
% Change t test
Pre-NREGS Post-NREGS
Kalachari 3432 4448 29.6 16.71***
DC Para 2431 3200 31.63 11.44***
***Signiﬁcant at 1% level
Source Computed by the authors
6Also known as Shifting Cultivation; Jhum is the local name.
7Items which help in income generation.
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GPs with the intensity being more in Kalachari. On the other hand, within the ambit
of ‘consumption assets’,8 it is found that the possession of mobile phones increased
by large proportions particularly in DC Para. Other consumer durable assets like
television (mostly Black and White), DVD/CD players (cable TV network is lim-
ited), and fan have also increased among the respondent households.
Figure 9.2 shows that the households of Kalachari GP are better endowed in
terms of asset possession than the representative households of DC Para, as
expected. The aggregate asset index increased from 0.416 to 0.419 for DC Para,
while that for Kalachari, it increased from 0.530 to 0.597. It is important to note
here that the index for Kalachari indicates greater changes as compared to DC Para
owing to the fact that increased income at the latter following MGNREGS has been
spent more on meeting basic necessities while in the former, for many households,
the fund flow from the scheme has been a supplementary income and thus enabling
purchase of assets.
Table 9.11 Assets possessed by sample households (%)
Assets Kalachari DC Para
Pre-NREGS Post-NREGS Pre-NREGS Post-NREGS
Production assets
Land 16 16 20 20
Bicycle 68 52 62 58
Consumption assets
Mobile 72 88 24 74
DVD/CD players 52 64 64 80
Television 44 66 30 72
Fan 70 82 72 88
Source Computed from Field Survey, 2015
Kalachari DC Para
Pre NREGS 0.53 0.416
Post NREGS 0.597 0.419
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Fig. 9.2 Asset index of the sample respondents. Source Computed from ﬁeld survey, 2015
8Items which do not directly help in income generation.
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9.4 Recent Changes and Its Impact
That quality of life of the participating households has improved owing to
MGNREGA in the Dhalai district of Tripura which is evident from the above
section, whereby distinct increases in income and asset base of the households are
visible. However, the issue which pertains at this juncture is whether the activities
undertaken in the scheme over the years led to creation of sustainable assets. It has
often been argued that the beneﬁts accrued in the form of income generation for the
masses have had a trade-off with creation of sustainable productive assets and
livelihood opportunities (Aggarwal et al. 2012). One has no doubts that from the
point of equity the scheme has had immense success in Tripura (Talukdar 2008;
Bhowmik 2013) and Dhalai district (Roy 2012) has also not been an exception.
However, the new Central government appears to be focussing more on efﬁ-
ciency aspects as is evident in its proposed changes in the programme and its
modalities. Linking the scheme to the agricultural sector and ensuring creation of
productive agricultural assets by earmarking 60% of the works and funds at the
district level for the development of land, water and trees is expected to augment the
agrarian economy.
In this context, it may be noted that water conservation and harvesting, drought
prooﬁng, micro-irrigation and rural connectivity has been the most prominent form
of work in DC Para as well as in Kalachari GP. Land development is also an
important activity; however, the sample participants have themselves opined that
non-permanent earth works have been of very limited utility.
The revised modalities also call for deeper focus on convergence with other
departments for greater technical guidance, greater professionalism and higher
resource availability for works. However, the issue of convergence is still at infancy
in Tripura though proposals worth ` 567.34 crores, with 40% contribution from 10
line departments, have been received by the MoRD from the state in 2014–15.9 In
all, 249 works have been undertaken under convergence in the state across the eight
districts of which North Tripura district has the maximum number, 82, followed by
Unakoti district with 60 works. Only 10 works have been assigned to the Dhalai
district.
In this context, it may be noted that the priority of works set up by the state
government under the convergence road map10 includes rural sanitation, con-
struction of all-weather roads, construction of animal shelter, creation of water
bodies, flood protection works, horticulture/forest plantation, vermicompost
preparation and rural water supply, and assigns 28.5% of the Labour Budget of
MGNREGA.
However, in the study area, none of the respondents were aware of any activities
under the convergence scheme. One respondent, however, expressed that he had
heard that convergence would be occurring in future and that is likely to beneﬁt
9http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/convergence/conindex.aspx, dated 28/11/2015.
10http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/writereaddata/Circulars/Roadmap_Convergence_tripura.pdf.
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them further. On the other hand, the GP functionaries are well aware of the con-
vergence initiatives and though there are no such schemes operational present in
their functional area, they are hoping to have such programmes in near future and
are extremely optimistic about linkages to agricultural activities. Works undertaken
for creation of water bodies show signs sustainability as ﬁshery/aquaculture has
been initiated in Kalachari.
Another area of concern regarding the scheme across the country has been
regarding the leakages during the implementation owing to inadequate supervision
and vigilance which the central government proposed to solve through strength-
ening of the social audit mechanism by involving the rural youth in a bigger way for
overseeing purposes for greater transparency.11 Issues of corruption and fund
embezzlement have also cropped up in Tripura and some government ofﬁcials have
been arrested for their involvement in scams relating to the scheme in recent years.
The sample respondents, however, opined that they have not witnessed and are
not aware of much corrupt practices or fund leakages in their area though issues of
favouritism often exist while assigning work to the job seekers. The central gov-
ernment has also highlighted the delays in wage payment as a hindrance to the
smooth functioning of the scheme, however, in the study area; all the respondents
were unanimous in expressing that they generally received their wages within
15 days of work. The usage of the Business Correspondent model by State Bank of
India has facilitated easier payments to the participating households in time. The
active interest taken by the state government has enabled the smooth functioning of
MGNREGS in the state, though planning for works is also a major concern in many
of the states.
However, there are problems regarding the preference of non-permanent earth
works in certain areas of the state including our sample GPs. Inadequate supervi-
sory staff and limited technical staffs are the major challenges in the state as is
observed from the state. The support of the state machinery for the scheme is well
known and it is without doubt that the large number of person-days generated
through MGNREGS has been instrumental in consolidating the power of the ruling
government over successive elections at various levels. The introduction of the
output-based payment system in 2014–15 is also considered as a challenge by many
participants for obvious reasons.
Nevertheless, one cannot deny the fact that MGNREGS has had signiﬁcant
impact on the life and livelihood of the participating households in the state, as a
whole, and in the interior tribal dominant parts of the state, in particular. The
scheme has led to greater ﬁnancial inclusion, ensured better education for the
children, improved the health standards, reduced out-migration and lead to the
empowerment of women in the state (Talukdar 2008; Bhowmik and Bose 2015).
In this context, it may also be noted that MGNREGS cannot be considered as the
sole factor for these improvements in the quality of life because implementations of
various other governmental schemes have been in practice and the outcome is
11http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/writereaddata/Circulars/Note_on_changes_in_MGNREGA.pdf.
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certainly due to a combination of all these factors. The building of all-weather roads
through PMGSY has led to easier transportation access for tribal hamlets like DC
Para as a result; there is a decline in the number of bicycles among the households
who prefer using the newly available public transport system/network. However,
one cannot avoid providing a caveat. The increasing monetary inflow has led to the
stupendous growth of gambling culture in the sample regions and lots of the
workers are hooked to the online single digit lottery which has spelled doom for
many in region already.
9.5 Conclusion and Implications
On the basis of the above discussion, one has no doubt that MGNREGS has had an
impact on the life and livelihood of the participating households in the Dhalai
district of Tripura. Most of the participants in the scheme are from households that
survive on selling labour on a daily basis. As they do not have any regular source of
income, they look for odd jobs. The scheme assures them of a certain level of
annual income, which is certainly an important component of their livelihood
strategy. Provision of work and the additional income has helped their living
conditions as is evident from the increased asset base.
The tribal households owing to their limited access to land ownership are more
dependent on state initiatives and MGNREGS has certainly been a boon for them.
The support of the state government to the scheme is because of their likeness for
greater state role in the economy which enables in gaining political support as is
evident in the electoral results at various levels in Tripura. The Left Front holds an
absolute majority at the Panchayat, TTAADC and Legislative Assembly levels
which was certainly possible due to the support of the tribal people, who have
beneﬁtted due to the monetary support through the MGNREGS.
However, the most interesting observation regarding the scheme in the district is
the decreasing trend in the allotment ratios for the STs suggesting that others and
unreserved categories are also not being neglected in terms of work allocation.
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Part III
MGNREGA: Micro Level Case Studies
Chapter 10
Inter-sectoral Linkages and Multipliers
of MGNREGA in a Rainfed Village
in Karnataka: Applications of Social
Accounting Matrix (SAM)
Gourav Kumar Vani, P.S. Srikantha Murthy
and Madhusudan Bhattarai
10.1 Introduction
Overall economy of India has been growing over 7–8% over the last one decade,
however, unemployment and poverty situation are also rampant across the country.
Over 50% of its population in India cannot make two dollars a day for living, and
are living under acute situation of poverty. Even after 70 years of Independence,
almost 1/3rd of the world’s poor populations are concentrated in India alone. Thus,
providing employment to swallowing pool of growing population and uplifting the
mass population out of the poverty are now the two gravest concerns in India, one
of the fastest growing economies in the world recently.
Since the initiation of ﬁrst ﬁve year planning period in India since 1951
reduction of unemployment through creation of jobs and poverty alleviation are the
major objectives of the strategy and planning process in India. Both unemployment
and poverty are also in fact interlinked. Poverty reduction can be achieved only by
increasing purchasing power of the poor which depends on providing them
employment. Hence, most of the poverty alleviation programmes attempted in India
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since independence till to-date are somehow linked at employment generation,
particularly for employment generation in rural sector (Yadav and Panda 2013).
However, only limited success has been achieved in terms of reduction of rural
poverty in India, and it is still an unﬁnished development agenda in India. Since, the
work force1 growth in India has always outpaced the growth of job creation and
provision of public and private sector employment.
During 1983–94, unemployment rate decline from 8.3 in 1983 to 5.9% in 1994.
However, after adopting liberalization policies in several sectors including agri-
cultural, the unemployment in India rose to a decade high levels of 7.32 and 8.28%
during 1999–2000 and 2004–05, respectively (Yadav and Panda 2013). The
increased on unemployment in early 2000s was not all due to high population
growth but was also partly due to structural changes in economy, and with rapid
pace of growth of share of service sector in the economy. Interestingly, the overall
economy grew at very rapid pace during the period of 1990s and early 2000s, but
unemployment did not decline rather it further grew, creating a further rift in farm
and non-farm sectors of the economy, and social tensions across the regions. Hence,
it was felt necessary to provide jobs to swelling rural population specially in periods
of agriculture to address the rapidly growing problems of unemployment and
underemployment in rural areas in early 2000s. As a remedial measure to the
growing unemployment and distress in the rural areas in early 2000s, the
Government of India, then led by UPA government, enacted the National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) 2005 to address rising unemployment and
chronic level poverty in the country, by providing a minimum survival level of
100 days of constitutionally guaranteed wage employment in a year to every
household in rural India. The employment to be delivered by the local authority
across the rural India. This programme was renamed as MGNREGA and was also
made as a nationwide programme in 2009.
With this background, this chapter quantiﬁed village economy wide
inter-sectoral linkages of MGNREGA. More specially, taking a dryland village of a
northern Karnataka state, in the following section, we provide various inter-sectoral
linkages of the economic activities and transfers of goods and services across the
sectors (agents) within the village economy. This is done by taking framework of
social accounting matrix (SAM) (details on SAM are in Bellu 2012; Thorbecke
2000). Then, we present the detailed results on direct, indirect, and total effects of
the MGNREGA interventions in a village wide context. Then, at the end of the
chapter, we provide conclusions and implications out of the empirical analysis for
improving implementation of MGNREGS programme.
1All the persons who are actually engaged in economically productive activities constitute work
force and those who are either part of work force or are willing to be part of it are said to constitute
labour force. Thus labour force connotes a larger meaning than work force.
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10.2 Inter-sectoral Linkages of MGNREGA
in an Economy
An economy consists of three broad sectors, namely agriculture, industry and
service sector. Each sector has several different sub-sectors (Bellu 2012).
Agriculture is considered to be the primary sector and a pre-cursor for development
of all other sectors of the economy (Mellor 1976). This is also to ensure adequate
employment and food security to all, including to industrials and service sectors of
the economy (see, Mellor 1999). Agriculture is in fact a low productivity sector
with surplus labour that should generate surplus labour and food for the growth of
other sectors of the economy (Mellor 1999; Lewis 1954).
As agriculture productivity and farm income grows, it would generate additional
demand for manufacturing goods and services, ultimately also helping to expansion
of manufacturing goods and services in the economy. This type of backward and
forward linkage of agriculture with the manufacturing and other sectors of the
economy would also generate multiplier effects in the local economy (Mellor 1976,
1999), when there is an additional investment in terms of expanding demand of the
primary sectors. An economy with strong linkages of backward and forward would
also ensure for higher multiplier effects and higher growth in the economy as such
via increased demand for input and production of additional outputs and feedback
effect in the economy (Thorbecke 2000; Bellu 2012).
10.2.1 Impact of MGNREGS on the Village Economy
When MGNREGA was enacted in 2005, it was envisaged to strengthening
employment and livelihood security of rural poor by ensuring minimum level of
100 days of employment to the households, at the same time also beneﬁting other
sectors of the economy—and the village economy as such—by creating assets and
public goods in the rural areas. In this process, it is expected that not only the
households who participate in the MGNREGA work activities but other better-off
households in the rural areas would also be beneﬁted from MGNREGA due to
transfer and inter-sectoral linkage effects across the sectors, and through the mul-
tiplier effects in the local economy (see Hirway et al. 2008).
A large number of empirical studies on MGNREGS available so far have
focused largely on the efﬁcacy of the scheme in achieving targets set under the 2005
Act. As a result, these studies have considered only direct employment creation
through this programme, but neglecting the indirect and intersectoral linkages and
village economy wide impacts produced by the MGNREGS investment done in the
village economy (Hirway et al. 2008; Vani et al. 2015). In this context, this chapter
assesses the economic impact of MGNREGS in a Markabbinahalli village in
Bijapur district located in northern Karnataka state.
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10.2.2 Socioeconomic Proﬁle of Markabbinahalli Village
Markabbinahalli is a typical dryland village in Karnataka, and located in a vast track
of semi-arid tropical region of India. There is neither a dug well, nor a canal or river
to provide irrigation water for growing crops, hence farmers have to totally depend
upon rainfall for farming purpose. Though this village is located nearby a seasonal
river, by the name ‘Doni’, its water is very saline and is unﬁt for irrigation. Because
of the salinity of river water, groundwater in the village has also become saline, and
not useful for irrigation as well as for drinking purpose. In this respect, farmers’ in
the village practice purely rainfed agriculture, a unique feature of farming in the
village, and is also the reason for selecting to study2 the inter-linkages effects of
MGNREGA interventions. Other features and farming characteristics of the village
are described in Vani (2015).
There are about 400 households in the village with a population of 2,545 per-
sons. This is a predominantly agrarian village with majority of the households
depending on agricultural wage employment (41%) for their livelihood, followed
by farming (39%), caste-based occupations (7%), non-agricultural labour (8%) and
others (5%) (Desai et al. 2012).
Out of about 1,000 ha of geographical area of Markabbinahalli village, 935 ha is
under agricultural use (rainfed farming). About 90% of land is deep to medium
black cotton soil and the remaining 10% of area comprises of medium black sandy
loam soil. This village receives a rainfall of about 625 mm per annum within just 40
rainy days in a year (Details in Vani 2015; Desai et al. 2012).
10.3 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)
Social accounting matrix (SAM) framework is used to study the inter-sectoral
linkages within the village economy, and to analyze village economy wide impact
of MGNREGA interventions. A SAM is an organized matrix representation of the
accounts and transactions of different activities, actual or imputed, within an
economy and with respect to the rest of the world (Adelman et al. 1988). In other
words, SAM is a square matrix and an extension of Leontief input output matrix
and is a useful tool to summarize an economy and its ﬁnancial as well as
non-ﬁnancial (barter) transactions, occurring in a year, in a meaningful way with
flexibility to add social dimensions (Subramanyan 2007; Adelman et al. 1988).
SAM works on double accounting principle of formal accountancy which states
that every debit must be accompanied by corresponding credit in the books of
accounts. Every row in SAM records a receipt for respective account and every
2This village is also part of Village Dynamics in South Asia (VDSA) Study conducted by
ICRISAT, and so large set of households and other basic features of data about the village, even
historical changes, are.
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column in SAM records a payment from the same account (details are in
Subramanian and Sadoulet 1990). Row and column total should match for each
account in SAM. For the present study, a SAM of 82  82 size was constructed.
Schematic representation of SAM constructed for the present study is given in
Table 10.1. A brief discussion on major account is done in the following sections
below.
10.3.1 Assumptions of the Village SAM
We have constructed village SAM for Markabbinahalli village with assumptions
and restrictions on certain activities of SAM, as listed below. Details on these
assumptions for construction of village SAM can be found in Bellu (2012) and
Thorbecke (2000).
• The village economy is an open economy, i.e. there is free movement of goods
and services between the village and the rest of the world.
• The village economy has the price elasticity of supply equal to inﬁnity, i.e. the
village economy does not suffer from supply side constraints.
• The economy is demand constrained, so that any increase in demand or mon-
etary injection from exogenous account is met by the necessary production.
• All households are the owners of the factors of production. Therefore, all the
factor incomes shall accrue to the household account in the SAM directly or
indirectly.
• All the adjustments are quantity adjustments and prices do not vary. Input prices
do not change either in response to changes in input demand and the production
technology stays unaltered.
• Economic agents take prices as given and value of all income elasticity is
unitary.
• The relationship between endogenous and exogenous variables are linear (i.e.
hypothesis of lack of substitution between different inputs and factors for all
productive sectors and between different ﬁnal goods for all institutions).
• All the elements of coefﬁcient matrix are assumed to be ﬁxed, i.e. aij or average
expenditure propensities must be calculated from SAM as parameters and
marginal expenditure propensities are equal to average expenditure propensities.
• Expenditure equals income in endogenous accounts.
Due to above assumptions SAM is a static analysis.
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10.3.2 Different Accounts and Components of Village SAM
Major activities and components of the village SAM constructed are summarized in
this section. Detailed information pertaining to these activities in the studied village
can be found in Vani et al. (2015). Likewise, theoretical aspects of these elements
are discussed in Bellu (2012) and Thorbecke (2000).
Activities The activity account represents here production activities in the village
economy. Activity account in column makes payment for all services and goods
procured as input in the process of production. Whereas, in the row, activity
account can receive money payment from only commodity account for domestic
supplies of goods and services (Thorbecke 2000; Subramanian and Sadoulet 1990).
Agriculture production and Charcoal making were considered as the production
activity. Likewise, service sectors-related activities included the following: agri-
cultural inputs trade, agricultural commodity trade, charcoal trade, machinery ser-
vices, tailor, barber, grinding mill, repair and maintenance, private school,
government school, government Ayurvedic hospital and SHGs. Within agriculture,
production of jowar, wheat, pigeon pea, cotton and chickpea crops were considered
as individual production activity, while minor crops such as sunflower, safflower
and onion along with livestock were clubbed together and were considered as other
agricultural enterprises.3
Commodities In this study, commodity accounts consider the same items as those
under activity account. Commodity account supplies the goods and services to the
village economy and rest of the world, and in turn receives the money from
respective accounts. In the column, commodity account makes payment to activity
account, and to savings and investment accounts for domestic supplies and for
previous year’s saved/remained goods, respectively (see, Bellu 2012).
Factors The factor account in this study consists of two components, namely
labour services and capital services. Labour services component can be classiﬁed
either into hired and family labour services or into male and female labour services
as per the need. We grouped labour as hired and family labour uses. Labour
receives capital services from different activities, receives contribution made by
capital, and similarly it receives remuneration for providing labour to the different
activities. Since factors of production are owned by households, these two
sub-accounts of factor account transfer the money received to household account
(details in Subramanian and Sadoulet 1990).
Institutions In this case, the institution account represents households (by land
holding size sub-category), the village local government (in the present study Gram
Panchayat), and religious institutions (here it is the Temple). The household is
shown to be separated from the Institution column in SAM. The village local
government collects funds from state government and also tax from residents of the
3Other agricultural enterprises are referred to as “Others” in original 82  82 SAM.
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village. Tax collected is transferred to the state government through rest of the
world. Gram Panchayat also spends funds received from the state government on
developmental and non-developmental activities. Subsidies, pension, grants and
aids are shown as ﬁnancial transfers. Likewise, temple institution receives dona-
tions from the villagers and spends it on various religious activities. If donations
exceed expenditure then it is a savings of temple institutions.
Households Households account makes payment for purchases made by house-
holds within and outside the village economy. It receives the income earned by
households from different occupations both within and outside the village economy
(Bellu 2012). Remittances sent and received are also channelled through this
account. In this study, households were divided into ﬁve VDSA4 categories, namely
landless, marginal, small, medium and large as presented in Table 10.2. These
households in each category were selected for survey with proportionate and pur-
posive sampling framework as noted earlier.
Savings and Investment Accounts The saving and investment account receives
the savings of the households (including cash in hand and stock of goods remaining
at the end of the year including crop and livestock outputs). Savings were derived as
the residual at the end of the year after deducting the consumption from opening
stock at the start of the year and quantity supplied during the year (Bellu 2012). In
this study, Gram Panchayat is assumed to invest in MGNREGP, ﬁrst, Panchayat
transfers money to savings and investment accounts and from there, it is channelled
to MGNREGP commodity account, which is considered here as an investment.
Rest of the World (ROW) This ROW account represents the economy outside the
village selected for SAM analysis (Bellu 2012). If any agent of economy (activity,
institutions) spends on goods and services from outside the village, then it is
channelled through the rest of the world account. Rest of the world account also
channels in remittances, receipts and income from outside the village economy. In
this study, to balance the account within SAM framework, balance of payment
(BOP) is also assumed in the village economy, like every country has BOP account.
10.3.3 Calculation of Multiplier
Using the standard framework of SAM analysis, the empirical estimated SAM
model is written as
yj ¼
X
i
wijþ
X
i
xij;
4VDSA: Village Dynamics studies in South Asia, A Project undertaken by ICRISAT, Hyderabad.
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where yj is the jth column total and a vector of yj would constitute Y vector. W is a
matrix of endogenous accounts with elements wij and X is a matrix of exogenous
accounts with elements xij (Details in Bellu 2012).
In the SAM model, the activity, commodity, factor and household accounts were
assumed to be endogenous, as a standard practice of SAM analysis (Thorbecke
2000). Exogenous accounts were considered as public administration (Village
Panchayat), savings and investment account and rest of the world account. These
exogenous accounts were aggregated because expenditure from these accounts was
all exogenous types (Bellu 2012).
Upon dividing each cell of SAM by its respective column total we get coefﬁcient
matrix A whose elements are aij. Mathematically, it can be represented as
aij ¼ wijyj :
The above equation can be written as
Y ¼ AY þX:
After some rearrangements the above equation can be written as
I  Að ÞY ¼ X:
And further, the above equation can be written as
Y ¼ I  Að Þ1X ¼ MX;
where M is a SAM multiplier matrix, consisting of coefﬁcients mij. Coefﬁcient mij is
the total impact on account i because of a unit shock in account j.
In our case, we estimated three types of multipliers, namely, output, household
income and employment multipliers. This was done selecting activity column for
which multipliers were to be calculated and then all row values for commodity
accounts, labour accounts and household accounts were summed up, respectively.
Table 10.2 Households classiﬁcation by landholding size and sampling framework used in
Markabbinahalli, Karnataka, 2013
Category Land classiﬁcationa (ha) No. of households in the villageb Sample size
Landless <0.1 110 6
Marginal 0.1 to <1 43 3
Small 1 to <2 89 4
Medium 2 to <4 86 4
Large >4 72 3
Total 400 20
Source aMarkabbinahalli village at a glance produced by ICRISAT (Desai et al. 2012)
bMarkabbinahalli Gram Panchayat records
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Percentage change in output of a particular sector can be referred to as per-
centage impact.
This was calculated as
Percentage impact on ith account ¼ mij  xij  100
Bi
;
where, mij is multiplier value for ith account due to a unit shock in jth account, xj is
amount of shock in jth account, Bi is the base value of ith account.
Note: A multiplier value of 2 is interpreted as 200% increase on that account
only if Bi = xj. That is, one unit of exogenous shock produces two unit of total
output in the economy.
10.3.4 Sampling Framework and Data Collection
For the study, both primary and secondary data were collected for the full cycle of
agricultural year 2012–13 (From 1 June 2012 to 31 May 2013). Purposive sampling
was done for collection of data from the households. Following ICRISAT–VDSA
study criteria and Government of India census survey criteria, households were
classiﬁed into ﬁve strata, namely, landless households and marginal, small, medium
and large land holding households as indicated in Table 10.2. From each household
stratum only 5% of households were chosen as representative samples. They were
chosen in such a way as to represent all occupations practiced in the target village,
so that the sample truly reflected the village economic conditions.
Primary data regarding details of employment provided, receipts and expenditure
were collected from different economic agents including shops (Agricultural input
shop, canteen5, provision store) and service providers (tailor, barber, drivers,
labourers, and so on). Structured questionnaire were used to collect data from
villagers. In the questionnaire information on the transaction both within and out-
side the village were recorded separately and sourcewise.
Secondary data were collected from Government institutions (Gram Panchayat,
anganwadi centre, school, post ofﬁce, healthcare centre, ﬁnancial institutions
located in Devarhippargi and Satihal towns, and ICRISAT VDSA database) and
ofﬁcial websites http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega and http://panchamitra.kar.nic.in.
5Canteen is a service providing entity including tea shop. Canteen and tea shop differs only in
respect of no. of different services provided to customers.
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10.4 Inter-sectoral Linkages of MGNREGS Expenditure
Table 10.3 provides SAM of 82  82 dimension coerced to 16  16 dimensions.
From SAM, multipliers were estimated, as noted earlier. Table 10.4 provides a
matrix of aggregate multipliers (aggregate of output, employment and income
multipliers). From this table it is evident that highest inter-sectoral linkages were
through other commodity trade6 based on highest multiplier value of 3.74, among
all endogenous accounts. Other commodity trade was followed by charcoal making
(3.63), cotton trade (3.53) and jowar (sorghum) trade (3.51).
On the whole, trade leads in inter-sectoral linkages and therefore a rupee of
additional expenditure in trade brings more prosperity to village than any other
activity. Agriculture is second in the list of activities having high inter-sectoral
linkages followed by charcoal. MGNREGS was ranked at much lower level among
all activities based on multiplier value (Table 10.3). In fact Government services
like anganwadi, school and ayurvedic hospital had better multiplier values than
MGNREGS. Trade alone provides employment equal to that provided by
MGNGREGS and charcoal making, which employs workers throughout the year,
and provides more employment than that by trade.
MGNREGS had very low multiplier value due to both low inter-sectoral link-
ages and high proportion of spending going to rest of the world. Out of total
spending of ` 1.5 million (or 15 lakhs), only 28% was spent on labour and rest of
the expenditure was incurred on materials which were purchased from outside the
village. From MGNREGS accounts, within the village economy, its expenditure
was only on labour component; hence the multiplier value for MGNREGS will be
always less than the multiplier value for hired labour services (3.05).
10.4.1 Analysis of Impact of MGNREGS
Tables 10.5 and 10.6 provide the multiplier effect of MNGREGS. From the results
presented in Table 10.5 it is evident that multiplier effect of MNGREGS on the
whole village economy of Markabbinahalli was very weak as indicated by a
multiplier value of the magnitude 1.86 (total of output, employment and income
multiplier values). Of the 44 endogenous accounts, multiplier value was highest for
hired labour services (0.288) followed by landless family households (0.107), small
family households (0.095), marginal family households (0.069) and large family
households (0.059).
A multiplier value of 0.288 implies that if the ﬁnal demand for MGNREGS in
the economy increases by 1 Rupee the demand for hired labour services in the
6Other commodity trade includes trade of sunflower, safflower, onion, milk, egg and any other
agricultural/animal products or by-products which are not included in other category of agricul-
tural products.
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economy increases by 28 paise. Of these 44 accounts 11 accounts had zero or
negligible multiplier values. But since the size of each account and multiplier value
for each account differed due to expenditure under MGNREGS was different,
increase in value of these accounts when the ﬁnal demand for MGNREGS in
Markabbinahalli increases by ` 1 million (or ` 10 lakhs (hypothetical) are pre-
sented in Table 10.5.
Maximum impact can be observed in hired labour services (2.92%), the area
where MGNREGS had been expected to have the highest impact. But this increase
is likely to be very small due to low intensity of MGNREGS works and very large
size of agricultural labour services (` 8.68 million, 50.23% of total labour receipts
in the village) and very weak linkages of MGNREGS with rest of the accounts. This
2.92% impact on labour account is equal to 9617 labour days or providing full-time
employment to three households in a year at the rate of 320 days of employment in
a year or 100 days of employment for nine households under MGNREGS.
Second largest impact was observed on small family households (1.02%) fol-
lowed by landless households (0.95%). From simulations, on the whole, impact of
Table 10.4 Aggregate
multipliersa for selected
accounts in SAM of
Markabbinahalli village
(2012–13)
Rank Particulars Aggregate
multiplier
1 Others commodity trade 3.74
2 Charcoal making 3.63
3 Cotton trade 3.53
4 Jowar trade 3.51
5 Wheat trade 3.46
6 Anganwadi centre 3.37
7 Pigeon pea trade 3.35
8 Chickpea trade 3.20
9 Repair and maintenance shop 3.12
10 Family labour services 3.09
11 MGNREGS 1.86
12 Machinery hired out 1.41
13 Agri-inputs trade 1.40
14 PDS shop 1.05
15 SHG 1.00
Note Multiplier value of selected accounts are presented here,
details results can be found in the authors’ another publication,
Vani (2015)
aIt is inclusive of all the three multipliers, namely employment,
income and output multiplier
7Rs. 288,438/Rs. 300 per day = 961.46 labour days, Rs. 288,438 will be the increase in labour
account due to Rs. 1 million (or Rs. 10 lakh) of additional investment from Table 5 and Rs.
300 was the prevailing wage rate for agriculture in the studied village.
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additional investment of ` 1 million (or 10 lakhs) in MGNREGP was only 1.1%
increase in total volume of transaction in aggregate or ` 1,855,486 (Table 10.5), but
in labour equivalents it implies 6,184 labour days or full time employment to 188
households at the rate of 340 days of employment per year per household. That is,
the indirect impact on labour employment was 84.46%9 of total impact of 1.1%.
The impact was very weak keeping in view the primary objective of livelihood
security embedded in the framework of MGNREGA activities.
In Table 10.6, simulation results for multiplier effects of an additional invest-
ment of ` 1 million (` 10 lakhs) investment in MGNREGS are presented as output,
employment and household income multipliers in a summarized form. Of all the
three multiplier effects, output had highest value of 1.14 followed by household
income (0.39) and employment (0.30), but the highest impact was on household
income (2.25%) followed by output (1.40%) and the least impact was on
employment (0.48%).
Output multiplier value of 1.14 for MGNREGP activity implies that for an
additional rupee of investment made in the programme, there will be 1.14 times
increase in the demand for output in the economy over existing demand for output.
Similarly, an employment multiplier value of 0.3 for MGNREGP activity means
that for an additional rupee of investment made in MGNREGP there will be 0.3
times increase in demand for labour in the economy. A household income
Table 10.6 Summary of impact additional investment of Rs. 10 lakhs in MGNREGS in village
economy of Markabbinahalli (from a policy simulation)
Particulars Base value for
agriculture
year 2012–13 (Rs.)
Multiplier
value
Impact of additional
investment in
MGNREGS
Rs. %
change
Output multipliera 81,528,134 1.14 1,139,000 1.40
Employment multiplierb 61,907,445 0.30 298,000 0.48
Household income
multiplierc
17,276,525 0.39 388,000 2.25
aOutput multiplier includes jowar, pigeon pea, chickpea, wheat, cotton, charcoal and other
commodities produced within village and all services provided in the village, i.e. trader, tailor,
barber, PDS shop, anganwadi centre, government hospital, etc.
bEmployment multiplier includes hired and family labour
cHousehold income multiplier includes landless, marginal, small, medium and large family
households
8Here, all calculations are done at prevailing agricultural wage rate of Rs. 300 per day. Rs.
1,855,486/Rs. 300 per day 6,184 labour days. This means 6,184 labour days/340 days per
household ≅18 households (person) would be given a full year of employment of 340 days of
employment per year.
9100 − (961/6,184) * 100  84.46.
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multiplier value of 0.39 for MGNREGP activity implies that due to additional
investment made in MGNREGP activity, income of households increase by 0.39
times over the existing income level in the economy.
10.4.2 Possible Reasons for Low Impact of MGNREGP
on the Village Economy Could be as Follows
1. Scale of MGNREGP operation: MGNREGP in the village was carried out on a
very small scale. Total outlay in MGNREGP in year 2012–13 was to the tune of
` 1 million (15 lakhs). This sum is too low compared to the size of the village
economy, i.e. only 0.89%10 of the total of all endogenous accounts of SAM.
2. Poor Linkages: Linkages of MGNREGP with other accounts were very weak,
due to less proportionate expenditure on hired labour services in the village. All
material components used by the MGNREGS for construction of building were
procured from outside the village which amounted to ` 10.81 lakhs, about 72%
of total expenditure incurred under MGNREGS. Most of the fund out of
material expenditure was incurred on purchase of cement, bricks and steel for
construction of Rajiv Gandhi Seva Kendra in Markabbinahalli village. This
reflects the fact that projects with high capital needs and long gestation periods
have lower multiplier effects at least in short11-run period. Thus, there was weak
linkage between MGNREGP and rest of the economy. Hence, MGNREGP
could not make any perceptible impact on village economy.
3. Material to Labour Ratio: The proportion of labour services among overall
outlay was only 28% as against 60% mandated. This sum was ` 4.2 lakh, only a
meagre 4.25%12 of total labour income in the village.
4. Wages under MGNREGS: Agricultural wage rate (` 300 per day) and non-farm
wage rate (` 350 per day) in the study area were higher than the MGNREGP
wage rate of ` 174 per day. On an average, in a year, a family worked for
27 days under MGNREGP, 80 days in non-farm activities and 253 days in
agriculture sector. With the prevailing wage rates for different activities, the total
family income was Rs. 10,859,814.13 Income from MGNREGP (` 4,698)
formed only 4.32% of total annual family income. Hence, workers were also not
attracted to MGNREGP works (Details in Vani et al. 2015).
10(1,500,000/169,099,228) * 100 = 0.89%, as shown in last row–fourth column in Table 5.
11In this study, we have only estimated multiplier value in a year period, these infrastructures
remains in village for long period and would have other indirect beneﬁts which have not been
captured in this study. This is a limitation of a SAM based analysis in static framework, as well.
12Rs. (420,000/Rs. 9,875,531) * 100 = 4.25%, as shown in ﬁrst row–fourth column in Table 5.
13Rs. 300 per day * 253 days + 27 days * Rs. 174 per day + 80 days * Rs. 350 per day = Rs.
108,598.
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5. Demand-Driven Programme: Instead of being a demand-driven programme,
MGNREGP had become programme prepared and executed by ofﬁce bearers as
per their wishes. Hence local people did not show much interest in making the
programme a success.
6. Migration: Since the village is nearer to Karnataka-Maharashtra state border and
employment opportunities are better in nearby Solapur and district headquarter
Bijapur, people tend to migrate to these places during drought year and Rabi and
Summer seasons. Migrant workers earned wage income of ` 400–500 per day
per person at the destination market, which was substantially higher compared
to MGNREGS wage rate @` 174 per day per person. As a result, MGNREGA
could not stop migration of workers to far away, but women and older persons
who cannot travel far distance for higher wage employments (Details are in Vani
2015).
7. Awareness about MGNREGS: During survey work it was found that many of
the villagers were unaware of the provisions of MGNREGS. This is also a
reason for lower participation of workers for the programme—even among the
pool of workers remained in the village and who were looking for the
employment during slack period of farming. All of these also led to a weak
supply driven programme in this particular village, unlike the case in other
villages or other parts of Karnataka.
10.4.3 Limitations of the Study
This study has its own limitations in terms of methodology followed and the degree
of generalization done based on the results obtained. These limitations can be
summed up as follows:
(a) Status of MGNREGP in the village: Since MGNREGP was not implemented
with vigour in the village, low value of multipliers was obtained. Hence, the
result can neither be interpreted as failure of MGNREGP to generate
employment and income nor its inherent capacity to generate employment and
income.
(b) Characteristics of the selected Village: Since the village selected for the study
follows a complete dry land agriculture, number of activities, volume and value
of each activity are less than that would be possible in a typical wet land
village.
(c) Institutional Setup: Since SAM is an analysis that takes into account institutions
prevailing in the economy and MGNREGP is thought to be demand-driven
programme, results obtained cannot be generalized to other areas with different
institutional setup and different degree of demand for MGNREGP.
(d) Choice of study area: In this study, the sample village chosen did not represent
the village with adequate MGNREGP expenditure. The choice of VDSA vil-
lage of ICRISAT was mandated.
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(e) Limited time availability for survey: Due to less time available for data col-
lection work, instead of conducting census survey for entire households, we
have adopted sample survey method for data collection work. This might have
resulted in lower accuracy of estimates and also some errors in balancing the
SAM, than the data that could have been gathered following the census method
for the construction of the village SAM.
10.5 Conclusion and Implications
Inter-sectoral linkages and multipliers are the key concepts behind implementation
of MGNREGA like rural development and employment schemes so that besides the
direct beneﬁt transfer to the programme beneﬁted households in the rural areas, it
can also beneﬁt in terms of infrastructure development and asset creation in the
village economy. Besides, by directly injecting over a million Rupees in a couple of
months in a year in a rural village, and transferring this amount to rural poor, the
MGNREGS also help in creation of additional demand for services in the rural
economy, such as beneﬁting the local retail shop owners, allied services activities,
transportation, production of food grains and vegetables within the local economy
resulting in an increase in the purchasing power of large number of rural poor
households. This in turn creates multipliers or inter-sectoral linkages in the village
economy and its surrounding geographies. MGNREGS was thus envisaged in 2005
to provide employment during the lean periods of the year, and to offer beneﬁts to
large segment of the village economy.
However, it was found that in the studied village in Karnataka state, the pro-
gramme had limited success in terms of generating higher employment and income
multipliers. The reasons for lower value of multipliers in this particular village are
discussed in details in earlier section. The key learning’s from the outcomes can be
stated in the form of necessary and sufﬁcient conditions while implementing
MGNREGS in other villages in dryland regions of India.
This includes creating awareness among all the stakeholders, including the
workers, village leaders and Panchayat ofﬁcials, about the programme and its
provisions, well ahead of implementation of MGNREGS work in the village. This
would also help workers to plan ahead of time, whether to stay in a village and
work for MGNREGA activities or to migrate to other places in lean season of
farming operations. The sufﬁcient condition is efﬁcient and enthusiastic leadership,
well informed and responsible administration which will ensure that MGNREGS
works would be taken in consultation with all stakeholders well in advance. Then,
to develop strong inter-sectoral linkages in the village economy and to get better
multiplier effects, the village administration needs to contain the leakages of
MGNREGA amount for activity on machinery uses or skilled work or on materials
and goods that would beneﬁt more to the sectors outside the workers in the village
and welfare of local village community. Of course, the distributional implication of
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the programme appears to be signiﬁcant, and the local Panchayat and MGNREGA
agency have greater stake in the selection of proper work/activities, which deter-
mine what scales of income and employment multipliers are generated in the village
economy, as discussed in the Chapter.
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Chapter 11
Economic Impacts of MGNREGA
in Dryland Region of India: A Meso
and Micro Study in Selected States
N. Nagaraj, P.S. Srikantha Murthy, M.G. Chandrakanth,
Madhusudan Bhattarai and Namrata Singha Roy
11.1 Introduction
Besides wage income and guaranteeing employment for at least 100 days per
household in a ﬁnancial year, in practice, the activities of MGNREGS have also
provided other beneﬁts like generating productive assets, protecting the environment,
empowering rural women and reducing rural-urbanmigration. In this perspective, the
MGNRWEGA scheme in fact also aims to achieve sustainable development in rural
India through improved natural resource management. In India, poverty is still ram-
pant, though Poverty Head Count Ratio declined from 45.3 in 1993/94 to 22.9 in
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2011/12 (GoI 2015).Whenwe consider the overall efﬁcacy of the programme, several
issues rose affecting the performance of MGNREGA on the ground, and misappro-
priation of fund at the local level, etc. In this context, this chapter discusses to what
extent MGNREGA has been successful in achieving the MDG of ‘Eradicating
Extreme Hunger and Poverty’. Likewise, has MGNREGA programme been suc-
cessful in providing 100 days of employment per annum and social protection to rural
families demanding employment?
In this context, the overarching objective of this study is to evaluate the performance
of MGNREGA in the reduction of poverty and distress in selected dryland states of
India. The speciﬁc objectives are: (a) to analyze whether MGNREGA programme has
been successful in providing 100 days of employment per annum to rural families
demanding employment, (b) to what extent theMNREGAhas offered social protection
to the rural poor, and (c) how far this programme guarantees sustainable development
through improved natural resource management conditions. The study combines
employment generation aspect, social aspect, aswell as environmental, and community
scale of beneﬁts through natural resource management in rainfed tropical region of
India, which is a most vulnerable zone to climate change issues in the country.
With this background, this chapter is organized as follows: The Sect. 11.2
describes the context and the salient features of the MGNREGS. Section 11.3
discusses briefly the objectives of the study, then illustrates study methodology,
source of data, sampling methods and empirical tools used in this study, Sect. 11.4
provides an inter-state comparative perspective of the implementation of
MGNREGA across the six states selected. This is done in terms of provision of
employment, gender and social inclusion and wages earned. Then, Sect. 11.5
analyzes micro-level evidence on the role of MGNREGA in selected sites in
Karnataka state. This involves natural resource management and water conserva-
tion, village development, and community development. The last Section provides
the conclusion and policy implications of the study.
11.1.1 Features of the MGNREG Act
and Sustainable Development
The MGNREGA scheme marks a paradigm shift in implementing rural develop-
ment programme in India by way of ensuring the right of employment to the rural
people, especially women. Thomas (2010) argued that ‘NREGA is unique in the
sense that, it gives primary importance to women participation and empowerment
as well as a corruption less implementation of the wage employment programme
through social auditing by Gram Sabhas’. By ensuring regular work at minimum
wages, the thrust was to be on ‘employment ﬁrst, with growth as an outcome’,
rather than vice versa (Bhaduri 2005).
The striking feature of the MGNREGA is that it not only provides employment to
combat chronic poverty, to grow resilience against drought, deforestation, soil ero-
sion, etc. but also aims at generating productive assets, protecting the environment,
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empowering rural women, and arresting rural-urban migrations. The impact of cli-
mate change falls differentially on people, and the poor are the most vulnerable to its
adverse impact. NREGA, by encouraging works on water harvesting, flood protec-
tion, afforestation and plantation helps to insulate local communities from adverse
effects of climate change (Sharma 2011). In this sense, the objectives and overall
criteria adopted for implementing MGNREGA in 2011/12 were, in fact, consistent
with the nation’s overall goal and objectives (targets) set in meeting the Sustainable
Development Goals by 2030 and its targets and milestones on several fronts.
MGNREG act is the most prominent act in the history of Independent India in
terms of ensuring grass-root level participation of every citizen and beneﬁciary in
local development process, through democratic process, multi-layered social audit
and transparency mechanism by involvement of the civil society, comprehensive
planning at village level towards sustainable and equitable development, etc.
(Reddy et al. 2014; Pankaj and Tankha 2010). Some of the important features of the
Act are to improve the quality of life of rural households who are vulnerable to
out-migration in search of daily wage employment by channelizing the wage
workforce towards developmental activities at the village level itself.
In this context, a study by Esteves et al. (2013) quantiﬁes the environmental and
socio-economic beneﬁts generated by the works implemented under the Mahatma
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. The same study has also
assessed the potential of these beneﬁts to reduce vulnerability of agricultural pro-
duction and livelihoods of the beneﬁciaries, post-implementation (2011–12) as
compared to pre-MGNREGA (2006–07), to current climate variability and showed
reduction in agricultural and livelihood vulnerability due to implementation of
works under the Act and resulting environmental beneﬁts.
11.2 Methodology and Data
This study attempts to address implications of MGNREGA at both macro and micro
scale of analysis. For macro-scale of analysis, we have analyzed implications of
MGNREGA across six states of India, which are predominantly dryland states with
higher percentage of crop acreage under a rainfed system of production than the
irrigated production system. Then, the meso-level analysis is supplemented by
doing a micro-level assessment on implications of MGNREGS on selected indi-
cators of rural development at stratiﬁed randomly selected block, and then ran-
domly selecting households in these blocks in the state of Karnataka.
11.2.1 Across States Level Analysis
The comparison across states on the impacts of MGNREGS on selected indicators
of rural development and sustainable developments were carried out using the data
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and statistics largely from the ofﬁcial sources of data on MGNRGA implementation
across the states provided by MGNREGA authority, Ministry of Rural
Development (http://www.nrega.nic.in/). The national level data are too generic to
make any meaningful assessment on any speciﬁc performance indicators of
MGNREGS. Whereas, disaggregated data at the state level would discern the
factors that make a difference in these performance indicators. Six states which
broadly represent the dry regions of agro-climatic sub-regions of semi-arid tropics
of India are taken for the analysis. Therefore, we have taken following six states for
across states comparative analysis, and they are: Karnataka, Rajasthan, undivided
Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. The comparative
assessment of performance of MGNREGA on selected indicators across the six
states of India was done taking data from MGNREGA report (2012–13) as well as
MGNREGA reports for 2008–09 and 2010–11 ﬁscal years.
11.2.2 District and Taluka Selection in Karnataka State
for Micro-Level Studies
The micro study was done by selecting few schemes based on stratiﬁed random
sampling method in dryland regions of Karnataka. In particular, a modest attempt
has been made to analyze the economic impact of MGNREGA on income and
employment in the most disadvantaged districts of Karnataka to provide micro-level
evidences along with meso (macro) level analysis across the states, as noted earlier.
Following criteria were adopted to select districts to undertake a study with regard
to various issues related to the implementation of NREGA in Karnataka state.
In the ﬁrst stage, selected districts of Karnataka were identiﬁed for a survey to
cover all the three phases through which NREGA has been implemented in
Karnataka state. In the second stage, based on the ﬁnancial performance and
number of person-days of employment generated, Ministry of Rural Development,
GOI, has classiﬁed districts in each of the state into two categories: good per-
forming districts and poor performing districts. Out of these lists, we decided to
select four districts for ﬁeld site observations and micro-assessment, covering two
from good performance districts and two from poor performance districts. In par-
ticular, we selected Chitradurga and Davanagere as good performing districts, and
Shimoga and Hassan were selected as poor performing districts, based on the
MGNREGA performances indicators provided at the government reports (website).
The same criterion was adopted to select two taluks\blocks within the selected
districts. In the third stage of sample selection, within the selected blocks, four
Gram Panchayats were selected randomly and one work was selected in each Gram
Panchayat in such a way that out of four works three are ongoing and one is a
completed work. In the fourth stage of sampling, 40 NREGA beneﬁciaries were
selected per taluk to collect detailed information by using structured schedule on
performance and implications of MGNREGA to individuals and at community
scales. In addition, interaction meetings and series of Focus Group Discussions
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(FGDs) were conducted with state, district and taluk/block level stakeholders of
MGNREGS work activities.
MGNREGA work activities in Karnataka have been implemented since 2006,
and by 2008, the annual budget of MGNREGA in the state was about Rs. 3,580
million generating 9 million days of employment across the 27 districts in a year.
Focus Group Discussions and Participatory Impact Assessment (PIA) were used for
in-depth understanding of the impacts and wider implications of the MGNREGA
activities on the targeted communities at different scales, such as communities,
households, and at individual members identiﬁed from the selected villages of
Karnataka. The micro-data compiled from these schedules were analyzed using
simple statistical tools like averages, ratios, percentages and graphical presentations.
11.3 Implementation of MGNREGA: A Comparative
Overview Across Six States
The comparative assessment across the states on implementation of MGNREGA
was done taking selected performance indicators of the MGNREGS, such as the
extent of fulﬁlment of the basic entitlements in terms of days of employment,
duration of employment, age-wise employment, season-wise work demand pattern
and the extent of involvement of women for MGNREGA work. The results are
summarized below by each performance indicator.
11.3.1 Trends in Employment Sought and Offered
by MGNREGA
Table 11.1 presents the results of the comparative overview across the selected
states on average person-days of employment per household and households with
100 days of employment. The results also provide a gleam of demand for and
supply of MGNREGA related employment across states selected for comparative
analysis. The performances of MGNREGA widely varied across the states of India,
as clearly illustrated by the huge variation on these performance indicators across
the states (Table 11.1).
For example, in 2008–09, the households registered under MGNREGA
demanded employment varied from 20% in Maharashtra to 75% in Rajasthan. The
demand for employment in 2011/12 also varied across the states. It declined at huge
scale in Rajasthan, Gujarat and Maharashtra. This reduction in demand for
employment under MGNREGA in these states may be due to more attractive labour
market wage outside of MGNREGA, and outside of agriculture. We accept the fact
that it is difﬁcult to isolate the real impact of MGNREGA on employment only
based on simple average related data as shown in Table 11.1. The employments are
also affected by other economic factors like spillover effects from economic growth,
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urbanization, non-farm rural growth, rural non-farm employment, increased liter-
acy, introduction of minimum wages act, and so on. All of these factors also often
coincide with the impact of MGNREGA.
Table 11.1 also shows that almost 100% of households who demanded
employment got offer to work under MGNREGA in the initial periods of its
implementation (2008–09), and the situation was same across all of the six states.
This trend continued in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, however, this was not
the case in Karnataka, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh (undivided) and Gujarat. In
Karnataka, unmet demand was as high as 30%. These states are with extremely
varying socio-economic, cultural and political conditions. The reduction in the
proportion of households for MGNREGA may be because of higher rural infras-
tructure development work, higher wage levels and an overall situation of labour
shortage. These alternate factors may attract less number of labour force opting for
physical work under MGNREGA with wage rate less than the statutory minimum
wage in the state.
Over the same period, in Karnataka, Gujarat and Maharashtra, the number of
person-days per household increased by 53, 66 and 16%, respectively, while it
experienced a decline of 39, 6 and 30% in Rajasthan, undivided Andhra Pradesh
and Madhya Pradesh, respectively. The sharp reduction in demand for MGNREGA
work in Rajasthan could also be the reason for highest reduction in person-days in
this state. This indicates that MGNREGA work could become un remunerative for
them, given the lower wage of MGNREGS than alternate options in rural areas.
In sum, the set indicators in Table 11.1 provide us a mixed performance of
MGNREGA across the selected six states. In some states, MGNREGA was able to
generate sufﬁcient manual work for unskilled labour, but not for all. It is therefore
also important to know whether these jobs are sustainable or not, and how the
situation would change in the coming years.
11.3.2 Share of Women in Workforce Under MGNREGA
The MGNREGA Act has given priority to women. Accordingly, in implementation
also it has mandated a minimum of one-third of the work funded by MGNREGA
should be reserved for women. As such, the women participation varied from 40 to
70% across sample states: in Rajasthan, undivided Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat, the
proportion of women force continued to be almost the same in 2012–13 compared
to 2008–09. But, the proportion of women participation slightly declined in
Karnataka (7%), Madhya Pradesh (2%) and Maharashtra (4%). It means that the
proportion of women participation has not changed over the years. It is a noticeable
fact that, though in Rajasthan MGNREGA was not functioning well, the proportion
of women employed was maximum (68%) among all the six states.
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11.3.3 Duration of Employment Under MGNREGA
Duration-wise employment patterns across the states are presented in Table 11.2.
Almost 50% of the households in all six states got only about one month of work
annually under MGNREGA programme. Only about 30% of the households got
about 60 days work per annum, and 20% got 61 to 99 days work per annum in the
period studied. Only 9% of the households each in Rajasthan and undivided Andhra
Pradesh, 8% in Karnataka, Gujarat, Maharashtra, and 6% in Madhya Pradesh got
employment for 100 days per annum. The data suggest that MGNREGA activities
were not providing 100 days of wage employment uniformly across states
(Table 11.2).
Table 11.2 Duration-wise employment provided under MGNREGA in SAT states
State/period Number of days work undertaken by families per year Total no. of HHs.
attending
MGNREGA work
(in million)
1–30 days 31–60 days 61–99 days 100 & more
days
Proportion of households attending to work (%)
Karnataka
2011–12 40.4 30.0 26.6 3.0 15.7
2012–13 40.4 26.0 25.9 7.7 7.0
% change – – – 157.0 –
Rajasthan
2011–12 34.6 30.8 26.9 7.7 17.6
2012–13 41.2 31.4 18.8 8.6 12.0
% change – – – 12.0 –
Andhra Pradesh (undivided)
2011–12 – – – – 4.0
2012–13 42.8 28.2 20.5 8.5 14.0
% change – – – – –
Gujarat
2011–12 50.9 26.4 17.4 5.3 5.4
2012–13 48.1 27.0 17.3 7.7 6.2
% change – – – 45.0 –
Madhya Pradesh
2011–12 45.0 27.0 20.0 7.8 10.0
2012–13 50.3 26.8 17.3 5.6 7.1
% change – – – −28.0 –
Maharashtra
2011–12 50.9 23.4 12.6 13.1 8.1
2012–13 31.0 37.0 24.0 7.7 4.3
% change – – – −41.0 –
Source Same as Table 11.1
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11.3.4 Pattern of Age Proﬁle of Employed Persons
Under MGNREGA
An age-wise disaggregated analysis of the workers participating in MGNREGA
gives better insights of the performance of MGNREGA across the states. The
results of the disaggregated analysis for 2011–12 are illustrated in Fig. 11.1.
Around 40–56% of the persons employed under MGNREGA were below 40 years
of age. It shows MGNREGA has also attracted young and able-bodied persons,
contradictory to the ﬁndings from several other studies on the topic.
In undivided Andhra Pradesh, around 50% MGNREGA workers were of 40–
60 years, whereas, 41% were from the youth category. In Karnataka, the situation
was opposite, compared to the middle age, 17% more youngsters were engaged in
MGNREGA work in 2012–13. In the period, the total number of employed persons
in Karnataka was almost half than that of the undivided Andhra Pradesh. But people
working below 40 years were almost 20% higher than in undivided Andhra
Pradesh. Major proportion of workers employed, i.e. more than 40% belonged to
the age group of below 40 years across states. Thus, MGNREGA also increased
employment opportunities for youth across the states, along with women and
others.
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11.3.5 Effective Targeting of Disadvantaged Group: Social
Dimension of NREGA
We also evaluated differentiating the impact of MGNREGA on the extent of
coverage of socially disadvantaged groups like SC, ST and women? To test whether
a social protection scheme like MGNREGA is reaching the right social group or
not.
An attempt has been done to assess the extent of inclusion of the social groups
(and women members) in relation to their share in work participation1 under
MGNREGA across the six states. The results are summarized in Table 11.3.
The SC household participation in the MGNREGA also depends upon relative
share of SC population in each of the state. The proportion of SC population in the
state total varies from as low as 6.87% in Gujarat to as high as 18.45% in Andhra
Pradesh. For the country as a whole, there was a decline in the share of SC
households in the total person-days of employment under MGNREGS from 26.71%
in 2008–09 to 22.02% in 2011–12, only with a marginal increase in Andhra
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. In Maharashtra, there was a sharp decline
in participation of SC in NREGA work over the years.
The share of ST households in the total employment created in 2008–09 was
disproportionately very high level—more than double their population share in the
selected states, then it declined over the years, but still their participation is rela-
tively at a high level. Earlier, Reddy et al. (2014) reported that the population share
of ST in the ﬁrst phase of MGNREGA implemented districts was signiﬁcantly
higher and most of the ST households suffer from extreme poverty, for whom,
MGNREGA work is of great relief (and social safety nets) and an option to protect
their livelihoods in lean season of farming. The higher share is a positive inclusion,
and the decline of their in share in later years may suggest not decline in their actual
employment to the programme, but increasing trend of participation of other social
groups under MGNREGA activities.
MGNREGA is designed to encourage women to participate in wage payment
under MGNREAG within the vicinity of their villages. On an average, the par-
ticipation rate of the women’s workforce surpassed the statutory level of a mini-
mum of 33% set across the states. However, there are several factors like
sociocultural, economic and locational factors which affect women’s participation
in physical work under MGNREGA. Earlier, Pankaj and Tankha (2010) reported
that the MGNREGS works have broadened women’s choices by opening them a
new avenue of paid employment under a government programme rather than
working for a privately operated farm or non-farm works, and by reducing eco-
nomic dependence of women members in rural poor households.
The results in Table 11.3 also show that regardless of cultural differences, in all
of the six states selected, women’s share in MGNREGA employment was higher
1Earlier, Reddy et al. (2014) have also suggested to check share of SCs and STs in the total number
of employment created.
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than average of women work participation rates in these respective states. It appears
that MGNREGA opened up a new window for the ease of livelihood specially for
rural women and successfully mainstreaming them into the contemporary process
of economic development.
11.3.6 MGNREGA and Wage
The MGNREGA work related guidelines from Ministry of Rural Development
clearly mentioned that the wages for MGNREGS funded works have to be paid
according to the minimum wages as prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act
1948 for agricultural labourers. Likewise, equal wage rate is to be paid to male and
female workers. When the Scheme was launched in 2006, an indicative wage rate of
` 80 per person-day was proposed. This meant that workers engaged under
MGNREGA would be assigned physically measurable work equivalent to ` 80, as a
Standard Schedule of Rate. Later, in 2009 the indicative wage was raised to ` 100
per person-day. Further, it was agreed to revise the base indicative wage rate of
` 100 indexed on the basis of inflation rate (Reddy et al. 2014).
Figure 11.2 presents the average nominal and real wage2 rate per person-day
across the six states selected from 2006–7 to 2011–12. Though nominal money
wage rates have been rising over the years, the real wage rates have been virtually
stagnant for Gujarat, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. In contrast, Karnataka
experienced a steep increase in wage rate in both nominal and real terms, especially
after 2009–10. Whereas, in Andhra Pradesh, real wage declined over the years from
2006 to 2012. In Maharashtra, trends in wage rate behaved in ‘U’ shape, it started
with higher value, then reached a minimum level of 80 ` in 2008–09, and again
showed a tendency of acceleration from 2010 onwards.
11.3.7 Season-Wise Trends in Employment Generation
Under MGNREGA
Table 11.4 shows the season-wise work demand pattern under MGNREGA across
the six states. In Karnataka, the demand for labour to do MGNREGA work in the
peak season of farming (Kharif and Rabi season together) has increased from 38 to
72% within a year, indicating scarcity of labour for farm work. Whereas, the
reduced demand in summer season further creates seasonal unemployment, as farm
work would also be very less in summer season.
2Real wage rate was derived by deflating the money wages by Consumer Price Index for Rural
Labour at 2009–10 base year.
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Apart from that, total annual demand for employment in 2011–12 was highest in
undivided Andhra Pradesh (47 million), and lowest in Gujarat in recent years. The
low share of work for MGNREGA compared to annual demand suggest that
MGNREGA is not the sole reason for the problem of labour scarcity in rural India.
Several other factors are also responsible for this observed phenomenon on shortage
of labour in agricultural activities in rural India in recent days.
11.4 Natural Resource Management and Sustainability
Under MGNREGA: A Micro Study in Karnataka
In addition to 100 days guaranteed employment in a ﬁnancial year to a poor rural
household, MGNREGA also aims at regenerating the environment by enhancing
productivity of land and forest by execution of works such as construction/reno-
vation of irrigation tanks, ponds, water harvesting trenches and check dams. These
Fig. 11.2 Trends of MGNREGA nominal average money wage and real wage per person-day in
selected states. Source www.nrega.nic.in; Real wages are 2009–10 base
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physical assets will persist for a longer time, if well managed by the local com-
munities, and thereby MGNREGA has a potential to foster a regional economic
growth. In this context, MGNREGA works are not only employment and livelihood
generating (CSE 2006a), but also with the potential to produce sustainable rural
development outcomes. In the following sections, we present the role of
MGNREGA in water conservation activities, based on the detailed micro-level
studies in Karnataka.
11.4.1 Water Conservation Activities Under MGNREGA
MGNREGA operational guidelines stipulate that priority of work shall be given to
community assets and water conservation structures. In all the four districts that we
visited in Karnataka, water conservation and renovation of traditional water bodies
accounted for more than 50% of the fund utilized under MGNREGS (Fig. 11.3). In
a relatively better-endowed district, such as Shimoga, which had excellent surface
water resources, 60% of the MGNREGA expenditure was on water conservation
through water harvesting, renovation of irrigation tanks, cleaning of irrigation
channels, provision of irrigation to tail end areas and flood control. This reflects the
important role of MGNREGA in water conservation activities. In Chitradurga
district, 74% of the MGNREGA expenditure in a year was devoted to water con-
servation activities, by harvesting water and offering protective irrigation to farms
Fig. 11.3 Utilization of funds under MGNREGA (2009–10). Source The lead authors’ project
report, Nagaraj et al. (2009)
280 N. Nagaraj et al.
and drought prooﬁng. This enabled Chitradurga to provide water to farmers during
the critical periods and seasons.
Davanagere is a most disadvantaged district, where around 50% of the
MGNREGA expenditure was incurred on water conservation. Thus, the micro-level
results in Karnataka state also suggest that natural resource management has
received greater emphasis in MGNREGA programme, as noted earlier.
11.4.2 Impact of MGNREGA on Village Development
In the studied villages inKarnataka,we also documented the type of beneﬁt that accrued
to the villagers by the community works like rehabilitation/desiltation of tanks, con-
struction ofwater bodies, layingout of canals/roads. Itwas observed that rejuvenationof
water bodies and water conservation activities considerably beneﬁted the village—
communities by augmenting additional area under irrigation and improving ground
water recharge for all in the community.Consequently, in the studied villages, therewas
an increase in area under irrigation both under tank and well commands that enabled
improved incomeof the farmers. The general beneﬁts accrued to the beneﬁciaries by the
types of rural development and NRM work activities undertaken by MGNREGA are
presented in Table 11.5. Likewise, some of the selected village development works
taken up under MGNREGA are shown in Fig. 11.4.
Table 11.5 Impact of MGNREGA on village development in selected districts
Work executed Impacts District/Taluk
1 Desiltation of tanks Improvement in water impounding
Facilitating ground water recharge
Double cropping
Increased irrigated area
Improved water bodies
All districts
2 Water conservation
practices like
construction of check
dams
Improvement in water table was
discernible
Water table improved by 50–100 feet
All districts
3 Regeneration of water
bodies
Drinking water available for livestock
even during summer months
Davanagere
(Harappanahalli) and
Hassan
4 Clearing of drainages
and diversion of flood
water flow
Drainage related problems like
flooding of roads and houses in the
low lying areas during rainy days,
blocking vehicular trafﬁc and stagnant
water creating health hazards solved
Shimoga (Bhadravati),
Chitradurga (Hiriyur),
Davanagere
5 Bunding and land
development activities
Reduced soil erosion and improved
land productivity
Shimoga (Bhadravati),
Hassan (Arasikere)
6 Road works Improvement in rural connectivity Shimoga (Bhadravati)
Source PIN-NREGA-UASB, (2009)
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Fig. 11.4 Village development works taken up under MGNREGA
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11.4.3 MGNREGA: Community-Level Beneﬁts
In addition to individual level beneﬁts, community works like rehabilitation of
tanks, construction of water bodies, repairs and laying out of canals have resulted in
improving ground water recharge and augmenting area under irrigation. These
outcomes beneﬁt the community at large, and do not beneﬁt only the work par-
ticipating households. Here two unique case studies in the villages surveyed in
Karnataka are presented to illustrate the kind, nature and scale of community-level
beneﬁts acquired under NGREGA programme (Table 11.6).
Nagenahalli village in Hassan district has a village tank spread over 23 acres,
which was heavily silted and the tank bund of which was in a dilapidated state.
Usually, the tank had supported only one paddy crop a year. Table 11.7 gives the
beneﬁts accrued because of MGNREGA work programme implemented in
Nagenahalli in those years.
Rejuvenation of this village tank was planned under MGNREGS with a total
budget of ` 10.3 lakhs (or ` 1.3 million). The work executed in 11 month period
beneﬁted 146 households in the village by providing them additional irrigation to
80 acres of land for growing crops. The tank now supports for growing two crops of
paddy in a year, which is generating an additional income of ` 20 lakhs per annum.
In addition to the employment of 7,102 person-days generated while implementing
the programme, this MGNREGS work has also ensured drinking water to animals
in all the seasons and has recharged 5 bore wells: these beneﬁts have not been
accounted here.
The second study was conducted in Kodakani village of Soraba Taluka, located
in Shimoga district. Soraba Taluka falls in a flat terrain, which possesses about 1600
tanks. Unfortunately, earlier, most of these tanks were neglected resulting in heavy
siltation of these tanks, with reduced live storage capacity of the tanks. Feeder
channels of most of the tanks were clogged and hence water inflow into the tanks
gradually declined. All of these factors also led to a reduction in irrigation water
availability, reduced cropping intensity, productivity and employment opportuni-
ties, but paradoxically also with unexpected flooding during a heavy downpour. As
a result, the agricultural workers migrated to coffee growing areas in the neigh-
bouring districts for stable employment and income.
Table 11.6 Case studies
Case study 1 Case study 2
Location Nagenahalli in Merkuli Gram
Panchayat; Hassan District
Kodakani Village, SorabaTaluk,
Shimoga District
Year 2007–08 2007–08
Type of work
executed
Disiltation of Tank and strengthening
of tank
Desilting of tank and repair of
feeder channel
Total budget Rs. 10.3 Lakhs. (Material: 4.48 Lakhs,
Labour: 5.82 Lakhs)
Rs. 6.5 Lakhs
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Haluru tank under the Kodakani Gram Panchayat, under Soraba Taluk in
Shimoga district, has a command area of over 300 acres. Due to heavy siltation, the
tank was not supporting more than one crop in a year until 2008. Under NREGS,
with a budget allocation of ` 6.5 lakhs, a feeder channel with a length of 0.5 km
was repaired and the tank was desilted after 2008. As a result, second paddy crop
could be cultivated in 100 acres and more than 42 bore wells were recharged. The
production of Paddy then increased by 20–22 quintals per acre for all. This is a
community scale beneﬁt of work implemented under the MGNREGA, which was
also actively supported by the villagers, especially the wage earners. The work
force that undertook the work, women folk who often faced the severity of the
water shortage in a local community outnumber the male workers by 2.5 times. This
development is in the right direction of women empowerment, as well.
11.5 Conclusions and Implications
The results from comparative analysis across the states and micro-level analysis
presented in this Chapter clearly suggest that at meso- or macro-scale of analysis,
the performance of MGNREGA is uneven across the six states selected for the
study. Even after 6–7 years of its implementation, the performance of MGNREGA
in terms of person-days generated varied widely across the six states studied. The
potentiality of MGNREGA work to provide 100 days of wage employment is far
away from its realized evidences across the states. Only 7–12% of the households
out of total participants availed 100 days of employment per annum under the
MGNREGA work.
Likewise, the trend of MGNREGA work of absorbing higher proportion of
youth population poses some serious implication in terms of youth employment in
Table 11.7 Beneﬁt accrued by MGNREGA activity in Nagenahalli
Particulars of beneﬁt accrued Status before
MGNREGA
Status after
MGNREGA
Area irrigated by the tank (Acres) 80 160 (in two
seasons)
Cropping intensity (percent) 100 200
Paddy production in a year in the tank command
area (quintals)
2000 4000
Additional returns (Rupees) – 20 lakhs
Number of families beneﬁted by additional irrigated
water availability
– 146
Employment generated by MGNREGA
(person-days)
– 7102
Number of bore wells recharged – 5
Water availability for animals – In all seasons
Source Field Survey by authors in 2010 and in 2011
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other sectors of rural economy. This increased demand for labour to do
MGNREGA work in Kharif and Rabi seasons in Karnataka, whereas the reduced
demand for work in summer season creates a seasonal imbalance on employment in
the rural economy. Given the huge variations in real wages of agricultural and
employments under MGNREGA across the states, problem of increased labour
scarcity, which is more prominent in the peak season of farming in India, cannot be
attributed only to MGNREGA, but it is due to a range of complex socio-economic
and structural factors prevailing in the country. The spillover effects of economic
growth, urbanization, non-farm rural growth, rural non-farm employment, increased
literacy, the introduction of minimum wage act, etc. all of these factors also affect
rural labour market and level of labour scarcity in a place at any moment of time, as
discussed in the Chapter.
To have a maximum outcome and livelihood impacts upon rural poor, the time
frame of MGNREGA work needs to be adjusted such a way it would ensure
employment security in the villages in slack season of farming. It must create more
jobs and more employment in slack season of farming so that the agriculture sector
would not be adversely affected at the same time livelihood of the rural poor will
also get secured. In Karnataka, only 50% of the households, who registered under
MGNREGA, actually demanded employment under MGNREGA, which is due to
attractive labour market opportunity outside of MGNREGA and outside of agri-
culture in Karnataka state. Over 60% of households in Karnataka were provided
employment for less than 60 days under the MGNREGA.
Moreover, besides employment beneﬁts, community-level beneﬁts of
MGNRGS, through asset creation, are also substantial. They include desilting
irrigation tanks and construction of check dams beneﬁting bore wells through
groundwater recharge, ensured source of drinking water for livestock even during
summer months, improved rural connectivity due to more rural access roads in
villages, construction of school building for children, and reduction in drudgery of
travelling to far away schools, and so on. These indirect beneﬁts of MGNREGS
were also substantial level.
The overall sub-optimal performance of MGNREGA in the six states selected
here may be due to the fact that MGNREGA wage rates are not as remunerative as
market prevailing wages rate for un-skill labour work for non-farm activities. Hence
workers usually prefer for non-farm labour, especially sand mining and other rural
non-farm work, which provides as high as around Rs. 600 per person per truck load
(in couple of hours), compared to ` 350 per person-days under MGNREGA work
scheme in Karnataka. Also, women cannot do drudgery work as done by men and
in the event of non-availability of men labour, the only alternative left is to use the
machinery to meet the compulsory need to execute MGNREGS works in rural
areas. Thus, the use of machinery in MGNREGS in many cases is by default
needed.
Though MGNREGA works were able to assure sustainable development
through improved Natural Resource Management (NRM) in some regions, but it
also failed in most of the cases in providing social protection where the leadership
of implementing agencies of MGNREGS was weak and the leaders lacked
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dynamism in terms of selection of work and making participation of the whole
village while selecting work activities and in bringing more funds to the village
from high-level authority. Stringent rules and regulations of MGNREGS also
resulted in an inordinate delay in executing works and making timely payment to
workers, which deter the labour force who need daily payments of their wages to
purchase the daily food needs.
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Part IV
MGNREGA: Governance Challenges and
It’s Future Perspectives
Chapter 12
Can Employment Guarantee
Scheme (EGS) Ensure Inclusive
and Resilient Growth in Rainfed Areas:
Convergence Lessons Learned and Way
Forward
Ravindra Adusumilli and Ashima Chaudhary
12.1 Introduction
MGNREGS emphasises on drought prooﬁng, soil conservation, land productivity
and water security as the principle areas for taking up works under the sub-head of
natural resources development. Creation of ‘durable assets’ is a central tenet of
investment decisions in the scheme; it protects MGNREGS investments from being
used as ‘labour subsidies’ in production which can potentially influence crop
choices and production relations.
Converging MGNREGS with other regular programmes of government to
contribute to agriculture growth has been a major policy concern recently. Several
efforts were made across the country and by the Department of Rural Development
(DoRD) to evolve convergence guidelines (Ministry of Rural Development
2009-10). The expanded list of permissible activities deﬁned in the revised
guidelines of the scheme also emanates from this concern.1
This paper presents a case to make MGNREGS more effective in strengthening
agriculture, livestock and ﬁsheries in rainfed areas. It builds on the ﬁeld experiences
R. Adusumilli (&)  A. Chaudhary
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1GO No. 11017/17/2008-NREGA (UN) (Part-II) approved works as per the revised Schedule I
(Para 4 (1) 1. (ii)) of the MGNREGA and GO No. 11017/17/2008-NREGA (UN) (Part-II)
Comprehensive treatment of watersheds—Works based on watershed management under
MGNREGA as per the revised schedule I, MGNREGA.
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of WASSAN and Revitalising Rainfed Agriculture Network in engaging with
MGNREGS and agriculture in rainfed areas across several states.2
A brief overview of impacts of the programme across the country is ﬁrst
attempted. This is followed by an analysis of the convergence efforts by DoRD and
some state governments as can be observed from the Government Orders/
Department Circulars. Gaps in the convergence framework are brought out based
on the ﬁeld experiences. Against this backdrop, a framework is presented to use
MGNREGS investments for strengthening rainfed agriculture systems. The dis-
course, as explained later, is around having more interpretative flexibility in
deﬁning ‘durable assets’ and taking a broader perspective on what constitutes
‘natural resources development’. In this effort, it appears that the primacy of
MGNREGS is better reflected as a means of securing employment guarantee, and
not to subsume it under asset creation, enhancing efﬁciencies, or any other social or
economic objective.
12.2 MGNREGS and Its Impacts on Agriculture
Much of the impacts of MGNREGS were mainly through improvements in land
development, water harvesting and bringing more land into productive use. This is
expected as around 51% of the overall investments in MGNREGS were on soil and
water conservation and related works (Table 12.1).
A comprehensive review of studies on the impressive impacts of MGNREGS
was presented in ‘MGNREGA Sameeksha’ (Shah 2012).The review presents the
multifarious impacts of MGNREGS across the country. Impacts are observed on
aspects of increased area under irrigation, land brought into cultivation, changes in
crop pattern, increased productivity of crops. Based on a multidisciplinary rapid
survey of the works taken up in Chitradurga district of Karnataka, Tiwari et al.
(2011) conclude on the multiple gains of the investments on providing environ-
mental services and reduced vulnerability to climate change.
The varied impacts of MGNREGS mostly emanate from the derivatives of
works related to soil and water conservation, land development, silt application and
plantation. As the ‘MGNREGA Sameeksha’ observes, ‘literature on the impact of
MGNREGA on agricultural productivity is neither uniform nor conclusive’. There
will also be problems of attributing impacts to the works alone. The impact of
MGNREGS on wage markets, farm labour scarcity and related impact on agri-
culture is much contested. The present paper stays away from this debate and
focuses on the Scheme’s direct relation with agriculture development.
2Rainfed areas are considered as those with less than 40% irrigation. Revitalising Rainfed
Agriculture Network (www.rainfedindia.org) is a national network engaged in evolving relevant
policy framework for the development of rainfed areas.
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12.3 Practices on Convergence
MGNREGA clearly mandates convergence of investments. MGNREGA with its
inter-sectoral approach opens up opportunities for convergence with different
programmes. A broader view on convergence is taken in the ‘MGNREGA
Sameekhsa’, ‘The aim of convergence is to optimise public investments made under
existing schemes through suggested ways of linking and steering them towards a
common/shared recipient end, both physical (area, infrastructure, natural resource)
and human (person, group, agency)’. ‘Area’ and ‘Agency’ are the two bases for
convergence in this approach.
The following three types of convergence mechanisms are generally observed in
practice:
1. Agency-based convergence: Budgets are made available to an Agency for
implementation of works in its mandate; an example is MGNREGS budgets
given to Forest Department to take up conservation works in forest areas.
2. Geography-based convergence: converging investment in a given Panchayat or
location by different agencies.
3. Plan-based convergence: A convergence window is opened up during the
planning process.
Table 12.1 Category-wise expenditure of MGNREGS in ﬁnancial year 2013–14 and 2015–16
Category of work Expenditure in FY
2013–14 (in %)
Expenditure in FY
2014–15 (in %)
Expenditure in FY
20015–16 (in %)
Rural connectivity 35.13 32.61 26.97
Water conservation
and water harvesting
13.64 13.83 14.32
Renovation of
traditional water
bodies
12.09 12.23 14.01
Category IV work 7.83 10.75 11.89
Land development 8.93 8.63 9.9
Drought prooﬁng 5.95 5.33 6.72
Micro irrigation works 5.26 4.77 6.41
Flood control and
protection
5.09 4.07 4.16
Other works 1.9 1.69 1.95
Rural sanitation 2.46 3.21 1.25
Fisheries 0.14 0.23 0.22
Rural drinking water 0.08 0.10 0.1
Total 100 100 100
Source MGNREGS Reports
http://164.100.129.6/netnrega/MISreport4.aspx?ﬁn_year=2013-2014&rpt=RP and http://164.100.
129.6/GRAPH/graphnewxml.aspx?source=national
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These are not mutually exclusive categories. Plan-based convergence may
involve the same agency or a different one in its implementation.
In practice, much of the discussion related to convergence is around sharing
labour costs from MGNREGS. One of the circulars on convergence with IWMP
typiﬁes this view; ‘It must be ensured that the material-intensive shall be taken up
under IWMP and all the other labour-oriented works shall be done only under
MGNREGS’ (Government of India 2008). Such convergence does not change the
scope of the intervention but only expands the scale of operation of physical asset
creation, mostly related to soil and water conservation.
While appreciable impacts are seen in natural resources related asset creation, as
different studies point out, it is argued that this approach does not harness the real
potential of MGNREGS in strengthening rainfed agriculture. In all these efforts at
convergence, the scope of MGNREGS is limited to soil and water conservation,
land development and plantation.
In the subsequent sections, ﬁrst, the unique features of the programme are
identiﬁed, elaborate on the requirements of rainfed agriculture and explore the
scope of MGNREGS to make a larger impact on rainfed agriculture.
12.3.1 Unique Features of MGNREGS
Several features of MGNREGS make it more attractive as a driver of growth in
production and livelihoods in rainfed areas:
1. Universality of its presence and larger coverage of rainfed geography
2. Demand-based investments
3. Focus on labour
4. location-speciﬁc works with Gram Sabha/Panchayat vested with the authority of
deciding on the works
5. Social audit
6. Human resource base with skills established on ground to implement the
programme.
There is no other programme in the rural landscape at present that has such ver-
satility in spread, budget allocation, human resources base and amenable for decen-
tralised decision-making and above all, a wider outreach to rainfed areas. These
unique features of MGNREGS potentially make it possible to develop decentralised,
participatory, location-speciﬁc and labour-oriented support systems for rainfed
agriculture. This is in contrast with the present external input centred agriculture
extension system driven by subsidised inputs and highly centralised programmeswith
‘limited’ outreach holds greater promise in making an impact on rainfed agriculture.
Low budget allocations for facilitation support, mandate of compliance with
employment generation demands, administrative over load and lack of robust
back-end technical support, however, limit the scope of MGNREGS making a
larger impact on agriculture on its own.
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12.4 Distressed Rained Agriculture
Rainfed agriculture is facing multiple problems. Climate uncertainties and vari-
ability are increasing. Farmers’ disinterest in rainfed agriculture is resulting in the
neglect of private investments and lack of attention in aspects like maintaining soil
productivity, crop systems and their management. These factors compound the risks
and low proﬁtability of rainfed agriculture.
Rainfed systems survive on the amount of rain harvested and retained in the soil
proﬁle. Soil organic matter plays a critical role in the process. Organic matter in
soils is maintained in the soil systems through a process of integration of livestock,
recycling of crop and animal residues and a mix of crop systems. Diversity in
production systems, multiple livelihood options and flow of services and inputs
across agriculture and livestock systems are traditional risk management strategies
followed in rainfed areas.
These integrated systems are breaking down as farmers are increasingly relying on
chemical fertilisers and other external inputs. Bare soils with poor organic matter
increase climate vulnerability of rainfed agriculture systems manifold. Increase in real
wages, problems of labour availability, family labour in particular, are altering farmers’
choices towards more external input dependent, unsustainable and risky practices.
Groundwater depletion is at an alarming rate making much of the private, high cost of
investments in dysfunctional bore well. Farmers’ distress spreading across rainfed
areas in the country is a symptom of a deeper malaise of rainfed agriculture.
12.4.1 Revitalising Rainfed Agriculture
Several consultations in the Revitalising Rainfed Agriculture Network over the last
8 years brought out the need for critical policy corrections that impinge on the
productivity and farmers’ income in rainfed agriculture.
The most relevant for the current discussion are the following:
1. A move towards provision of irrigation to ﬁll in soil moisture deﬁcits arising out
of increasing drought spells in extensive rainfed areas as a concept of irrigation.
2. Increasing public support to improve soils, particularly on promotion of farmers’
practices to improve soil organic matter.
3. Revival of the millet crop systems at scale into the household consumption, state
nutrition programmes and in farming.
4. Establishing a seed system that can provide seeds of diverse, locally adapted
crops and varieties in time and at affordable prices managed by communities.
5. A transition to agro-ecology—crop systems and agronomic practices that
improve local agro-ecology, such as system of rice intensiﬁcation, NPM—
managing pests without using chemical pesticides, LEISA—low external input
sustainable agriculture, etc.
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6. Mechanisation for agriculture labour, to improve their productivity and skills.
7. Focus on strengthening pastoral and agriculture-integrated extensive livestock
systems (that are grazing/foraging based).
8. Bringing numerous seasonal and perennial water bodies into quality ﬁsh
production.
The RRA Network suggests a landscape approach for strengthening the rainfed
production systems integrally. The 12th Plan document and the NRM and Rainfed
Farming Sub-Group recommendations also reiterate these propositions.3 Watershed
programmes constitute a sound system-based approach aimed at addressing prob-
lems of natural resource management. Various programmes aimed at improving
crop productivity and the present support systems, however, are not in sync with
sustainable natural resource management with resource degradation problems
continuing unabated. Resource conservation and sustainable use, and management
for enhanced productivity need to be seen in unison. The Working Group makes a
strong case for integration of productivity enhancement with NRM as the core
strategy of rainfed areas development. Given the inherent diversity of natural
resources in rainfed areas, the health and dynamic inter-relations of the natural
resource base (land, water and biomass) are direct determinants of the productivity
and incomes from economic activities using these resources.
Apart from physical investments in the above process, the transition to a more
secure, productive and remunerative rainfed agriculture requires a wider engage-
ment with farmers, tenants and agriculture labour on effecting a transition to
agro-ecology-centred approaches that reduce costs and enhance productivity.
12.4.2 Agriculture Extension and Rainfed Agriculture
Designed for delivering ‘Green Revolution’, the current agriculture extension
system is modelled on a ‘transfer of technology’ paradigm. The Green Revolution
technology is mostly embedded in external physical inputs—new seeds, fertilisers
and pesticides. Extension involves promotion of these external inputs through
subsidies and disseminating the research station evolved ‘package of practices’
tailored mostly to usage of these external inputs. Highly centralised and compart-
mentalised in their knowledge, these extension systems are fast losing their rele-
vance in the context of rainfed systems where the problems are complex and highly
location speciﬁc.
Some of the key challenges in the re-design of appropriate agriculture extension
for revitalising rainfed agriculture (see Table 12.2).
Unlike in irrigated agriculture, productivity of rainfed agriculture systems is
integrated with natural resources management. For example, productivity of sheep
3http://planningcommission.gov.in/aboutus/committee/wrkgrp12/agri/wg_NRM_Farming.pdf
page 1.
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and goats in extensive system is a function of fodder base in the grazing tracts and
effective public (livestock) healthcare service delivery systems. The movement of
animals, in turn, fertilises the commons and even the private lands. Investments in
these areas are in the nature of ‘public goods’; the beneﬁts of such investments are
difﬁcult to contain within the private farm boundaries. Farmers’ would be reluctant
to invest on these for the same reason.
How to restore the agro-ecology and environmental flow across integrated
crop-livestock-commons systems? What constitutes the role of farmer and what is
the role of state? And therefore, what is the scope of public investments in the
revival of agro-ecology? These questions still remain. The mainstream agriculture,
livestock and ﬁsheries programmes are couched in a different paradigm that is not
much relevant for rainfed areas. Even for subsidised fertilisers applied, for example,
needs moisture and organic matter in the soil to be more productive to give higher
yields.
The need is for developing an appropriate public investment programme that can
effectively enable farmers to shift towards sustainable agro-ecological approach to
farming. Can MGNREGS play any effective role in this process without compro-
mising its own objectives?
As several evaluation studies suggest, MGNREGS investment on soil and water
conservation infrastructure itself has substantial impacts. As ﬁndings of the
Chitradurga study (Tiwary 2011) illustrates, MGNREGS has provided multiple
environmental services and reduced vulnerability, apart from providing employ-
ment and income to rural communities. The environmental services include
Table 12.2 Agriculture extension for revitalising rainfed agriculture
Sl. No. Present focus Needed shift in focus
1 Few crops
– Major cereals and pulses and
commercial crops
Few animals
– Intensive dairy
Few water bodies
– Fisheries in large, perennial
water bodies
Multiple crops
– Millets, minor pulses and oil seeds, trees
All animals
– Draft animals, small ruminants, backyard
poultry, pigs, etc.
All water bodies
– Seasonal and perennial; private and
commons
2 Input-centric extension
(technology is embedded into
external inputs)
Knowledge- and skill-centric extension as
much of the technology is around
management, i.e. soils, crop systems, pests,
weeds, etc.
3 Subsidy (for inputs) led Facilitation/knowledge-centric and skill-based
transition of labour
4 Isolated, i.e. mostly focus is
within crop inputs
Integrated with natural resources, i.e. much of
the actions in increasing productivity lie in
natural resources base and how it is managed
within the crop systems. For, e.g. soil organic
matter is important to hold moisture in the
soil; and it comes from crop residues and
better soil conservation and tillage practices
12 Can Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) Ensure Inclusive … 297
groundwater recharge, water percolation and increased water storage in tanks,
increased soil fertility, reclamation of degraded lands and carbon sequestration.
These services contributed to and had positive implications for, increased crop and
livestock production. The scheme activities also contributed to reduce vulnerability
of agricultural production to uncertain and low rainfall. The implications measured
in this study are only for about 1–3 years of implementation of the scheme; a much
longer period of observations are needed to understand the full extent of environ-
mental services and the potential for vulnerability reduction given the gestation
period in ecological, hydrological and soil processes. Such efforts also contribute to
meeting challenges of climate change. However, the scope of MGNREGS can be
much larger given its unique strengths mentioned earlier.
12.5 Boundary Conditions for Expanding
the Scope of MGNREGS
At the outset, it is important to lay down some boundary conditions for expanding
the scope of MGNREGS so that its constitutional mandate is not compromised and
that it would not inadvertently influence the existing production relations or labour
markets. Four such principles can be thought of:
1. MGNREGS investment should crowd-in private investments and should not
compete with or substitute for private investments.
2. Works should not get subsumed into agriculture as regular labour subsidies
without adding ‘asset value’ to natural resources—as it will have substantial
impact on production relations. Having a ﬁnite period for speciﬁc ‘MGNREGS
—projects’ will help in avoiding creation of perpetual dependency.
3. Scheme investments must result in improving productivity of the natural
resources and drought prooﬁng. The scope of asset creation can be new assets,
renovation of old assets or making the existing assets functional or improving
the quality of assets/natural resources.
4. Must potentially result in more wage employment generation or higher aggre-
gate wage incomes in the production system to enhance employment
opportunities.
12.5.1 Expanding the Scope of MGNREGS
for Rainfed Agriculture
Within the above boundary conditions, to explore ways in which MGNREGS
investments can be effective in addressing sustainability and growth of rainfed
agriculture we ﬁrst, outline these and provide the argument subsequently.
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1. Enabling Sustainable Agriculture Transitions: Support in agriculture labour to
attain new skill sets to aid in sustainable agro-ecological transitions
2. Extend centralised services to make sustainable agriculture practices viable at
farm level, i.e. agriculture practices that improve the quality of natural resources
3. Incubation of labour intensive local enterprises that can potentially replace
external industrial inputs with local labour intensive inputs in agriculture to aid
in more employment intensive agriculture growth
4. Creation of ‘public good-services’ (beyond manual earth/labour work) that help
in reducing private costs for farmers
These propositions are further illustrated in the following section.
12.5.2 Enabling to Sustainable Agriculture Transitions
Subsidised external inputs played a key role in transitions like Green Revolution.
Unlike these input-embedded technologies, agro-ecological transitions are often
labour and management intensive requiring labour with new skills. Who will bear
the costs of labour getting trained and available in the market with new set of skills?
This falls on the initial innovators or on the extension programmes. System of Rice
Intensiﬁcation (SRI) is a classic case.
Transition to SRI requires availability of labour pool that can transplant early
seedlings in square-grid and labour who can weed with a mechanical weeder as
against the conventional manual weeding. Experience suggests that mere farmers’
awareness or interest is not sufﬁcient for transiting to the new systems; availability
of labour with these new skills in the market is a crucial determinant of the spread
of SRI. These are typical public goods and farmers will have higher transaction
costs in training labour in SRI skills and giving them adequate opportunity to
practice and shift to new skills. Once the skill-transformation takes place, studies
suggest that there will be savings for farmers on input costs and gain through
increased productivity (Adusumilli and Bhagya 2011; Ranganathan et al. 2013).
This can potentially increase wages for labour with the new skills creating a
win-win situation.
Improvement on sets of skill of agricultural labour is not any part of Agriculture
Department’s mandate, of either centre or state government agencies. Agriculture
Department, with the present structure across states, do not have the ability to
operationalize such a programme on skill improvement of un-skill labour in rural
India. SRI promotion in programmes like National Food Security Mission (NFSM)
gets limited to demonstrations and distribution of implements to farmers.
MGNREGS is well placed to work with labour in acquiring the new skills as it has
the apparatus to manage such work. A detailed operational process for enabling
such transition to SRI is developed by WASSAN for National Consortium on SRI
(NCS 2012).
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12.5.3 Provision of ‘Public Good’ Services
Availability of certain key-services will help in reducing input costs for farmers. To
illustrate, a transition to non-pesticide management of insect pests (NPM) approach
requires regular pest surveillance. Identifying and marking the threshold levels of
pest incidence at an early stage helps farmers to take much cheaper and easier
preventive measures at right time-saving in high costs of pesticide sprays later on.
Getting farmers’ regularly visit ﬁelds for pest monitoring is one of the biggest
challenges in the promotion of NPM. Local pest surveillance is also a ‘public good’.
If collectively done, it saves large private expenditure. One way to support NPM
transition is to establish such pest surveillance mechanism at Gram Panchayat/
habitation level.
Livestock disease surveillance, local weather monitoring and dissemination of
weather forecasts and agro-advisories are also of the same nature in terms of
work-types and nature of execution. Providing such services under MGNREGS
should only be transitory, i.e. for a deﬁned period; once the services are used and
systems operational, additional investments may be made to use MGNREGS
institutional systems for continued support for such functions.
12.5.4 ‘Agro-Ecological Restoration’
as Durable Asset Creation
Soil and water conservation works are taken up largely under MGNREGS and even
in the watershed development programmes. Production in the rainfed systems
largely depends on the amount of rainfall harvested (with in the few rainy days) and
retained in the soil proﬁle; soil proﬁle is the largest store house for rainfall.
Encrustation of the surface, poor permeability and lack of organic matter constrain
soils in rainfed areas from harvesting and retaining rainfall. If properly done, the
incremental rainfall harvested in soil proﬁle may far exceed the rainfall harvested
through water harvesting.
The works taken up in MGNREGS are limited to soil conservation (prevention
of runoff) and of late, construction of composting structures like NADEP after the
revised guidelines. Both these interventions are inadequate for substantially
increasing soil organic matter. A composting structure (a pit or a brick-enclosure)
built under MGNREGS is inadequate for motivating rainfed farmers to practice
composting or adding organic matter to soils. The operations involved in trans-
porting biomass, ﬁlling-in the pits, watering, overturning, harvesting and trans-
porting of the compost requires considerable attention and labour. For lack of such
labour available, farmers’ ﬁnd it easier to shift to chemical fertilisers to meet the
crop-nutrition requirements. But, use efﬁciency of fertilisers, water harvesting and
retention in soil proﬁle depends on organic matter in the soil.
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Organic farming usually considers a period of 3 years to recuperate soil health
and the local agro-ecology to offset productivity losses in transition.
In similar lines, MGNREGS can provide common pool-services in few of the
components required for compost making at homesteads and farms such as digging,
planting of biomass trees, watering, overturning or harvesting. This will reduce the
total labour costs for individual farmers to make addition of organic matter viable
for farmers. This part support to composting must be seen as a way of improving
soil health and restoring soil biology adding substantially to the asset value of the
land and does similar function as water harvesting.
Even 10% of the annual fertiliser subsidies invested on this, may result in
substantial beneﬁts in (a) improving fertiliser use efﬁciency, (b) improving soil
health and reducing fertiliser use, and (c) move towards low external input agri-
culture (d) improved soil moisture to sustain short drought spells. Moreover, if
farmers shift to local compost making it creates demand for wage employment.
Either this can be made part of MGNREGS or an allocation from Agriculture
Department can be made (to the equivalent of 10% of fertiliser subsidies) sepa-
rately, to be implemented by MGNREGS machinery.
Unfortunately, the perception of ‘durable assets’ in MGNREGS at present is
limited to physically measurable constructions (digging, ﬁlling of earth and brick
and mortar). If comprehensive measures are taken up in addition to soil conser-
vation, the same soil with improvement in its quality in say, a block of 10 ha of
rainfed agriculture can potentially reduce the costs to the farmer, provide better
resilience to climate variability, improve productivity and may even reduce the
subsidy burden by substituting local material for subsidised inputs. Soil is after all,
a public good (irrespective of the private property regimes) that the present gen-
eration has to protect and improve for future generations. When the markets fail to
generate required surplus for farmers to be able to invest on soils, the responsibility
falls on the state to invest and protect this national asset.
The same analogy can be extended to other qualitative aspects of public goods
that can potentially provide environmental services. Insect ecology if restored, for
example, can improve the predator complex to reduce pesticide costs of individual
farmer. Agro-ecological restoration needs to be considered as a ‘durable asset’,
even if it does not involve brick, mortar or earth work.
12.5.5 Incubation of Labour Intensive Enterprises
in Sustainable Agriculture Transitions
With the fast spread of NPM and organic agriculture, the scope for local inputs to
substitute for external chemical inputs which are often subsidised has increased;
such demand is also universal across the rainfed areas. Conversion of this potential
demand into local enterprises needs considerable skilling, innovations and effective
demand generation; MGNREGS can be an effective platform in incubating such
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local labour intensive enterprises. Provision of labour subsidy for such enterprises
for a deﬁned incubation period can be an effective instrument for their promotion.
These enterprises are the key to ecological restoration, reducing the costs of
production, reducing the chemical load in products and can potentially generate
employment. One such option is also to promote ‘labour guilds’ equipped with
knowledge, material and required implements/machinery to take up service con-
tracts in agriculture. This will address the twin problems of employment generation
at higher wage rates and addressing the issue of farm labour scarcity for key
operations. The experiments like the one in Kerala on ‘food security army’4 merit
such consideration; this involves a shift from daily wage labour to ‘labour-service
guilds’ taking contract of operations; MGNREGS is well equipped to promote such
guilds.
12.5.6 Enabling Services for Natural Resources
Management
Natural resources related assets will have short lifespan if they are not managed.
Management of commons, land degradation, groundwater, management of water
bodies, protection of biomass and such other principle requisites for community led
agro-ecological regeneration often get crippled by lack of participation due to high
transaction costs for individuals. Traditional systems of water management also
collapsed in several places as state did not take over such management functions.
The ‘neerati’ or water distributor system in tank irrigation system is dysfunctional
in several cases for lack of willingness of farmers’ to pay for the services of neerati.
The collective grasing systems, especially in kharif season, that are prevalent across
India are slowly collapsing.
MGNREGS can effectively play a role in restoring these community-based
natural resources management systems and even modernise the services. Viability
gap-provisioning for the people involved in these systems help in revival of the
traditional systems or in the formation of new natural resources management
systems.
4http://www.indiawaterportal.org/news/keralas-paddy-war-food-security-army-swings-
actiontransplanting-rice-300-acres-land-ﬁve-days.
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12.6 Operationalisation of ‘Expanded Scope
of MGNREGS’
In all the above, MGNREGS with its unique positioning across the country and
institutional capacity to work with rural labour can play a substantive role.
However, the non-negotiable boundary conditions (mentioned earlier) for
expanding the scope of MGNREGS must be complied with. The instrumentalities
of expanding the scope could be the following.
12.6.1 Finite Time Period
MGNREGS must only support transitions with a deﬁned time period, which sub-
stantially involves labour and their skills.
(a) Not to Compete or Substitute Farmers’ Investments: Support only the
additionally or the viability gaps on which farmers’ are not forthcoming with
investments or effort.
(b) Have a technical programme: It is important to recognise that MGNREGS is
not a technical establishment. Unless there is a technical programme associated
with the ‘work’, the assets created will not sustain nor get integrated with the
production. Water body created without a programme on establishing support
services and knowledge transfer on ﬁsheries, for example, is most unlikely to
result in increased ﬁsh production. To be effective, MGNREGS works must be
embedded in a technical programme. Such technical programme must have
technical capacities in planning and execution and have complementary
investments to fulﬁl the programme requirements.
(c) Community Resource Persons: An approach that is widely accepted across
several programmes is building capacities in the community and experienced
farmer-led extension. The requirement for low-end technical services on a wide
scale can be met effectively with this approach. This can be a potential
‘Skill-Indian Agriculture Mission’ spearheaded through MGNREGS platform.
(d) Using MGNREGS as a Platform: Though MGNREGS investments in labour
are much coveted for convergence, a much greater strength lies in its ability to
reach out to labour and labour payment systems that are well established in
several states. For initiatives like skilling labour, incubation of enterprises, etc.
special allocations may be made within MGNREGS within deﬁned ‘pro-
gramme areas’ which can be integrated with the programmes of agriculture,
animal husbandry or other departments. Such provisions also enable the ser-
vices to flow smoothly even when the demand for employment is low.
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12.7 Summary
In summary, MGNREGS is uniquely positioned to make a substantial contribution
to drive sustainability, resilience and growth in rainfed agriculture, livestock and
ﬁsh production systems. Its strength lies in its universal presence, focus on labour,
well laid out systems of payments, social audit and intensive coverage of rainfed
geography. All that is needed is providing interpretative flexibility on the concept of
‘creation of durable assets’ in natural resources development and drought prooﬁng.
Expanding the scope of ‘durable assets’ to include environmental services,
quality of natural resources that can potentially crowd-in private investments in
employment-intensive production will enable the Scheme to build a larger support
system for rainfed agriculture. Such expanded scope of MGNREGS may include
(a) enabling sustainable agriculture transition, provision of critical public goods;
(b) provision of labour intensive services that are ‘public goods’ in nature;
(c) seeing agro-ecological restoration as a ‘durable asset’; (d) incubation of labour
intensive enterprises that aid sustainable agriculture transitions; and (e) enabling
services for natural resources ‘management’ (as against merely considering their
development). The paper also lays out some boundary conditions for not com-
promising the constitutional mandate of MGNREGA. Such expansion of scope of
the Scheme without compromising its own objectives can potentially have a mul-
tiplier effect of its investments in achieving resilience and growth of rainfed
agriculture.
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Chapter 13
The Journey of MGNREGA: Changing
Approaches and Challenges
Amita Shah, Aasha Kapur Mehta, P.K. Viswanathan
and Nicky Johnson
13.1 The Context
Casual agricultural labourers are the largest group among the chronically poor in India.
Most poor rural households are either landless or near-landless, bear a higher depen-
dency burden, are illiterate and depend on wages (Mehta and Shah 2001; Bhide and
Mehta 2004). Access to work and wage rates vary across regions, occupations and
gender. Special interventions are needed to ensure productive employment for the poor
who are able-bodied and can earn through work and thereby escape from poverty.
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(MGNREGS) was seen as a major milestone in the anti-poverty policies in
Independent India. MGNREGS has its roots in the Maharashtra Employment
Guarantee Scheme (MEGS)—a flagship initiative of the Government of Maharashtra
that was the ﬁrst state to recognise the right to work and made a commitment to
provide unskilled work on demand to all adults in rural areas.
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Ever since the early phase of the MEGS, a large number of scholars, NGOs,
policy makers and government agencies extensively studied the MEGS to under-
stand the process and its impact on employment and poverty reduction in rural
areas. Encouraged by the performance of the MEGS, in 2005, the Government of
India launched the nationwide scheme to provide employment guarantee to the rural
masses under the Mahatma Gandhi Rural Employment Guarantee Act
(MGNREGA). It is now a decade since the programme was launched. How has
implementation of MGNREGA progressed from its initial phase to the present
phase? Does this vary across states and social categories? How have rural house-
holds beneﬁted from it? What has been gained?
The nature and content of the MGNREGA itself has undergone signiﬁcant
changes over the past decade from being a mere employment guarantee scheme to a
core flagship programme being scaled up in convergence with many other devel-
opment programmes by the national and state governments. Has convergence been
implemented in practice? If so, how has this been implemented? These are some of
the questions that this paper seeks to answer.
At the same time, a large number of studies based on detailed analysis of the
status of implementation and the outcomes of MGNREGA point out that the pro-
gramme had lost its initial vigour. There are concerns about lack of fulﬁlment of the
basic premises on which the programme was founded. The dismay in the overall
performance1 of the programme stems from the fact that a vast segment of the rural
populace (especially, the youth) continues to be dissociated with the programme
either due to the low wages paid or due to the lack of adequate number of days of
gainful employment available or even due to the sheer absence of opportunities to
improve skills and thus improve the socio-economic status. This raises several
issues and challenges in the current context of high economic growth with
increasing inequalities, regional disparities,2 widening rural–urban divide and the
increasing rural distress in the country (Kundu and Varghese 2010; Suryanarayana
and Das 2014; Kohli 2015; Chand et al. 2007). While realising this, the Twelfth
Five-Year Plan (2012–17) emphasised the need for inclusive growth in terms of
poverty reduction, regional balance, inequality reduction, empowerment and
employment generation (GoI 2013, as cited in Suryanarayana and Das 2014).
1Performance of MGNREGA has been far from satisfactory in recent years in terms of the average
number of days of employment generated per household, percentage of actual expenditure made
against total funds available and the percentage of works completed (Jha and Gaiha 2012).
Instances are many where the works undertaken for asset creation remained incomplete along with
poor quality of such assets created (GoI 2014; ILO 2014; Drèze and Khera 2009).
2At the all-India level, it was found that the relatively deprived social groups, STs and SCs, have
been left out of the growth process and the other social groups (OSGs) perform the best. The
ﬁnding on increasing disparity between the poorest and richest states was corroborated by the
estimates of: (i) coefﬁcient of variation, which increased from 17.59 to 30.78% for mean [per
capita consumption expenditure]; and (ii) index of dispersion, which increased from 17.63 to
32.98% for rural mean per capita consumption across major states between 1993–94 and 2011–12
(Suryanarayana and Das).
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Is there a need to go beyond the present approach while moving forward with
MGNREGA? The basic questions, therefore, are to get an understanding of what
worked and did not work and why and determine whether it should continue as a
dole-based employment guarantee programme or be scaled up as a development
programme with long-term strategies and action plans?
In fact, these questions are yet to receive adequate attention in the policy and
academic discourse across the country. Far from being an academic analytical
exercise, the search for answers to these questions might provide some useful
insights towards redesigning the future course of MGNREGA and the related
development policies that address the needs speciﬁcally of the youth, women,
disadvantaged groups and regions that are still in distress despite the decade long
existence of the programme.
While MGNREGA remains the most important strategy for creating rural
employment, a closer understanding of the same in the emerging context may help
in attaining the basic goals of poverty alleviation and equity. Unfortunately, lack of
a nuanced analysis of the interrelationships between employment, poverty allevi-
ation and equity amongst the varied social groups, over time and space, has made it
difﬁcult to understand the developmental dynamics of MGNREGA. This paper is
an effort to address some of these gaps and the questions raised above.
The analysis is based on data from the ofﬁcial MGNREGA sources
(MGNREGA website and the Ministry of Rural Development) from 2006–07 to
2014–15. While the MGNREGA is a signiﬁcant modiﬁcation over the MEGS, we
also try to draw on some parallels between the MEGS and the MGNREGA while
discussing the impacts and outcomes in a comparative perspective. Though these
comparisons have been already made by some scholars, the effort here is to
approach the MGNREGA from a comparative framework of time, space and
activities vis-a-vis the MEGS.
The chapter is organised into four sections, including this introduction. Section 13.2
provides a snapshot of employment generation programmes from the 1970s through
the MEGS toMGNREGA as well as their role and relevance for achieving growth and
poverty reduction in India. Section 13.3 provides a detailed analysis of the statewise
extent of participation in MGNREGA in the context of poverty levels, drought con-
ditions as well as the socio-economic status of the rural households over time.
Section 13.4 is the concluding section of the paper and highlights some of the critical
challenges undermining the potential of MGNREGA. It also argues the case for a
paradigm shift in approaches and design of the programme as a strategic development
intervention with long-term impacts on the economy and society.
13.2 The Transition from MEGS to MGNREGA
Historically, employment generation programmes in India have a chequered history
of over four decades (Shah et al. 1998) and were an integral aspect of the public
works programmes introduced as part of poverty reduction strategies under the
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planned development regime. As these programmes were primarily intended at
providing employment to a vast segment of the illiterate and unskilled workers in
the rural areas, they were rarely considered as ‘economically productive’ and
remained a major point of contention between academics and policy makers. The
earlier debates on employment programmes centred on the effectiveness of the
self-employment versus wage employment programmes in reducing poverty in
India, with a clear divide between scholars. For instance, some scholars, such as
Dandekar and Rath (1971), Rath (1985), Dreze (1990) and Dev (1996) favoured
wage employment programmes and advocated for employment guarantee schemes
(EGS) in view of their self-targeting nature and the associated beneﬁts. On the
contrary, while Krishna (1973) advocated for direct poverty reduction programmes
(rather than employment generation programmes), Dantwala (1978) argued that
self-employment programmes (like the IRDP) needed to be promoted, as they were
thought to help improve the skills of the workers. The underlying argument was that
more emphasis on wage employment programmes would create a genre of workers
who would always tend to depend upon either the state or other agencies to provide
such employment opportunities. On the other hand, self-employment programmes
make the workers independent and skilled over time.
The MEGS was seen as the largest employment guarantee experiment in India
and was initially launched as a drought relief programme in the 1970s. It was
continued as an anti-poverty programme that could be replicated in other parts of
the country. Rajasthan was the ﬁrst state that adopted the EGS as a drought relief
programme, following the drought in the state in the year 2000. A strong people’s
movement led to the demand for jobs to provide drought relief. The Supreme Court
of India also supported such schemes that link the right to food with the right to
work. Eventually, this resulted in the enunciation of the total rural employment
scheme, called the Sampoorna Gramin Rozgar Yojana (SGRY), which was the
precursor of MGNREGA (Desai et al. 2015).
MGNREGA was modelled on the MEGS that had evolved as one of the most
important programmes aimed at reducing rural poverty and distress. Inmany respects,
MGNREGS adopted the basic features of the MEGS with signiﬁcant changes in
coverage of the rural households and content as is evident from Table 13.1.
This table presents a brief comparative overview of the basic approaches fol-
lowed by the two employment guarantee programmes. It is important to note that as
they progressed, both the programmes were recast with the goal of reaching out to
the poor, landless and socially discriminated households. The approach followed
was to support these social groups within the existing socio-economic structure,
rather than creating a new one.
In what follows, we try to discuss some of the important aspects of the MEGS
and the MGNREGS in a comparative perspective. This would help us to reflect on
the gaps in the basic approach in planning and design for employment generation
while moving from the MEGS to MGNREGS, which would further help in setting
new pathways for future interventions.
The MEGS required that the employment be ‘gainful to the individual and
productive to the economy’ i.e., that ‘on completion of the works undertaken, some
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durable community assets should be generated’. The priority areas for works
included labour intensive components of irrigation projects, percolation and storage
tanks and underground bandharas; soil conservation and land development works;
afforestation and social forestry; roads including internal village roads; and a few
years ago individual beneﬁciary schemes such as Jawahar wells, horticulture, etc.
(Shah and Mehta 2008).
Initially, the impact of the MEGS was quite impressive. For instance, in the three
decades after the scheme formally commenced in 1972, it ﬁnanced 3597 million
person days of work on irrigation, soil and water conservation, reforestation and
local roads (Krishnaraj et al. 2004). An average of 120 million days a year were
provided, spread across hundreds of thousands of separate work sites (Moore and
Jadhav 2006). Nevertheless, Shah and Mehta (2008) noted that the employment
generated had varied signiﬁcantly over time. While the number of person days
generated through the MEGS increased rapidly from 48.1 million in 1974–75 to a
peak of 205.4 million in 1979–80, it declined thereafter to 13.33 million in 1987–88
and further to an all-time low of 7.80 million in 1989–90. However, by the period
2004–05, the employment generation under MEGS rose from 110 million in 2000–
01 to 222 million person days in 2004–05 (Shah and Mehta 2008), followed by a
decline to 169 million in 2005–06 (Government of Maharashtra, Department of
Economics and Statistics). One of the important features of the employment gen-
eration activities under MEGS was that women workers constituted more than half
of the beneﬁciaries. Person days of employment generated for women during the
period 1996–97 to 1999–2000 were around 58% on average (Shah and Mehta 2008).
The MEGS had disintegrated much before it was converged with the
MGNREGS. As indicated by some scholars, the decline had started in the late
1980s and its subsequent impact remained relatively low. Once it was passed into
law with guaranteed funding independent of the annual budget process, it was felt
that the EGS no longer needed active proponents. The beneﬁciaries were also too
dispersed, and their dependence on EGS was quite irregular, irrespective of the
drought or distress conditions that prevailed in the villages. Eventually, the level of
political and bureaucratic zeal attached to the Scheme also faded away. The
changing development priorities diverted attention to other programmes (Moore
and Jadhav 2006).
Shah and Mehta (2008) attributed three main factors as responsible for the
decline of the MEGS, notwithstanding the unspent money earmarked for the same.
The ﬁrst reason was the growing economic diversiﬁcation and increasing oppor-
tunities in non-farm activities, especially in urban areas. Second, the scope for
undertaking productive work beneﬁting the landed households had by then reached
near saturation, especially in the heartland of western Maharashtra, thereby
resulting in reduced demand from the dominant agrarian class. Third, was the
dilution of the grassroots movements, which had played a crucial role in generating
demand for work at earlier stages of the programme. Since the scheme had emerged
out of social mobilisation, and also allowed multiple manifestations of movements,
dilution of grass root mobilisation during the late 80s and onwards dissipated the
momentum for demanding work (Shah and Mehta 2008).
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Concerns were also raised about the overall impact of the MEGS on poverty
reduction in Maharashtra. While studies show that some people were able to cross
the poverty line, the wider impact of the MEGS on enabling the poor to escape from
poverty was limited. This was reflected in the high percentage of people below the
poverty line in Maharashtra, with estimates of poverty remaining above or close to
the all-India average. Further, the impact on asset creation was limited, as the
emphasis was more on wage employment rather than sustainable asset creation.
Although work was to be provided ‘on demand’, poverty reduction was constrained
by: (a) low wages for given work; (b) limited number of days of work per person
actually provided; (c) non upgradation of skills; and (d) the limited ability of the
schemes to foster development of the areas where projects were initiated; (e) limited
community mobilisation for demanding work, leading to limited coverage of
workers, especially outside the few districts in which works were concentrated and
during non-drought years and (f) limited administrative systems for monitoring and
tracking the implementation of the scheme (Shah and Mehta 2008).
The MEGS was scaled up into NREGA and was implemented in 200 districts at
the national level in the ﬁrst phase (2006), mainly based on the larger potential of
employment generation for the vast segment of the rural households. The distinc-
tion of ‘right to work’ has made it an unparalleled development intervention in the
history of the country. As noted by Dreze (2011), MGNREGA has played a very
important role in bringing the ‘right-based’ approach of development, especially in
rural India. Started initially as a ‘right to work’, it has now emerged as the single
most important instrument that supposedly guarantees an array of associated rights
or entitlements of a worker. These entitlements include the: (a) right to a job card;
(b) right to demand and receive work within 15 days; (c) right to unemployment
allowance; (d) right to plan and prepare a shelf of projects; (e) right to obtain work
within a radius of 5 km; (f) right to worksite facilities; (g) right to notiﬁed wage
rate; (h) right to receive wages within 15 days; (i) right to compensation for delay in
payment of wages and (j) right to time-bound redressal of grievances and (k) right
to conduct concurrent social audits and social audit of all MGNREGA expenditure.
A quick review of the broader content and guidelines of the MGNREGA shows
that a number of important aspects were taken into consideration while designing it
with a hope that it will be a major step ahead of MEGS in terms of the larger
economy-wide impacts and social welfare.
A vast literature on the status of implementation and impacts of MGNREGA is
already available in the form of books, journal articles, reports by the national as
well as international agencies and government departments. Though a detailed
review of the literature on the MGNREGA is outside the purview of this chapter, a
brief review of the major impact of the programme is presented. It may be noted
that the majority of studies examined the performance of MGNREGA in various
states in both micro- and macro-settings and highlighted the issues that emerged
across these study sites related to its implementation and functioning. Most of these
studies were undertaken using appropriate methodology and many of them also
used interdisciplinary research methods relying on both quantitative and qualitative
techniques.
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By and large, the literature on MGNREGA falls into three broad categories as
highlighted in a study by Kannan and Jain (2013). Accordingly, the three categories
of literature included: (a) studies reflecting on the design and implementation
related issues; (b) those examining the outreach and impact of MGNREGA and
(c) those attempting to build a national level comprehensive proﬁle of MGNREGA
implementation.
Several analysts examined the changing proﬁle of the rural labour markets in the
post-MGNREGA context and reported that the programme had signiﬁcant impacts
in terms of employment creation, wages and other associated beneﬁts across states,
though with notable variations. However, the overall trends in the number of man
days generated under the MGNREGA had shown a declining trend especially since
2010–11. This has been a major cause for concern regarding the effectiveness of the
programme. The total number of person days generated had increased more than
threefold from 0.91 crore during 2006–07 to 2.84 crore during 2010–11, followed
by a decline thereafter to 2.3 crore in 2012–13 and 1.67 crore in 2014–15 (MoRD
2015). While this decline in the number of person days may also reflect the
declining popularity of the programme, the evidence based on secondary data as
well as primary ﬁeld studies suggests that the entire decline in person days gen-
erated cannot be attributed to the increasing prosperity in rural areas (Himanshu
et al. 2015).
At the same time, a large number of studies highlight the instrumental role
played by the MGNREGA in creating multiple socio-economic, environmental and
ecosystem impacts (David 2008; IISC 2013) as well as rural asset creation (Kannan
and Jain 2013; Tiwari et al. 2011; Shah 2012). The instrumental role played by the
MGNREGA has been identiﬁed in terms of: (a) women’s economic empowerment
stimulating increased labour market participation (Pankaj and Tankha 2010;
Narayanan and Das 2014; Viswanathan and Mandal 2012); (b) social inclusion and
ﬁnancial inclusion3; (c) sustainable asset creation in rural areas4 (Desai et al. 2015;
Verma 2011; Verma and Shah, this volume); support to the disabled; (d) protection
against distress migration and (e) rise in money and real wages and an increase in
reserve price of labour and reduction in gender wage gap (Usami 2011;
Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2011; Dutta et al. 2012; Ghose 2012; Kannan and Jain
2013; Jose 2013). Another major impact has been the enhanced participation of the
poor and the socially vulnerable households and workers (agricultural wage
labourers, Adivasis, Dalits and other backward classes and landless, marginal and
small farmers) and thus, MGNREGA was instrumental in reducing poverty among
these groups (Desai et al. 2015) to a greater extent.
3Under MGNREGA, employment was provided to 5.62 Crore Households and it also resulted in
an average increase in household income by around Rs. 6,000 per year. As part of ﬁnancial
inclusion, 9.29 crore bank/postal accounts are opened and the scheme also resulted in the increase
of purchasing power in rural areas (Niti Aayog 2015).
4Based on a study in a Gujarat village (Nana Kotda) in South Gujarat, Hirway et al. (2010) re-
ported that the expenditure on various NREG works had generated multiplier impact on the rural
economy, even though the impact was low due to the various leakages in implementation.
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A report by the Planning Commission (GOI 2013) also highlighted some of the
notable achievements under the MGNREGA. Among the important observations
are that: (a) the MGNREGA has led to a signiﬁcant increase in monthly per capita
consumption expenditure of rural households; (b) MGNREGA works have been
described as ‘Green’ and ‘Decent’ i.e., the scheme creates decent working condi-
tions by ensuring workers’ rights and legal entitlements, providing social protection
and employment and environmentally sustainable works that regenerate the
ecosystem and protect biodiversity; (c) MGNREGA has had a more direct and
positive impact on reducing distress migration as compared to migration for eco-
nomic growth and other reasons.
Apparently, it seems that the interface between MGNREGA and the major
segments of the rural households, especially the vulnerable social categories, has
not received the due attention it warrants in the emerging context. We consider that
such an effort may help us answer ‘whether and how the MGNREGA has impacted
the rural economy in terms of the perceived goals of the programme’. Hence, in the
next section, we present a detailed analysis of the causality or the nexus between the
major sources of vulnerability and the extent of participation in MGNREGA across
the major states. We deﬁne the major sources of vulnerability of the states in terms
of: (a) incidence of poverty; (b) occurrence of drought and (c) the preponderance of
the social groups, viz. SC, ST and women.
For the purpose of analysis, we classify the states into four categories in terms of
work participation of the rural households in MGNREGA, viz. (a) Very low (0–
14%); (b) medium (15–30%); (c) high (>30 to 45%) and (d) very high (above 45%).
We have estimated the level of participation of rural households in MGNREGA in
20 major states over the 9-year period from 2006–07 to 2014–15. Based on the
long-term trends in household participation in MGNREGS works, 4 of the 20 states
(Punjab, Haryana, Maharashtra and Gujarat) were classiﬁed as states with low level
of participation; 8 states (Bihar, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Jammu
& Kashmir, Assam and Uttarakhand) reflected medium level of participation; 5
states, (Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Himachal Pradesh, West Bengal and Madhya
Pradesh) had high level of participation; while 3 states, (Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and
Chhattisgarh) had very high level of participation.
13.3 MGNREGA and Its Interface with Poverty, Drought
and Vulnerable Social Groups
While examining the one-to-one correspondence between the major vulnerability
conditions and participation in MGNREGA over the decade, we posit a question:
has participation in MGNREGA been positively influenced by the extent of pov-
erty, the occurrence of drought or the socio-economic characteristics of the
household? In other words, we expect higher incidence of poverty to be associated
with higher participation of rural households in MGNREGA.
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13.3.1 Overall Trends in Rural Household Participation
in MGNREGA
At the outset, we examine the overall trends in rural household participation in
MGNREGA across states. The analysis compares the statewise work participation
during the entire period 2006–07 to 2014–15 as well as compares the changes in
participation during the ﬁrst 5-year period and the last 4-year period. The results are
presented in Table 13.2. We follow the classiﬁcation of states based on the four
levels of rural participation in the programme as noted above.
Table 13.2 Trends in rural households’ participation in MGNREGA, major states—2006–07 to
2014–15
No States based on extent of
participation
Changes in participation of rural households in
MGNREGA (%)
2006–07 to
2014–15
2006–07 to
2010–11
2011–12 to
2014–15
A. Very Low participation (0–14%)
1 Punjab 6.6 4.9 8.6
2 Maharashtra 6.7 3.8 10.0
3 Haryana 6.7 4.7 9.0
4 Gujarat 11.1 12.5 9.4
B. Medium participation (15–29%)
5 Bihar 16.7 23.0 9.9
6 Odisha 18.4 18.3 18.5
7 Uttar Pradesh 19.5 19.1 20.0
8 Karnataka 19.5 21.7 17.0
9 Kerala 23.5 14.2 36.2
10 Jammu & Kashmir 24.5 17.8 32.0
11 Assam 26.9 31.9 21.4
12 Uttarakhand 27.4 25.0 30.1
C. High participation (30–44%)
13 Andhra Pradesh 30.0 36.5 22.4
14 Jharkhand 32.4 37.4 26.9
15 Himachal Pradesh 32.6 28.6 37.3
16 West Bengal 33.6 28.4 39.7
17 Madhya Pradesh 35.8 42.8 28.3
D. Very high participation (45% above)
18 Rajasthan 45.8 50.8 40.5
19 Tamil Nadu 47.2 32.0 65.1
20 Chhattisgarh 52.4 52.1 53.0
Note The ﬁgures are simple averages for the respective periods
Source Total employment provided from MGNREGA Public Portal accessed in February, 2016
www.nrega.nic.in and Rural Households from Census India, 2011
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Three of the four states with low level of participation in MGNREGS reflect
participation rates that are just below 7% during the entire period under consider-
ation. However, comparing the level of participation between the two time periods
(2006–07 to 2010–11 and 2011–12 to 2014–15) shows that there was a notable
increase in rural participation during the latter period (2011–12 to 2014–15) in these
three states. The highest increase in participation was in Maharashtra (from 3.8 to
10%), followed by Haryana (from 4.7 to 9%) and Punjab (from 4.9 to 8.6%).
Gujarat is an exception to this trend, as there was a decline in the participation of
rural households (from 12.5 to 9.4%) during the last 4 years.
In the case of eight states reporting medium level of participation during the
entire period of analysis, some interesting trends emerge. Some states, which were
classiﬁed as medium rural participation states improved their status by moving to
the next category of high participation states over time. These states are Kerala,
Jammu and Kashmir and Uttarakhand. On the contrary, states, such as Bihar,
Assam and Karnataka reported a decline in participation, while Odisha and Uttar
Pradesh reported a consistent level of rural participation during the two periods.
States with higher levels of participation such as Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand and
Madhya Pradesh, reported a decline in their participation rates during 2011–12 to
2014–15, while Himachal Pradesh and West Bengal reported an increase compared
to the ﬁrst 5-year period.
Amongst the three states reporting very high participation, estimates for Tamil
Nadu doubled from 32 to 65% between the two time periods, while Rajasthan
reported a decline by about 10% and Chhattisgarh reported a marginal increase
from 52 to 53%.
13.3.2 MGNREGA—Poverty Nexus Across States
Is there a correspondence between the level of poverty and extent of participation in
MGNREGA? The results are presented in Table 13.3 and are quite revealing. We
note that MGNREGA, which has an ultimate objective of reducing poverty by
providing employment especially to the very poor rural households, does not seem
to have resulted in improving the situation in terms of high participation in case of
the states with high incidence of poverty.
Of the four states with very high levels of poverty (above 45%), Chhattisgarh is
the only state that has correspondingly very high participation of rural households
in MGNREGA. In comparison, Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh have high (but not
very high) levels of participation and Odisha medium level of participation in
MGNREGA.
Interestingly, the state of Gujarat with high levels of poverty has very low level
of participation in the programme. The proportion of households depending upon
MGNREGA is also disproportionately low in states like Assam, Bihar and Uttar
Pradesh despite high levels of poverty. West Bengal shows a close correspondence
between high levels of poverty and high participation in the programme.
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Maharashtra with medium poverty incidence reports very low participation in
the programme while Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu that are clubbed in the same
poverty category have very high participation in the programme.
At the other end of the spectrum, of the seven states with low levels of poverty
(below 15%) two states, Haryana and Punjab are also quite distinct in that there is
correspondingly low level of participation in the programme. However, despite low
incidence of poverty, Andhra Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh show high partici-
pation rates in MGNREGS while Jammu & Kashmir, Kerala and Uttarakhand
report medium levels of participation.
Overall, the data contradicts the postulated relationship and raises questions of
whether supply side issues of State capacity and willingness to support MGNREGA
works persist or whether there are demand-side issues such as delayed payments
that lead to such contradictory relationships.
We further discuss the lack of correspondence between level of poverty and
MGNREGA participation by examining the trends in expenditure in MGNREGA
and the relative share of the states in the cumulative expenditure and poverty over
time. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 13.4.
It may be seen from Table 13.4 that the share of low participation states was the
lowest in the cumulative expenditure on MGNREGA in both the periods, i.e. 3.32%
during 2006–07 to 2010–11 and 7.12% during 2011–12 to 2015–16. On the other
hand, these groups of states accounted for almost 12% of the total BPL population
at the national level. The other categories of states with medium to very high levels
of MGNREGA participation had reported a notable increase in the expenditure on
MGNREGA activities over time. Though the low participation states reported
almost a 30-fold increase in the cumulative expenditure on MGNREGA, the
average amount of cumulative expenditure incurred by these states was much lower
than in the categories of states with medium to very high levels of participation in
the programme. For instance, during the period 2011–12 to 2015/16, the cumulative
average MGNREGS expenditure of low participation states was Rs. 63.29 crore, as
Table 13.3 Correspondence between poverty and level of participation in MGNREGS across
states, 2006–07 to 2014–15
Poverty level State level participation of rural households in MGNREGA (%)
Very low
(0–14%
Medium (15–29%) High (30–44%) Very high
(>45%)
Very high
(45% or more)
– Odisha Jharkhand, Madhya
Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
High (30–
45%)
Gujarat Bihar, Uttar Pradesh,
Assam
West Bengal
Medium (15–
30%)
Maharashtra Karnataka – Rajasthan,
Tamil Nadu
Low (15%
below)
Haryana,
Punjab
Jammu & Kashmir,
Kerala, Uttarakhand
Andhra Pradesh,
Himachal Pradesh
–
SourceAuthors’ compilation based on data accessed from theMGNREGA portal, www.nrega.nic.in
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compared to Rs. 277.66 crore in case of very high participation states, Rs.
246.5 crore in respect of high participation states and Rs. 127.7 crore in case of
medium participation states. Thus, it seems that the states had shown distinct
variations in terms of implementing the programmes under MGNREGS with thin
distribution of resources in the case of the low participation states.
13.3.3 Drought and MGNREGA Participation
We now turn to another important question, ‘whether the incidence of drought
conditions would have a bearing on MGNREGA participation across states?’ One
may anticipate that a decline in rainfall or the sudden occurrence or continued
prevalence of drought conditions may increase the level of participation in
MGNREGA. In this regard, we have examined the trends in fluctuations in rainfall
(normal and drought year) and participation in MGNREGA in the corresponding
year across the 20 states over the 9-year period (Table 13.5).
States responded differently to the changing rainfall situations (see Table 13.5).
The deviation from normal rainfall ranged from 11 to 100% during the drought
year. Data pertaining to the severity of drought conditions that prevailed in the
states is presented in column 5 of the Table. The year in which drought was
experienced varied across states. However, there are no clear patterns across states
with regard to participation in MGNREGA and occurrence of drought.
In many states, the normal rainfall years have reported signiﬁcant participation in
the programme especially in the case of states with medium, high and very high
participation rates. On the other hand, the response to ameliorating distress during
the drought period through participation in MGNREGA varied signiﬁcantly across
states. For instance, the work participation levels have been notably weaker in case
of low participation states (as low as 5.7% in Haryana), while it doubled to over
70% among very high participation states such as Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu.
However, even in this category, participation in MGNREGA declined from 54.3%
Table 13.4 Share of states in expenditure on MGNREGA and population below poverty line
Level of
participation
Cumulative expenditure (Rs. Crore) Share in poverty (%
of rural population—
BPL)
2006/07 to 2010/11 2011/12 to 2015/16 2004/05 2011/12
Low 10.71 (3.32) 316.46 (7.12) 12.27 11.94
Medium 53.87 (33.39) 638.49 (28.74) 52.26 52.86
High 91.34 (35.38) 1232.48 (34.67) 23.67 23.23
Very high 98.38 (22.86) 1388.31 (23.44) 10.66 10.72
Note The ﬁgures in brackets indicate the relative share of the respective groups of states. The
ﬁgures covers only 20 states as listed in Table 13.2
Source Authors’ estimates based on MGNREGA data and rural poverty estimated by the
Rangarajan Committee
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to 49.2% in Chhattisgarh. Several other states have reported reasonably high levels
of work participation during the drought years as well (Fig. 13.1).
Thus, while the extent of participation in MGNREGA during normal rainfall
years has been quite signiﬁcant across the medium, high and very high participation
states, the participation during drought years does not seem to be quite signiﬁcant
across states with very few exceptions of Maharashtra (in low participation cate-
gory), Kerala and Uttarakhand (medium participation states). The levels of
MGNREGA participation have been notably high in respect of states with high and
very high participation rates (Figs. 13.2 and 13.3).
The lack of correspondence between drought and MGNREGA participation as
evident from many states, especially in states with low and medium participation
needs to be corroborated in terms of two major factors. First, there could be a time
lag in identifying the drought-hit areas, planning and implementing the programme
supported with allocation of the necessary ﬁnancial resources. Since the ﬁnancial
allocations are to be made by the central government (MoRD) and the state gov-
ernments or the implementing agencies often do not have the necessary resources,
the delays in implementation are quite natural as commonly observed in several
studies on MGNREGA in particular. Second, the choice of activities undertaken
also may have a bearing on participation.
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13.3.4 MGNREGA and the Marginalised Groups
One of the important observations emerging from a large number of studies on
MGNREGA (including the chapters in this volume) is that the programme has led
to increased participation by the vulnerable social groups, i.e. SCs, STs households
and women. Hence, this subsection examines the status and trends in participation
of the marginalised social groups in MGNREGA.
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The statewise scenario of participation of marginalised groups, viz. SC, ST and
women in MGNREGA is presented in Table 13.6. Participation of women in
MGNREGA was high in several States with the highest levels being report as
91.4% in Kerala and 80% in Tamil Nadu. However, participation was very low at
20% in Uttar Pradesh, 29% in Bihar and 16% in Jammu and Kashmir—lower than
the nationally stipulated norm of 33%. The share of SCs was highest at 58.6% in
Punjab, 42.1% in Haryana and 43.5% in Uttar Pradesh. Person days among STs
were highest in Madhya Pradesh (40.4%) and Jharkhand (38.6%).
Among states with low household participation, the presence of SC and ST
households (as expressed by their combined share) was very high in Punjab (77%)
and Gujarat (54%), followed by Haryana (42%) and Maharashtra (36%).
Participation of women was also high in these states, with the highest percentage
reported from Gujarat (45%), followed by Maharashtra (44%), Punjab (41%) and
Haryana (37%).
In the case of states with medium levels of participation by rural households in
MGNREGA, the extent of participation was highest for SCs/STs in Odisha (59%),
followed by Uttar Pradesh (48%), Bihar (42%) and Assam (40%), etc. It was also
noticed that within the SC/ST categories, the relative share of the ST households
was the highest in Odisha (36%) and Assam (30%). Similarly, the states that had
higher participation of SC households in MGNREGA were Uttar Pradesh (43.5%),
followed by Bihar (37%) and Odisha (22%). The percentage of women’s partici-
pation in MGNREGA in case of medium participation states was extremely high in
Kerala (91%), followed by Karnataka (44%), Uttarakhand (43%), and Odisha
(36%).
In the case of states with high levels of rural participation in MGNREGA, the
combined share of SC and ST was notably high for Madhya Pradesh (59.5%),
closely followed by Jharkhand (57%) and West Bengal (46%) while it was 39% in
Andhra Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. More than half of those who participated in
MGNREGA work were women in Andhra Pradesh (57.5%) and Himachal Pradesh
(51.6%).
In the three states with very high levels of rural participation in MGNREGA, the
combined share of SC/ST was only half (51–52%). The relative share of ST
households beneﬁting from the programme was high in Chhattisgarh (35%) and
Rajasthan (27%), while the share of SC households was the highest in Tamil Nadu
(35%). The extent of women’s participation was the highest in Tamil Nadu (80%),
followed by Rajasthan (68%) and Chhattisgarh (46.36%).
Thus, from the above analysis of the status of participation by the major social
groups in MGNREGA, it may be concluded that the combined share of SC/ST
households was the highest in states with low, high and very high participation of
households in MGNREGA, while the extent of women’s participation was extre-
mely high in states with very high levels of participation (Fig. 13.4). Three states
reported extremely high levels of women’s participation, viz. Kerala (91%), fol-
lowed by Tamil Nadu (80%) and Rajasthan (68%). The states with low level of
MGNREGA participation also indicated a greater share of SC and ST households in
the MGNREGA compared to other states.
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Based on the above analysis, it may be noted that a larger proportion of social
groups, such as SC and ST were able to beneﬁt in states such as Punjab, Haryana
and Gujarat, where the overall household participation was lower. The proportion
of SC/ST households beneﬁting from the MGNREGA was also seen to be highest
across states with medium and high levels of MGNREGA participation, such as
Odisha, Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Chhattisgarh,
Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu. Notably, these states also reported higher percentages
of ST households being beneﬁted under the programme. It was also observed that a
higher proportions of SC households beneﬁted from the programme in Punjab,
Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Bihar and Tamil Nadu. Thus, it may be
concluded that the MGNREGA has been signiﬁcant in reaching out to the mar-
ginalised social groups in most states. However, an important question here is
whether the state-supported interventions such as MGNREGA would reduce (if not
ameliorate) the existing class differences based on the socio-economic categories?
Or, do such State-supported programmes lead to further deepening or perpetuating
the existing differences? This is a major challenge needing further discussions as to
how the state support could be recast to bring about equity across social groups on
par with the mainstream groups.
13.4 MGNREGA: Challenges and Way Forward
From the foregoing analysis, it emerges that though MGNREGA has signiﬁcantly
contributed towards improving the status of the rural households, the programme is
beset with many challenges. In what follows, we discuss some of the pertinent
challenges that MGNREGA needs to address.
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13 The Journey of MGNREGA: Changing Approaches and Challenges 327
In order to overcome some of the major constraints as well as to achieve greater
success in implementation of MGNREGA, ‘convergence planning’ was introduced
in 2009 by the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD), Government of India. It
was anticipated that the efforts towards inter-sectoral convergence of development
programmes would lead to not only optimum utilisation of public funds but also
maximum returns on the public investments along with rise in employment, wages
and earnings. Convergence planning is thought to help bring all the developmental
programmes in one single implementation package, as also discussed in chapters by
Mishra and Mishra; and by Adusumilli and Chaudhary (in this volume). However,
it is not clear ‘whether the MGNREG programme has made any dramatic impact on
the livelihoods when implemented in convergence with other rural development
programmes’.
The Report of the First Common Review Mission (2016a) constituted by the
Ministry of Rural Development to review the implementation of rural development
programmes in eight States observed ‘strong scheme convergence’ in some states
while others need to plan better for convergence.5
In Mayurbhanj district in Odisha, the CRM team found signiﬁcant efforts to
enable sustainable livelihoods through convergence of MGNREGA with schemes
and funds from line departments. There is convergence of MGNREGA with hor-
ticulture plantation, with Anganwadi centres/ICDS in using MGNREGA labour to
construct Anganwadis, with agriculture, through dug wells, ponds, check dams,
etc., to enable increased crop yields, with animal husbandry through construction of
goat sheds and azola pits and with NRLM in growing and developing sabai grass
products. MGNREGS work has been used for setting up bamboo fences for schools
in Jashipur block, Mayurbhanj as also to dig stagger trenches between cashew
plantations to stop the wastage of rainwater and reduce soil erosion in Jashipur
block in Mayurbhanj.6
While the convergence initiatives are yet to get a wider adoption across states, it
has been found that the states, which have incorporated convergence planning in
implementation of programmes, focus more attention on schemes such as rural
sanitation, works on individual lands and rural connectivity. The success of con-
vergence initiatives requires active participation of the relevant line departments
and other stakeholders in planning, management and execution of the works. More
speciﬁcally, in the absence of coordinated efforts by the participating agencies and
proper integration of works, convergence initiatives may fail to deliver the desired
outcomes, particularly in respect of creation of quality public assets and thereby
employment generation.
5Ministry of Rural Development (2016a).
6Ministry of Rural Development (2016b).
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The next important and perhaps a daunting challenge is to have more inclusive
strategies in the employment guarantee programme, speciﬁcally targeting the rural
youth. As has emerged from several studies, the inclusive nature of the programme
currently is largely constrained by the non-participation of a vast segment of the
rural youth in MGNREGA, who consider that the programme does not rise to their
aspirations. Two points merit attention here. First, though MGNREGA had made
signiﬁcant positive impacts on rural wages (see also chapter by Narayanamoorthy
et al., this volume), in many states, especially, Kerala, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh,
Haryana, Karnataka, Bihar, Rajasthan, West Bengal, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand,
the MGNREGA notiﬁed wages are lower than the minimum wages for unskilled
agricultural work, which acts as a major obstacle in attracting workers, especially
the youth, who often prefer migrating to urban areas in search of high wages.
Second, the proﬁle of the existing works is such that they neither warrant using
technical skills nor provide avenues for learning new skills or technical expertise.
The results emerging from a recent study by NCAER7 (Desai et al. 2015) are
quite revealing in this regard. Based on data gathered on age groupwise trends in
participation of workers (in the age group 15–59 years) in MGNREGA and other
agricultural and non-agricultural activities of the rural households, it was found that
the extent of participation in MGNREGA among male workers in the age group of
15–29 years was 22.3% and hardly 13% in case of female workers. Whereas, the
extent of participation of these age groups in agricultural labour activity was 45%
for males and 33% for females. The proportion of male workers reported to be
engaged in non-agricultural activities was 62% among males. Quite interestingly,
an overwhelming proportion of these age groups prefers to be nonworking (prefer
leisure for work) than working in MGNREGA.
This leads to the next important issue of women’s economic empowerment due
to MGNREGA. Obviously, almost all the studies on MGNREGA highlight its
positive impact on signiﬁcantly increasing the participation of women in the pro-
gramme. As observed by Desai et al. (2015), about 45% of female MGNREGA
workers were either not working or worked only on a family farm during 2004–05,
i.e. before MGNREGA was launched. This signiﬁes that the programme has given
the ﬁrst opportunity to almost half of the rural working women to enter the
MGNREGA labour market and earn cash income, which had signiﬁcantly enhanced
their self-esteem, power within the household and control over resources (Pankaj
and Tankha 2010; Narayanan and Das 2014; Viswanathan and Mandal 2012; Desai
et al., 2015).
The gender dynamism in MGNREGA as reported from many states underscores
the need for scaling up the programme as an effective instrument for gender
mainstreaming in India, though with variations across states. However, there are
several challenges that the country may face in order to transform the MGNREGA
7The NCAER study was quite unique in terms of its coverage and methodology adopted. It
surveyed 26,000 rural households that were interviewed twice, once in 2004–05 before
MGNREGA’s passage and again in 2011–12, after the programme had been extended nationwide.
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as an effective instrument for gender mainstreaming. An important challenge is how
to revamp the programme especially in states with lower women’s participation so
as to create more work and employment opportunities for including women. It also
calls for policies and interventions to adequately address the innate structural
inﬁrmities/problems of the MGNREGS that restrain women’s participation in the
scheme in states with low levels of women work participation.
Perhaps, this takes us to the earlier discussion on the importance of skill building
as an integral aspect of employment guarantee programme as cautioned by Dantwala
(1978), who argued that skill-based workers could command much higher wages.
This calls for recasting the MGNREGA activities to attract more rural youth. In this
regard, mention may be made of some of the new initiatives of the national gov-
ernment, such as the Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana8 as well as the Make in
India9 initiative. Nevertheless, the scope and relevance of these initiatives are yet to
be explored in terms of integrating MGNREGA with these initiatives.
Yet another challenge is taking the MGNREGA to the contours of economic and
social development rather than approaching it merely from an employment guarantee
programme viewpoint. This is all the more important given the fact that the wage
gains (earnings) from MGNREGA do not get translated into poverty reduction on a
signiﬁcant scale due to the simultaneous causation of food price inflation as argued by
some10 (Ghose 2012; Kannan and Jain 2013). Moreover, it may also be noted that the
wage earnings realised fromMGNREGA are also too meagre to make any signiﬁcant
dent on reduction of household vulnerability and poverty. The drastic decline in the
number of average person days of employment per household especially since 2010–
11 also would have signiﬁcantly weakened the influence of wage earnings in
reducing or even minimising the poverty burden on the household.
In fact, MGNREGA interventions assume greater signiﬁcance in the heightened
context of distress induced by persistent drought in rural areas. This raises an
important issue as to ‘whether MGNREGA should also continue as a drought relief
measure in the drought-hit areas’. By virtue of the notiﬁcation by the Ministry of
Rural Development (MoRD), the drought-hit areas are entitled to get 50 additional
days of employment from the existing 100-day mark11. But, this is a real challenge
8The objective of this skill certiﬁcation and reward scheme is to enable and mobilise a large
number of Indian youth to take up outcome-based skill training and become employable and earn
their livelihoods.
9The ‘Make in India’ initiative launched by the Government of India to promote manufacturing in
25 sectors of the economy shall lead to job creation and consequently generate need for skilled
manpower.
10The surge in inflation during recent years had curtailed considerably the magnitude of real
beneﬁts to be gained from the NREG (Kannan and Jain 2013: 51).
11The MoRD moved a Cabinet note to expand the scope of MGNREGA by extending the number
of annual work entitlement days from 100 to 150 in areas to be declared drought-affected by the
respective state governments. This comes in the wake of a prospective monsoon failure for a
second consecutive year as forecasted by India Meteorological Department (IMD). Expansion of
the work entitlement days by 50 stems from the concern that there would be greater demand for
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as currently only 4% of the employed households are able to get 100 days of
employment (during 2014–15) due to either rationing of work or lack of availability
of work. Even when the programme was at its peak of success, only 14% of the
rural households had 100 days of work (during 2008–09), which had declined to
10% and remained at that level until 2013–14. This calls for revisiting the pro-
gramme and the implementation strategies to make them much more sensitive to the
drought-affected regions as a measure of livelihood security and distress mitigation.
That said, the challenges are serious, as the vibrancy and sustainability of the
programme invariably depends on the ﬁnancial strength of the implementing
agencies (national and state governments).
Last but not least, focussing on the links between right to work (realised through
MGNREGA), ecology and health, there is no doubt that these three aspects of
overall human development, especially among poor, have to get integrated in the
next phase of development. The speciﬁc question that needs immediate under-
standing is to know the macro-micro level interactions in rural India. In the absence
of this, it may lead to ‘double-discrimination’ of the rural poor who are still waiting
to become an important part of the development process.
From a future perspective, MGNREGA should take into consideration the
multifunctional nature of the impact that the assets, related mainly to natural
resources, are expected to generate, especially, if initiated through a developmental
mode. The various facets of the impact may thus, include not only income and
employment, but also larger developmental objectives such as environmental sus-
tainability, intra-village equity and building of institutional capacities through
democratic decentralisation.
(Footnote 11 continued)
wage-related work in drought-affected districts. Further, it will be applicable to only those
households which complete 100 days of work.
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Annex 4: Normal and Drought Year % Deviation
from Normal
State Name Normal
Year
Normal year
(rainfall) % Dep
Drought
year
Drought Year
(rainfall) % Dep
Andhra
Pradesh
2010–11 43.6 2006–07 −39.9
Assam 2012–13 −12.6 2014–15 −24.6
Bihar 2007–08 18.8 2012–13 9.8
Chhattisgarh 2013–14 10.7 2009–10 −36.3
Gujarat 2010–11 44.8 2012–13 −40.2
Haryana 2008–09 9.8 2012–13 −100.1
Himachal
Pradesh
2013–14 16.4 2009–10 −35.5
Jammu And
Kashmir
2013–14 20.0 2009–10 −34.2
Jharkhand 2007–08 5.9 2010–11 −39.2
Karnataka 2009–10 16.1 2012–13 −11.3
Kerala 2007–08 17.2 2012–13 −25.2
Madhya
Pradesh
2013–14 36.3 2007–08 −50.1
Maharashtra 2010–11 21.9 2012–13 −11.4
Odisha 2006–07 20.7 2011–12 −33.4
Punjab 2008–09 7.6 2012–13 −20.6
Rajasthan 2013–14 35.9 2009–10 −83.4
Tamil Nadu 2008–09 30.0 2012–13 −27.4
Uttar Pradesh 2013–14 6.8 2014–15 −25.6
Uttarakhand 2010–11 19.4 2009–10 −37.7
West Bengal 2013–14 15.7 2014–15 −16.3
Source India Metrological Department
Note Rainfall of Andhra Pradesh includes Coastal Andhra Pradesh + Telengana + Rayalaseema
Rainfall of Uttar Pradesh includes East Uttar Pradesh + West Uttar Pradesh
Rainfall of Gujarat includes Gujarat Region + Saurashtra & Kutch
Rainfall of West Bengal includes Sub-Himalayan West Bengal + Sikkim + Gangetic West Bengal
Rainfall of Haryana includes Chandigarh + Delhi
Rainfall of Maharashtra includes Madhya Maharashtra + Marathwada + Vidarbha
Rainfall of Madhya Pradesh includes East Madhya Pradesh + West Madhya Pradesh
Rainfall of Rajasthan includes East Rajasthan + West Rajasthan
Rainfall of Karnataka includes Coastal Karnataka + North Interior + South Interior
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Glossary
Local terms specific to India
Angan Wadi Centre (AWC) It is a part of the Indian public healthcare system,
providing basic nutrition and healthcare activities in lowest tier of Indian vil-
lages. Its basic nutrition and healthcare service includes contraceptive coun-
selling and supply, nutrition education and supplementation, pre-school nutrition
and care to children in rural India
Gram Panchyat are at the bottom of the three-tier organisation of Panchayati Raj.
Gram Panchayats for a village or group of villages were established earlier
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Index
A
Aadhaar numbers, 74
Ability to negotiate the duration of the working
day, 98
Absence of alternative growth paths, 26
Absolute terms, 236
Academicanalytical exercise, 309
Accelerate capacity building, 33
Acceptable Standard Schedule of Rates, 73
Action plans, 309
Activities, 251
Adaptation, 24
Additional investment, 259
Additional workforce, 87
Administrative delays, 14
Administrative mechanisms, 314
Administrative pressures, 111
Administrative reforms, 156
Administrative reorganisation, 228
Adverse production effect, 37
Afforestation and plantation, 267
Agencybased convergence, 293
Aggregate asset index, 238
Agrarian crisis, 157
Agrarian economy, 126
Agrarian transformation, 178
Agricultural commodities, 133
Agricultural labor market, 37, 80
Agricultural labour, 81, 168, 190, 277
Agricultural labour activity, 329
Agricultural labour operation, 80
Agricultural operations, 67
Agricultural output, 37
Agricultural productivity, 34, 37
Agricultural sector, 81, 155
Agricultural stagnation, 157
Agricultural wages, 37, 67, 80, 91, 92, 98, 109,
133, 219
Agricultural work in the afternoon, 95
Agriculture and allied activities, 85
Agriculture-related activities, 157
Agroclimatic subregions, 268
Agroecological restoration, 24, 304
Agroecology, 297
Agronomic practices, 295
Alcoholism, 204
Alleviation of poverty, 38
Allied services activities, 262
Allotment of works, 235
Allotment ratio, 228, 230
Allowed lighter tasks, 75
All-weather roads, 241
Ameliorate, 199
Analytical perspective, 309
Analyzes microlevel evidence, 266
Anicuts, 120
Annual budget allocation, 31
Annual fertiliser subsidies, 301
Annual income, 236
Antipoverty policies, 307
Apple harvesting season, 81
Application, 235
A.P State Employment Guarantee Council, 74
Area under cultivation, 94
Artiﬁcial labour shortage, 131
Aruna Sharma, 18
Asset creation, 175, 178, 183, 212
Asset ownership index, 23, 228
Associates, 75
Assured employment, 93
Assured minimum wages, 73
Attendance, 75
Autonomy, 203
Availability of employment, 284
Availability of labour, 133
Average expenditure propensities, 249
Average household income, 236
Average monthly income per capita, 316
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Average poverty line, 320
Average wage of casual workers, 131
Awareness about MGNREGS, 261
B
Backward and tribal districts, 167
Backward district, 93
Bandharas (storage), 313
Banks or post ofﬁce, 54
Barefoot engineers, 122
Bargaining power, 179
Bargaining power of migrant labour, 81
Bargaining power to agricultural labourers, 98
Basic entitlements, 71, 73, 269
Below Poverty Line (BPL), 190, 319
Beneﬁciary committee system, 204
Beneﬁciary households, 45, 62
Best-performing MGNREGA water assets, 20,
105, 106, 117, 118, 120
Better-off farmers, 126
Bhattarai, et al (2014), 13
Bidharwa region, 266
Biometrics, 74
BJP JD(S) alliance, 203
Block administration, 125
Boribandhs, 121
Bounded rationality, 178
BPL survey list, 33
Bureaucratic interventions, 34
Bureaucratic executive branch, 221
Business correspondent model, 240
C
Calculation of multiplier, 252
Cardamom and other spices cultivation, 215
Cash payment of wages, 39
Cash transfer programme, 122
Caste leaders or landlords, 211
Casual agricultural labourers, 307
Casual employment, 237
Cell phone, 74
Census town, 227
Central government, 323
Central Public Works Department, 217
Centre for Environment Concerns, 73
Cereal crops, 144
Chairman, 74
Chakraborty, 13
Challenges and way forward, 327
Changes in crop pattern, 292
Changes in wages, 80
Changing development priorities, 313
Changing facets, 24
Check dams, 120
Chemical load in products, 302
Childcare facilities at the worksite, 39
Christian migrants, 215
Chronically poor, 307
Chronic poverty, 266
Civil engineering, 122
Civil society, 34, 267
Class differences, 327
Cleaning of irrigation channels, 280
Clientelism, 204
Climate change, 266, 292
Climate uncertainties, 295
Climate vulnerability of rainfed agriculture,
295
Coefﬁcient matrix, 249
Coffee growing, 283
Collector of the District, 201
Combined harvesters for paddy harvesting in
Pondicherry, 82
Command Area Development & Water
Management (CAD&WM), 84
Commensurate, 72
Commercial Plantation, 186
Commission, 73
Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices
(CACP), 134
Commissioner of Punjab Agriculture, 81
Commodities, 251
Common Pool Resources (CPR), 114
Common pool services, 301
Common village property, 214
Communalism, 204
Communist party of india (M), 226
Community based organizations, 72
Community Development Programme (CDP),
3
Community evaluation of project, 184
Community level beneﬁts, 283
Community resource persons, 303
Community score cards, 33
Comparative economic prosperity, 236
Comparative perspective, 310
Comptroller and Auditor General
(CAG) report, 33
Congress JD(S) alliance, 203
Congress led UDF, 215
Connectivity to input and output markets, 126
Constitutionally guarantee, 246
Construction of all weather roads, 239
Construction of animal shelter, 239
Consumer durable assets, 238
Consumer price index for agricultural labour,
156
Consumer price index for rural labour, 77
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Consumer Price Index of Agricultural Labour
(CPIAL) deflator, 134
Consumption assets, 238
Consumption expenditure, 36
Consumption of food, 93
Contractor driven mode, 212
Contractors, 39
Control of corruption, 36
Convergence, 308
Convergence guidelines, 291
Convergence initiatives, 183, 192, 195, 328
Convergence intervention, 190
Convergence models, 184
Convergence of various development
programmes, 181
Convergence planning, 25, 176, 328
Convergence scheme, 239
Coordinated efforts, 328
Correlation coefﬁcient, 228
Corruption, 222
Cost of asset, 213
Cost of cultivation survey data, 21, 133, 148,
149
Creation of assets, 176
Creation of durable assets, 172, 304
Creation of ‘public goodservices’, 299
Creation of water bodies, 239
Crisis situation, 99, 132, 155, 199
Critical challenges, 309
Crop calendar, 84
Crop diversiﬁcation, 86
Cropping pattern, 133
Crop proﬁtability, 133
Crowding, 75
Cultivation of the project (cost c2), 137, 138,
142
Cultivators, 190
Cumulative expenditure, 320
D
Daily productivity norm, 218
Daily wages, 73
Dalit parties, 205
Dalits, adivasis, 14, 71, 315
Debt burden, 36
Decade long, 309
Deceleration, 78
Decentralised decision making, 294
Decline in rainfall, 320
Delayed payment of wages, 35
Demand constrained, 249
Demand driven programme, 261
Demand based investments, 294
Demand-driven, 33
Demographic and socioeconomic mix, 232
Department of EGS and Water Conservation,
160
Department of Rural Development (DoRD),
291
Depletion of groundwater, 86
Deprived sections, 32
Derivatives of works related to soil and water
conservation, 292
Desai, Vasistha, and Joshi, 10, 13, 14, 17, 310,
315, 329
Desilting, 9, 283, 285
Destination market, 261
Determinants of participation, 36
Deterrent to development, 225
Developmental dynamics, 309
Developmental mode, 331
Developmental plans and welfare initiatives,
229
Development process, 331
Development programmes, 308
Development report, 13
Devolution, 179
Devolution of responsibilities, 33
DFID, 202
Diesel-saving, 120
Difference-in-difference evaluation technique,
14
Differential impact of MGNREGA, 19, 31,
268, 269, 272, 275, 281, 315
Differential in income, 236
Dilapidated tube-well room, 81
Direct Beneﬁt Transfer (DBT), 74
Direct Beneﬁt Transfer (DBT) districts, 97
Direct poverty reduction programmes, 310
Directive Principles of State Policy, 308
Disadvantaged groups, 309
Disincentivising participation in MGNREGS,
219
Dissipated the momentum, 313
Distress migration, 85, 114, 316, 331
District headquarters, 167, 227
District level rural development ofﬁcials, 74
District Programme Ofﬁcer, 201
District programme coordinator, 38
Divergence between actual and ideals, 214
Diversity in production systems, 295
Divisional level postal ofﬁcials, 74
DMK and AIADMK, 204
Dominant agrarian class, 313
Door-to-door survey, 33
Double discrimination, 331
Drinking water, 283
Drought, 157
Index 349
Drought affected regions, 331
Drought conditions, 320
Drought prooﬁng, 46, 281, 291
Drought prooﬁng and water conservation, 207
Drought relief programme, 310
Drought years, 323
Drought-hit areas, 323, 330
Drought relief measure, 330
Drudgery, 95
Drudgery work, 285
Dry land agriculture, 261
Dry land states, 266
Dry land villages, 94
Dual mode of work, 95
Durable assets, 159, 292
Dynamics of rural economies, 71
Dysfunctional, 118
Dysfunctional bore, 295
E
E-check measurement, 74
Ecological regeneration, 22
Economic agents, 249
Economically inactive middle class women,
112
Economically productive, 310
Economic diversiﬁcation, 313
Economic Survey of India, 157
Effectively function, 33
Effectiveness, 9, 17, 33, 34, 45, 72, 186, 226,
310, 315
Efﬁcient management, 172
Electronic Fund Management System (eFMS),
16, 74
Eleventh plan, 155
Elite capture, 35
Embankments (ahar), 118
E-measurement, 74
Employment, 1–26, 32–46, 54, 59–62, 65–67,
71, 72, 74, 78–81, 84, 86–94, 97–99,
103, 104, 110, 118, 121, 125, 126,
131–138, 141, 142, 144–146, 149, 150,
156–162, 167, 169–172, 175, 177, 180,
181, 187, 193, 195, 199, 209, 213, 226,
227, 229, 237, 245–248, 253–255, 257,
259, 261, 262, 265–280, 283–285, 291,
294, 297–299, 301–304, 307–318,
328–334
Employment alternatives, 32
Employment and environmentally sustainable
works, 316
Employment ﬁrst, 266
Employment generation, 246, 302
Employment generation at higher wage rates,
302
Employment growth, 26, 72
Employment Guarantee, 1–6, 15, 16, 21, 23,
24, 26, 31, 68, 71, 72, 74, 80, 99, 103,
131–133, 156–158, 175, 199, 246, 267,
292, 307–310, 330
Employment guarantee programme, 330
Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS), 80
Employment intensive production, 304
Employment level, 158
Employment multiplier value, 259
Employment-reduced migration, 86
Employment security, 285
Employment, wages and earnings, 71, 328
Empowering rural women, 265
Empowerment, 127
Empowerment and employment generation,
308
Empowerment of the rural poor, 32
E-muster system, 74
Enabling Sustainable Agriculture Transitions,
299
Encrustation of the surface, 300
Endogenous accounts, 249
Endogenous and exogenous variables, 249
Engineering consultant, 74
Engineering Staff College of India, 73
Enrollment of children, 68
Entitlements of a worker, 314
Environmental and ecosystem impacts, 315
Environmental flow, 297
Environmental protection, 4
Environmental services, 292
Environmental sustainability, 331
Equal level of wages, 72
Equity aspect, 227
Evolution of employment generation
programmes, 3
Excavation of tanks, 189
Executive orders, 204
Extend centralised services to make sustainable
agriculture practices, 299
Extra area effect, 99
Extra purchasing power, 64, 66, 68
Extra worker and extra employment effect, 97
F
Factors, 251
Factors of production, 249
Failure of markets, 178
Fair in time measurement, 72
Fairness of rates, 72
350 Index
Fallback employment source, 32
Fallow and rainfed lands, 94
Fallow lands, 85
Family farm, 329
Family size, 36
Farm and non-farm sector, 246
Farm labour scarcity, 292
Farm labour scarcity for key operations, 302
Farming communities, 90
Farm-owners, 81
Farm wage rate, 132
Feasibility studies, 217
Female agriculture wages, 98
Field survey, 167
Financial resources, 323
Financial strength, 331
Financial year, 31, 265
Fiscal transfers, 179
Fish production, 24, 192, 296, 303, 304
Fixation of wages, 72
Fixed schedule twice a month, 74
Flagship programme, 308
Flagship social security programme, 103
Flood control, 280
Flood control and flood protection, 207
Flood protection works, 239
Flow of services and inputs across agriculture
and livestock systems, 295
Fluctuations in rainfall, 320
Focus Group Discussions (FGDS), 89, 200,
268, 269
Focus on labour, 294
Foodgrain crops, 21, 134, 146, 148
Food production, 67
Food security, 32, 67, 156, 247
Food security army, 302
Forest Right Act, 9
Four levels of rural participation, 317
Fulﬁlment, 71, 269, 308
Fund utilization, 38
Future course, 309
Future perspective, 331
G
Gainful employment, 308
Gangetic belt, 82
Gap-provisioning, 302
Gender and caste-related, 75
Gender and social inclusion, 266
Gender dynamism, 329
Gender mainstreaming, 330
Gender neutral wages, 31
Generating productive assets, 265
Generation of employment, 172
Geographical advantages, 227
Geography-based convergence, 293
Global human, 13
Global Positioning System (GPS), 217
Good governance, 226
Government of Andhra Pradesh, 73
Government of India, 200, 308
Government of India census, 254
Government of Maharashtra, 307
Government Orders/Department Circulars, 292
Government welfare programmes, 237
Government determined minimum wage rate,
106
GPS based measurement of wages, 218
Gram, Block and District Panchayats, 199
Gram Panchayat (GP), 33, 54, 172, 179, 188
Gram Panchayat President, 202
Gram Panchayat Secretary, 201
Gram Sabha, 39, 200
Gramsevak, 170
Grass root mobilisation, 313
Grass roots, 201
Grass roots movements, 313
‘Green’ and ‘Decent’, 316
Green revolution, 296
Gross cost of cultivation, 139
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 155
Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP), 176
Groundwater depletion, 295
Groundwater irrigation, 118
Groundwater recharge, 120
Groundwater table, 86
Group basedworks, 75
Group discussion, 32, 116
Growing shift towards piece rate or contract
work, 98
Gujjar, 75
H
Harkhetkopaani, 127
Healthcare facilities, 237
Heavy downpour, 283
Heavy subsidies to harvesting machines, 82
Heterogeneous mix of tribal and nontribal
population, 225
High and low productivity states, 21, 134–136
High area with high productivity, 21
High area with low productivity, 21
Higher participation of the people in gram
sabhas and Gram Panchayats, 203
Higher wage employment, 81
Higher wage levels, 272
Higher wages, 81, 87, 116
High levels of poverty, 318
Index 351
High participation, 320
High-performing assets, 127
High population growth, 246
High productivity (HAHP) states, 21
Hike in wages, 117
Hiring the labour forces, 90
Historical discourse, 309
Horticultural linked EGS, 159
Horticulture crops, 181
Horticulture/forest plantation, 239
Household consumption, 68
Household income, 236
Households, 251, 252
Human resource base, 294
100 days of employment, 45
I
ICAR, 176
ICRISAT, 13
ICRISAT–VDSA, 254
Identiﬁcation of households, 39
IFPRI, 13
Illegal presence of contractors, 35
Impact, 257
Impact of convergence, 189
Implementation and the outcomes of
MGNREGA, 308
Implementations, 89, 204, 240
Implementation strategies, 331
Implementing agencies, 26, 219, 331
Improved worksite facilities, 116
Improvement in working conditions, 81
Imputed value of family labor cost (cost c2),
133
Incentive problem, 220
Incidence of poverty, 318
Incidence of seasonal out-migration, 86
Inclusive growth, 308
Inclusiveness, 226, 228
Inclusive strategies, 329
Income and employment, 331
Increased welfare, 37
Increase in area cultivated, 86
Increasing costs of cultivation, 99
Increasing monetary inflow, 241
Incremental gross value, 127
Incubation of labour intensive local enterprises,
299
Independent agency, 73
Independent and skilled, 310
Indian Constitution, 6, 201
Indian Industries Association (IIA), 88
Indicative wage rate, 277
Indigenous systems, 118
Indirect impact, 259
Individual lands, 328
Industrial sector, 229
Ineffective targeting, 33
Inequality reduction, 308
Inflationary potential, 35
Inflation rate, 73, 277
Inflexible social norms, 35
Inflow of migrant labour, 113
Informal contractors, 213
Informally trained and hired, 122
Information Communication Technology
(ICT), 204
Infrastructure facilities, 133
Inherent diversity of natural resources in
rainfed areas, 296
Inordinate delay, 286
Input prices, 249
Insight, 90
Institute of Rural Management, Anand
(IRMA), 105
Institutional capacities, 331
Institutional dynamics, 189
Institutional failures, 178
Institutional framework, 178
Institutional measures, 72
Institution building and legislative reforms, 203
Institutions, 251
Instrumental, 315
Integral aspect, 330
Integrated in the next phase of development,
331
Integrated Rural Development Programme
(IRDP), 158
Integrated Tribal Development Agency
(ITDA), 186
Integrated Watershed Management Programme
(IWMP), 84
Intensity of crop cultivation, 133
Interaction meetings, 268
Interdisciplinary research methods, 19, 314
Interior tribal dominant parts, 240
Interlinkages effects, 248
International Centre for Research in SemiArid
Tropics, 18
International Water Management Institute
(IWMI), 105
Intersectoral approach, 293
Intersectoral convergence, 177
Intersectoral convergence of development
programmes, 328
Intersectoral linkages, 246–248, 255, 262
Intra-district performance, 231
Intra-village equity, 331
352 Index
Irrigation coverage to cropped area, 133
Irrigation potential, 118
Irrigation works, 34
J
Jat, 75
Jawahar (Dhadak) Sinchan Well Scheme, 159
Jhuliflora clearance, 215
Jhum cultivation, 229
Job cards, 200
Job guarantee scheme, 33
Job opportunities, 38
K
Kapildhara, 121
Kerala Congress (M), 215
Kerala State Planning Board, 203
Kharif and rabi seasons, 285
Kudumbashree, 125
L
Labor to material ratio, 14
Labour becoming lazy, 115
Labour budget, 239
Labour cost, 135
Labour cost to material cost, 212
Labour intensive agricultural operations, 125
Labour intensive components, 313
Labour intensive crops, 36, 135
Labour market, 81
Labour market participation, 315
Labour saving technologies, 98
Labour scarcity, 36
Labour shortage, 20, 80, 81, 111, 272
Labour supply, 36
Labour-surplus regions, 80
Lack of availability of work, 331
Lack of childcare facilities, 35
Lack of correspondence, 323
Lack of employment opportunities, 32
Land development, 169, 186, 208, 292
Land exchange, 114
Landless, 307
Landless and marginal farmers, 115
Landless population, 168
Landlords and industrialists, 204
Land ownership, 168
Land productivity, 85, 291
Landscape approach, 296
Large cost overruns, 214
Large farmers, 81
Larger coverage of rainfed geography, 294
LDF regime, 203
Leakages, 33, 34
Lean agricultural season, 67
Lean season of employment, 84
Legislative assembly, 225
Leontief input output matrix, 248
Less productivity-sensitive vis-à-vis the
residual market, 111
Liberalization policies, 246
Linear phenomenon, 86
Line departments, 85
Literacy rate, 229
Livelihood, 87
Livelihood activities, 90
Livelihood generation, 193, 194
Livelihood option, 167, 192
Livelihood security, 31, 62, 120
Livelihood strategy, 167
Livestock, 168
Local administration, 38
Local agro-ecology, 295
Local authority, 246
Local conditions, 93
Local economy, 72
Local elites and proxy members of the elites,
201
Local government, 251
Local government bodies, 199
Local institutions, 127
Local labour markets, 111
Local Public Works Department, 217
Local social audit mechanism, 217
Local water security, 126
Location-speciﬁc works, 294
Longer duration, 87
Longterm impacts, 309
Longterm strategies, 309
Loot for Work Programme, 33
Lower crop productivity, 157
Lower wage rates, 161
Low productivity sector, 247
Low wages, 115, 308
Low yields in agriculture, 86
M
Machinery, 39
Macromicro level interactions in rural India,
331
Maharashtra Employment Guarantee
Scheme (MEGS), 3
Maharashtra Employment Guarantee
Scheme (MEGS) Act, 157, 307
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), 72
Index 353
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), 156,
199
Mainstream groups, 327
Maintenance of assets, 36
Make in India, 330
Male-female differentials in agricultural wages,
98
Male-female wage differentials, 80
Male-female wage gap, 80, 98
Management Information System (MIS), 122,
226
Manage peak season agricultural labour
demand, 84
Mandal, 74
Mandal Programme, 74
Mandals (Blocks), 210
Manual measurement, 219
Manufacturing goods and services, 247
Marginal and small farmers, 86, 315
Marginal expenditure propensities, 249
Marginal farmers, 190
Marginalised social groups, 324
Marginalized communities, 120
Material to labour ratio, 260
Matrix, 253
Maximum returns, 328
Maximum value, 228
Mckinsey, 202
Measure of livelihood security, 331
Measure of social protection, 78
Mechanisation of sugarcane harvesting in
Maharashtra, 82
Mechanization, 80
Mechanization of paddy transplantation, 82
Medium and large farmers, 115
Medium participation, 320
Medium poverty incidence, 319
Medium to very high levels of MGNREGA
participation, 319
Mesolevel analysis, 267
MGNREGA, 226
MGNREGA administration, 124
MGNREGA in Convergence, 191, 194
MGNREGA intensity shock, 37
MGNREGA mates, 122
MGNREGA notiﬁed wages, 329
MGNREGA Sameeksha, 292
MGNREGA website, 309
MGNREGA work is lighter, 116
MGNREGA-labour market interactions, 105
MGNREGS calendar, 95
MGNREGS worker, 74
MGNREGS work in the forenoon, 95
Micro and macro settings, 314
Micro irrigation, 52
Micro irrigation works, 48, 170
Mid-Travancore region, 215
Migrant workers, 113
Migration, 261
Minimising the poverty burden on the
household, 330
Minimum guarantee of employment, 90
Minimum security of job, 90
Minimum value, 228
Minimum wages, 34, 73, 103, 218
Minimum wages act 1948, 272, 277
Minimum wages for unskilled agricultural
work, 329
Minimum wage work, 127
Ministry of rural development, 110, 268, 309
Model of governance, 38
Mode of payment, 73
Mohan kanda committee, 150
Monitoring, 314
Monthly per capita consumption expenditure,
316
Monthly per capita income, 36
MoRD, (2012), 10, 17, 132
MoRD, (2013), 10
MoRD, (2015), 11, 315
MoRD, (2016), 16
Most backward districts, 171
Most vulnerable social groups, 316
Multidisciplinary rapid survey of the works,
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Multifunctional nature, 331
Multilayered social audit, 267
Multiple livelihood options, 295
Multiplier effects, 259
Multiplier effects of the investment, 24
Multiplier impacts on village economy, 133
Multiplier matrix, 253
Muster rolls, 34, 54
N
National average, 77
National average wage rate per person day, 77
National democratic alliance government, 226
National economy, 72
National Food for Work Programme (NFFWP),
32
National government, 330
National Horticulture Mission (NHM), 190,
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National Mission for Micro Irrigation, 196
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
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National Rural Employment Programme
(NREP), 158
National Rural Livelihood Mission (NRLM),
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National Sample Survey (NSS), 37
Natural calamities, 90
Natural resource management, 31, 265
Natural resources, 331
Natural resources development, 292
NCAER, (2015), 329
NCEAR study, 14
Negative predictor, 35
New skills, 329
New wagefloor, 116
Ninth plan, 203
Non-agricultural activities, 81, 329
Non-agricultural work, 87
Non-drought years, 314
Non-durable materials, 219
Non-farm activities, 18, 172
Non-farm rural growth, 285
Non‐farm rural jobs, 131
Non-farm sector, 81
Non-ﬁnancial (barter) transactions, 248
Non-implementation of statutory minimum
wages, 80
Non-participants in MGNREGS, 92
Non-participation, 329
Non-permanent earth works, 239
Non-Pesticide Management (NPM) of insect
pests, 300
Non-possession, 228
Non-tribal district, 120
Non-wage beneﬁt, 126
Normal rainfall, 320
Northeastern states, 12
Number of average person days per household,
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Number of days of employment, 75
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